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Abstract 
This thesis generates insights into the re-conceptualisation and revaluation of industrial 
policy (IP) as a legitimate tool of economic policy in the context of developing countries. It 
draws upon what I call the New Industrial Policy (NIP) thinking, which is based on 
institutionalist and evolutionary economics concerned with both 'the innovation, learning 
and knowledge triad' and the spatialisation of IP. The NIP thinking asserts the importance 
of learning and innovation, the 'power of economies of association' and 'the power of 
place' as key sources of competitive advantage. These three propositions are evaluated 
through empirical research which is based on the Argentinean experience in light of the 
failure of the last neoliberal programme implemented in the country (1991-2001). 
Specifically, the research focuses on a regional economy in which there exists both a cluster 
of SMEs and a group of institutions concerned with firm competitiveness. 
This thesis makes three main contributions to re-conceptualise the NIP thinking in the 
context of economies affected by economic decline. First, it identifies key factors that 
explain why the learning and innovation economy has less relative importance in these 
economies (if compared with firms in more developed economies), by arguing that the 
learning and innovation require a minimal threshold of resources and accumulated 
capabilities that the SMEs in development countries often do not have. Secondly, it explains 
why the powers of place and the economies of associations are only marginally exploited by 
firms due to the marked influence of restrictions at micro-, meso- and macro-economic 
levels. Finally, despite these restrictions, this research reveals that some emerging processes 
of change in individual firms and institutions have recently occurred w^ich are in line with 
the assumptions forwarded by the NIP thinking. I conclude that in the interstices of the 
Argentine economic policy there is a case to consider the new IP ideas. 
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Introduction 
This research aims to generate both empirical and theoretical insights in order to rethink 
and revaluate the concept of industrial policy (IP) as a legitimate tool of economic policy. 
In particular, it evaluates in practice the relevance and viability of the 'New Industrial 
Policy' (NIP) thinking for developing countries, specifically in relation to Argentina, in the 
context of increasing globalisation and hegemony in the neo-liberal agenda for 
development. 
Overall, industrial policy has been absent from the agenda for development in Latin 
America since the early 1980s. A widespread 'consensus' emerged around market-led 
policies (notably, macroeconomic policy) as the unique way for economic growth. Contrary 
to expectations, the programs of adjustment and stmctural reforms implemented in 
Argentina have been fer from 'neutral', fevouring a marked increase of capital 
concentration and, as a result, a regressive distribution of wealth. The Argentinean case has 
demonstrated that the application of an extreme neo-liberal agenda not only has had 
considerable negative effects on the productive activity. It has resulted in increasing 
unemployment, social exclusion and, more recently (from the traumatic events of 
December 2001) social unrest, which are helping to discredit such a 'consensus'. This 
situation has however not brought about sustained efforts against the dominant economic 
model. 
Interestingly, in the 'fringes' of the Argentine political economy, a critical current of 
thought inspired by the New Industrial Policy thinking emerged through the 1990s and it is 
beginning to diffuse as praxis of industrial micro-policy. These micro-policies have 
primarily been targeted at boosting the competitive performance of SMEs through the 
provision of the so-called real services to firms (i.e. technological upgrading, consulting 
services and training programs). Public agencies and intermediate institutions have been 
established at national, regional and local levels in order to design, deliver and coordinate 
the supply of such services. However, they have rarely followed criteria to complement 
each other. In some cases, they have also aimed to promote both partnerships between 
public and private sectors and territorial mobilisation for local industrial development. This 
is the case of the Institute of Bonaerense Entrepreneurial Development, in the Province of 
Buenos Aires. 
I use the term New Industrial Policy to refer to those schools of thought which, draw upon 
institutional and evolutionary economics, -in particular literature on innovation, learning 
and knowledge, industrial strategy, socio-economies of development, governance and 
varied approaches in economic geography concerning with local and regional economic 
development-, are making critical contributions to redefining and reconceptualising the idea 
of IP. The NIP thinking asserts the end of the old national IP by arguing the relevance of 
'learning and innovation' in boosting competitiveness and the case for the 'power of 
economies of association' and 'the powers of place' as key sources of advantage in the new 
competitiveness. These three assertions represent the main conceptual research focus of this 
study. Accordingly, the NIP thinking claims the need for a conceptual and political shift 
towards more 'decentralised' and 'bottom-up-led' IP agendas and multi-agency schemes of 
political-economical governance to design, deliver and coordinate IP. It claims that regions 
and localities, when considered as 'social constructions', may become both platforms for 
policy design and agents for economic development. The small- and medium-size firms, a 
varied set of inter-firm arrangements (i.e. groups of firms and industrial clusters) and extra-
firm actors and institutions with which firms relate (i.e. agencies of services to firms and 
technological, training and consulting organisations), are seen here as key agents and 
targets of IP. In a context where macroeconomic policies have lost the monopoly on the 
'valid recipes' for cementing economic growth, the NIP agenda instead advocates the 
micro- and meso-economic levels of economic policy and the spatialisation of the IP as key 
elements for a new supply-side economy. 
As the reader may note, I have used the adjective 'new' to refer to the set of ideas and 
assertions outlined above. Therefore, what needs to be elucidated here is in what sense the 
NIP is new for this study. Certainly, I am aware that the ideas and theories comprised in the 
NIP literature, notably irmovation and learning and new approaches for local and regional 
development, are informing the policies of a wide range of institutions, including EU, 
OECD and UNIDO. Mostly operating during the '80s and '90s, this move towards a new IP 
agenda has largely taken place in industrialised countries (see OECD 1992, 1996, 1999, and 
2000). Although institutions like UNIDO (1999) have opportunely given account of the 
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NIP principles for the developing and transition economies (see Chapter 2), the NIP 
thinking is fer fi^om being mainstream policy in these economies. Having said this, what 
struck me most was that there is no systematic overview and systematisation, into a 
coherent theoretical framework, of the diverse schools and traditions of thought that 
comprise the NIP thinking. This thesis aims to help fill this gap in the literature by putting 
these ideas together. In so doing, the reader v^ll notice that innovation and leaming policy, 
SME policy, cluster policy, local and regional development policy, and industrial policy 
itself, will be treated not as 'independent' policies with points in common or overlapping 
with IP. Instead, they will be treated as constituent parts of a comprehensive and so far non-
developed body of ideas to which I call the New Industrial Policy. 
Argentina represents an interesting case study due to the importance that the industrial 
apparatus had, and still has, in its productive structure. Current economic decline in 
Argentina needs to be discussed not only on the basis of dominant (old) ideas on economic 
policy but also on the basis of new and innovative ideas that allow us imagine fiiture 
settings for its industrial competitiveness. Furthermore, this discussion must be realistic in 
evaluating the context and circumstances in which a new IP agenda, as the one proposed by 
this research, is going to be implemented. Hence this study assumes a critical view with 
respect to the conceptual developments forwarded by the NIP literature. 
Specifically, I have chosen Tigre's region and the wood fiamiture sector as the place and 
industry through which to explore the relevance of the NIP thinking in the context of 
Argentina. The reasons for selecting Tigre's region was that it represents an economically 
vibrant case of a regional economy in which three key factors for this research, namely, 
'sector' (agglomeration of wood furniture firms), 'size' (notorious presence of SMEs) and 
'place' (developed institutional set up) are present and visibly interact in Tigre's 
development process. As discussed throughout this thesis, these factors need to be fijlly 
understood in relation to research inspired by the NIP literature, in particular in the context 
of local and regional economies in Argentina where these elements oft;en appear 
asymmetrically represented. In tum, the reasons for selecting the wood fiimiture industry 
are directly linked to the reasons stated above. A substantial number of the total figure of 
firms located in the region belongs to the timber industry. They are SMEs and operate in a 
low-tech industry as the majority of the SMEs in Argentina do. For their number, 
geographical proximity and sectoral composition the wood fiirniture firms of Tigre's region 
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constitute an 'industrial cluster'. Due to both the nature of the products these firms produce 
and the processes of production involved, there exists a (theoretical) possibility to develop 
labour division among the local furniture firms. Finally, the origins of Tigre's wood 
fiimiture industry are rooted in the economic and institutional history of the region. Hence 
the roles played by 'sector' and 'size' of firms in the local economy can be analysed vis-a-
vis the role that 'place', that is, the local history and the institutional set up, plays in the 
current development of the region. Furthermore, Tigre represents a case of local economy 
which is situated within the City of Buenos Aires. As explained in Chapter 5, the majority 
of the manufacturing firms in Argentina are located in big cities (notably, Buenos Aires). 
My point here is that most of the NIP literature relating local and regional economic 
development is largely based on successful cases of small or intermediate cities (i.e. in the 
Third Italy). Instead, what I wanted to test here was the relevance of the NIP literature in 
the context of a large metropolitan area. 
I am certainly aware of the limitations of having chosen Tigre and the wood furniture 
industry as case studies have for the generalisation of research conclusions. Sectoral and 
geographically limited cases of study in no case permit to obtain a fiill account of the series 
of complexities observed in national and cross-sectoral industrial economies. However, I 
consider it necessary to understand the complexity of the micro-realities i f we want to avoid 
falling into the misconceptions of economic policy that have frequently occurred in Latin 
America. I mean, misconceptions of economic policy derived from oft;en naive and 
decontextualised readings in relation to agendas and instruments of IP developed in more 
industrialised countries. The NIP is considered here as a body of assertions whose 
applicability requires testing in specific contexts and circumstances and not as a 'paradigm' 
of economic policy. 
Three main propositions forwarded by the NIP literature were tested in this study. Firstly, I 
examined regional social, cultural, and historical features in relation to economic evolution, 
factors of productive specialisation and performance. Secondly, I assessed the extent to 
which learning and innovation matter for firms in shaping their competitive strategies and 
enhancing their performance. Thirdly, I studied the nature of the relationships between 
local economic actors. Specifically, I have sought to identify both emergent processes of 
institution-building and territorial mobilisation aimed towards the establishing of place-
based industrial development policies and strategies, and the constraints operating against 
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such processes. The firms, particularly 'local' small- and medium-sized firms (SMEs), the 
main local/regional public and private institutions (notably, local govemment and business 
associations) and the local/regional system of innovation and governance, are in turn the 
main empirical research focus. 
The main research questions, as pursued in examining the claims of the NIP, were: Are 
learning and change processes forwarded by the NIP thinking possible for firms in contexts 
where short term and wait and see business strategies seem to be the most rational answer 
to cope with uncertainty? Are the assumptions of the NIP thinking conceming innovation 
and learning economies compatible with situations of institutional complexity and failure as 
well as absence of 'innovation' systems? Is it possible, as well as contextually relevant, to 
promote local and/or regional IP agendas in Argentina inspired by the NIP thinking in light 
of the predominant restrictive local conditioning? Does territorial competitiveness matter in 
the framework of the Argentine economic policy as a platform for policy design? Finally, 
can the NIP literature adapt to settings characterised by a marked and permanent macro-
economic instability often dominant in developing countries like Argentina? 
The findings demonstrated the importance of the geographical concentration of firms in the 
development of extemal economies, such as the market existing in the region (for some 
local productions, notably wood fixmiture) and the importance of its 
institutional/educational public infrastructure. These extemal economies became critical 
factors for the entrepreneurship to develop. 
However, other claimed advantages of clustering, notably collective learning and 
efficiency, have not been observed within the wood furniture cluster studied. The nature of 
learning and innovation in the great majority of firms studied is incremental, unsystematic 
and sometimes unintended. Above all, leaming and innovation largely occur within the 
firms. The entrepreneurs' personal network of relationships (or their relational assets), 
rather than the claimed advantages of geographical and cultural proximity, seems to play a 
more important role in the firm's leaming process. Likewise, the evidence revealed that a 
small group of firms, located within and outside of the cluster boundaries, displays a higher 
innovative capacity which is based on dynamic and evolutionary leaming. That is, the 
leaming process of these firms mostly relies on interfirm collaboration and also high levels 
of flexibility, specialisation and, to a lesser extent, vertical disintegration within the 
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organisation of their production process. As a result, these firms have considerably 
improved their competitive performance. 
While the first group of firms, and the fiimiture cluster itself, are showing some of the main 
contextual restrictions of the NIP literature (when it is read in the framework of small firms 
working in traditional sectors in developing countries), the second group sheds light on 
where the NIP should be aiming at in order to boost competitiveness in such a context. 
There is a prime need for IPs aimed at strengthening the productive efficiency at the firm 
level in areas such as management techniques, training and technological extemal support. 
There is also a need for policies aimed at widening and deepening the firms' sources of 
learning. For instance, IPs aimed at both deepening the relationships with the firms' 
existing stakeholder network (notably, with their customers and suppliers) and 'exposing' 
the entrepreneurs to new sources of information and (practical) learning (i.e. through visits 
to both trade fairs and more advanced firms and/or centres of expertise at national and 
international levels). Cluster policies aimed at both the dissemination of relevant business 
information among firms and the organisation of associative activities amongst them, also 
enhance the firm's learning process. 
An underdeveloped institutional set up and the absence of a shared business culture (as 
regards provision of real services and learning and knowledge economics) was observed 
despite the visible institutional 'presence' in the region. Firms neither identify a proper 
local offer of services nor recognise the local institutions as strategic facilitators, even less 
as partners, in their process of learning and development of innovative capacities. Both the 
insufficient level of firm-institution and inter-institutional communication and the absent 
role played by the local institutions as mechanisms of representation and coordination, 
reflect the lack of institutional thickness existing in the region. Hence the institutional set 
up observed is unlikely to facilitate the developing of a political network able to promote 
territorial mobilisation for the setting up of local-led and/or decentralised (top-down) 
industrial development policies. Whether the NIP literature can accommodate the evidence 
found depends critically upon the consideration of some emerging processes of institution 
building observed, regarding institutional change and practices of collective learning. At 
the level of firm-institution relationships, the evidence reveals that both a direct, more 
personalised and long-term strategy of networking and a more customised battery of 
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supplied services were identified as the determinant fectors of success for some local 
policies aimed at firms. Both factors, however, contradict the budgetary and timing 
restrictions of any IP set up in the fi-amework of the neoliberal Argentina. At the level of 
institutions, both good govemance of public affairs by the local government (based on an 
efficient, stable and transparent administration) and the 'policy network' shaped by three 
local institutions linked to the manufacturing industry (a business association, a centre of 
services and a technical university) constitute the most interesting factors of institutional-
building observed in the region regarding firm competitiveness. These processes of 
institutional building have helped to generate a fi-iendly business environment, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, a set of IP initiatives aimed at the local SMEs (i.e. upgrading 
and training programs). This is particularly relevant in the context of the endemic 
institutional failure observed in Argentina at national and local levels. Interestingly, in 
Tigre both processes operate separately. The local state maintains a non-interventionist 
conception of economic policy limited to setting up 'the rules of the game'. Consequently, 
both local public IP and public/private collaboration do not exist in Tigre. I argue that, 
despite the need for 'strong' local players (as a result of the existence of 'weak' national 
states), decentralised and bottom-up led schemes of IP in developing countries require a 
more active role to be played by the local state in IP issues and a more inclusive and 
participative agenda of political govemance at local and regional levels. 
Finally, there is a solid conviction within the main public decision-making spheres and 
policy makers at a national level that the main goal for Argentinean industrial 
competitiveness should be to solve its 'chronic' macroeconomic instability. It is understood 
that in the context of a 'normal' macroeconomic performance it would not be necessary to 
have differentiated IPs, whether it be by firm-size (i.e. SME policies) or firm-location (i.e. 
regional or local policies). However, the evidence revealed emerging counter tendencies 
that allow me to debate the argument of the macroeconomic policy as the only possible IP 
framework for development in Argentina. The findings showed that both the improvement 
in the microeconomy of firms and a fevourable meso-economic setting matter in both 
enhancing the firms' learning process and boosting their competitive performance, despite 
the turbulent business environment. Therefore, there is a case for IP frameworks aimed at 
these areas of economic policy as claimed by the NIP thinking. 
This thesis is divided into two sections and nine chapters. Section I critically reviews the 
industrial policy legacies and the New Industrial Policy literature through chapters 1, 2 and 
3. It places the industrial policy debate in a historical perspective and, by focusing on 
theoretical discussions and evidence of IP practices, it conceptualises the transition towards 
new conceptual frameworks which I term New Industrial Policy thinking. Section n 
evaluates the relevance of the NIP thinking to Argentina through a study conducted in both 
the Tigre region and with the main national institutions concerned with IP issues in 
Argentina. This section includes chapters 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
Chapter 1 discusses the classical IP approach associated with the paradigm Structure-
Conduct-Performance and the market failure theory. Then, it examines historical and 
political events that caused the 'ostracism' of the IP idea during the early 1980s. Finally, 
this chapter analyses the Asian and Italian experiences of industrial development and paves 
the way to understand the subsequent re-conceptualisation of the IP idea. 
Chapter 2 examines the transition, and/or continuities, of the IP debate under the 'paradigm 
of competitiveness' and, in doing so, it begins to mould the New Industrial Policy thinking 
in light of the changes in the international market place. 
In Chapter 3,1 attempt to systematise and critically discuss the main theoretical approaches 
that shape the core of the NEP literature. Firstly, it outlines the main philosophical 
foundations on which this literature is based. Secondly, this chapter analyses the literature 
concerning innovation, learning and knowledge economics and, finally, those concerning 
the spatialisation of the MP thinking. 
Chapter 4 analyses both the evolution and recent changes observed in the Argentine 
industrial economy, particularly in the context of the failure of the last neoliberal economic 
model implemented in Argentina (1991-2001). This chapter's main aim is to discuss the 
previous analysis in light of the insights drawn upon fi-om the NIP literature. 
Chapter 5 introduces the case study conducted in the Tigre region in Argentina and 
attempts to tease out fi-om the analysis of the Tigre's productive structure some factors 
linked to territorial identity, pattems of organisation, and entrepreneurial culture that may 
be crucial to interpreting the economic geography of the region. This chapter focuses on the 
study of the timber and wood fijmiture cluster existing in the region, the local institutional 
set up and their performance in light of the above social and cultural features. 
Chapter 6 evaluates two propositions of the NIP thinking. Firstly, it assesses whether 
learning and innovation are interactive and collective processes and, secondly, whether 
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geographical proximity matters in stimulating such processes. In general, it evaluates the 
importance that the learning and knowledge economy has for firms. Specifically, the 
chapter examines interfirm relationships, primarily between the furniture firms of the case-
study. 
Chapter 7 looks at the nature of the institutional set up existing in the Tigre region and 
attempts to evaluate the impact of local institutional activities in supporting firm 
competitiveness. Specifically, it analyses the nature of the relationships between local 
institutions and firms. 
Chapter 8 examines the nature of the inter-institutional relationships in the region studied, 
primarily between the public and private sector. In particular, this chapter evaluates 
whether local institutions share communal interests concemed with firm competitiveness 
and whether processes of institution building exist that can result in territorial mobilisation 
in order to promote such interests. 
The concluding chapter discusses the main IP implications derived from the empirical 
research and attempts to re-conceptualise some theoretical claims of the NIP thinking in 
light of the evidence from a developing economy like Argentina. 
SECTION I 
Changing Industrial Policy Paradigms 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Industrial Policy Legacies 
1.1. Industrial policy theory 
Chapter 1 reviews the literature concerning the changing meanings of the industrial policy 
(IP) concept. In order to examine how IP concept has evolved and what this has meant in 
practice I have divided the chapter into four sections. Section 1.2 analyses the classical IP 
approach, tracing the passage fi-om what I shall call a 'narrow' definition of IP toward a 
'broad' one. Section 1.3 briefly examines some historical events, associated with 
restrictions of political and ideological orders, which as a v^iiole caused what I will term the 
'ostracism of the IP idea'. Finally, Section 1.4 analyses the revival of new IP practices 
which have developed in different capitalist economies and the subsequent transition in the 
re-conceptualisation of the IP idea. Section 1.5 summarises the concluding remarks of this 
chapter. 
1.2. The classical approach of industrial policy 
The classical literature on IP has originally been linked with the Industrial Organisation 
Theory and its widely known paradigm Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P)\ whose 
pioneer works are associated to the so-called 'Harvard Tradition'. In this theoretical 
tradition, structure refers to fectors such as the number and size distribution of firms in the 
market, patterns of vertical and horizontal integration, and industrial relations. Conduct in 
turn refers to attitudes, motivations and the decision-making processes of firms conceming 
their strategies of investment, price policy and market sharing. Finally, performance refers 
to outcomes of a market or industry as regards levels of efficiency and productivity. 
' I have decided to exclude from this review the experience of the central planning economies on the IP 
debate as this has had little direct influence on the Latin American experience. However, the influence of 
former socialist economies, such as the Soviet Union, on Western policy-makers is well known (Audrestch, 
1997). 
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product diversity and irmovation rhythms, profit rates and distribution (Hodgson, Samuels 
and Tool, 1994; Pitelis, 1996). The intemal logic of the S-C-P paradigm relies on a 
mechanism of successive determining factors between market structures, the conduct of 
economic agents and subsequent performance, and the normative assumption that oversees 
the economic action under this paradigm is the conformation of market stmctures 
considered as 'optimal' or 'perfect'. Only this type of market stmcture allows a Pareto-
efficient (or optimal) resource allocation in such a way that guarantees social welfare. Thus 
emerges, according to Pitelis (1991), the first ftindamental theorem of the market failure 
theory or, in a more general sense, welfere economic theory. Namely, it is only in perfect 
markets where the right signals will be given to economic agents (notably firms) who are 
endowed with rational elect capacity, leading their behaviour towards 'theoretically' correct 
decision-making. This is finally reflected in their good performance. As Hodgson et al 
(1994) stress, the market failure theory has thus provided a generic basis for much of the 
relationship between industrial organisation and economic performance. 
How does this relate to IP? According to Justman and Teubal (1986:121), 
"the neoclassical economic approach to justifying public intervention in the market-place 
uses the concept of "market failure" as its point of departure. Arguing that a disparity 
between the marginal value of an economic activity for society as a whole and its 
marginal value for the private sector may lead the fi'ee market to a suboptimal allocation 
of resources. It suggests that in cases such as this govemment intervention can bring 
about an improvement in market performance" (emphasis in original). 
The (historical) appearance of monopolist markets in the industrial stmcture became the 
first case for state intervention, and therefore ff, since they bring about (theoretical) market 
failures (Scherer, 1980) that yield socially undesirable results. Scherer (ibid) argues that 
monopoly is seen as a source of inefficiencies, and consequently welfare losses, owing to 
the excess profits that this type of monopolist economic agents (or this type of market 
stmcture) can attain as a result of its market dominant position. Consequently, through IP, 
the state (selectively) intervenes in the market altering the existing economic stmcture, by 
combating actual or potential market distortions arising fi-om uncompetitive market 
conditions (Tyson and Zysman, 1983; Jacquemin, 1984). 
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Two key economic actors thus appear in the classical IP approach. First, the larger 
companies, or 'the DP target', since under the assumption of market failure IP rationale aims 
at the specific segment of enterprises that have achieved market positions defined as 
monopoly (and subsequently oligopoly). Second, the state, or the 'IP subject', which 
intervenes in the market through IP instruments (notably, antimonopoly and antitrust laws^) 
by using its legal and regulatory faculties. Therefore, the role of IP in the market failure 
framework has above all a regulatory nature. 
In considering continuous 'theoretical maladjustments' generated by and in the real 
economy, the market failure approach has become more permissive of interventions in the 
market through IP. Market failures derived from the existence of public goods, externalities 
and transaction costs are only some examples of 'market imperfections' that have served to 
justify IP (Chang, 1994). As regard public goods, they are defined as goods and services 
that "are non-excludable (it is difficult or impossible to exclude an individual from 
consuming the good or service). They are non-rivalries (one person's consumption does not 
detract from another's consumption)" (Sawyer, 1989:306-7) (brackets in original). National 
defence, security and provision of lighthouses are often cited as examples of cases where 
the government intervene regarding the provision of public goods. Externality, in turn, 
"exists where there are some spill-over effects from an individual's activities to those of 
others, leading to a discrepancy between the private cost/benefit structure and the social 
cost/benefit structure" (Chang, 1994:10). The difficulty of tackling the problem of 
externalities from an economical standpoint (i.e. by defining more precise property rights) 
lead to the justification of the state provision of goods and services with 'positive' 
externalities (whether in a direct or indirect way) in socially optimal amounts (i.e. 
education, health, R&D and facilities). State intervention is also justified by acting against 
those who create 'negative' externalities (i.e. pollution tax) (Chang, 1994:11). As a result, 
state interventions, where they are market 'functional' and 'friendly', become increasingly 
frequent under the market failure approach. The body of ideas developed above is known as 
the narrow IP approach. 
^ Antitrust policy came into being during the last two decades of the nineteenth century, established within the 
USA by the Sherman Act of 1890. It attempted respond to a movement that had begun in the 1870s, with the 
formation of the first trusts. 
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1.2.1. Critiques to the classical IP approach 
As regards the successive 'stretching' of the market failure assumptions, this theoretical 
approach has received numerous critiques. As Possas (1995: 78) rightly claims, its internal 
logic "has reached the paradoxical situation fi-om which the relevance of the theoretical 
model is not dictated by their adherence to the real, and the respective market 
'imperfections' and 'failures' are exceedingly more frequent than the situation assumed by 
the ideal model". Admittedly, Possas concludes: " I f the theory always finds 'failures', in 
general significative, in the application of its ideal model, would it not be the case to reckon 
that failure is of the model itself?" In accordance, Zysman and Tyson (1983:42) stress that 
"[u]nfortunately for the elegant application of [market failure] theory to policy, the range of 
exceptions is wide in practice. When exceptions become the rule, we need a rule for coping 
with the exceptions, or at least a means to judge the implications of the most difficult 
cases". 
1.2.1.1. Critique to the 'static' nature of the classical IP approach 
According to Sawyer, the classical IP approach is of a 'static' nature because it only 
focuses on "the static allocation of existing resources rather than with dynamic creation of 
new resources, with perfect information and technical efficiency generally 
assumed"(1992b:53). Its notion of competition itself is defined in a structural and static 
way, that is, in terms of the number of firms and ease of market entry. Hence market 
contestability will arise here only from more firms in the market and/or lower barriers to 
entry (Sawyer, 1992a). Dietrich comes to a similar conclusion when he points out that the 
"tension between static and dynamic perspectives mirrors a tension in economic theory 
about the conceptualisation of competition" (1992:18). In contrast to the Schumpeterian 
legacy that understands competition as a 'process', in Dietrich's view, "neoclassical 
theories, and in particular the structure-conduct-performance tradition in industrial 
economics, stress the nature of competition as a market structure" (ibid). Following 
Sawyer, a range of concerns such as the level of dynamism of an industry, the creation of 
new products and the improvement of productive efficiency "just do not arise" under the 
neoclassical view. "There is clearly no reason to have as the objective of policy the 
improvement of productive efficiency when such efficiency has been assumed to exist" 
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(Sawyer, 1992a:7). Therefore, the feet that the analysis of dynamic aspects of industrial 
development (mostly based on the Schumpeterian legacy, as explained in Chapter 3) are 
excluded, make the classical IP approach an extremely weak tool considering the aims of 
this research. 
Directly linked with the above critique, the classical IP approach has also undervalued the 
importance of the conduct of economic actors. As Sawyer argues, "this paradigm has paid 
relatively little attention to conduct even though it supposedly provides the link between 
structure and performance" (1992b:55). Indeed, given that, in the S-C-P paradigm, 
performance is mainly determined by the market structure, the firms' conduct, whether it be 
attempting to mould the market through more proactive strategies or reacting to changes in 
market conditions through more reactive strategies, have hardly been examined. As 
industrial policies inspired by the market failure theory are designed to change market 
structures only, rather than market conducts, this fi-amework "effectively precludes any 
discussion of the range of policies which may prove usefijl in the encouragement of 
industrial development in part because there is an element of believing that there is an 
'optimal' structure" (Sawyer, 1992b:55-56) (emphasis in original). Again, the firms' 
conduct or, similarly, the analysis of the entrepreneurial attitudes of economic actors 
(notably, entrepreneurs), are key aspects for an IP approach that seeks to explain dynamic 
aspects of industrial development. 
1.2.1.2. Critique of monopoly as 'object of IP' 
The argument of 'welfare losses' and 'inefficiencies' derived fi-om the emergence of 
monopoly market structures has also been widely questioned. Old and newer conceptual 
approaches have been used to discuss these assumptions. Drawing on the Schumpeterian 
school, Pitelis argues that, "it is differences in innovative activity that lead to large size 
[ . . . ] , therefore once again gains fi-om innovative activity should be set against any welfare 
losses" (1996:4). For Williamson, on the other hand, "monopohes may have lower costs, 
which could offset any welfare losses through cost efficiency gains" (Pitelis, 1996:4). 
Hence in the 'Williamson's trade off model', as in Chandler's model on 'the 
Multidivisional firm' (1986), large enterprise can be the most efficient solution to lower 
'transaction costs' (derived from market failures) and not the source of such failures. 
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De Bandt (1994), based on the analysis of the current industrial setting, concludes that 
monopoly, as the rationale for state intervention, and the traditional anti-tmst IPs have 
become a source of rigidity and conservatism. Arguing against the case for IP derived fi^om 
the market failure theory, De Bandt asserts that: 
"[d]ue to the crisis [of the 1970s], stmctural change and the internationalization process, 
competition has been increasing steadily. [In addition], due to technological progress, the 
definitions and boundaries of the diflferent industries and of 'relevant markets' are likely 
to be outdated. [Hence] the configuration and boundaries of firms have also been 
undergoing big changes, such that in most cases complex sets or networks of actors are 
involved" (1994:5) (emphasis in original). 
Finally, the successfiil Japanese experience of industrial development constituted a 
remarkable empirical argument and source of contioversy due to the virtuous relationship 
between 'big size' (individual companies and the so-called keiretsus), on the one hand, and 
productive efficiency and competitive performance, on the other. 
Al l the aforementioned arguments have helped to question the intemal logic of the market 
failure theory. As Sawyer notes: " I f there had previously been perfect competition which 
had dissolved into oligopoly or monopoly, the question is why did that happen?" (1992:54). 
A response to this question is (paradoxically) given by Friedman, to whom "[m]onopoly 
frequently, i f not generally, arises fi"om govemment support of collusive agreements among 
individuals" (1962:26). Notoriously, this statement constitutes an interesting trade off, as 
within mainstream economic theory the state (in an economic market) exists because of 
market failure (Pitelis, 1991), while monopoly constitutes the principal cause of market 
failure! 
1.2.13. Critique of the state as 'subject of IP' 
A fiirther set of critiques aimed at the assumptions of market failure theory places into 
question the 'capacity' of state (governmental) intervention for correcting market failures, 
despite govemmental 'intention' to improve the efficiency of an economy. Risk of rent-
seeking conducts and market imperfections derived from asymmetiies or lack of 
16 
information have led to a debate questioning the state's ability to intervene, what in 
economics literature is known as 'government failures'. According to Chang, "[i]n many 
theories of state intervention it is (implicitly) assumed that the state knows everything and 
can do everything [. . . ] It is assumed that the state has all the relevant information for 
social-wel&re-maximising intervention and is able to achieve what it sets out to do" 
(1994:25). The assumption of 'perfect information' means that "the state may be able to 
collect and process all the information relevant for the correction of market failure only at 
costs that are greater than the benefits from such correction" (ibid). This would suggest, the 
state has perfect knowledge of every aspect of both the current situation and future trends 
concerning different markets and industries. As regards the 'rent-seeking' assumption, 
Chang points out that "state intervention incurs not only traditional deadweight losses but 
also costs when resources are diverted into unproductive activities by private agents in 
order to capture rents generated by state intervention" (1994:27). Hence, the costs 
generated from state intervention could exceed the potential benefits of the intervention, 
giving rise to inefficiencies v^ich are then identified as government failures. 
Inasmuch as the 'intention' of state interventions is concemed, the 'market failure' theory 
becomes more vulnerable since it assumes that state economic policy represents the general 
interest of society. Following to Pitelis, this argument relies on the arguable assumption 
that "economic agents have reached a consensus" (1991:337) in order to find Pareto 
efficient solutions as the best way to obtain social welfare. This assumption has indeed 
been criticised by both advocates and opponents to government intervention. Among the 
former, Pitelis argues, "a consensus on efficiency is unlikely to exist, in the presence of 
inequitable distribution of income, power [and] resources" (1991:337). In principle, the 
existence of asymmetries of power and resources at the level of industries and firms render 
the assumption of 'consensus among economic agents' unrealistic. This is the case with 
industrial policies such as the antitrust laws which act on a few winners (monopolic or 
oligopolic enterprises) in theory 'representing' the interests of the remaining economic 
actors that shape a given market. The debate about 'asymmetries of representation' 
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affecting the decision making processes of state is not new', however, it has received more 
attention recently. 
Drawing on the 'interest-group' approach, Chang (quoting Skopol, 1985:4), summarises 
very well the problem of asymmetries of representation. In his words, the interest-group 
approach sees the state as "an arena within which economic interest groups or normative 
social movements contended or allied with one another to shape the making of public 
policy decisions" (1994:19-20). Admittedly, the most powerful (economic) vested interests 
in an economy will be those exerting greater influence on the decision-making process 
concerning economic policy and, therefore, the real targets of an industrial policy (if IP 
were the economic policy in question). The state appears thus 'captured' by interest groups. 
According to Stigler (1975), the pioneer of the 'regulatory-capture' theory of the Chicago 
School, "regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for 
its benefits" (quoted by Chang, 1994:20). Capture is materialised both by claiming more 
legal guarantees and resources from the state budget and restricting it to the other 'rival' 
groups. IP instruments such as entry restrictions, property rights, subsidies, and price 
fixing, may fall in this category. Therefore, taking into account the above arguments, 
Pitelis's claim that the market failure theory represents an IP approach in a 'negative' 
sense, takes on greater importance. Indeed, under the analysed logic "it is assumed that 
firms have a strategy of their own and the state's role is to support them in their efforts up 
to the point where such efforts clash with consumers' interests" (1996:3). 
Whatever the approach utilised to evaluate government failure or, more precisely, 
government intervention failure, the dominant trends in the economic analysis have been 
rather unidirectional. Economic analysis has mostly aimed towards both the control of state 
interventions until a minimal expression ("minimal state" hypothesis), and towards the 
isolation of state from potential rent seeking or interest groups whether they be internal 
(state bureaucracy) or extemal to state (society). The rationale behind the hypothesis of 
state isolation is that an 'isolated' state within society can take a neutral and technically 
^ Into the Marxist tradition, Marx himself and followers such as Miliband (1968) and O'Connor (1973) have 
argued that the capitalist state is one that serves the interests of the economically dominant class. This is the 
capitalist class in the capitalist society. 
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correct decisions leading towards maximising-efficiency (Friedman, 1962; Buchanan et al, 
1980; Hayek, 1980; North, 1990). 
Finally, Chang stresses that, common to the conceptual approaches that identify 
government failure derived from asymmetries of information and rent-seeking conducts, is 
"their inability (or unwillingness?) to suggest how govemment failures may be remedied 
other than by non-intervention" (1994:32). Hence Chang rightly asks himself, "[d]oes this 
mean that we are condemned to accept foiling markets in fevour of failing governments as 
the lesser of the two evils?"(Ibid). In the following section I discuss several theoretical and 
empirical arguments that allow me to question such a conclusion. 
1.3. Ostracism of the IP idea 
A far-reaching debate conceming the relations between state and economy (specifically 
state interventions in the economy) took place between the 'market vision' and the 'broad' 
notion of IP starting from the series of transformations that occurred within the main 
Western economies and in the international market place since the late 1960s onwards. It is 
not my objective here to lead the conceptual discussion towards a purely historical ground. 
However, in order to explain changes operated in the development of the theoretical debate, 
some historical observations will need to be made. 
1.3.1. Setting the scene 
The debate on the IP question began to gain public notoriety during the process of erosion 
of the so-called 'Golden age' of the central capitalist economies (Singh, 1994; Amable and 
Petit, 1996). In particular, discussions on IP issues were triggered by the controversy 
generated from the 'crisis' in the dominant model of accumulation (widely known as 
Fordism"*) and the alternative ways to overcome such a crisis. With regard to the process of 
erosion of the 'Golden Age', Singh argues that a set of "[s]erious difficulties arose at the 
'' Drawing on the French regulation school, Jessop points out that Fordism can be analysed on four different 
levels: "As a distinctive type of labour process (or industrial paradigm) [...] As a stable mode of 
macroeconomic growth (regime of accumulation) [... ] As a mode of social and economic regulation (mode of 
regulation) [...] And, fourthly, Fordism can be seen as a general pattern of social organisation (socialisation)" 
(1991:136-7). 
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levels of both the national and international regulatory regimes; these began to interact with 
each other in a cumulatively adverse way to the detriment of the system as a 
whole"(l994:63). The 'productivity slow-down' observed in the leading capitahst 
economies, the novel balance of payments problem experienced by the US (the largest 
western economy and engine of the system as a vdiole), and the subsequent break down of 
the Bretton Woods monetary system, defined the crisis of both the traditional forms of 
organisation of production (the so-called 'techno-productive paradigm') and the regulatory 
system on which this model was until then based. That is, the 'social contract' established 
by the main constituent actors of the Fordist model, notably, national states, large 
companies and the larger trade unions. 
For a while, the member countries of the OECD (notably the largest European economies) 
put forwarded programmes of structural reform trying to overcome the difficulties raised, 
by following expansionary 'demand-side' economic policies aimed to reactivate their 
competitive performance and to secure full employment (Amable and Petit, 1996). A 
battery of IP instruments was targeted to the whole of the industrial sector mainly in order 
to strengthen the competitiveness of the so-called 'national champions' (often the largest 
public and private national companies). These instruments, known as 'picking winner 
policies', involved large outgoings of public subsidies, transference of resources, and tax 
concessions, hence they greatly exceeded the enclosed limits of the traditional regulatory 
framework of the IPs inspired by the market failure theory. As it is well known, IPs aimed 
at the promotion of 'national champions' (although simultaneously in support of 'lame 
ducks') had varying degrees of successes, those targeted at the telecommunications sector 
being perhaps the most successful ones in the European case. However, they largely failed 
to promote key manufacturing industries such as breeder reactors, electronics and 
computers. The case of the Anglo-French 'Concorde' is perhaps the most polemic and 
controversial example of failure in this respect. Consequently, the unsuccessful attempts 
carried out by the OECD countries in order to restore economic growth reached during the 
'Golden Age' were finally abandoned in 1979 after the paradigmatic 'Volcker shock' in the 
US. As Singh argues, this drastic adjustment program entailed "the implementation of 
deeply contractionary monetary policies in the USA which were subsequently widely 
imitated elsewhere" (1994:63-4). The feilure of the promotion policies of 'national 
champions' thus gave a soUd empirical foundation that helped to underpin the strong 
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current of critical thought against state interventions in the economy initiated during the 
1960s and 1970s. That is, when "the relevance and soundness of public intervention was 
severely questioned" (Amable and Petit, 1996:31). 
13.2. Political and conceptual antecedents of the criticism against the IP idea 
A new hegemonic thinking regarding economic policy materialised in the early 1980s, this 
series of policies and agendas for development is often referred to as 'The Washington 
Consensus' (see Williamson, 1990). This 'consensus' follows World Bank (WB) policy 
which stipulates that state interventions must be exclusively framed within the neoclassical 
model of growth, IP being excluded from the WB agenda of economic policy for 
development. The adjustment programs and structural reforms inspired by the Washington 
Consensus brought about processes of economic liberalisation, widespread deregulation of 
markets and the privatisation of public assets, among other aspects. 
The quintessence of these adjustment policies and structural reforms aimed at causing the 
market to supersede the state as the main allocater of resources in the economy. The WB 
theses concerning the role of the state in economic development were reconfirmed in the 
World Development Report for 1991. In what this Report terms the 'market friendly' 
approach of development, the critical interaction between government and market is 
understood as follows: 
"Competitive markets are the best way yet found for efficiently organising the 
production and distribution of goods and services. Domestic and extemal competition 
provides the incentives that unleash entrepreneurship and technological progress. But 
maricets cannot operate in a vacuum - they require a legal and regulatory framework that 
only governments can provide. And, at many other tasks, markets sometimes prove 
inadequate or feil altogether. This is why governments must, for example, invest in 
infrastructure and provide essential services to the poor" (1991:1). 
Although this Report challenge some of the neoclassical assumptions, specifically by 
justifying ftinctional interventions in areas such as infiastructure and services, IPs relating 
to the manufacturing industry are understood to be of a regulatory character only and, 
therefore, of a 'negative' and 'static' nature. A slight adjustment in the WB's position 
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regarding economic policy began to take place when its principles started to be scrutinised 
in several internal WB Reports in the mid 1990s. A first critical document came from the 
WB Department of Industry and Energy (1992) written by Frischtak. This document 
develops a conceptual guide to lead government policy in order to create an institutional 
'environment' that encourages an efficient reconversion of industry. Interestingly, a second 
internal document (by Frischtak, 1993) asserted that once the first stage of the reconversion 
is overcome (and rising productivity and profitability is achieved) a second stage will 
require what the document termed 'positive reconversion' (ibid). It encompasses the 
adoption of an aggressive 'technological policy' and provides fianding for investment, 
iimovation, and the adoption of an organisational culture to support both objectives. What 
is more, a renowned study led by Page (1993) stressed the important and systematic role 
played by the state interventions in 'The East Asian Miracle' (through the so-called 
fundamentals and selective policies underpirmed by a wide and strong institutional basis) in 
promoting industrial development. This study gave rise to a heated debate due to the 
assertive attempts by the WB to attribute such achievements to market fundamentalism 
rooted in a macroeconomic vision, downsizing the role played by the micro economic 
fimdamentals (notably, sectoral IPs) in these experiences. Interestingly, Joseph Stiglitz, a 
nobel prizewinner and former chief economist for the WB, played a critical role in 
revaluating the Asiatic experiences of industrial development by stressing (in an article 
titled 'Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle'-1996-), the role played by the 
governmental interventions in the competitive performance reached by these economies. 
However, despite the adjustments to the 1980s' WB view, its main principles of economic 
policy regarding state interventions have not changed. In the WB view, state interventions 
in the economy are restricted to providing a legal framework and basic infrastructure for the 
market to operate efficiently within a framework of competitive discipline at the domestic 
and international levels (Singh, 1994). 
As previously mentioned, antecedents of the 'Washington Consensus' can be found within 
a revisionist current of thought in economic theory, inaugurated by Milton Friedman, to 
which excessive interventions in and regulation of the economy by the state and 
government is and was the main cause of inefficiencies and constraints in market 
economies. In his seminal work titled 'Capitalism and Freedom', Friedman concludes: "the 
great Depression [...] was produced by government mismanagement rather than by any 
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inherent instability of the private economy. [...] Similarly today, government measures 
constitute the major impediments to economic growth in the United States" (1962:38). 
Subsequently, in 'Free to Choose', Friedman and Friedman assertively argue that "market 
competition, when it is permitted to work, protects the consumer better than do the 
alternative government mechanisms that have been increasingly superimposed on the 
market" (1979:222). Within this revisionist tradition there exists a generalised belief that 
only market forces give incentives to economic agents to operate efficiently. Hence only 
the market allows the efficient co-ordination of producers and consumers and therefore the 
production of profits and efficiency in whole industrial structure. As Coates points out, 
opponents to IP have placed their "faith in the capacity of markets to act as optimal 
economic allocators, and in the ability of individuals within those markets to pursue their 
own self-interest in ways that maximise benefits for all" (1996:6). Friedman's, as well as 
Buchanan's (1980), view on market economies have had a decisive impact on the critique 
against state interventions and the IP idea. It indeed reached the whole of the Keynesian 
legacy on which basis both state intervention and IP were inspired in the main Western 
economies until the early 1980s ^ As stated by Sawyer, following this legacy "the modern 
State has become more closely involved in regulating the operation of the economy. State 
intervention in this area ranges from fecilitating industrial development through subsidies 
and tax concessions, to direct involvement in the productive process through public 
ownership of certain industries"(l989:301). Interestingly, the revisionist criticisms also 
reached the regulatory BP framework based on the market failure theory. In contrast to the 
arguments used by IP advocators to characterise the 'crisis' of the 1970s, the anti-
interventionist thinking outlined above does not even acknowledge such a crisis. Schultze 
(1983), "a dissent of IP " (a label used by himself), concluded that the American advocators 
of IP are wrong as much in their interpretation about the American economy problem as in 
their proposal to tackle it. He emphatically argued: "America is not de-industrializing [. . .] 
Government is not able to devise a 'winning' industrial structure. Finally, it is not possible 
in the American political system to pick and choose among individual firms and regions in 
the substantive, efficiency-driven way envisaged by advocates of industrial policy" 
' Certainly, IPs inspired by the Keynesian legacy can hardly been taken homogenously, since they differed in 
character, extension and depth depending upon the western economy in question, hi this respect Amable and 
Petit (1996) distinguish between countries where Keynesian pohcies have been apphed with a "restrictive 
approach" (such as the UK and the US) to others with a "comprehensive approach" (such as France and Italy). 
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(ibid:30) (emphasis in original). Although Schultze then recognised that the US economy 
was suffering serious consfraints, his critique against the IP idea is conclusive, "industrial 
policy is a dangerous solution for an imaginary problem" (ibid: 3 7). In concordance with 
this thesis, the World Bank Report on the State (1997) asserted that IP is "combustible" 
since "implemented badly, activist industrial policy can be a recipe for disaster" (ibid:74). 
As seen above, the WB's principles had a character of universal mandate whereby its 
policy 'recipes' substituted any debate about IP. The 'political-ideological' critique comes 
from the Bretton Woods institutions along (and combined) with the 'conceptual' critique 
resulting in the emergence of a powerful 'crusade' against the industrial policy idea, to 
which the only possible rationality leading towards economic development and social 
welfare is one rooted in the will of institutions and individuals (that as a whole are) 
metaphorically called the 'market'. 
Under the pressure of this 'crusade' the IP idea was finally abandoned by the main western 
economies and, following them, many regions all over the world did the same. In Latin 
America, Argentina and Chile in particular constituted extreme cases of dismantiing the 
Keynesian legacy. As Bianchi rightly argues, during "the 1980s the concept of 'industrial 
policy' was eliminated from economic debates. There was a return to a mythical vision of 
the market as a single institution sufficient to manage the economy and it was held that the 
role of the State must be minimal" (1994:16) (emphasis in original). As seen, it did not 
follow that the basic assumptions of the IP approach based on the market failure theory fell 
into absolute academic disrepute. I argue that despite the important criticism aimed at its 
basic assumptions (see in section 1.2.1) the market failure theory acquired a renewed 
relevance (i.e. in Latin American during the 1980s and 1990s) and the main reason for this 
is the extreme ideological antagonism as regards state interventions in the economy. As 
Amable and Petit (1996:32) claim, regarding IP in the 1990s, 
"[t]he ideological environment leads to questioning all kinds of public intervention and 
has implications in the different programmes of 'structural reform' advocated by 
international institutions such as the OECD or the European Commission. [...] In such 
an environment, it is therefore not surprisiQg that motivations of IPs in terms of market 
failures are called for more frequently". 
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However, at the beginning of the 1980s, in the interstices of the dominant views on 
economic policy, the IP idea returned to the arena of debate. Both the internationally 
celebrated achievements reached by 'unconventional' experiences of industrial 
development (i.e. Japan and the East Asian NICs) and (the subsequent and parallel) 
development of schools of critical economic thought, provided renewed empirical and 
theoretical arguments on the IP question. In bringing about changes in the antagonist 
ideological climate against the IP idea this constituted a milestone for the IP debate. 
Notably, the impact of the Japanese experience reached not only academic circles but also 
institutions such as the OECD and, as shown, the WB (OECD, 1972; Johnson, 1982, 1984; 
Boltho, 1985). As De Bandt concludes, paradoxically; 
"[a]nd when industrial policies -or the more visible part of those policies- were nearly 
eliminated from the scene in the 1980s, the mainly intellectual debate was reopened, due 
to the knowledge which had been accumulating concerning the role 'intdustrial' poUcies 
have been playing in the outstanding industrial performance of Japan and the some of the 
newly industrialised countries (NICs)" (1994:1-2). 
The following section examines diverse experiences of industrial development showing 
how different IP rationales can be built positively and how a variety of economic actors 
and institutional agreements, besides and beyond the market, can critically become an 
integral part of an industrial development process. 
1.4. The practices of new forms of industrial policy alternative to 
neoliberals 
A varied group of insightful experiences of industrial development in which state 
'interventions' and IP have played critical roles shape the new industrial economic 
geography. The Scandinavian model of social market economy (or 'negotiated economy'), 
notably, the cases of Sweden and Denmark; the German case (the 'Rhine state'); and 
regional experiences such as the Basque Country in Spain are only some noteworthy cases 
that an exhaustive analysis regarding IP should consider. I have preferred however to draw 
upon insights from both the Japanese and the East Asian NICs experiences, on the one 
hand, and the case of the Emilia Romagna in Italy, on the other, in order to illustrate how 
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substantially different processes of institutional building helped to lay the foundations for 
industrial development. That is, starting from the setting up of active, planned and 
sequential 'supply-side' industrial policies mainly based on the establishment of economies 
of association between the public and private sectors. 
There are specific reasons why these cases have been chosen. Japan and the East Asian 
NICs constitute national-based experiences, as national states, large companies and the 
biggest economic conglomerates are the main actors of the development process from the 
IP perspective. I will argue fiirther on in this thesis that 'place-based' IPs in Latin America, 
particularly in Argentina, critically call for national states to play a proactive and 
intertwined role. The multifaceted 'developmental' role played by national states in the 
Asian experiences (see Sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.2) thus becomes a very valuable one to be 
analysed. Interestingly, due to both historical similarities that the Asian experiences had 
during their initial stages of development (particularly during the first stages of the ISI 
model) with some Latin American experiences (notably, Argentina and Brazil), and to the 
broadly divergent trajectories in their subsequent development pattems, both experiences 
have been the object of frequent comparisons (Evans, 1987, 1992). Hence the Asian 
experiences have also been seen as models of best practice for Latin America, particularly 
in relation to the strategic role played by the national state in promoting development. In 
the Argentine case though, this influence has not lead to the emergence of an IP framework. 
The Emilia Romagna region constitutes instead a local- and regional-based experience, the 
local institutional set up, notably local governments, SMEs and the place itself being the 
main actors in its development process. In particular, I have taken the Emilia Romagna case 
since its institution building process was specifically concemed with (and embedded in) a 
notion of place as a social construction, and a more inclusive, participative and 
decentralised framework of 'bottom-up' IP. Interestingly, this experience has in effect been 
taken as a role model in different Latin American countries since the early 1990s, to the 
design and establishment of IP programs mostly aimed at SMEs at local and regional levels 
(Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999; Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999). Argentina indeed is a 
good example in this sense (see Chapter 4). In particular, some elements of the Argentinean 
entrepreneurial culture show notable similarities with those observed in small Italian 
entrepreneurs (besides entrepreneurs from other south European countries like Spain), 
which can be traced to the fact that a high percent of the Argentinean population are 
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directly descended from former immigrants coming from Italy and Spain. This is mostly 
the case for the south and central part of Argentina where my empirical research was 
conducted. Finally, I have to make clear that it is not my intention here to analyse 
exhaustively the multifaceted aspects that led both the Asian and the Third Italy 
experiences to succeed. Rather, I will focus on those specific aspects that allow me to 
illustrate the theoretical claims that this research raises. 
1.4.1. The Japanese case 
The process of institution building of the Japanese industrial development experience 
critically shows the existence and fiinctioning of a public-private partnership that became 
its main 'policy-making' mechanism. The national state and the largest corporations, best 
known as 'zaibatsus', were the main architects of this process. As argued by Johnson, in 
Japan "the state's role in the economy is shared with the private sector, and both the public 
and private sector have perfected means to make the market work for development goals" 
(1982:VIII). The Japanese IP framework arose as a result of public-private networking 
practices whose 'shared' architecture of governance has developed "multiple formal and 
informal linkages across the business-government frontier" (Kitshelt, 1991:480). Public-
private cooperation was not, however, the resuh of a smooth and natural process rooted in 
idiosyncrasy of the Japanese culture. Contrarily, it was the result of a long-term process of 
learning and trust building through which both state and private sector were able to discuss 
and define common interests and aims, and to design strategies in order to overcome the 
numerous conflicts raised*. According to Johnson (1982), only after the state recognised the 
need for the private sector and vice versa in the decision-making process was the 
cooperation possible. Johnson understands that the 'developmental' policies themselves 
(established by the Japanese state) were the key tool through which government-enterprise 
relations were articulated. Hence the first priority of the Japanese agenda for industrial 
development was a 'developmental' strategy whereby, as Johnson points out, "the 
government tries to secure Japan's economic livelihood through public policies based on 
* It is important to mention here that from WWII until the 1970s Japan passed through periods of both 'state 
dominance' (late 1940s) and 'private dominance' (early 1970s) (Johnson, 1982) in the determinant decision-
making processes. 
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such criteria as long-term dynamic comparative advantage and international competitive 
ability" (1986:190). 
The Japanese IP approach differed in many ways from the classical IP approach analysed in 
section 1.2. Firstly, it entailed an instrumentalist view of the market in which they can be 
implicitly and/or explicitly guided. As Best (1990) notes, under the Japanese IP approach, 
guided by a Schumperian notion of competition rather than by a criterion of 'allocative 
efficiency' (which presumes that market 'interference' is bad), markets are seen as 
'instruments' of growth. Hence IP is understood as "a means of shaping (planning) markets 
to promote the intemational competitiveness of Japan's business enterprises"(ibid:168) 
(brackets in original). The strategic rationale underlying the Japanese IP, leading to the 
creation of dynamic competitive advantages, illustrates well how this IP framework 
'stretched' the rigid limits of the classical IP approach. According to the Hecksher-Ohlin 
neoclassical theory on intemational trade, countries specialise in those sectors in which 
they have relative advantages in terms of factors of production endowment (or 'static' 
comparative advantages). In the aftermath of WWII Japan's comparative advantages were 
mainly based on its low labour costs and by no means in more complex production sectors 
such as in the heavy manufacturing industry. As it is well documented, the Japanese 
economy, in a few decades, developed 'dynamic' competitive advantages in production 
sectors where they did not have them previously, for instance in complex industries such as 
shipbuilding, electronics and automotives. Interestingly, this was achieved through 
(dynamic) innovations in production processes and developing new 'soft' technologies, 
specialising its labour force and establishing new patterns of labour relations (Aoki, 1990; 
Coriat, 1991). Likewise, the traditional IP regulatory framework inspired by the market 
failure theory (e.g. antimonopoly laws) was here tackled in a much more permissive way. 
The Japanese 'antimonopoly' policy, established during the allied occupation after WWII, 
considered the "intemational competitive ability rather than purely domestic competition 
[as the American antimonopoly laws do] as its main antimonopoly criterion" (Johnson, 
1986:195). What is more, it explicitly promoted different forms of interfirm cooperation (or 
'collusion' in the American framework) but preserving at the same time high levels of 
competition between them. All this resulted in an industrial structure endowed with a high 
level of dynamism in the domestic market and increasing intemational competitiveness. As 
Best rightly asserts, the "United States industrial regulatory policy had presumed the ideal 
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of perfect markets and defined inter-firm cooperation as collusion against the public 
interest. Japanese industrial policy, in contrast, has been based on the presupposition that a 
mix of inter-firm competition and cooperation can promote international competitiveness" 
(1990:201). The virtuous combination of cooperation and competition (more recently 
termed 'coopetition'), coordinated by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MTTI) (Yamamura, 1988), without doubt opened a new chapter in the IP debate. 
The establishing of MITI is one of the most salient factors of institutional innovation and a 
key issue in understanding the roles played by the central government in the Japanese IP 
framework. According to Johnson (1982), M i l l was the key organ of government in 
formulating and executing IPs, under a scheme of economic policy in which both 
microeconomic policy (called 'industrial rationalisation policy') and macroeconomic policy 
(called 'indusfrial structure policy') were intelligently matched i f not harmonised following 
the same objectives. The quality and efficiency of its bureaucratic staff enabled MITI to 
conduct industrial 'targeting' through sectoral promotion policies based on two key IP 
instruments: the preparation of complete sectoral studies (or strategic business information) 
provided to enterprises as a public good, and the preferential allocation of capital to 
'targeted' industries considered as strategic by MITI (Johnson, 1982, 1986). In particular, 
the procedure known as 'administrative guidance' allowed the strategic information 
elaborated by MITI to reach the enterprises by means of relational networks established 
with the private sector. In contrast to the regulatory framework of the classical IP approach, 
adminisfrative guidance operated through MITI's 'directives', 'requests', 'suggestions' or 
'warnings' did not entail a legal obligation as in IPs derived from the "regulate state" 
(Johnson, 1982:319). A critical factor of political governance which allowed administrative 
guidance to function, was an effective, rather than formal, division of state duties and 
powers or between 'reigning' and 'ruling'. This political practice of the 'depoliticization' of 
decision-making processes allowed M i l l ' s 'economic stafiT to take decisions on economic 
policy (particularly in the long-term) beyond the possible contingencies and restrictions 
arising from political processes. Finally, despite the fact that the Japanese state played a 
central role in this experience of accelerated industrial development, the state (contrarily to 
many Western examples) neither became a direct owner of the main national large 
companies (Boltho, 1985) (or national champions), nor was its influence exerted through 
direct and compulsory IP instruments. As Cowling notes, the Japanese state was rather in 
charge of 'bringing guidance where the market offers little' (1990:18). Hence, unlike other 
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cases, the IP Japanese case (though active) is a clear example of what is termed 'indirect' 
industrial policy. Furthermore, the Japanese state did not have a fiindamental theorem of IP 
ex ante (as the classical IP approach has) but it was strategically developing it according to 
particular historical-contextual circumstances and individual cases as required. Once the 
Japanese meaning of strategy is thus understood, it illustrates that "industrial policy is first 
of all an attitude, and only then a matter of technique" (Johnson, 1984:7). 
Therefore, there exists a broad consensus that the Japanese experience of industrial 
development relied on a process of institution building that differs in a critical way from 
those underlying the classical model of state 'interventions' (Best 1990; Coriat, 1991; 
Johnson, 1982, 1986). As Johnson argues, "the Japanese have put together the political and 
economic institutions of capitalism in ways that differ from Anglo-American model" 
(1986:200). As a result, the traditional parameters utilised to think about both the actors and 
institutions of IP in light of the Japanese experience became more diffuse, tending to blur, 
as Kitshelt asserts, "the line between the private and the public realm" (1991:480). 
Consequently, the metaphor of 'intervention' in the economy, both as the traditional term 
utilised to refer to IP practice (or \\iien the state 'intervenes' in the economy) and as a term 
which reflects the relationships between 'dichotomies' such as state/market, private/public, 
and economy/policy, becomes theoretically and empirically questionable. 
1.4.2. The East Asian NICs cases 
Inspired by the Japanese case, a group of East Asian countries, notably Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, undertook comparable processes of industrial 
development in which state 'interventions' and the industrial policy played key roles 
(Johnson, 1982, 1986; Wade, 1990; Singh 1998). Due to their celebrated success, this 
group of countries became known as the 'four Asian tigers' or, in a more general sense, the 
East Asian New Industrialised Countries (NICs). 
The mobilisation and transference of resources in order to build up international 
competitiveness of their respective domestic industrial apparatus was the main strategic 
rationale followed by the East Asian NICs (Wade, 1990). Active, planned and coordinated 
IPs, rather than the free play of market forces, were the basis on which the process of 
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structural change became possible in these countries (Singh, 1998). Concisely, the East 
Asian NICs (notably. South Korea and Taiwan) began their development pattern during the 
1960s with a plarmed strategy of primary import substitution based on light industry 
promotion. It was followed by a stage of 'outward orientation' during the early 1970s in 
which IP sought export promotion. Subsequently, a second stage of import substitution 
based on heavy industry promotion took place. Finally, these economies experienced 
periods of economic liberalisation starting from the early 1980s (Wade, 1990). 
Liberalisation policies, however, began only to be established once the East Asian NICs' 
fiindamental objectives, notably the promotion of their manufacturing exports, had been 
reached (Singh, 1992). Previously, as a result of the surprising process of capital 
accumulation experienced in the ISI initial stages, the public investible resources increased, 
the role of state bureaucracy being the steering and transferring of these resources towards 
the 'targeted' industries (called 'promising industries'). The transference of public 
resources was carried out utilising different public IP instruments managed through the 
bank system, the govemment budget and public enterprises, fiscal investment schemes and 
direct investment controls. Both the capital accumulation and the 'developmental' use of 
the state-created rents (see Section 1.4.2.1) largely relied on 'market guidance', regarding 
the long-term investments and socialising risks that such investments entailed, provided by 
the central govemment. Although slightly different to the Japanese MITI, powerfiil public 
agencies were in charge of most domestic aspects of the IP, such as trade and foreign 
investment policy. In some cases, notably South Korea, the IP framework was endorsed 
with a similar degree of strategic importance to that of the macroeconomic policy 
framework. Chang notes, regarding the Korean case, that "[a]lthough macroeconomic 
constraints often set severe limits on the conduct of industrial policy, industrial policy has 
been actively used whenever deemed necessary and practical. When the aim of 
macroeconomic stability clashed with the aim of upgrading the industrial structure, the 
latter was usually allowed to dominate" (1994:110). Anti-rent seeking IP devices also 
became a central piece to the Korean model (ibid). 
With respect to the institution building scheme on which these experiences of industrial 
development were based, the East Asian NICs show notable differences. This reveals the 
diversity of possible forms that institution building can take in promoting industrial 
competitiveness. Taiwan found a key engine in the large 'upstream' public enterprises with 
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which the govemment estabhshed cooperative relationships. Unlike South Korea (and also 
Japan), the Taiwanese case demonstrates a larger degree of separation between the 
govemment and the private sector (Wade, 1990:179). State dirigisme and a looser, informal 
public-private relation was the core of the public and private scheme of relations in Taiwan 
(Wade, 1990). Korea on the other hand tmsted its model of development to the active 
promotion of its big national industrial conglomerates (chaebols), with which the state 
established a relationship based on a rigid system of incentives and punishments or "carrots 
and sticks" (Kim, 1994). Such a system evolved from a more coercive stage towards a more 
negotiated one, particularly with the increasingly successfijl chaebols (Chang, 1994; Wade, 
1990). The East Asian NICs' scheme of political govemance largely exceeded the limits of 
the so-called Japanese 'soft authoritarianism' (Johnson, 1982). Indeed, the authoritarian 
political systems ruling these countries acted as a guarantee (at a high social cost) of both 
political 'stability' and the centralisation of the decision-making process needed for the 
industrialist thinking-led accumulation process to occur. It must be said that unlike some 
authoritarian regimes observed in Latin America (notably Argentina and Chile during the 
1970s and 1980s), the industrialist project of development was the main priority of 
economic policy put forward by the East Asian NICs' governments. Finally, although the 
evidence shows that the govemments were able to 'govem the market' in the East Asian 
NICs experiences (Wade, 1990), they did not supplant it (Singh, 1998). With reference to 
the Korean case, Chang concludes, 
"[t]hat the Korean state has put a restraint on the operations of the market does not mean 
that it did not believe in the power of the market [...] What differentiates the Korean 
state's attitude toward the market from that many other states is that it has taken a 
dynamic view of the market whereby problems of technical change and learning, rather 
than allocative efficiency, have taken centre stage" (1994:128). 
Therefore, the above experiences demonstrate that IP and the market are compatible 
concepts and that, when well matched, can become a powerfiil device to industrial 
development. More importantly, it also demonstrates that the fundamental "institutions of 
capitalism" can be re-built up and re-organised in many different ways, following strategic 
rationales embedded in cumulative and path-dependent learning pattems. 
32 
1.4.2.1. From the developmental state to the need to develop a state 
The 'developmental' state observed in all the Asian experiences of industrial development 
constituted an important institutional novelty that substantially differs from other 'ideal 
types' of states such as the corporatist, despotic or liberal. In summarising the nature of the 
developmental state regarding the IP framework Wade (1990:342) suggests that, 
"the central economic mechanism of the capitalist developmental state is the use of state 
power to raise the economy's investible surplus; insure that a high portion is invested in 
productive capacity within the national territory; guide investment into industries that are 
important for the economy's ability to sustain higher wages in the future; and expose the 
investment projects to intemational competitive pressure whether directly or indirectly". 
Once both rising productivity and intemational competitiveness are achieved, there follows 
a cycle of domestic investments that leads to rises in labour demand, increases in labour 
incomes, and subsequent improvements in the distribution of benefits of growth. 
Two key issues arise from the definition provided above. First, the state has accumulated 
sufficient influence and power "to shape, pursue and encourage the achievement of explicit 
developmental objectives" (Leftwich, 1995:401 quoted by Amin, 1995). Second, the state 
effectively has and pursues a 'strategic rationality', which underlies all of the 
developmental IP instmments established and 'oversees' the performance of its main 
political-institutional guidelines. As already seen, this strategic rationality has critical 
influence on macroeconomic, trade and regulatory policies. As regards the specific political 
and institutional foundations of the developmental state, Amin (1995) argues that there 
exist three factors (the last of which has been already discussed) that explain the relation 
between this particular kind of state and economic success: "strategic state economic 
leadership; division of labour and reciprocity between the executive and the economic 
bureaucracy; and state-driven embedded networks of influence and obligation"(l995:31). 
The first factor is largely explained by the hegemonic control of state power by a 
modemizing developmental elite (based on an authoritarian pohtical system) and its 
permanent enhancement and defence of the national development project. The existence of 
an "efficient and powerful economic bureaucracy" endowed with decision-making policy 
'autonomy' with respect to the political elite helps to explain the second factor. As Amin 
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notes, "the progressive insulation of economic decision making and industrial policy in the 
hands of a small technocracy of highly qualified professionals gathered together in 
specialist economic agencies such as MITI in Japan or the Economic and Planning Board in 
South Korea" (ibid:28) became the key factor to achieving the necessary levels of 
autonomy required (and reached) by the economic staff However, it was not an 
'accountable' autonomy (with respect to the agenda of the developmental political elite) 
which mattered for the success of the developmental state, but an embedded' autonomy. 
This means that the economic decision making process within the state apparatus should 
also rely on links and networks of inter-dependencies developed with both other public 
agencies and, critically, private organisations and enterprises. Evans (1992, 1995) coined 
the term 'embedded autonomy' to refer to this combination of 'autonomy' and 'embedding' 
in the decision making mechanisms. The 'clientelist relational networks' (Amin, 1995) 
through which embedding took place in the Asian experiences were mostly developed 
along with the largest national economic conglomerates (such as the Japanese zaibatsu and 
the Korean chaebol), politically privileged large companies' peak business associations and 
the main banking and financial institutions. Despite critiques received during the second 
half of the 1990s (see below), this governance scheme of public/private relations was the 
key tool in the widening of the state 'intelligence' through which these states were able to 
overcome a series of 'failures' where the market offers no guidance (notably, information 
failures). That is, by gathering information, knowledge and know how coming from the 
states' networks of relations (Evans, 1992). The embedded autonomy becomes an efficient 
mechanism both for maintaining institutional counterweights between the big economies 
and public powers, whilst also controlling the former, and building up legitimacy and 
consensus on the developmental policies undertaken. 
The crises in the Asian countries in the late 1990s sparked a wave of criticism aimed 
precisely at the nature of public/private relations in this region. In Argogyaswamy's view 
(1998), the Asian crisis was the result of institutional and structural weaknesses caused by a 
'cronyistic' political-economic structure and a non-transparent ( if not corrupt) corporate 
governance system. Indeed, Krugman (1998) claims that the combination of industrial 
policy and corruption generated fiindamental problems of moral hazard since the scheme of 
incentives established (in which there operate an effective socialisation of risk warranted by 
public policy) led to 'unaccountable' investments by large firms. Krugman notes that in a 
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context of weakened institutional contiols the banks were willing accomplices in the firms' 
investment strategies as they were effectively still under governmental guarantee or control. 
It is not my intention here to get into details about the causes of the last Asian Crises. I 
acknowledge that to some extent the emergence of this crisis related to the interplay of 
some of the factors of political and economic governance mentioned above, notably 
corruption. However, concerning this debate, I largely agree with a long list of scholars for 
whom these factors were not the main cause of the crisis (Chang, Park and Yoo, 1998; 
Haggard and Mo, 2000; Hughes, 2000; Johnson, 1998). In a broad sense, Johnson 
(1998:653) understands that there are three "main contenders" among explanations for the 
crisis, all three of which may prove to be true due to their effects on the Asian economies: 
"the liquidity-crunch explanation; the overcapacity explanation, and the end-of-the-Cold-
War-in East-Asia explanation". In particular, Chang et al (1998:735), by referring to the 
Korean case, conclude "that it was the dismantling of the traditional mechanisms of 
industrial policy and financial regulation [from 1993 to 1997], rather than the perpetuation 
of the traditional regime, that generated the crisis". Johnson comes to a similar conclusion 
arguing that "[t]hroughout the (Asian) region, the current crisis was caused much more by 
under-regulation than by corruption or any other side effects of an overly close relationship 
between businesses and the govemmenf (1998:654). In all the cases, the package of 
'recommendations' to rescue the Asian region from the crisis put forward by multilateral 
organisations such as IMF (best known as the neoliberal program of adjustment and 
structural reform) are identified as the key problem in the outbreak and deepening of the 
crisis. Though Johnson (1998) admits that only Japan fits the 'crony capitalism' argument 
(becoming "a serious side effect of Japanese-type economies" in Johnson's words) he 
argues that its economic costs have been rather exaggerated by the critique (ibid:655). What 
is more important, the wave of criticisms aimed at the Asian experiences of industrial 
development still has not explained why these countries (in particular the 'Four Asian 
Tigers'), to a large extent and in a short period of time, overcame their previous condition 
of 'underdevelopment' countries. It is an issue that in the Latin American countries remains 
to be seen. 
Returning to the Latin America case, as shown in Chapter 4, a process of re-building of the 
Argentinean state in its different constituent scales is required in order to rethink a new 
framework of economic policy in which IP plays a key role. A process in this sense should 
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necessarily be different to those observed in the Asian experiences since it must consider 
both the rules of the game of the still dominant political-economic setting and the new 
context of debate inaugurated in the aftermath of the economic collapse of the neoliberal 
project and the political crisis that occurred in Argentina at the end of 2001. Hence, though 
the developmental state legacy demonstrates that processes of institution building based on 
public/private collaboration and public 'guidance' may play key roles in boosting industrial 
competitiveness, it also shows shortcomings that have limited its development and that in 
turn challenge some of the main aims of this thesis. Notably, the experiences o f industrial 
development outlined above were based on 'top-down-led' institutional agreements, 
developed under authoritarian systems of economic and political governance, in which only 
the largest public and private corporative powers (national-states^ and large public or 
private companies) participated. The case of the Third Italy, based on a 'bottom-up-led' 
industrial development process, w i l l provide me instead with insights to discuss the IP 
question in a diametrically opposed perspective to the 'top-down-led' experiences above. It 
is in the 'intersection' of both approaches to IP (regarding conceptual frameworks, practical 
experience and methodologies) that there w i l l perhaps emerge some of the answers that this 
research is looking for in the Latin American case. 
1.4.3. The Third Italy case 
The term 'Third Italy' refers to the celebrated Italian industrial districts o f the Emilia 
Romagna region, in the North Central part of Italy. Unlike the industrialised north and the 
agricultural south, the Emilia-Romagna economy and its pattern of industrial organisation 
is based on a system of small entrepreneurial firms (Brusco, 1982). Hence this region is 
best known as 'Third Italy' in the literature concerned with industrial development. The 
success stories of the manufacturing SMEs of the Emilia-Romagna region, which upgraded 
their innovative capabilities and conquered international markets (mostly during the 1970s 
and 1980s), were largely based on the development of a specialised but flexible scheme of 
production, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a place-based collective system of 
learning and production organisation on which the latter relies (Becattini, 1979; Brusco, 
^ I have used 'national-state' to refer to these experiences even though the Chinese province of Taiwan is not 
a national-state. However, due to the level of both political and economy autonomy showed during its 
development process Taiwan's government acted as it were a 'national-state'. 
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1982; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990). Both fectors, along with the subsequent 
exceptional levels of growth reached in this region (Best, 1990), have had a marked impact 
on the IP debate. 
The Third Italy succeeded as a result of an institution building process in which 'the place', 
understood as a social construction, and the main actors of consequence to industrial 
development of that place such as firms and public, private and intermediate institutions 
were, in effect, involved. Two 'relational' factors seem to have been critical in shaping 
'collective entrepreneurship' (Cooke and Morgan, 1994). Firstly, the nature of the relations 
among local small firms, which made interfirm collaboration and varied economies of 
association possible. Secondly, the active presence of numerous formal institutions (or 
'extra-firm' institutions, in Best's words -1990-) along with the network o f relationships 
developed between them and the firms, which underpins competitive performance of 
local/regional firms. Formal institutions include public, private and intermediate institutions 
such as local governments and diverse public agencies, R & D institutes, trade unions, 
community-based civi l associations, varied entrepreneurs associations (notably, CGA -
General Confederation of Artisans- and C A N -National Confederation of Artisans-) 
consortiums and, critically, the regional development agency ERVET (Ente Regionale per 
la Valorizzazione Economica del Territorio), established in 1974, and the diverse sectoral 
and functional centres of 'real services' provision to firms. As Cooke and Morgan note, the 
shareholding structure of ERVET (the core o f the Emilia's institutional set up) "reflects an 
ethos of collaborative engagement in the sense that ERVET has tried to integrate the 
potential o f public and private sectors, o f credit and financial institutions, entrepreneurial 
associations, and chambers o f commerce, etc. Although ERVET is itself the dominant 
shareholder it sets a high premium on involving as wide a social constituency as possible" 
(1994:109). Therefore, a novel architecture of governance in the fi"ame of the IP debate, 
based on the interplay of local political and economic actors and institutions and in which 
local governments often play key roles of intermediation and coordination, became the key 
policy maker in charge of designing and managing the IP instruments established. Hence 
government 'interventions' and the IP framework in the Third Italy have also aimed to both 
strengthen and widen different aspects of local/regional institution building. 
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The Emilian IP framework provided firms with a variety o f business-services, generically 
known as 'real services' (see below), though also with institutionalised financial resources. 
Furthermore, as Brusco notes, it helped to mobilise "local forces [ . . . ] in support of 
demands directed to the state" (1982:181). Interestingly, the Emilian IP framework often 
reaches areas o f local social policy, for instance social services and urban planning (i.e. 
control of speculative building development), which both raised the real wages and quality 
of l ife of the population and helped to cut the firms' costs. The quasi-public 'service 
centres' established in different industrial districts of the region (i.e. Emilia Romagna 
Textile Information Centre -CITER-, in Carpi) are perhaps the most striking vectors o f 
local IP observed in this experience of industrial development. These centres provided the 
firms with the so-called real services, which enabled Ihem, in particular the smaller ones, to 
overcome restrictions associated with their size and scale economies such as availability o f 
resources, time and skills. Access to business information, training and technological 
upgrading programmes whether collectively or individually delivered (Brusco, 1982; Pyke 
et al, 1990), and a proper utihsation and 'assimilation' o f these business assets, are 
examples of real services. Specifically, through the institutionalised service provision, the 
small firms were able to update in areas such as marketing, new technologies, fashionable 
product trends, intemational trade and business opportunities. The availability of collective 
external economies, such as the industrial atmosphere which arose in Emilia Romagna as a 
result of the series of institutional innovations which occurred, became a key source for the 
creation of dynamic competitive advantage in the region (Bianchi and Giordani, 1993). 
Interestingly, this is tme for 'low-tech' industries and labour-intensive manufacturing 
sectors such as ceramics, furniture and knitwear. Hence, Bianchi and Giordani (1993:33) 
conclude that " [ i ] f by industrial policy we mean the set of interventions aimed at inducing 
structural changes in the productive system, then 'structural services' may well be 
considered as an instrument of industrial policy". 
Unlike the Asian 'developmental' states, the Italian national-state did not have a direct and 
active involvement in the decision-making process related to the 'bottom-up-led' industrial 
development experience o f the industrial districts of the Emilia Romagna (Brusco, 1982). 
However, the good competitive performance reached by the small firms o f this region 
carmot be explained without recognising the role played by two key 'national' IP 
instruments targeted toward the manufacturing firms: the so-called 'Sabatini Law' (1965), 
38 
aimed at the subsidised acquisition o f 'New Capital Equipment', and the poHcy of 
'Information and Technology Diffusion ' . Both 'top-down-led' IP instruments, without 
becoming 'market guidance' (such as it was observed in the Asian experiences) did 
however help to steer the system of investment incentives for small and medium-sized 
firms towards patterns o f technological upgrading necessary to underpin learning and 
irmovation. Hence this experience demonstrates how a positive combination of 'bottom-up-
led' territorial mobilisation, in order to put forward industrial development agendas, and 
specific 'top-down' schemes o f national IP may become a key 'trigger' device for industrial 
competitiveness in a locality or region. 
Therefore, the nature o f the IP framework observed in the Third Italy leads me to revaluate 
the critical importance, for market guidance and industrial competitiveness, of economic 
agents and institutional set ups so far undervalued ( i f not ignored) in both the classical and 
developmental IP approaches. These can be divided into four distinct areas. First, the sub-
national local and/or regional dimension o f IP and, linked with these, 'decentralised' 
schemes of 'top-down' national IP. Second, both geographical proximity and the social 
foundations o f economic life and social capital developed in a given territory. Third, 
networking activities and the subsequent development of associative economies primarily 
between small- and medium-sized firms and between firms and 'extra-firm' institutions. 
Four, the collective entrepreneur or the 'community o f producers' operating in the 'local 
polity' (Best, 1990) which, through social conventions, underlying the economies of 
association and supplying monitoring and control devices to avoid the risk o f opportunistic 
conducts (Best 1990; Pyke et al, 1990). The Third Italy experience thus offers valuable 
elements in rethinking the diffuse borders between dichotomies such as economy and polity 
or market and plan (Best, 1990). The interplay o f political and economic governance 
factors, along with social factors underlying the former, were here a key tool in tmst- and 
consensus-building starting fi-om which competition and cooperation between potentially 
contradictory interests becomes possible. I t allowed the region to establish interactive and 
more 'horizontal' mechanisms o f decision-making regarding IP and local industrial 
competitiveness. 
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1.5. Concluding remarks 
Chapter 1 began by analysing the classical IP approach and the main criticisms that this 
approach, inspired by the market failure theory, has received. As argued, this is an IP 
approach of 'negative' and 'static' nature in which IP (which in all cases is a second-best 
resource) is justified only i f it is both regulatory in nature and aimed at reducing 
inefficiencies identified as market failures. Furthermore, only the largest companies, which 
have reached monopolist and oligopolist positions in the market, here constitute the direct 
'object' (or target) of IP. The national state, through its legal and regulatory system, 
constitutes in turn the only 'subject' (or policy-maker) o f IP. Territorial cormotations, apart 
from those concerning (legally circumscribed) nations, are absent f rom this approach as 
(macroeconomic) regulatory policies have an effect on national territories as a whole. 
Drawing on a brief review of historical events, I have then set the scene starting f rom which 
state 'interventions' in the economy, particularly IP, were both abandoned and conceptually 
stigmatised as a tool of economic policy for development. The 'market view', based on the 
influential neoliberal legacy, became the hegemonic paradigm of economic policy in the 
major capitalist Western economies. The adjustment policies and structural reform 
programs inspired by the so-called 'Washington Consensus' laid the foundations of 
economic policy ' for development' still ' in force' in Latin America -though recently 
questioned in countries like Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. Finally, the practices of new 
forms of supply-side economies and IP frameworks alternative to neoliberalism 
paradoxically came to revive 'the IP debate', though this time under original and 
stimulating supply-side economics fi-ameworks. The experiences o f Japan, the East Asian 
NICs and the Third Italy have demonstrated that IP, i f widely but 'strategically' employed, 
can become a powerfial instrument of economic policy for development in the context of 
market economies. Accordingly, there are four key theoretical claims I would like to raise 
regarding IP in the following chapters. 
Firstly, the nature of IP in the 'heterodox' experiences of industrial development has turned 
into both a 'positive', in the sense that it critically helps to guide or steer the firms' conduct 
(in order to become part of the market), and a 'dynamic', in the sense that the definition of 
competition is fi-amed in a Schumpeterian view in which the innovative capabilities of 
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economic agents become determinant factors. Both the Schumpeterian and particularly the 
Neo-Schmpeterian approaches w i l l consequently be specifically discussed in Chapter 3. As 
Sawyer notes, f rom a criterion of economic efficiency based on allocative (or static) 
efficiency there emerges here one IP rationale that seeks "to move the focus to dynamic 
efficiency" (1992a:2). It w i l l allow me to think about an IP framework substantially 
different to that inspired by the market failure theory in which firms "have to accept the 
prevailing market conditions and cannot mould those conditions to their own advantage" 
(Sawyer, 1992b.66). In Best's (1990) words, under a dynamic IP viewpoint both firms and 
IP itself perform active roles in 'market-shaping' actions rather than in 'market-reacting' 
actions. Hence to this scholar "a first element in a successfijl industrial policy is a creative 
use of the markef (ibid:20). That is, in the setting of what Best identifies as the 'new 
competition'.* 
Secondly, the state is here critically called upon to supply 'guidance' to those enterprises or 
industries defined as strategic (or 'infant industries', in many cases), by the developmental 
national states or by the local or regional governments, as seen in the Third Italy case. 
However, the state (as the main policy-maker o f IP) no longer operates 'isolated' within 
society but performs through networks o f relations and institutional agreements established 
(mostly but not exclusively) with the private sector starting fi-om diverse and differentiated 
processes o f institutional building. As a result, a discussion surfaces as regards the very 
nature o f the relation between state and economy and, more specifically, between IP and 
market. That is, in light o f the analysed heterodox experiences where critically state, 
economy, IP and market are complementary. In this respect Best (1990), who draws upon 
the impact generated in Western academic circles by the Asian and the Third Italy 
experiences, claims: "Industrial policy fails when it overrides or ignores the market and is 
based upon the presumption that plans and markets are altemative means of economic 
coordination [Hence] effective policy toward industry depends upon breaking with the 
traditional plan or market dichotomy that informs conventional economic theory" (ibid.20). 
Similarly, Sawyer argues that the potential complementarity between market or plan and. 
^ Best coined the tenn 'New Competition' to rqjort the determinant factors of industrial competitiveness 
emerging during the 1980s and 1990s in the international market place. In Best's view "the New Competition 
can be distingmshed from the old in four dimensions: organization of the firm, types of coordination across 
phases in the production chain, organisation of the sector, and patterns of industrial policy" (1990:11). "New 
competition is about strategic actions within each dimension" (ibid). 
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more specifically, between firms, govemment and IP "arises from the govemment setting 
the general framework within which firms operate, and seeking to aid firms to fu l f i l the 
strategy" (1992b:66). The idea of 'intentional' state guidance is reflected in what Best 
terms 'strategic industrial policy', whose differential aspect is the primacy of strategy over 
planning, and where strategic planning "is not to plan industries of the future, but to 
examine the prerequisites for sustaining competitive success and work to ensure that firms, 
which provide the real dynamic thrust, can respond quickly as new markets emerge" 
(1990:268). In the extreme. Cowling and Sudgen (1994a,b) claim that the market is not the 
starting point of IP but both the production sphere and the challenge concerning the 
incorporation of the firms into the market. 
Third, intemational 'competitiveness' became both a leading concept for development of 
domestic industrial apparatus and therefore a guide (and benchmark to reach) for IP. In 
other words, while the dynamic factors of the new competition are identified as the main 
source of economic performance in the new competition setting, the intemational market 
place (in a context of increasing globalisation) is identified as their main arena of 
validation. Hence, due to its impact on the supply-side economics approaches, the concept 
of competitiveness and the relation between this and IP wi l l be analysed in detail in Chapter 
2 of this thesis. As seen, competitiveness in the Asian experiences mostly refers to the 
largest public and private enterprises and economic conglomerates gaining positions in 
intemational markets. By contrast, the Third Italy case has demonstrated that the largest 
firms in an economy are not the only economic agent able to gain intemational 
competitiveness as a result of active IPs designed to that end. Small- and medium-sized 
firms, particularly when they are considered collectively, have also shown to be able to do 
so. Interestingly, it has proven to be tme even for small firms operating in 'low-tech' 
industries. SMEs thus became, for the first time in the IP debate, the 'direct object' (or 
target) of IP. The Italian experience of the industrial districts also demonstrated that the 
national-state is not necessarily the main and only 'subject' (or policy-maker) o f IP. 
Contrarily, both local and regional states and/or the architectures of pohtical and economic 
govemance estabhshed in sub-national territories can also become the main policy-maker 
of an IP framework. In addition, the territory, i f defined as a social constmction, appears for 
first time as both 'actor' and target of IP. Consequently, assessing both the 'top-down-led' 
Asian IP approaches and the 'bottom-up-led' approach observed in the Third Italy, and the 
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intersection and divergence points between these two groups of experiences, supplies me 
with valuable insights for reflection on IP in the Argentinean context. I w i l l retum to this 
point in Chapter 4. 
Finally, I w i l l finish this chapter by discussing briefly the problem of the definition of 
industrial policy. The reason why I have chosen to do so at the end and not at the beginning 
of this chapter lies in the very nature of this subject o f study. Defining what constitutes 
bona fide IP is not an easy question, no least because the wide-ranging objectives that IP 
has been expected to perform and deliver requires integrating, complementing and/or 
overlapping over a number of economic policy areas (Coates, 1996; Michie and Ougton, 
2001). As Hospers notes, " i t is unclear exactly where industrial policy stops and other 
economic policies such as competition, trade and regional policy begin" (2001:139). 
Perhaps the most archetypal (and all-encompassing) definition of IP is one still in use in an 
informative volume titled 'Industrial Policies After 2000', according to which "industrial 
policy is about govemment intervention in markets" (Eisner and Groenewegen, 2000:1). 
Coates (1996), suggests a broad definition such as this is ultimately not very useful as it 
serves to hide and obscure the nature o f industrial policy. In this respect Wren (2001) 
rightly argues, tiiat the defining problem lies not in the meaning o f the 'industry' part of IP 
(as it can be taken to be any paid production, whether public or private and manufacturing 
and services, outside the administrative sector) but in the definition o f 'policy' and, in 
particular, its necessary intention and relative subjectivity. The atypical character of 
industrial policy has been well documented by Audretsch, to whom IP first: 
"reflects more of a subject for investigation than any one particular developed and 
established academic discipline. Scholarship on the subject is not monopolized within 
the domain of any single traditional field. [...] The second striking characteristic of the 
field is a lack of consensus about what actually constitutes bona fide industrial policy, 
[and] A third characteristic of the literature on industrial policy is that it is fairly specific 
to the particular countries involved" (1998:9). 
The 'contingent' character of IP should also be added to this enumeration. As stated by 
Hiroya Ueno, one of Japan's leading IP theorists. 
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"unlike traditional fiscal and monetary policies, industrial policy demonstrates no clear 
relationship between its objectives and the means of attaining them. Its conceptions, 
content, and forms differ, reflecting the stage of development of an economy, its natural 
and historical circumstances, international conditions, and its political and economic 
situation, resulting in considerable differences fi-om nation to nation and fi^om era to 
era"(1983:34) (quoted by Johnson 1984:6). 
Consequently, the 'changing' nature o f IP w i l l force me to undertake a conceptual search 
within different theoretical traditions that have conceptualised the IP idea under the new 
settings. Aware of the risk of falling into theoretical relativism, I w i l l ascribe to an 
epistemological principle according to which "[a] continuing dialogue between different 
perspectives is clearly preferable to a continued search for a single, new, all-encompassing 
paradigm" (Hudson, 2000:21). This is one in which the definition of IP should be in part a 
research result rather than an ex-ante defined concept upon models of unique rationale. 
In the following chapter I w i l l first examine briefly the ways in which the IP debate has 
reacted in face of the 'heterodox' export-oriented experiences of industrial development 
discussed above. Then I w i l l examine how the very nature of the IP idea, upon the 
paradigm o f 'competitiveness', has been transformed in light o f the changes in the 
international market place. In doing so I w i l l begin to mould the emerging supply-side 
economics theories which in Chapter 3 I w i l l term the 'New Industrial Policy'. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Industrial Policy and Competitiveness: Transition or 
Continuity? 
2.1. Introduction 
The concept of 'competitiveness' has recently taken enormous analytical importance in 
academic circles and in the world policy-makers concerned with industrial development 
issues. As Porter observed more than a decade ago, "competitiveness has become one of the 
central preoccupations of govemment and industry in every nation" (1990:1). In developing 
countries, policy makers every year closely watch indices, ranking intemational 
competitiveness performance (Lall, 2001). To a large extent, competitiveness became the 
general prism through which supply-side economics and IP are currently rethought in the 
framework of increasingly open market economies. What is more, to many scholars 
competitiveness came to supersede the old-fashioned idea o f industrial policy (Porter, 1990; 
UNIDO, 1999). Such an interest on the issue o f competitiveness is however not new. A 
number o f works concemed with the problem of the intemational competitiveness of the 
main Westem economies were written during the early 1980s (Johnson, 1984; Magaziner 
and Reich, 1982; Reich, 1982a, 1982b; Tyson and Zysman, 1983; Turrow, 1985), giving 
place to what Johnson (1984) termed 'The Industrial Policy Debate'. This debate, largely 
developed in the Harvard Business Review, evolved around the idea that Westem 
economies, notably the US, were: a) deindustrialising, particularly due to the crisis in their 
manufacturing industries; b) losing positions in the intemational market place, at the hands 
of newcomers (notably, the newly industrializing countries); and, c) that macroeconomic 
measures were not sufficient for reactivating their competitive performance. Hence, the 
main conclusion of the IP advocators was that the states should intervene through active IPs 
aimed to promote and enhance processes o f stmctural adjustment in the (largest) domestic 
industries in order to boost their 'international competitiveness'. As Amable and Petit 
(1996:31) stress, "the 1980s thus appear as a transition period where IPs lost ground but 
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gained new credentials when changes in the forms of competition which characterize the 
post mid-1970s context are taken into account". 
In which sense was this a period o f transition? First and foremost, the IP debate reflected on 
a 'virtuous' relation that was not obvious in the framework of the old IP, that of successful 
competitive performance critically relating to 'intemational competitiveness'. This passage 
from IP towards a concept reflecting on intemational competitiveness is clearly reflected in 
the pioneering work of Magaziner and Reich, in which it is argued: "industrial policy must 
pay careful attention to intemational market signals, noting pending structural shifts and 
helping the domestic economy adjust to them" (1982:332). To assume that firms should 
aim to compete in the intemational market place or to consider intemational standards as 
benchmarks for them, presents significant conceptual limitations for the old BP idea. In 
Amable and Petit's (1996) view, these limitations are threefold. Firstly, IP per se is no 
longer able to control competitive pressures associated with external markets. Second, the 
influence of the most restricted aspects o f an IP (for instance, those linked with 'national' 
regulatory policies) is today limited due to the increasing intemalisation of firm activities. 
This means that firms now "have more latitude for escaping the constraints set upon them 
by IPs" (ibid:32). Third, IP rationale should now strictly observe the issue o f its neutrality 
(with respect to all the firms in a market) and its political legitimacy. As these authors note, 
" [ i ] t has become increasingly difficult to implement targeted policies aimed at favouring a 
particular sector because such a policy usually means favouring one or a few national firms, 
which leads to an opposition from other countries" (ibid:32). Hence, the IP idea was losing 
ground as a tool o f economic policy in academic and policy maker circles and began to be 
surpassed by the concept of competitiveness. It is worth considering what is meant by 
'competitiveness' within this context. To this end, some definitions and discussions relating 
to competitiveness are outlined below. 
2.2. Discussing competitiveness 
Competitiveness is not a formal concept in economics. The concept in feet comes fi'om the 
business school literature where, according to Lal l " i t forms the basis for a great deal of 
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strategic analysis" (2001:1502-3). Debates on competitiveness often start with the question 
of definition. A much quoted and accepted definition of national competitiveness is "the 
degree to which [a country] can, under free and feir market conditions, produce goods and 
services which meet the test of international markets, while simultaneously maintaining and 
expanding the real incomes o f its people over the longer term" (OECD, 1992, quoted by 
Boltho 1996:3). Variants o f this definition can be found in the United States 
Competitiveness Policy Council's first report (1994) and in E U white papers (1993, 1994). 
The World Economic Forum (WEF) supplies instead a definition that stresses the nation v/s 
nation dialectic involved in the problem of competitiveness: "World competitiveness is the 
ability of a country or company to, proportionally, generate more wealth than its 
competitors in the worid markets" (Geneva, 1994, quoted by Aiginger, 1996:125). 
Fagerberg (1996) identifies three basic constituents of competitiveness. Firstiy, 
competitiveness is a relative concept since it involves the comparison o f performance 
across economic units. As Lall (2001) informs, both the elaboration o f competitiveness 
indicators and their comparison are however extremely intricate as "the phenomenon is too 
multifaceted and complex to permit easy measurement" (ibid: 1520). Secondly, 
competitiveness refers to different economic units including firms, industries as well as 
national (and sub-national) economies as a whole. Thirdly, competitiveness, when applied 
at the level o f countries, can relate either to qualitative features (i.e. the well being of 
population) or to more quantitative features (i.e. trade performance of domestic industries). 
Defining the correct unit of analysis to measure competitiveness, how different economic 
units relate to each other, and which are the rationales for policy, have been and still are 
sources of greater controversy (Aiginger, 1996; Boltho, 1996; Camagni, 2002; Krugman, 
1994, 1996; Lawton, 1999). It is not my intention to provide a detailed account of the 
debate on the validity of the concept of national competitiveness. Rather, in the review 
below, I w i l l stress some aspects conceming the complex relationship between 
competitiveness and IP. 
In the industrial competitiveness debate, many studies agree that the ' f i r m ' is the correct 
unit of analysis (Porter, 1990; UNIDO 1999). Porter, a leading academic in this field, 
proposes to substitute the concept o f national competitiveness with that of competitiveness 
of "specific industries and industry segments" (1990:9). He understands that the firms and 
not nations compete in the international market. Hence the key question for Porter to be 
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answered is "why do firms based in particular nations achieve international success in 
distinct segments and industries?" (ibid: 18). Porter's answer relies on the productivity with 
which a nation's resources (mainly capital and labour) are utilised (understanding 
productivity as the value o f the output produced by unit o f labour or capital). Furthermore, 
Porter maintains that a country is competitive wiien a concentration of competitive firms 
and sectors exists in that given country, since a country cannot be competitive in all 
industries. Some critics question Porter's argument by claiming that "a country can in 
principle be [for instance] the technological leader in most industries"; namely, the US in 
the aftermath of W W f l (Aiginger, 1996:123-4). 
In my view the debate on the concept of competitiveness became more controversial when 
competitiveness policies began to be implemented. In fact, during the 1990s 
competitiveness became the key concept in the policy agenda of powerfiil and influential 
international organisations such as the OECD, E U and The World Economic Forum 
(WEF). The controversy generated by Krugman (1994, 1996, 1998), regarding the validity 
of the concept of competitiveness is well known. To Krugman the assumption that 
countries compete with each other for world markets in the same way that corporations do 
is "a poor metaphor" (1996:17-18). According to Krugman, countries "do not go out of 
business" as corporations do (1998:6). In his view, the economic success of a country is 
determined by domestic factors (notably, the US in which exports represents only about 10 
per cent of GDP). I t primarily depends upon the rate of (domestic) productivity growth, and 
not on productivity growth relative to other countries. ICnigman claims that "[e]ven though 
world trade is larger than ever before, national living standards are overwhelmingly 
determined by domestic fectors rather than by some competition for world markets" 
(1994:34). Hence national competitiveness can be used "as a poetic way of saying 
productivity, without actually implying that international competition has anything to do 
with i t" (1994:35). His critique concludes by claiming that the dangers o f the 'obsession 
with competitiveness' could result not least in the wasteful spending of public resources but 
most importantly, govemments could try to embrace protectionism by following neo-
mercantilist strategic trade policies aimed at promoting national firms at the expense of 
other producer countries (ibid). 
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Regarding whether countries compete as companies do, Lawton (1999) rightly points out 
two key issues. Firstly, i t is widely accepted that in the global economy arena there are 
transnational corporations that enjoy high levels of autonomy and compete directly with 
one another for world market shares. In such a case, it is firms, and not governments (which 
tend to be either 'marginalized' or 'adopted' as partners by the intemational players) who 
compete. However, the great majority o f firms (that is, the micro-, small- and medium-size 
firms) in most countries (notably, in developing countries) cannot be classified as 
transnational corporations. They have a distinct national identity and largely operate under 
the regulatory jurisdiction o f one national state. Hence these firms' performance is critically 
linked to the governmental policies aimed at supporting industry. Lawton maintains that 
when this segment of firms penetrates intemational markets " i t may be argued that both the 
individual firm and the nation are competing, given the clearly identifiable and strong ties 
between the firm and its national govemment and economy" (1999:7-8). Secondly, Lawton 
argues that because "access to market share globally is unequal" the govemment-firm 
equation is becoming increasingly relevant to the competitive success of the smaller firms 
in the context o f what he calls 'the age of co-operation' (ibid). With this expression he 
refers to the policy framework essentially based on govemment-business partnerships 
emerged through the 1990s in the intemational setting. Consequently, Lawton concludes 
that raising productivity can be achieved through public policies, and that nations do 
compete " in that they choose policies to promote higher living standards" (ibid:4). 
Likewise, Aiginger (1996) maintains that aspirations among countries vary as regards both 
economic goals (i.e. export and income expectations) and 'preferences' between economic 
and social goals. Consequently, "an assessment of the competitiveness of a nation can be 
made only after filling these subjective notions with some content, the content, however, 
depends on past achievements and current aspirations" (ibid: 125-6). Aiginger's 
contribution to this debate is valuable for this study because he delegates the scope of 
policy decision-making to individual countries, and their respective strategies for 
development, giving less importance to 'universal' benchmarking (intemational 'best 
practices') endorsed by mainstream institutions regarding competitiveness standards. The 
insights provided by Lawton (1999) and Aiginger (1996) to the debate on the issue of 
competitiveness are key arguments for the policy agenda in developing countries. These 
countries often have scarcely intemationalised manufacturing industries, on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, they have serious structural deficiencies which make tiieir standards 
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of (intemational) competitiveness far f rom those observed in industrialised countries. The 
following section presents a model o f national competitiveness policy, fi-om which I w i l l 
start to try to place into context the issue of competitiveness in developing countries. 
2.3. 'Models' of competitiveness and critique 
Some interesting models o f competitiveness were generalised towards the end of the 1990s, 
along with respective policy recommendations (i.e. UNIDO, 1999; Lawton, 1999). I w i l l 
focus here on the work by Sercovich et al (1999) for the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO), due to its particular concems with the issue of 
'manufacturing competitiveness' in developing countries. 
Like other approaches already discussed, the UNIDO's model argues that the firm is the 
right unit o f analysis to measure manufacturing competitiveness. It includes three different 
aggregate levels of firms to the policy design: the competitive f i rm (firm-centred policies); 
the competitive subsector (subsector-specific policies); and the competitive manufacturing 
sector (industry-wide policies). To the UNIDO's model, a 'competitive firm' is one that: 1) 
Stands at the best practice frontier, in terms of production and management, being cost-
efficient, quality-oriented, dependable, flexible and innovative; 2) has accumulated 
significant human and physical capital endowments, as well as intangibles, with 
demonstrated productive and technological capabilities; 3) has a superior economic and 
financial performance. A 'competitive subsector' in turn is one in which "its representative 
f i rm is competitive, in the sense that firms, on average, produce a competitive output, as 
measured by the ability of the subsector competitively to supply domestic and intemational 
markets" (ibid:85). I f this is the case for both the subsector and manufacturing sector, the 
model understands that "this constitutes prima facie evidence that the country's 
macroeconomic prices and systemic costs are in balance and that country is endowed with 
sufficient human, material and institutional resources to be competitive" (ibid:85-6) 
(emphasis in original). With regard to policy recommendations, this model put forward the 
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concept of 'capability building', by claiming that 'industrial development policies'^ aim "at 
increasing the productivity of resources in the medium- and long-run through capability 
building" (ibid:9). As observed from the quotation, the concept of 'capability building' 
becomes a key and wide-reaching one within this model. As the UNIDO model notes, 
capability building "refers to skill enhancement, scientific and technological progress, 
capital accumulation, quality upgrading, resource mobilization, environmental 
sustainability and market, institutional and regional development" (ibid:9). Both the policy 
areas and the battery of instruments derived f rom this model are exposed in Table 1 below. 
I t includes an order o f priority to the policy areas recommended, regarding the type of 
economy in question (see left-hand column in Table 1). The world's economies are 
classified as: a) successful industrialised economies (i.e. East and South-East Asia); b) 
economies turning towards outward-oriented strategies (i.e. Brazil and India); c) the least 
developed economies (the world's poorest countries); and d) economies in transition (the 
former command economies). 
' 'Industrial development poUcies' is the concept utilised here since it interprets best the issue of 
competitiveness and allows the model to surpasses the old IP concept. 
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Table 2.1. Policies for manufecturing competitiveness 
Policies a 
Countries 
b c d 
1. Firm-centred policies: 
a. Quality and productivity programmes + + + + 
b. Training and skill acquisition + + + -f-
c. Investment incentives - 4- + -
d. R&D incentives + - -
e. Small-scale and micro-enterprise support + 4- + + + + 
2. Subsector-specific policies: 
a. Trade and commercial policies -1- + + -1- + + 
b. Subsector restructuring + + + + + + 
c. Targeted capacity creation + + + - -
d. Clusto' support (with regional focus) - + + 
e. Government-private sector networking + + + + + + 
3. Industry-wide policies -reduction of country costs: 
a. Macroeconomic and public finance costs: + + + + + 
Exchange rate + + 
Real interest rates + + + + + 
Tax rates - + 
b. Physical infrastructure: - + 4- + 
Transportation + + + + + -1-
Telecommunications - + + + + 
Energy - + -1-
Environment + + + + 
c. Social infrastructure: - + + + + + 
Education and training - + + 
Health - + + + + 
d. Regulatory and business environment: + + + + + + 
Judicial system + + + + 
Foreign Direct Investment regulations - - -1- + + 
Competition policies + + ~ + + 
Notes: Country Groups: 
A. Newly industrializing economies 
B. Newly opened economies 
C. Less developed countries 
D. Transition economies 
+ + high priority 
+ moderate priority 
Source: UNIDO, 1999 
low priority 
Five critical issues are raised by UNIDO model regarding competitiveness. Firstly, this 
ideal-type is built up on the basis of 'objective' criteria of measurement, which in theory 
can apply to manufiicturing firms in any context. Likewise, it assumes that the so-called 
'best practices' constitute the main benchmarking for industrial competitiveness. The 
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concept of 'best practice', despite its usefulness as a point of reference, can be problematic. 
Best practice (i.e. a production or managerial technique or strategy) is 'temporally' and 
'spatially' determined. That is, best practice for a firm, at one determined moment and/or in 
a determined context, may well not represent best practice for another firm in other moment 
and/or in other context. 
Secondly, this model is built on the idea of convergence of practically all areas of economic 
policy: 
"because of the multiplicity of tasks and market failures it [competitiveness] addresses, 
industrial development policies need to be finely tuned to the working of the economic 
and social incentive system and to take fiill note of the reciprocal influence between 
macro- and microeconomics, monetary and real variables, short- and longer-term 
elements and economic and social factors" (ibid:9). 
In other words, competitiveness, like some IP approaches, has also become an all-
encompassing concept. This fact represents a complex problem for this research. As Chang 
concludes "[s]uch a practice overloads the concept of industrial policy, rendering the 
concept meaningless" (1994:59). I would not like to steer this study in that direction. In 
fact, industrial policy now seems to be essentially micro- and meso-economic in nature. It 
is important to highlight here, however, that for public and private actors responding to a 
world-survey on industrial development policy and competitiveness (conducted by UNIDO 
in 1996) the good connection between industrial development policy and macroeconomic 
policy stood out 'the most important' factor in the issue of competitiveness (ibid). As seen 
in Chapter 1, the good fit between IP and macroeconomic policy is identified as one of the 
key issues in the developing of the successful Asian experiences of industrialisation. 
Thirdly, unlike the roles previously played by governments under the old IP framework, 
UNIDO's model put forward the idea of 'govemment sponsorship'. Grovemments in the 
new fi-amework for industrial development should operate "as inducer and catalyser rather 
than driving force" (ibid:6). This change of nature regarding the main actors of IP reflects 
not only "the changed consensus of the role of the govemment in society" as Wren 
(2001:857) notes, but also the influence that some components of private sector (notably, 
the largest companies and international players in a economy) have accumulated in society 
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regarding policy decision-making issues. In this regard Cowling and Sudgen warn that 
currently large corporations concentrate power so as to enforce their own corporative 
interest over any national, regional or collective interest, which is a source of 'systemic 
inefficiencies' in market economies (1990). The decentralised democratisation at the level 
of firms and the territories where they are located, is seen here as a key issue for IP 
(Cowling and Sudgen, 1995). I will come back to this point in Chapter 3. The UNIDO 
model however assigns important roles to govemments to be played in partnership with the 
private sector. Through their different agencies, govemments should work alongside with 
the private sector in order 
"to open communications channels, establish an eflfective partnership aimed at spreading 
best practice, benchmarking, assisting development of subsector export strategies, 
promoting SMIs [small- and medium-size industrial enterprises] in the context of supply 
chain development and, ultimately, attempting to address key determinants of 
competitiveness in partnership and cooperation with industry" (ibid:97). 
In particular, UNIDO asserts, "govemments provide support for firms to penetrate 
international markets" (ibid:97). 
Fourthly, unlike the old IP legacy, the nature of the policy agenda put forward by UNIDO 
is (like the WEF model, based on Lawton 1999) 'horizontal' rather than sectoral. Under this 
model, the policy should necessarily be neutral regarding its conception, design, delivery 
and aims. In this regard, Lawton concludes, "the emphasis of public intervention in the 
market has shifted from vertical actions promoting or protecting specific companies or 
business sectors, towards horizontal measures which encourage trans-sectoral fiinctional 
developmenf (1996:226). Critically, horizontal measurements "promote enterprise in the 
global market place" by facilitating market-driven structural adjustment (ibid:6). The 
relationship between policy in practice and the metaphor of 'horizontality' (as the policy's 
main rationale) presents significant problems of applicability for policy-making activities. 
UNIDO recognise this and note that "the practice of policy implementation has shown that 
many policies need, perforce, to be either targeted at or configured to specific subsectors" 
(ibid:92). In this sense, trade and commercial policies, industrial restructuring, and cluster 
policies are only some examples of policies with an almost necessary (direct or indirect) 
sectoral content. Even policies that are by defmition identified as 'horizontal', such as 
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cross-sectoral training programs and skill acquisitions, often become sectorally-determined 
so that they can function. Likewise, public/private partnerships and networking practices 
commonly are structured around subsector issues. It is worth pointing out that this model 
has an oversight with respect to the ways in which public/private partnerships are build up 
under the new settings. This omission is no less important since UNIDO maintains that 
"[rjedefining policy as vision and the basic implementation mechanisms as shared public-
private efforts would, in essence, be the making of a new approach to industrial 
development policy" (ibid:96). The tension existing between 'horizontality', as contrary to 
'verticality' (sectoral or targeted policies), has led some scholars to talk about the existence 
of a necessary degree of 'obliquity' in both the policy design and its implementation 
(Vazquez Barquero, 1995). Hence the concept of 'horizontal' policy is, at least, a 
misleading concept. I argue that the firms both are different in nature (as Nelson claims, 
firms 'differ' in different aspects -1991-), and therefore they cannot be (realistically) tried 
as identical, and their proximity to public policy varies. In both cases the degree of 
'horizontality' of a policy depends critically upon issues such as firm- size, capabilities and 
resources, location and network of relationships. Hence the accessibility to 'generic' policy 
instruments (aimed at firms as a whole) may not fulf i l the criterion of neutrality with which 
they were originally designed. Whether intentionally or not, 'horizontal' policies might 
well end up picking winners. 
Finally, establishing the exact relationship between competitiveness policy and industrial 
policy is rather problematic. In a seminal work, Johnson (1984), saw competitiveness 
policy as identical to (the old) IP. To Johnson the former refers to all those government 
policies "intended to develop/retrench various industries in a national economy in order to 
maintain global competitiveness" (1984:7). When this definition of EP is restricted to those 
aspects that affect particular firms and industries, competitiveness policy (which, as the 
UNIDO's model shows, includes macroeconomic aims) is broader. This would suggest that 
the policy measures adopted are dependant on the definitions that are used. In this sense. 
Wren notes that "where industrial policy is focused solely on competitiveness, and 
competitiveness policy is intended only to change the intersectoral allocation of 
resources"(2001:851) they are both the same. To the contrary, "where competitiveness 
policy deals only with the economy as a whole then the policies may have nothing in 
common" (ibid:851). Wren provides another interesting observation with respect to his 
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analysis on the Competitiveness White Papers in the UK (notably, the 1998 White Paper). 
He rightly asserts that that the wide view of competitiveness taken by these papers (which 
coincide with the UNIDO's model) "potentially broadened the scope of industrial policy, 
but the coincident shift in the nature of policy fi'om 'sectoral' to 'horizontal' measures has 
in fact much reduced its content" (ibid:851). Hence, Wren argues that IP may be best seen 
as a component part of competitiveness policy. In particular, "it is that part of 
competitiveness policy which is concerned with altering the intersectoral allocation of 
resources, including that at the firm, industry or sector level" (ibid), and, in which, "there is 
no substantial redistributive or stability objectives" (ibid:857). From a different perspective, 
DeMartino (1998) develops a strong critical evaluation of what he terms the 
'competitiveness-enhancing perspective'^ ". In DeMartino's view, "competitiveness became 
a means by which to salvage state intervention in pursuit of socially benevolent outcomes" 
(ibid:27). That is, during the period of 'ideological transition', operated in the 1980s, in 
which neoliberalism came to articulate the critique against state interventions. Under the 
adverse ideological circumstances of the early 1980s in which IP was 'ostracised' (see 
Chapter 1), the competitiveness advocators, (which mostly come from ideas closed to the 
supply-side policy approaches), had to 'adjust' their theoretical-ideological principles to the 
new circumstances. According to DeMartino (ibid:39), the conceptual/ideological transition 
from IP to competitiveness policy implicated a substantial shift in the policy framework. 
Industrial policy previously had "sought the creation of genuine equality, opportunity, full 
employment, and stability" (1998:26), rather than competitiveness of firms and industries 
per se. To DeMartino the following constitute the main foundations of this transition. 
Firstly, in the framework of the competitiveness policy "the market is now taken to be the 
optimal form of economic integration. The liberalised global market sets the context within 
which firms must prosper or perish" (ibid:39). Secondly, the tripartite systems of 
govemment of the IP (including state, private sector and unions) have given way to 
"bilateral capital-state partnerships"(ibid). As a result, the protection of workers' 
livelihoods "must occur through the market, in place of industrial policy's emphasis on 
protecting workers from the markef (ibid). Finally, the market "is taken to be the inevitable 
and/or most desirable form of economic organization, so that industrial strategies must 
conform to its dictates"(ibid). Hence the "competitiveness" advocaters, DeMartino 
DeMartino includes in this perspective a wide range of approaches such as flexible specialisation, human 
capital, management theorists (i.e. corporate governance) and institutionalist economists. 
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concludes, permanently need to show how market success can be tied to socially 
benevolent outcomes (ibid:39). Though the focus of this thesis is neither the distributive 
problem nor the associated search for the 'creation of universal equity and opportunities' in 
an economy, DeMartino's critical contributions remind us that these are aspects worthy of 
consideration by the IP framework under the paradigm of competitiveness. 
2.4. Concluding remarks 
The central conclusion of this chapter is that international standards of competitiveness and 
the so-called 'best practices' should be considered but only as points of reference. This is, 
beyond any criteria or standard that a given country or territory chooses in assessing its 
competitive performance. Raising productivity rates at the level of 'residential' firms or 
industries often entails undertaking ongoing processes of upgrading and 'catching-up', and 
therefore learning, following international standards regarding 'soft' (i.e. managerial 
techniques) and 'hard' (i.e. capital goods) technologies. This argument does not maintain 
that the 'external variable' was not an issue in the old IP framework, but it clearly was not 
the main one. This was the case for the great majority of manufacturing firms targeted by 
the IP in developing countries (notably, Latin America) under the ISI model, with the 
renowned exception of the East Asian countries. As UNIDO claims, the old IP aimed "at 
changing the sectoral allocation of resources through short-run redistributive measures such 
as subsidies, import restrictions and credit allocation" (1999:9). The aim of manufacturing 
competitiveness policies instead "is steering countries towards better focused policies for 
raising productivity, upgrading skills and technology, promoting innovation, attaining 
dynamic efficiency gains from learning, specialization and stimulating competition rather 
than towards protectionist policies, competitive devaluations and the like" (ibid:8).^' At the 
same time, it is necessary to insist again that the consequences of a 'do nothing setting' as 
regard to international competitiveness in increasingly open market economies can be 
ruinous. 
" Although to UNTOO there is still room for what they call 'industrial development policies' in the new 
context since "the convergence towards international policy and best practices does not mean the demise of 
national policy" (ibid:7). 
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The second conclusion derives from the context in which the new policy framework 
(whether IP or competitiveness policy) emerges and is designed and implemented. My 
specific concern relates to the real 'content' of such a policy framework regarding its 
influence and capabilities for raising productivity and boosting competitiveness (or at least 
'international awareness') in developing countries. In other words, my question is how it 
could cope with all the expectations discussed above set by UNIDO without enough 
influence on the main public decision-making spheres and in a context of rigorous 
budgetary restriction and generalised lack of capabilities. I will return to the discussion 
about this particular kind of contextual restrictions in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
The following chapter systematises and critically discusses the main theoretical approaches 
that shape the core of the NIP literature. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The New Industrial Policy Thinking 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 attempts to move the argument on fi-om previous discussions concerning IP 
towards a new rationale which explores IP in light of the emergence of 'paradigms of 
competitiveness'. Through the examination of different traditions of thought that seek to 
conceptualise the transition towards new forms of competition, I attempt to synthesise 
supply-side economics into a cohesive framework which I term 'New Industrial Policy' 
(NIP). 
The chapter is divided into four subsections. Section 3.2 outlines the main philosophical 
foundations on which the new IP literature is based. That is, those principles of economic 
theory, particularly those concerning economic policy, derived from the institutionalist and 
evolutionary economic critique of the neo-liberal tradition.'^ Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present 
and discuss both of the main schools of thought concerning the new industrial policy 
literature and their respective policy fi-ameworks on industrial competitiveness and 
development. In particular. Section 3.3 analyses the literature conceming innovation, 
learning and knowledge economics, whilst Section 3.4 reviews the available literature 
conceming regions, localities and local governance. Finally, Section 3.5 summarises and 
systematises the main theoretical claims of the New Industrial Policy thinking. 
3.2. Institutional^ '^  and evolutionary economics 
Institutionalist and evolutionary economics (as well as economic sociology) provide an 
important part of the theoretical base on which new supply-side economics is recently 
By neo-liberalism I mean the school of thought that emerged in the 1970s as a result of an alliance between 
neoclassical economics, which provided most of the analytical tools, and the Austrian-libertarian tradition, 
which provided the political and moral philosophy (Chang, 2002). 
" By 'institutionalist' economics I have in mind the so-called 'Old Institutional Economies', based on the 
works of Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, Thorstein Veblen and Karl Polanyi, as opposed to the 'New 
Institutionalist Economics", based on recent works by Oliver Williamson, Mancur Olson and Douglas North. 
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being built up. Historical antecedents of institutionalist and evolutionary economics can be 
traced back to the classic works of Kari Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, Thorstein Veblen 
(Chang, 2002; Hodgson, 1988; Ingham, 1996). Marx (1867), and Schumpeter (1934) later, 
informed us about the turbulent and protean nature of the capitalism system. Marx initiated 
a fundamental analysis of economic theory by highlighting the determinant character of 
technological change on the structure and fiinctioning of the socio-economic system. 
Likewise, Marx informed us of the social nature of both individuality and the economic 
system as a whole, in doing so challenging the methodological individualism exhibited in 
mainstream economics. Schumpeter, in turn, broke the bonds of equilibrium in mainstream 
economics by asserting the key role played by iimovation and entrepreneurship in both 
economic change and evolution. Schumpeter's critique of mainstream economics gave rise 
to meaningful theoretical developments regarding the dynamic and evolutionary nature of 
economic processes. Finally, Veblen, who is regarded as the originator of the institutional 
school, informed us of the vital importance of institutions and institutional change to 
economic analysis and theory. Veblen was particularly concerned with both the ways in 
which actions are moulded by circumstances and the evolutionary character of economic 
processes. 
Currently, institutional economics can be defined in terms of 
"(a) the rejection of individuaUstic assumptions of hedonism and exogenous preferences 
in favour of a more organicist conception of individual agency; (b) the rejection of an 
exclusive emphasis on equilibrium in favour of the idea of cumulative causation; and c) 
the adoption of institutions as the main units of analysis, rather than atomistic 
individuals" (Hodgson, 1994:377). 
As regards ihe debate on point 'c' above, it is vital to point out that the 'Old Institutional 
Economics' held in this study differs from the 'New Institutionalist Economics' mainly "in 
seeing institutions not simply as constrains on the behaviours of the pre-formed and 
unchanging individuals [...] but also as shaping the individuals themselves" (Chang, 
2002:551-552). Similarly, economic sociology, or more specifically, the so-called 'New 
Economic Sociology', has laid its foundations on three main programmatic propositions: 
" 1 . economic action is a form of social action; 2. economic action is socially situated; and 
3. economic institutions are social institutions" (Grannoveter and Swedberg 1992, quoted 
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by Ingham, 1996:266). In sum, sociology informs us that the market is socially constructed 
and that actions of individual economic actors are necessarily embedded in wider networks 
of relations (Bagnasco, 1988; Granovetter, 1985). These three principles recognise roots in 
the critical sociological tradition with respect to mainstream economics. According to 
Ingham, sociology differs from the former in the following three senses: 
"(i) social and economic stmctures have properties that cannot be reduced to those of 
individuals taken singly; (ii) social and economic action has 'meaning' that cannot be 
reduced to the calculus of want satisfaction or utility maximisation [and]; (iii) social and 
economic life is based upon power (and associated) 'asymmetries' and inherent 
imcertainty" (1996:252) (emphasis in original). 
Finally, evolutionary economics focuses its critique on both the narrow assumption of 
maximizing rationality, by addressing problems of 'information' and 'knowledge' that 
economic actors fece and by questioning the very nature of their rationality, and the static 
assumption of time and equilibrium in mainstream economics. That is, by "shifting instead 
towards a view of economic phenomena as being largely dependent upon the result of 
learning by economic agents who are moving irreversibly through time" (Hodgson, 1988:4-
5). Due to the evolutionary and dynamic nature of economic phenomena, recognition here 
can be given to the following factors: 
"long-run development rather than short-run marginal adjustments [...] qualitative as 
well as quantitative change, as evolution means structural development and not 
parametric change [...] variation and diversity [in the process of selection] [...] non-
equilibrium as well as equilibrium situations, as evolution applies to open systems which 
are often far from equilibriimi situations [and] the possibility of error-making and non-
optimizing behaviour, as these are part and parcel of both human learning and evolution 
itself (Hodgson, 1994:223). 
Opinions on IP are more varied, i f not divergent. Interestingly, Chang (2002) has recently 
attempted to systematise the foundations of a new supply-side economics to what he terms 
an 'Institutionalist Political Economy' (IPE). IPE sensitises three key theoretical claims for 
this research regarding the relationship between economy, state and politics. Firstly, IPE 
addresses the 'institutional complexity of the market', in the wider sense of the word, in 
contrast to the view that 'markets develop naturally' (Stiglitz, 1992), as maintained by neo-
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liberals, or the view that 'in the beginning, there were markets' (Williamson, 1975), as 
argued by the New Institutionalist Economics. Chang argues that, 
"[e]mphasising the institutional nature of the market [...] requires that we have to bring 
politics explicitly into the analysis of the market [since] maricets are in the end political 
constmcts in the sense that they are defined by a range of formal and informal 
institutions that embody certain rights and obligations, whose legitimacy (and therefore 
whose contestability) is ultimately determined in the reahn of politics" (2002:554). 
Secondly, in order to overcome the limitations of the neo-liberal assumption that the agents 
that make up the state (i.e. politicians and state bureaucracy) have 'pre-formed motivations 
that are selfish', IPE holds that "human motivations ['preferences' in the neo-liberal 
discourse] are varied and interact with each other in complex ways [so that] individual 
motivations are fundamentally formed by institutions that surround the individuals" (ibid). 
Finally, Chang argues that "the claim that politics inevitably corrupts the market is 
problematic, not only because markets themselves are political constructs but also because 
the notion of an 'uncorrupted' market that the neo-liberals have is based on a particular set 
of political beliefs that cannot claim superiority to other sets of political beliefs" (ibid:556). 
In this sense, IPE reinstates the place of 'positive' politics in economic policy, by placing 
emphasis on the role of political factors in determining state policy. Specifically, to Chang 
politics "is an institutionally structured process, not only because institutions shape 
people's political actions, given their motivations and perceptions, but because they 
influence people's perception of their own interests, of the legitimate boundary of politics, 
and of the appropriate standards of behaviour in politics" (ibid). 
The reading we have here is that the economy is an instituted process, socially constructed 
and dynamic in nature. This means that markets are formed by a variety of institutional 
fields (ranging from formal institutions, such as laws and organisations to informal ones, 
such as habits, routines and values). Contrary to the orthodox view on the economy, the 
emphasis here "fells on processes of institutionalisation as a means of stabilizing and 
interpreting an economy that is essentially non-equilibrating, imperfect and irrational" (ibid) 
and in which economic process largely depends upon the result of knowledge and learning 
by economic actors (Hodgson, 2001:250). Therefore, it is central to the framework 
proposed here that "economic progress is only possible in what, from an equilibrium 
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viewpoint, is an inefficient world" (Metcalfe, 1995:28). Furthermore, there is a call here for 
reinstating the place of politics (understanding 'politics' as an institutionally stmctured 
process) in the analysis of the economy and market; the result of the political process in 
determining state policy and; finally, the 'context-specificity' and 'path-dependency' of the 
political and economic process in determining patterns of development. As Hodgson 
concludes, "[t]o understand fiilly the ways in which human agents are moulded by 
institutions, we have to look at particular cultures, circumstances and cases" (2003:173). 
Two major strands of thought that are discussed throughout this chapter enable us to think 
of the economy as an instituted process, socially constmcted and dynamic in nature as 
claimed above. Specifically, Section 3.3 discusses the literature in which the processes of 
learning, knowledge creation and development of innovative capabilities by economic 
agents, notably firms, is placed at the centre of explanations regarding competitiveness and 
economic success. Though firms are the key unit of analysis these approaches maintain that 
leaming and innovation are collective processes. Hence the institutional set up surrounding 
firms can help to enhance (or to constrain) the processes mentioned above. This issue is 
also addressed in Section 3.3. Finally, this section examines the policy implications of this 
strand of the NIP literature. Section 3.4 discusses a second strand of the literature focusing 
on the study of regions and localities, and arguing that geographical proximity is an 
important component for economic organisation and competitive advantage. Local 
institutional set ups and communities as a whole, are considered as key actors for economic 
success. Hence local govemance related to socio-economic and political organisation is 
seen as a key issue for economic policy. Al l of these issues are also analysed in Section 3 .4. 
Finally, this section examines the main policy implications supplied by this literature as 
regards competitiveness and economic success. Therefore, these two strands of thought 
provide conceptual and methodological insights that enable us to think of new IP rationales 
and agendas of policy that are able to cope with the new competitive settings associated 
with paradigms of competitiveness. 
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3.3. Innovation, learning and knowledge economy and the NIP 
thinking 
3.3.1. Introduction 
Innovation, learning and knowledge have become central concepts in recent discussions 
concerning industrial competitiveness and economic growth in advanced economies 
(OECD, 1992, 2000). It is argued that in a context of increasingly important non-price 
factors of competition (i.e. quality products, tailored customer production and related 
services), segmentation of markets (as a resuh of changing tendencies in consumer 
demand), shortening of product life-cycles and, therefore, changing business environments, 
the capacity to learn and innovate is critical for the survival of firms. Innovation, "is said to 
account for 80 per cent of productivity growth in advanced countries, and productivity 
growth accounts for some 80 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth overall" 
(Freeman, 1994b, quoted by Cooke etal, 2000:1). This places the importance of innovation 
in context and demonstrates why it is critical for competitiveness. This is without doubt a 
major insight over the last few decades deriving largely from neo-Schumpeterian and 
evolutionary approaches (Dosi etal, 1988; Freeman, 1988, 1994; Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Lundvall, 1992; Johnson, 2002; Johnson and Lundvall, 1994; Edquist etal, 2002; Metcalfe, 
1995). 
The complex set of relations and interdependences between 'the triad' of iimovation, 
learning and knowledge (ILK) cannot be reduced to a single and mechanical description. 
However, in order to get started, I am (schematically) going to conceive the ' ILK triad' in 
the following way: to be able to 'innovate' (or develop new knowledge), firms use 
'knowledge' (input), which is considered as 'the most fundamental resource' in the modem 
economy (Lundvall, 1992:1). Though knowledge as an input can be 'existing' knowledge, 
in order to innovate, firms often 'generate' knowledge (output) and/or 'acquire' it. 
Knowledge creation is a result of 'interactive' practices between economic agents carried 
out inside and outside the firm (through the firm's network of relations), all of which 
essentially involves 'leaming'. Leaming thus becomes 'the most important process' 
(Lundvall, 1992:1), which is predominantly interactive and, therefore, socially embedded. 
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Let me briefly analyse each one of these concepts separately in order to place how they 
converge in the policy debate of the new industrial policy (NIP) literature. 
33.2. Innovation 
According to Metcalfe, the evolutionary policy maker's central concern "is the innovation 
process, the operation of the set of institutions within which technological capabilities are 
accumulated" (1995:31). Innovation can be social, institutional and technological. 
Literature concerned with innovation mostly (or rather, originally) refers to technological 
innovation. I am going to claim that often all the above mentioned forms of innovation are 
necessary for technological innovation to take place. However, there is no single pathway 
to success. The nature of innovation varies by industry and size of firm, and is clearly 
influenced by different national and sub-national cultures. In other words, every firm, 
industry and industrial culture produces and commercialises 'original knowledge' in 
different ways. Following Nelson and Rosenberg (1993), innovation can be broadly defined 
as the processes by which firms master and put into practice products and manufacturing 
processes that are new to the firms, i f not also to the markets in which they operate. As 
outlined in the previous section, interest in innovation is however not new. Schumpeter 
(1934), who first situated innovation at the heart of economic theory, saw it as the driving 
force of economic development in capitalism. In his view, capitalism suffers permanent 
processes of 'creative destruction' as result of the introduction of'new combinations' in the 
market, or innovations. The famous Schumpeterian definition of innovation, or 'the 
carrying out of new combinations', marked a turning point in economic theory. The 
evolution of critical debates on innovation theory is well documented elsewhere (see Dosi 
et al 1988; Freeman, 1994). My aim here is not to carry out a ftill review of these debates. 
Instead, it is to discuss the foimdations on which the NIP literature concerning innovation is 
based and how previous misperceptions of the nature of innovation held by governments, 
industry and academia were overcome. 
Two major theoretical advances, largely based on neo-Schumpeterian thinking, laid the 
foundations of a new approach to industrial policy. The first relates to the role of 
incremental innovations, whilst the second relates to the idea of 'non-linear' model of 
innovation. As regards the first, new research findings follow the: 
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"discovery of the major contribution to the economic performance of firms made by 
incremental innovations not just radical ones [a central issue to incorporate in studies on 
innovation to the largest part of firms in any economy which do not generate path-
breaking innovation, notably the smaller firms]; recognition of the importance to 
productivity growth of transmission of fundamental scientific fmdings into firms by new 
recmits from universities or research institutes; understanding of the centrality to 
successfiil innovation of social interaction through networks involving diverse 
innovation actors; realization of the flindamental role played by innovation users in the 
development of successful innovation and associated firm performance improvements" 
(Cooke and Morgan, 1998:196, based on Freeman, 1994). 
As regards the second advance, new thinking has sought to move on from an earlier model 
of innovation in which technological innovation was conceived as a 'linear' and 
'sequential' process which went from basic 'upstream' scientific research (such as R&D 
developed inside laboratories in universities or companies) to applied 'down-stream' 
activities of production, production organisation and marketing. This linear or 'science-
push' model of innovation is seen to suffer from three main weaknesses: "it exaggerates the 
role of basic science, it invokes an unwarranted hierarchy of knowledge, in which 'pure' 
scientific knowledge is ranked above 'applied' technical and engineering knowledge, and it 
fails to appreciate the need for continuous interaction and feedback" (1998:12, based on 
Kline and Rosemberg, 1986; Aoki and Rosenberg, 1987) (emphasis in original). 
Consequently, today there appears to be a broad consensus on the representation of 
innovation as an interactive and socio-organisational process based on cumulative practices 
of leaming (OECD, 1992), all of which takes place in and out of the firm and requires 
continued feedback loops between 'upstream down-stream' and 'external-internal' fluxes. 
Innovation thus is no longer either seen as an act of heroic individualism (as expressed by 
the Schumpeterian innovator) or as a linear sequence of deliberate 'top-down' (R&D) 
activities. Although recognition is given now to innovation as a socio-interactive process 
into which converge a multiplicity of actors, the firm is conceived as the main 'collector', 
'repository', 'processor' and 'generator' of productive knowledge and, consequently, the 
key agent of innovation. The dialectic of 'intra-firm' and 'extra-firm' determinants of 
irmovation, that is, between those determinants in which either 'the firm' or 'systemic 
factors' become the main unit of analysis, underlie and cut across all of the debates on the 
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' ILK triad'. This can be understood in the following way. The recognition of both variety 
among agents (firms for some reason 'differ' from each other) and the uncertainty 
underlying the economic system led evolutionary scholars to think of the firm. This, in turn, 
led to the principle of search or selection, that is, a process of trial and error enabling the 
creation of the new. Finally, it led back from the firm to its core determinants, the 
innovation process, which, as seen already, has a social nature. In Nooteboom's words, 
"[t]he question conceming the sources of innovation needs to focus on how firms create 
and adapt resources and competences, in particular cognitive competence, by themselves 
and in interaction with each other" (1999:129-130). Hence the firm and the firm's network 
of relationships become key units of analysis in evolutionary and institutional economic 
thinking. 
My aim here is not summarise advances in the theory of the firm. Instead, I outline below 
some issues that a policy framework should take into account as regards firms. Indeed, 
there is not an articulated or unified theory of the firm that fits the needs of the institutional 
and evolutionary tradition (Nelson, 1994). Valuable advances in this field have been made 
by approaches based on the study of firms' transactions and boundaries (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975) and the evolution of firm's competences (Penrose, 1959) and 'core' 
competences (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Nelson (1994) for example concludes that it is 
convenient to focus on three different though interconnected features: the firm's 'strategy', 
'structure' and 'core capabilities'. Possible questions to ask in relation to the theory of the 
firm regarding issues of strategy, structure and core capabilities (rather than as a nexus of 
contracts) are numerous'"*, as are the disciplines concemed with it (notably, corporate 
management and business studies, psychology and sociology of organisations, industrial 
organisation and industrial economics). More recently, the knowledge-based approach (see 
Section 3.3.3), in wiiich the firm is considered as a 'processor of knowledge' (Fransman, 
1994), has come to supply a valuable perspective in the theory of the firm and innovation 
studies. The firm here is conceived as "a locus for setting up, selecting, using and 
Namely, a) strategy: including the analysis of aspects such as behaviour and culture of both the fum and 
entrepreneurs themselves (i.e. whether they are risk-takers or adverse to risk-taking; defensive or offensive); 
b) structure: including the analysis of features such as vertical or horizontal integration; network-firm; family-
integrated frnn, multidivisional-fmn, strategic alliances, etc; and c) competences: including the analysis of 
those products and/or processes in which the firm both 'does things well' and 'does things better' (core 
competences) than the other firms or present competitive weaknesses. All these aspects without doubt have an 
extreme importance in the innovation process. 
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developing knowledge" (Amin, 2002:2). This approach recognises that competences 
constitute the main sources of the competitiveness of a firm and, "[i]n doing so, it brings to 
the fore in the theory of the firm the problem of how such knowledge is generated, 
maintained, and transmitted" (ibid) in order to maintain economic performance. Learning, 
'the main process' in the modem economy, is an essential part of the answer to the problem 
posed above. How firms learn or how learning occurs and is realised is analysed below. 
3.3.3. Learning 
The conceptualisation of learning developed alongside the conceptualisation of innovation 
and like the latter, became part and parcel of policy debates (Johnson and Lundvall, 1992; 
Metcalfe, 1995). Johnson and Lundvall maintain that a key policy role in a 'learning 
economy'^' is "to support learning processes and, sometimes, processes of forgetting" 
(1992:301). Similarly, Metcalfe argues "the adaptive, evolutionary policy maker is far more 
concerned to influence process than to impose predetermined outcomes, far more 
concerned to enhance the adaptive, leaming capabilities of firms" (1995:31). Let me start 
with the problem of definition. 
In economics, leaming is associated with the process of creation and development of 
competitive knowledge, or innovation, which takes place in and out of the firm, that is, 
through the 'institutional set up' (Lundvall, 1992) with which the firm interacts and 
develops business links. Malerba (1992) identifies a set of attributes regarding leaming that 
should be considered by a policy framework: a) leaming is costly, in terms of time, 
resources, and required capabilities; b) leaming occurs in different parts of the firms, since 
'competences'^ ^ often appear distributed among different 'individuals' (a key issue in the 
case of SMEs), 'divisions and departments' and 'communities' within the firm; c) leaming 
involves interaction between intemal and extemal sources of knowledge (and therefore, it 
critically involves social relations and interaction among agents); d) leaming is cumulative 
The notion of a 'learning economy' has been built up from the consideration of the appropriate institutions 
to sustain leaming culture in 'learning institutions' (Johnson and Lundvall, 1992). 
Competences involve sets of routines, (differentiated) skill, know-how and abihties which express the 
efficiency of problem-solving procedures in a firm, they express what a firm 'can do well'. 
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(it is evolutionary in nature and therefore history 'matters' in the cumulative process); and 
e) it supports localised and primarily incremental innovation. 
A policy framework should also be informed about different types of learning and stages in 
the learning process. Metcalfe (1995, based on Malerba, 1992) has grouped the different 
types of learning identified in the literature in three broad categories. Firstly, there is 
learning which is a product of 'leaming-by-doing' (Arrow, 1962) and learning-by-using 
(Rosenberg, 1982). Learning in this stage "is conceivable as the repetition and 
improvement, through practice, of a task [and then] this assumes practices are, to some 
extent, borrowed or copied from elsevy^ere, implemented and adjusted in the process of 
use" (Braczyk et al, 1998:12); secondly, learning which involves interaction with external 
sources of knowledge (whether other firms, suppliers, customers, or science and technology 
agencies) or 'leaming-by-interacting' (Lundvall, 1992). This stage may be seen as a closer 
approximation to a well-developed learning culture (Braczyk et al, 1998); and, thirdly, 
internal or directed learning which is typically organised around formal innovation or R&D 
activities. Braczyk etal's (ibid) distinguish a fiirther type of learning, or stage in a learning 
culture, when learning by interaction becomes a practice that occurs through established 
cooperative networks that enhance practices of learning and change. 'Strategic monitoring' 
and 'continuous improvements' thus are possible due to the fact that cooperative networks 
"have the capability to be reflexive {...] and to apply institutional memory and intelligence 
to the refinements constantly needed as systems have to adjust to their environment" 
(1998:13) (emphasis in original): 'leaming-by-leaming' (Stiglitz, 1987). 
Due to the fact that learning and innovation involve a varied and fragmented set of 
technological, organisational and market knowledge, firms often have a limited capacity to 
undertake such a range of activities by themselves, thus requiring informal or formal co-
operation with other firms (Lawson and Lorenz, 1999). The notion of 'network' has 
become a very usefiil tool to conceptualise the social and iterative nature of the leaming 
In tiiis respect Braczyk et al (1998) note "incremental innovation has become necessary for the survival of 
firms, requiring many leaming interfaces inside and outside finns" (1998:13). A policy framework should 
then be informed with respect to the leaming interfaces that may operate in the innovation process. 
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process.'* In particular, inter-firm networks can be either more informal 'soft' networks of 
firms joining together to solve common problems, share information, or acquire new skills; 
or more formal 'hard' networks, involving firms joining together to co-produce, co-market, 
co-purchase, or co-operate in product or market development (Huggins, 2000:112). 
Likewise, the building up of 'trust' between partners in the networking process is 
considered to be critical to collective learning activities (Lorenz, 1999). As Lazaric and 
Lorenz note, "[t]rust is a kind of cement which allows partners to commit resources to 
collaborative endeavours in contexts where there remains an irreducible element of 
uncertainty over the outcome" (1998:209). In sum, the creation and development of 
competitive knowledge is (or should be) the result of the interfece between different 
learning processes inside and outside of the firm, engineered by 'technological-pull' and 
'market-push' criterion. However, it is crucial to recognise that such processes can be the 
result of both cognitive practices (manifest for example in 'conscious' practices of new 
knowledge acquisition and processing) and/or non-cognitive practices, which have been 
characterised as 'unconscious learning' (Wenger, 1998). Although the importance of 
'unconscious learning' in the innovation process is not the main focus of this thesis, 
without doubt it leads us to question some important assumptions of the evolutionary and 
competence-based approaches on the theory of the firm (Amin, 2001; Lee, 2001).'^ 
According to Malerba (1992), the nature of each learning structure in question (by-doing, 
by-using, by-interacting, by-leaming, by-networking or learning through communities of 
practices) will produce and determine different patterns of innovation in the firm. Hence 
A rather 'empirical' (as opposed to theoretical) definition of inter-firm networks is that they "consists of 
two or more firms [and/or individuals] pursuing common objectives or working towards solving common 
problems through a period of sustained interaction" (Huggins, 2000: II2). 
" In an attempt to systematise a theoretical proposal in this sense, Amin concludes that the everyday 
sociology of knowledge highlights that a "substantial amount of learning is of a non-cognitive nature, situated 
in the practices of communities; practices, in turn, that are the source of both radical and incremental 
innovation" (2001 a:24). This would suggest that within informal and self-organising communities of practice 
in the firm that novelty can be produced, "by mobilizing distributed knowledge and competences and 
blending varied forms of knowledge" (Lee, 2001:556). Learning in learning communities thus is 'the product 
of shared expertise, talk, sociability, argument and disagreement' (Amin, 2001 a: 16). It is this specificity of 
learning that permits enhanced exploration in order to generate new possibilities for the fum, rather than 
formal learning devices such as training courses, formal R&D and acquisition of new technologies. As far as 
the policy debate is concerned, Amin argues "[a]n understanding of inventiveness of communities of practice 
[.,.] shifts the debate in a different direction, by appreciating the centrality of 'boring' old things such as 
socialisation, sociabihty, work, and the practices of doing, for knowledge creation" (ibid:24) (emphasis in 
original). Without doubt this valuable contribution opens up a promising and innovative arena for poUcy 
debate, one indeed of very recent exploration in economic policy. 
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both the conditions of 'access to diversity' in sources of learning and innovation, and the 
incentives to the exploration of new learning structures become other key issues for a 
policy framework aimed at enhancing diversity and creativity in the discovering of novelty 
(Metcalfe, 1995). In Maskell's and Lundvall's view, "competitiveness can only be buih on 
heterogeneity: on firms having control over something wanted by others or by firms being 
able to do something that competitors cannot do as well, as fast, or as cheap" (2002:364). 
Likewise, the critical importance of 'variety' and 'otherness' for competitiveness, 
expressed in strategic analysis regarding firms' customers, suppliers, competitors and new 
entrants in the market, brought Porter to conclude that "[n]ations gain advantage because of 
differences, not similarities" (1990:623). Having problematised the relationship between 
irmovation, learning and competitiveness, the discussion now turns to the analysis of 
knowledge, the third component of the "ELK triad' in question. 
33.4. Knowledge 
In the introduction of this section I argued that knowledge has been considered as 'the most 
fiandamental resource' in the innovation process (Lundvall, 1992) and, therefore, as 'the 
source' of competitive advantage (OECD, 2000). Its importance has led some authors to 
identify a shift towards a new 'knowledge-based economy' (Burton-Jones, 1999; Dunning, 
2000), in which knowledge is conceived as a key form of capital (Burton-Jones, 1999). 
Whatever the status of this argument, it must be recognised that knowledge in its own right 
has become a key concept for debates on industrial competitiveness and therefore needs to 
be discussed from the IP point of view. Qualities attributed to knowledge as a resource are 
numerous and may be conceptualised in different ways. Burton-Jones conceives knowledge 
as the main form of capital in the new economy which appears distributed through the all 
value chain of the firm, as follows: 
"[a] firm's knowledge capital, often referred to as its intellectual capital or intellectual 
assets, can be identified in its workforce (human capital), its customers' demands and 
preferences (customer capital), and its systems, products, processes, and capabilities 
(structural capital). The value of the knowledge assets of a fum may thus significantly 
exceed the value of its tangible assets" (1999:6). 
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Hence knowledge is 'the key to economic progress' (ibid). Prahalad and Hamel (1990) in 
tum maintain that knowledge as an input in the process of production distinguishes itself 
from other inputs owing to its 'durability'. The use of knowledge never reduces the stock, 
rather it often creates new knowledge (ou^ut) as an integral part of the activities developed 
in the firm. Similarly, the economic importance of knowledge for Amin and Cohendet 
(2002) is explained by the fact that knowledge represents 'a imique asset' that appears as 
'an ou^ut' and, at the same time, as 'an input' of the production process: 
"As an output, the production of new knowledge refers to the endeavours of scientific 
activity (i.e. publications) or technological effort (i.e. patents, new products, new 
processes, etc.). Innovation can be regarded as the main outcome of knowledge 
production. It adds to existing knowledge and expresses its economic value [...] 
Knowledge as the main input is cumulative and integrative [...] The cumulative 
characteristic of knowledge implies path-dependence and the progressive creation of 
barriers, as established participants in given technologies accumulate a differential 
advantage over potential entrants" (2002:24-25). 
Interestingly, the complex nature of knowledge (based on the dialectic of the permanent 
destruction of 'old forms' and creation of 'new contents') has also been conceptualised 
from the policy point of view. In Lagendijk's view, "knowledge creation (irmovation) and 
usage (leaming) do not only embody important targets of policy-making [... ] Knowledge 
also underpins the business of policy-making itself, as reflected in the constant search for 
new approaches, the exchange of experiences and the building of networks and 
partnerships" (Lagendijk, 1999:110). Whatever the nature of knowledge, today it seems to 
be underlying the fi-ontiers of success and failure in each one of the stages of economic 
activity, hence its increasing importance for competitiveness (OECD, 2000). 
The issue I wish to tackle now is how knowledge and leaming interact within the firm. I 
previously argued that knowledge creation is the product of a varied leaming process 
carried out by the firm, which can be more or less deliberate or structured more or less 
incrementally or radically.^ In order to understand how these different forms of leaming 
make knowledge creation possible it is necessary to review some concepts of the 
°^ Learning from experience (Arrow, 1962), trial and error (Anderson, 1976), by repetition (Scribner, 1986) 
can give rise to incremental innovations in firms and markets. At an intra-firm level, knowledge created 
intentionally can be the result of formal R&D activities developed through public or fum-based activities. 
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evolutionary theory of the firm. Knowledge creation is a process in which not all the 
necessary information to allow rational decision-making is available to the firm. Maskell 
and Malmberg note that "[f|irms seem to handle this basic uncertainty by developing 
internal procedures and routines when searching for possible solutions [which] are based on 
the firm's interpretation of its successful behaviour in the past, and they will continue to be 
reproduced and reinforced as long as they seem reasonably efficacious" (1999:13). Hence 
some created knowledge bases can be rejected when they are put into practice and others 
can be accepted, in which case they are gradually integrated into part of the firm's internal 
routine^V Each round of knowledge creation largely depends upon the result of the former 
rounds (success or failure) and therefore it also determines future possibilities for the firm 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1991). Hence deliberate knowledge creation, and therefore 
the learning processes that have given rise to this, are strongly 'path-dependent' (ibid). 
Successfiil knowledge creation may give place to durable routines and competences^^ that 
can sustain competitive advantage but, in the long term, can also turn into rigidity. This 
underlines the importance of the unlearning process, particularly in context of 
environmental uncertainty that requires quick adaptation of economic agents (Maskell and 
Malmberg, 1999). 
For Metcalfe (1995:34) the central aspect about the modem process of innovation is that it 
is based on a 'division of labour', which guarantees that economies of variety and 
specialisation arise. The division of labour "is reflected in the many different kinds and 
branches of knowledge which are relevant for the process of innovation [...] which are not 
only produced in specialised institutions [notably, firms]; they are also accumulated by 
different mechanisms" (ibid:34). Two policy implications arise from this statement. Firstly, 
a policy framework should not only be informed of the different chains in this 'division of 
labour' but, fundamentally, it also "requires a framework to cotmect together the 
component contributions of different agents" (ibid). As Metcalfe maintains, "as far as 
knowledge and skills are concemed this aspect of connectivity [...] cannot be effectively 
co-ordinated by conventional markets" (ibid) due to both the variety in the sources and the 
'^ The concqjt of 'routine' is a key concept in evolutionary economics which refers to an established set of 
the ways in which tirms both do things or determine what to do (Nelson, 1982). 
Competences involve sets of routines, (differentiated) skill, know-how and abihties which express the 
efficiency of problem-solving procedures (Guilon, 1994). Competences express what the firm can do well. 
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different types of accumulation mechanisms and/or forms of knowledge involved in 
innovation process. Indeed, Cohendet et al maintain that the major problem for a globalised 
firm "has become a problem of mobilising and integrating fragmented and diversified 
forms of localised knowledge and competence" (1999:226). Localised and scarcely 
globalised smaller firms, for example in low- or medium-tech sectors of production, also 
face the same problem, with perhaps the difference that their only way to decode external 
'localised knowledge and competence' is by looking for it in concrete artefacts. 
Secondly, the different mechanisms of accumulation and communication of knowledge are 
relevant to the level of codifiability of knowledge. According to Metcalfe (1995), different 
classes of knowledge are associated with different costs of'encoding' and 'decoding'. It is 
thanks to Polanyi (1967) that the first attempt to distinguish (though not divide) between 
codifiable and tacit knowledge was made. Codified knowledge is said to comprise of the 
whole set of transmissible (in formal and systematic language) technological knowledge 
(i.e. embodied in blueprint, patents and artefects) and organisational know-how, both of 
which do not require direct experience to be acquired. Codified knowledge can in theory be 
obtained through pure market transactions (as a commodity) since it has a 'ubiquitous' 
nature. In contrast, tacit knowledge is said to "concern direct experience that is not 
codifiable via artefacts [...] it represents disembodied know-how that is acquired via the 
informal take-up of learned behaviour and procedures" (Howells, 2002:872). Admittedly, 
tacit know-how catmot be directly or easily transmitted or communicated through formal 
language, "as knowledge and task performance are individual and specific and involve the 
acquirer making changes to existing behaviour" (ibid). For the same reason it cannot be 
easily acquired via market transactions. 
Tacit knowledge can be illustrated by the difference that exists between the perfect 
photograph on a cake-mix package and the real cake made at home. According to Novick 
(1998), tacit knowledge makes it possible to form a complex mental picture of the work 
process. Tacit knowing is likewise associated with both leaming that occurs unconsciously 
and 'scientific intuition' (Howells, 2002). Due to its specificities, tacit knowledge is 
difficult for firms to assimilate. Hence the leaming mechanisms based on both direct 
experience, by doing, by using and, essentially, by interacting, are seen as critical fectors 
for its acquisition. Accumulation of knowledge that occurs through direct experience and 
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communication is more likely to be verbal and often relies upon personal contacts, hence 
some form of 'proximity' between agents, which can be relational, organisational, cultural 
and geographical, becomes necessary. I will expand upon in this point in Section 3.4 in this 
chapter. 
Antonelli (1999) proposes a four-fold classification between 'tacit' and 'codified' 
knowledge regarding whether this is 'internal' or 'external' to the firm: a) internal tacit 
knowledge, which is generated through processes or learning by doing and by using; b) 
external tacit knowledge, which is acquired through informal exchanges and socialisation; 
c) internal codified knowledge, which is the resuh of formal intra-firm activities of R&D 
and; d) external codified knowledge, which is acquired be means of the recombination of 
bits of technological information which are reorganised and applied to different contexts 
than those originally conceived, and often implemented via formal cooperation (including 
firms, R&D institutes and universities). Likewise, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) propose a 
'bottom upward' model of knowledge conversion where the key issue is the way in which 
competitive knowledge is 'socialised' (conversion of tacit knowledge into another form of 
tacit knowledge), 'externalised' (conversion of tacit knowledge into codified knowledge), 
'combined' (combination of codified knowledge) and 'internalised' (conversion of codified 
knowledge into tacit knowledge). For these authors 'tacit knowledge' can only be acquired 
through social interaction, including direct observation, imitation and feedback loops based 
on face-to-face contacts. Hence, what they identify as a 'learning organisation', is one in 
which creating new knowledge is not a specialised activity, restricted to a small group of 
specialised individuals within the firm (knowledge workers), but a general form of 
behaviour or a culture extending to the firm as a whole. 
The distinction between codified and tacit forms of knowledge (along with the respective 
learning processes associated with their acquisition and creation) have had important 
effects regarding the different theoretical, metiiodological and policy interests addressed by 
the NIP literature concemed with the ' ILK triad'. On the one side, the emphasis is placed 
on the study of 'path-breaking' innovations, 'radical' learning, 'national/global' codified 
knowledge (often associated with large corporations) and/or tangible technological 
dimensions of innovation; and with methodologies and measurements tools largely based 
on (national and/or international) aggregated statistics series, for instance including 
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'patents' vis-a-vis public/private R&D expenditure. As regards areas of policy concem, the 
national dimension of innovation policy (vis-a-vis other countries) has been the main focus 
of policy interest. Some neo-Schumpeterian approaches fell within this category (e.g. 
National Innovation System studies in the US and the rich research based at SPRU in 
Sussex University). On the other side, the emphasis is placed on the study of 'incremental' 
innovation and leaming, 'localised-contextual' tacit knowledge (often associated with less 
innovative small- and medium-size firms) and intangible social, organisational and 
relational dimension of innovation; and with triangulation of quantitative and qualitative 
research methodologies (primarily focused on processes and their evolution) and 
measurement tools. As regard areas of policy concem, the sub-national dimension 
including regions and localities (vis-a-vis regions and localities nationally and 
intemationally) are the main focus of policy interest. Approaches associated with this 
tradition of thought include the 'learning economy' approach (Lundvall); some neo-
Schumpeterians (Freeman) and varied strands in economic geography concerned with the 
study of the ' ILK triad' (Camagni, 1991; Cooke and Morgan 1994, 1998; Florida, 1995; 
Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; Morgan, 1997; Storper, 1994, 1995, 1997). These strands of 
the NIP literature not only address the regional and local dimension of innovation policy 
but also debate on 'polities', regarding factors of socio-economic governance relating to 
industrial competitiveness. This debate on politics and govemance and its spatial 
dimension, which has not been a main concem on the first strand of thought, stems from 
discussions regarding the foundations of economic development existing within the NIP 
literature that goes beyond the ' ILK triad'. These require separate analysis which will be 
considered in Section 3.4 later in this chapter. 
Whatever the nature of and the relationship between tacit and codified knowledge, today 
there appears to be a broad consensus that they are to an extent indivisible and equally 
important for economic success. As Becattini has recently argued, "[e]ven the most 
automated [of the codified knowledge] display gaps which require the intervention of 
practical, contextual knowledge i f they are to continue. However, it is certain that there is 
no concrete artisanal production process -which would appear to be the locus of 
contextuality - which is not based on routines and devices that embody codified 
knowledge" (2002:486). Likewise, there appears to be an increasing awareness that 
knowledge creation is "an iterative process, a continuum of codified and tacit knowledge, 
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an interactive and relational asset, and distributed within the firm as well as in links with 
others along the supply chain (Amin, 2002a:4, based on OECD 2000). Competitive 
advantage thus is a product of the ways in which both are combined or, more precisely, a 
product of the dialectic between the forms of knowledge vis-a-vis the set of social relations 
where knowledge resides and is created. 
33.5. The ' I L K 'Triad and policy implications 
The socio-interactive nature of both innovation and leaming suggests that, for both to take 
place and to be effective, firms and networks (whether in localities, regions and countries) 
should be able to develop institutional stmctures that promote both access to diversity of 
sources of knowledge and continuous interaction and feedback. This is cmcial for a policy 
body aiming to tackle the processes through which the firm crafts and builds 'extemal' 
links and interfeces in order to mobilise and put together varied and often fragmented 
sources of new knowledge and leaming. This principle has led some strands in the NIP 
literature (notably, neo-Schumpeterians and the leaming economy perspective) to think in 
terms of 'systems of innovation' (Sis) as a platform for policy. 
The concept of Sis is of cmcial importance for the policy debate regarding irmovation. 
Metcalfe has argued that Sis "encourage policy makers to think in terms of institutions and 
their connectivity and thus to address the mechanism by which policy is translated into 
shifts in the innovation possibility frontiers of firms" (1995:42). National boundaries have 
defined the domain for policy making in the first instance,^ ^ which leads us to the concept 
of'national systems of innovation' (NSIs) (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992). NSIs are indeed 
one of the main innovations in innovation policy. Sub-national levels, notably regions and 
localities (Boekema et al, 2000; Brazyck et al, 1998; Cooke et al, 2000; Florida, 1995; 
Howells, 2000; Morgan, 1997; Morgan and Nauwelears, 1999), and recently cities (Cooke 
et al, 2002), have also gained increasing importance for policy making (initially in the 
European context). Finally, although national boundaries define the domain for policy 
making in the first instance, it is increasingly recognised that relations with international 
circuits of knowledge production are a key element for policy making regarding innovation. 
In Lundvall's words: "In the real world the state and the public sector are rooted in national states and their 
geographical sphere of influence is defmed by national borders" (1992:13). 
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As Metcalfe notes, "[t]he issue for policy making is to be aware of how different 
technologies are promoted by different accumulation systems, and the extent to which these 
systems are connected internationally" (1995:42). 
Definitions of national systems of innovation (NSIs) vary according to the author and 
country in question. For Lundvall (1992) a NSI is defined by both the structure of 
production and the institutional set up of a given country and consists of elements and 
relationships that interact in the production, diffiision and deployment of new and 
economically useful knowledge. Lundvall and Edquist (1991) in tum specify that it consists 
of institutions and economic stmctures affecting the rate and direction of technological 
change in society. While for authors like Lundvall (1992) the national public policy plays 
an important role in enhancing innovation (i.e. it involves direct support of R&D; its 
regulations and standards influence the rate and direction of innovation; and the state 
indeed is the main user of innovations developed by the private sector in an economy) for 
authors like Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) its influence is of a more indirect nature (i.e. 
through soft institutions like culture and language). For this research, the idea of NSIs helps 
to reintioduce the role of the national state as a necessary and legitimate agent in economic 
development (after years of rejection regarding industrial policy issues as we saw in 
Chapter 1). As Nelson and Rosenberg (1993) highlight, it is the nature of national 
innovation policies that helps to explain key differences between the East Asian and the 
Latin American policy frames in the 1980s (see Table 3.1). The substantial contrast 
between both experiences indeed helped to determine the huge gap currentiy existing in 
their industrial competitive performance.^ '* 
The East Asian countries started from a lower level of industrialisation in the 1950s compared with Latin 
America; whereas in the 1960s and 1970s the Latin American and East Asian countries were often grouped 
together as very fast growing NICs. However, a sharp contrast began to emerge in the 1980s (the so-called 
'lost decade' for Latin America), the East Asian countries' GNP grew at an average annual rate of about 8%, 
while in most Latin American countries this fell to less than 2% (Freeman, 1995:13). 
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Table 3.1. East Asian and the Latin America NSIs in the 1980s 
East Asia Latin America 
Expanding universal education system with 
high participation in tertiary education and with 
high proportions of engineering 
Import of technology typically combined with 
local initiatives in technical change and at lata-
states rapidly rising levels of R&D 
Industrial R&D rises typically to >50% of all 
R&D 
Development of strong science-technology 
infrastructure and at later stages good linkages 
with industrial R&D 
H i ^ levels of investment and major inflow of 
Japanese investment and technology with strong 
Yen in 1980s. Strong influence of Japanese 
models of management and networking 
organisation 
Heavy investment in 
telecommunications infrastructure 
advanced 
• Detaiorating education system with proportionately 
lowo- output of engineers 
• Much transfer of technology, especially from the 
US, but weak enterprise-level R&D and little 
integration with technology transfer 
• Industrial R&D typically remains at <25% of total 
• Weakening of science-technology infrastructure and 
poor linkages with industry 
• Dechne in (mainly US) foreign investment and 
generally lower levels of investment. Low level of 
international networking in technology 
Slow development of modem telecommunications 
• Weak electronic industries with low exports and 
little learning by international marketing 
Strong and fast-growing electronic industries 
with hig^ exports and extensive user feedback 
from international markets 
Source: Freeman, C. (1995:13) 
The national state is now called to promote a leaming and innovation economy as a means 
to economic progress^^ That is, the 'traditional' state is called to become a 'neo-
Schumpeterian state (Jessop, 1993). In the meantime, the main policy concern has changed, 
evolving from technological innovation to leaming (or institutional innovations) and then 
knowledge creation. 
Following the definitions above, an NSI is composed of a varied set of institutional forms 
including firms; government agencies; public and corporate R&D institutes; the structure of 
Metcalfe proposes a policy-oriented concept of NSI by arguing that it is "that set of distinct institutions 
which jointly and individually contribute to ttie development and diffusion of new technologies and which 
provides the framework within which governments form and implement policies to influence the innovation 
process. As such it is a system of interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skill 
and artefacts which define new technologies" (1995:38). 
*^ In the last few years, a light shift towards policies aimed at the build up of 'social capital', in order to create 
'leverage' for collective leaming and systemic innovation has also become a main pohcy concem (Lundvall 
and Maskell, 2000; Cooke et al, 2000; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 1999). 
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industry; educational and training systems; information and communication infrastmctures; 
the financial system; and private consultancies and professional societies. Furthermore, it 
comprises other elements, traditionally considered 'far from' science and technology, such 
as the general level of education and expertise of population; the labour organisation and; 
critically, the industrial relationships of firms with clients, suppliers and rival firms, banks 
and finance institutions, and the institutions above mentioned (Lundvall 1992; Lundvall 
and Johnson, 1994; Freeman, 1994). In particular, Lundvall (1992) addresses the user-
producer relationship as key stmctural component in an NSI since this (as previously seen) 
can generate the needed interface through which users can 'express needs' and producers 
can 'express new possibilities' for innovation. 
Two broad categories of innovation policy should be distinguished. Firstly, policies that 
induce firms 'to shift around their given innovation possibility frontiers', that is, to apply 
more or less innovative effort in order to generate incremental innovations and, secondly, 
policies that seek 'to shift the innovation possibility frontiers' (Metcalfe, 1995:37), that is, 
to seek and generate radical irmovations. In Table 3.2, I outline the main policy areas of 
concem of ISs regarding (technological) innovation policy and productive structure, which 
consisting of the various direct and indirect ways to support. 
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Table 3.2. ISs-based innovation policies 
Access to variety aiid lieterogeneity of sources 
Improving physical (i.e. information and communication, transport and R&D) and educational and training 
inirastructure (the less controversial policy) 
The creation of new knowledge in public and private R&D institutes: by providing R&D subsidies to (high-tech) 
firms and funding universities and public research agencies (development of technology) 
Importation or joint development with into^ational partners of generic knowledge in specific fields where both the 
country has localised capabilities and spill-over knowledge effects can be absorbed by wide sectors of the 
productive structure (application of new technology). This encompasses a specific strategy of connectivity with 
intmiational sources of expotise and knowledge involving the key components of the national institutional set up 
For sector-based technology centres. Besides 'hard' technology research, these centres should conduct studies on 
sectoral logistics, planning, quality control and marketing. They can also play a key role enhancing inter-firm 
relations through clustra'-based innovation policies 
Innovation services for SMEs. They may be delivered through 'service centres' which can also be integrated in 
cluster policies 
Public support for innovation fmancing for firms, including risk capital fra- high- and medium-tech projects. 
Connectivity of sources 
The generation of an integrated institutional-technological infrastructure, encouraging the emergence of interfaces 
and (formal and informal) networking between educational-training, research and industry. Inter-firm networking 
here is seen as the key micro-component of a well-integrated institutional-technological infi-astructure and public-
private partnership as the key macro-component. Need for a 'strategic coalition' between education, industry and 
government 
The diffusion of new knowledge and technologies to a wider set of users, with diffo-entiated policies for innovative 
and less innovative firms, through a poUcy of difliision and attractiveness for innovating. Inter-institutional mobility 
of experts, technologists, engineo-s, skilled workers and entrepreneurs is seen as a critical tool for mobilising and 
transferring the more tacit aspects of the new knowledge 
The absorptive capacity for new technologies (with choices between generic knowledge, skills and artefacts as the 
primary teigeH of policy) by firms, organisations and individual users (institutional innovation) by providing 
incentives, means, and resources to team, unlearn and releam 
An entrepreneurial culture through the institutional set up as a whole. It may also include support to 'innovation-
led' entrepreneurship. 
Market awareness 
• The exploitation of new knowledge and technologies through commercialisation 
• A demand-awareness iiuiovation policy: national and international market research regarding new market trends in 
low-, medium- and high-tech industries. 
Source: based on Burton-Jones 1999; Cooke et al, 2000; Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall and Maskell, 2000; Metcalfe, 
1995; Maskell et al, 1998. 
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3.3.6. Concluding remarks 
The learning and knowledge-based economy is at the heart of current policy debates on 
industrial competitiveness and economic progress in developed countries (OECD, 1999; 
2000). This shift in the policy debate has re-installed the state as a necessary and legitimate 
agent for economic development. The NIP literature has provided both a solid battery of 
conceptual foundations and a promising DP framework. However, the learning and 
knowledge economy is by no means a guarantee of economic success. Different problems 
can be singled out with the ISs concept. Firstly, it represents a 'top-down-oriented' to 
iimovation, since the emphasis is placed on 'up-stream' institutions (notably, govemment 
agencies, R&D institutes and educational and training systems) to create conditions for 
'down-stream' firms to innovate. In tum, it is suggested that innovation depends upon the 
emergence of systemic interactions, but interactions between institutions and individual 
actors might well behave unsystemically, motivated by established and path-dependent 
routines that hinder adaptation, change and innovation. Secondly, its emphasis on 
technological innovation has also been identified as a limit to innovation as long as 
technological innovation requires an interconnected set of socio-organisational innovations 
to take place. Finally, regarding social-spatial equity, the NIP literature indeed assumes, 
critically albeit, the realm of capitalist relationships of production, which have always been 
characterised by uneven processes of growth and social inequality. A varied set of 
asymmetries including those in power, resources and capabilities characterise the process of 
production, distribution and commercialisation of knowledge and learning (Hudson, 1999), 
which have effects at the level of the firm and on the relationships at inter-firm, inter-
institutions and inter-regions and countries levels. 
82 
3.4. The spatialisation of the NIP thinking 
3.4.1. Introduction 
"... global capitalism is being constmcted through interactions between flow economies 
and territorial economies [...] That is, globalisation should involve not merely 
international flows of resources, but economic systems that operate as international flow 
economies..." (Storper, 1997:181). 
Since the 1980s a body of literature has grown highlighting the role of the 'region'^' as a 
critical locus of competitive advantage (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Keating, 1998; Morgan, 
1997; Sabel, 1988; Scott, 1988, 1995, Scott and Stoiper, 1995; Storper, 1994, 1997). 
Prominent authors associated with the California school of economic geography argue that 
there are reasons to conceive regions as an 'essential level of coordination' (Storper, 
1994:192), as a 'fiindamental basis of economic and social life' (Storper, 1997:3), and as 
'indispensable motors' (Scott, 1988) to contemporary capitalism. This renewed interest has 
been associated with the emergence in some regions of novel forms of organisation of 
production (notably, in industrial districts), different from the mass production systems. 
Hence for some scholars "there might be something fimdamental that linked late 20* 
century capitalism to regionalism and regionalization" (Storper, 1997:3). Regional systems 
of production are being described as 'flexible' and 'specialised' (Piore and Sabel, 1984), 
'intelligent' (Morgan, 1995) or 'learning regions' (Florida, 1995), responsive to post-fordist 
geographies of production and governance. This novel set of foundations gave rise to a 
second strand of the NIP literature. 
In my view, three interrelated sets of constituent factors laid the foundations of the claims 
outlined above. The first relates to the accumulation of a critical mass of evidence 
If the region is thought as a 'social construction' and not as a determined geographical space the issue of 
the defmition necessarily becomes a terrain for debate. Following Keating (1998), I am going to understand 
the region as an 'open system of action' in a constant process of definition in which interests, policies and 
strategies for development should primarily emerge from and be propriety of the regional actors. Social, 
economic and political features necessarily overly (in more or lesser conflictive and/or harmonic ways) in 
this type of definition. Hence the search for a regional 'interest' should be understood as a complex political 
process. 
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regarding successful local and regional economies. The 'paradigmatic' cases elsewhere 
mentioned in the literature being the Italian industrial districts, some German's Lander such 
as Baden-Wiirttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia, the Basque Country and Catalonia in 
Spain (in the European continent); and Silicon Valley, Orange County, and Route 128, in 
the US. The second relates to new roles played by the 'old' nation-state in the context of a 
globalising and neo-liberal political economy. The third relates to the emergence of a novel 
and stimulating body of literature claiming the importance of the region as a potent 
foundation of competitive advantage. All these experiences are elsewhere examined by the 
literature (see Camagni, 1991; Braczyk et al, 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984; Pyke et al, 1990; Saxenian, 1994) and my aim here is not to go back onto 
those discussions. Furthermore, the case of the Italian industrial districts was already 
discussed, that is, as an example of heterodox practices of new IP as well as influence of 
the Italian experience on the policy-making world in Latin America (see in Section 1.4.3 of 
Chapter 1). Consequently, in the following sections I will focus on the other two sets of 
factors, starting with the analysis of the role of the nation-state in a globalising political 
economy. 
3.4.2. Nation-state and region 
The nation-state as we knew it during the 'Golden-age' of capitalism has been transformed 
over the last two decades. The hegemony of neo-liberal ideas (primarily in the UK and US 
in the early 1980s and then elsewhere around the world), along with, and in response to, the 
various 'state failures' brought about a wave of structural transformations which 
determined the downsizing and the 'hollowing-out' of the national states (Jessop, 1992; 
1994). As a result, they lost part of their former power and capacity as a regulator 
mechanism and for the setting up of pohcies for instance at sub-national levels. According 
to Keating (1998:73), the power, the authority and the legitimacy of the nation-state is 
currently being eroded by three different vectors, "from above by internationalization; from 
below by regional and local assertion, and laterally by the advance of the market and civil 
society" (see also Jessop, 1995; 2000). The intensity and form in which each one of these 
three vectors affects the national states is determined by the features and circumstances 
affecting each particular case in question. In the following these three vectors are analysed 
separately. 
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'From above', increasingly globalisation and the parallel establishment of supra-national 
regimens are eroding the capacity of the nation-states for policy decision making. In the 
case of the EU (European Union), which represents the most advanced case of 
supranational 'political' and economic integration, the member states delegate and transfer 
a part of their sovereign power to the supranational authority. This authority is (as a result 
of this transference) a depositary of a larger capacity of regulation and control on global 
forces than each national state separately. In contrast, experiences of integration strictly 
based on commercial agreements, such as NAFTA (North America Free Trade Area) in 
North America, APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum) in Asia and 
MERCOSUR (Southem Common Market) in Latin America, have not advanced towards a 
process of larger 'political' integration. In these cases the national states in theory conserve 
sovereign power with respect to their own decisions in economic policy issues. However, it 
is in reality a restrictive sovereignty, since in smaller and less-developed countries, such as 
Argentina and Brazil (the core of MERCOSUR), the nation-state has extremely limited 
power of control and regulation of global forces. The multilateral institutions that govern 
the international trade represent a second source of loss of sovereign power for the national 
states. This is the case of the WTO (World Trade Organisation), whose normative 
framework constrains the decision-making capacity of each member country in relation to 
their domestic policy regarding, for instance, promotion of export industries. 
'From the side', the advance of market powers associated with the increasing mobility of 
financial global capital and corporate activity of multinational companies, on the one hand, 
and the hegemony of trade and regulatory policies inspired by the neo-liberal ideas, on the 
other, are weakening the power of the nation states. Privatisations of former public assets, 
rigid monetary policy, deregulation of markets and many other 'market-fi-iendly' decisions 
of economic policy have deteriorated, i f not destroyed (like in Argentina), the power of the 
state as the main mechanism of coordination in the economy. The policy agenda endorsed 
by the Bretton Wood's institutions, the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary 
Found (IMF), starting fi-om 'The Washington Consensus' played a determinant role 
undermining the manoeuvrable capacity of the national states which affects key policy 
areas for development including micro- and, above all, macro-economic policy (Stiglitz, 
2002). International financial agreements have established compromises and obligations 
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which limit the policy decision making capacity of signatory countries, particularly of the 
smaller countries (ibid). In the case of countries which are highly indebted, like Argentina, 
where there exist a high dependence upon extemal flows of capital and investments, the 
problem is even greater due to the high levels of 'sensitivity' and 'volatility' of such capital 
flows to domestic 'noise' (Gatto, 2001). The fiscal pressure affecting indebted countries 
operates in the same sense as above, that is, by reducing the availability of resources, for 
instance, for regional policy (ibid).^* I must emphasise here, however, that many countries 
(notably, in Latin America) have made use of the extemal conditioning mentioned above to 
carry out severe adjustment processes, which internally had neither political support nor 
social legitimacy. 
'From below', both political demands coming fi-om successfial regionalist (if not 
nationalist) movements and the institutional challenge that presupposes the establishing of 
regional political structures and/or governments in the light of increasingly competitive 
pressures, has also challenged the domestic legitimacy and political manoeuvrability of 
nation states. This is the case in a number of European countries in which regionally-based 
economies have experienced important levels of development. In any case, demands direct 
at the nation states come firom, on the one hand, those more developed and organised 
regions in economic and political terms, which claim for greater levels of decision-making 
autonomy and capacity, and, on the other hand, from those of lower level of relative 
development (or less favoured regions), which are often negatively affected by 
globalisation and therefore demand special public support and/or protection. This has been 
observed in Latin America, where many regions can be better identified as a locus of 
distributive problems rather than as a locus of economic order. 
Hence, in the new setting, the nation states are no longer able to play the 'mediator' role 
between global forces and sub-national territories (localities and regions) as they used to do 
in the past. However, this does not mean that the nation state is no longer the main 
coordinator and regulator within national boundaries. Indeed, for many regions the central 
state is the only institution of reference to deal with intemational competition and 
globalisation. It can be concluded that the nation state no longer 'monopolises' the extemal 
It is important to recognise that some multilateral organisms such as the WB (1996) have begun to see the 
local and the regional as important levels for their interventions (Lovering, 1999). 
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links of regions nor it is able to 'mediate' between all the external forces that affect local 
and regional economies with the same level of intensity that it did in the past. The 
relationship between region, nation-state and global forces is well illustrated in Figure 3.1 
below. It shows a two 'ideal type' of setting, the new and the traditional order, and 
describes types of relations. 
Figure 3.1. Regions, states and the global order 
a. The traditional order b. The new order 
International Market 
Sovereign powers 
States 
Tariffs, protection, 
subsidies 
Political support, 
representation 
Regions 
Market 
• 
International Regimes 
States 
Competitive 
advantage 
Direct links and 
influence 
Regions 
Source: Adapted from Keating, 1998 
In the traditional order (Figure 3.1 a), the interaction between national state and region is 
characterised by relations of mutual dependence through which the state provides 
protection and subsidies to the regions in exchange for political support and representation. 
The national state being the institution that relates to the international scenario. In contrast, 
the new order (Figure 3.1 b) is characterised by more direct and less centralised relations 
and/or pressures existing between markets (whether national or international) and the 
regions. These can either be activated by regions (in which case they constitute 
'relationships' with) and/or they can be affecting them (in which case they can be 
characterised as 'pressures' of). Nation states (due to their own inefficiencies, lack of 
resources, lack of interest and/or political determination) may or may not intervene in this 
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new setting through mediating the flow of influence outlined above. The big challenge is 
that the position of the localities and regions in, and with respect to, the domestic and 
international market is increasingly being determined by their 'competitive advantage' and 
their 'political capacity and intelligence' to exploit these advantages inside and outside of 
national boundaries. 
As regards the development of dynamic competitive advantage, I argue below that the 
strands of the NIP literature concerned with the ' ILK Triad' come together, and to some 
extent converge with those arguing the case for regional- and local-base industrial 
development and policy. Likewise, as regards the 'political capacity and intelligence to 
exploit' competitive advantage, these strands of the NIP thinking have gone deeper in the 
analysis and conceptualisation relating to issues of socio-economic and political 
governance of IP than the former. 
Two types of setting characterise the role that localities and regions play in the new order, 
in which they have seen themselves 'pushed' to undertake the search for their own answers 
in the face of new challenges. At one extreme, some regions have managed to constitute 
themselves, via a process of creative adaptation, reconversion and institutional innovation, 
as "new places for the construction of policies [...] and as actors themselves in the global 
order" (Keating, 1998:78). In these cases the new setting is an 'opportunity', which has 
been exploited starting from new principles of economic and political organisation and 
'offensive' strategies of development (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). This is the case of the 
'paradigmatic' experiences previously mentioned. At the other extreme, the large majority 
of less successful territories have been challenged by the new order and in some cases 
'forced' to constitute themselves as actors in the new order (Keating, 1998; Scott, 1998). 
Most localities and regions around the world have in effect been globalised 'by default', 
that is, they often only 'enjoy' the negative effects of globalisation. Thus, globalisation, 
such as we know it, is mostly considered as a 'threat' rather than an opportunity. In the 
middle of these two extremes it is possible to imagine several combinations of strategic 
settings and policy frameworks. The second setting includes entire regions around the 
world, notably in developing countries like Argentina, in which the disappearance of 
traditional and non-traditional sectors of production exposed to extreme international 
competition has caused not only the 'non-creative' destruction of accumulated capital 
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(notably, physical assets, skills, expertise and know-how, which are unrecoverable) but also 
led to unemployment, poverty and social unrest, repression, and so on (Katz and Kosacoff, 
1989). It is important to highlight that the large majority of countries around the world do 
not possess a supra national 'umbrella' which regulates the global forces operating within 
and across the country. As Gatto (2001) argues, the absence of a supra-national 'umbrella' 
d la European, along with the difficulties that the developing countries often have in 
conducting their macroeconomy within 'normal' pattems, imposes limits to any project of 
regional development in most of the regions in countries of the developing world (i.e. vis-a-
vis European regions). 
The importance gained by the region as a source of competitive advantage in the 
globalising political economy has taken place within a context where, on the one hand, 
globalisation is exerting determinant 'localised' effects on sub-national territories and, on 
the other, the nation states are no longer able to perform roles as mediators of global forces 
(Scott, 1998). However, and given the magnitude of problems that less developed regions 
exposed to the new competition fece, elsewhere the national states by themselves or in 
partnership wdth regional actors are displaying an increasing 'interest' in the promotion of 
instruments, actions or programmes (depending upon the country and region in question) 
for regional economic development ('top-down' vector). Likewise, in many regions, 
political and economic regional actors attempt, through offensive or defensive strategies, to 
generate answers in order to face the pressures of the new competitive setting ('bottom-up' 
vector). Hence, the real practice of the supply-side economy emerging in some localities 
and regions, in particular in less developed ones, should be understood as a product of the 
dialectic (though generally highly asymmetric) between the 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' 
vectors of development. 
To return to the debate on 'competitiveness' addressed in Chapter 2, it is worth discussing 
whether this concept is theoretically relevant as a rationale for a local or regional policy of 
economic development. I argue that, as globalisation enhances the competitive climate in 
which firms operate, the issue of territorial competitiveness is of increasing importance for 
industrial development at the level of regions and localities. Following Camagni's (2002) 
recent contributions on this matter, I maintain that territories can play a key role in the 
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development of competitive advantages and therefore on firm competitiveness. This scholar 
rightly asserts that, 
"the concept of territorial competitiveness is theoretically sound, considering not only 
the role that territory plays in providing competitive 'environmental' tools to individual 
companies, but especially the role that it plays in the processes of knowledge 
accumulation and in the development of interpretative codes, models of co-operation and 
decisions on which the innovative progress of local companies is based" (2002:2395-6) 
(emphasis in original). 
It is important to remember that Camagni's contributions respond to recent critical debates 
about the validity of the issue of competitiveness in regions and localities derived from 
Krugman's scepticism on the concept of national competitiveness (see in Intemational 
Regional Science Review 1996 and Urban Studies, 1999). In Camagni's view, 
"the law of comparative advantage does not hold in the case of confrontation among 
local economies (inter-regional trade) and, consequently, the conclusion [derived from 
Krugman's critique] that each region will always be granted some specialisation and a 
role in the interregional division of labour is not valid. A region can well be pushed 'out 
of business' if the efficiency and competitiveness of all its sectors are lower than those of 
other regions" (ibid:2401) (emphasis in original). 
Within the developing world there are many cases of regions and localities being pushed 
'out of business' and this has been particularly the case in the context of increasingly open 
market economies. The fete of economies that do not assure a certain rate of growth in 
competitiveness may be in a state of crisis, depopulation and desertification. Hence 
Camagni is arguing the case for policies aimed at enhancing both competitiveness (of the 
local economic-fabric) and attractiveness (with respect to 'real' and 'financial' capital) of 
sub-national entities (ibid). In particular, to enhance both the internal productivity of a 
territory, in the first place, (which is associated with the efficiency of supply-side factors), 
and secondly its extemal competitiveness (with respect to extemal firms and territories) as 
regards exports, are two key aspects (which Kmgman rightly keeps separate) that should be 
closely observed and considered by a policy fi-amework. As seen above, this is particularly 
the case in the context of developing economies increasingly exposed to global forces and 
various sets of uncertainties. With respect to policy instmments, preference is given here to 
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horizontal or non-sectoral policies, like those addressed at improving the quality of 
production factors (i.e. human capital, regional accessibility, information and 
communication networks) and the local/regional business environment. Likewise, Camagni 
makes a particular case for policy instruments related to local governance, such as 
stimulating local co-operation networks and partnerships and collective learning and local 
relational capital, as well as construction of territorial 'visions' and strategies based on 
effective participation of local actors (see section 3.4.4). 
To summarise, this section has developed some key arguments to understand why the 
national states through genuine interest, political need or even obligation^^ have begun to 
see localities and regions as platforms for policy making and, in some cases, as actors in 
their own right in the development process. In the following, I will analyse the main 
theoretical claims that assert the contrary logic of analysis, that is, the 'from-below' view 
on regional industrial development and policy. 
3.4.3. Economic foundations of the new regionalism 
The main economic foundation that re-asserts the region as a locus of economic order and 
as a potent foundation of competitive advantage relates to the importance of 'geographical 
proximity' among agglomerated and/or clustered economic agents. This is said to have a 
varied set of positive effects on economic activity, including the generation of externalities 
and knowledge spillovers (Marshall, 1919); the developing of economies of agglomeration 
and specialisation (Krugman, 1995; Porter, 1994; Scott, 1988; Storper, 1997); the reduction 
of transaction costs (Scott, 1995; Krugman, 1995); and the enhancement of the leaming 
process of firms and fecilitation of tacit knowledge transfer (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999; 
Morgan, 1997; Storper, 1997). Thus, a cluster of 'proximity policies' has become a prime 
concern for regional development policy. Although the theoretical insights outlined above 
can be associated with particular authors, it must be said that they often overlap when they 
materialise into policy instruments. However, a clear broad cut division can be made 
between two conceptual strands that stand out in this field. The first relates to the so-called 
^' This is the case of many state policies aimed at the poorest regions in developing countries. In these cases 
the regions are seen as a 'locus of redistributive problems' rather than as a 'locus of economic order'. 
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'new geographical economies'. The second strand relates to varied approaches in 
'economic geography', which I associate with the NIP thinking. 
The first conceptual strand is associated with the work of Krugman (1995, 1998), Porter 
(1990; 1994), and other international trade theorists, interested in endogenous growth 
theory from a mainstream economic perspective. They have given rise to the influential 
'new geographical economies'. In order to understand international trade, Krugman (1998) 
argues that we should first explain why industries tend to concentrate geographically. His 
answer relies on firms locating in areas with both larger demand, because of the potential 
for increasing returns generated by potential larger economies of scale, and in areas where 
the offer of inputs is economically convenient. To Krugman (1995) the agglomeration of 
economic activity reflects processes of 'cumulative circular causation' through which 
productive activity tend to agglomerate or cluster where markets are larger and markets 
become larger there where industries cluster. It follows that local/regional agglomerations 
of larger demand will draw new firms and this will reinforce that local/region's 
attractiveness for the location of other firms and so on (Helmsing, 2001). This relates to the 
old theory of externalities developed by Marshall (1890), according to which advantages 
arising from the presence of many firms of a similar industry or trade in one area are the 
provision of varied intermediate inputs, the poling of a local specialised labour markets and 
the local information flows. Specifically, as Storper (1997:13) explains, Krugman's "scale 
economies affect both intermediate and final ou^uts, giving rise to an uneven pattern of 
market dominance [...] and hence to specialization and trade (especially intra-industry 
trade)". Economies of specialisation in clustered related industries are also a key issue in 
Porterian's theory of competitive advantages (1990; 1994), since they represent sources of 
productivity gain and growth. 
The 'new geographical economics' has gained considerable influence in academic circles 
and policy world. It provides potent economic foundations for geographical agglomeration, 
including the exploitation of economies of scale and specialisation, the reduction of 
transaction costs and the development of external economies (Amin, 1999), based on an 
analytical approach largely led by transactional relations. However, explicit IP implications 
from Krugman's insights are a matter of speculation. In Martin and Sunley's (1996) critical 
reading of Krugman's work, the authors ask themselves that i f clusters prove to be a source 
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of positive external economies, then clusters provide evidence and the case to define which 
industries should be objects of IP. As Martin and Sunley speculate, what "Krugman seems 
to be suggesting, though he does not use the term explicitly, is that the only justifiable form 
of industrial (trade) policy is in fact regional industrial development policy" (ibid:282). An 
IP body aimed at generating positive externalities at the level of agglomeration (i.e. 
subcontracting policies which aim to link large and small firms) could well be extrapolated 
to the levels of region and country, that is, due to its potential to foster national competitive 
advantage a la Porter (Helmsing, 2001). 
In Porter's view, the strategic capacity of the firms depends not only upon one firm's 
resources but critically upon external resources (associated with fectors such as product 
design, production, commercialisation and consumption) that the firm needs to gain 
competitive advantage. Porter coined the politically influential concept 'value chain' to 
refer to those vertical and horizontal external linkages that the firm can develop through a 
varied set of economic agents in order to access these resources and, within which, the firm 
operates as the unit of strategic coordination. Industrial 'clustering' is in turn a key concept 
in the Porterian logic since clustering of related industrial activities fecilitates the 
development of business links and therefore the development of value chains. 
Subsequently, as Porter argues, "[a] nation's successful industries are usually linked 
through vertical (buyer/supplier) or horizontal (common customers, technology, channels, 
etc) relationships" (1990:148-9). 
Finally, despite its influence, the new geographical economics nevertheless fails to provide 
a full explanation of the very source of agglomeration economies (Martin and Sunley, 
1996; Storper, 1997). As Storper (1997) informs, Krugman says little about how clustered 
intermediate-ou^ut producers become so specialised, how the long process of 
concentration of assets that generate the emergence of final outputs takes place (i.e. how 
firms get 'there'), and how the structure of specialist suppliers and the demand for 
proximity is created through market transactions. Hence Storper claims, "there is almost 
nothing in the new geographical economics about the potential geographical foundations of 
economic performance. Everything reduces rather axiomatically to fiilly efficient, though 
imperfectly competitive, clusters of producers who enjoy pecuniary extemalities"(ibid:14). 
In my view, the 'new geographical economics' is informative in relation to our 
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understanding regarding the development of both pecuniary extemalities in industrial 
agglomerations and subcontracting links between clustered firms. However, it does not 
address key issues which are relevant in this research such as evolutionary learning and 
socio-political and institutional factors underpirming economic development. 
The second conceptual strand is associated with the work of different economic 
geographers wiio, drawing on institutional and evolutionary economics, offer a valuable 
and promising set of arguments to answer the questions above, by asserting the crucial 
importance of social, cultural and institutional features which underlie the relationships 
between economic agents in local/regional industrial agglomerations (Amin and Thrift, 
1994; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Maskell et al, 1998; Morgan, 1997; Storper, 1997). A 
distinctive aspect of this strand of the NIP literature is that greater 'emphasis' is placed on 
those localised relations among agents that do not necessarily occur through market 
transactions in the strict sense (or traded input-producer relations). Certainly, both traded 
and untraded relations are in practice complementary and sometimes interdependent. As 
seen already, transactional user-producer relations in fact are essential to generate flows of 
information (Lundvall, 1992). As Lambooy notes, "agglomeration economies have to be 
connected with the 'socio-economic infrastructure' of a region and with the behavioural 
options of people in their -sometimes adverse- regional enviromnent"(2000:28) (emphasis 
in original). It is, according to Lambooy, the way in which advantages associated with 
social, cultural and institutional features can combine with the central concepts of 
agglomeration economies previously discussed: scale, differentiation (in connection with) 
specialization, information, organisation and dynamic external effects (ibid). 
There have been a range of attempts to conceptualise the foundations of agglomeration 
economies beyond traded input-output relations (in successful vis-a-vis less successful 
regions), including those by the milieux innovateurs approach, the flexible specialisation 
approach, and California schools (see Storper, 1997). However, it was Michael Storper 
who, based on a fescinating critical reading on the approaches above, systematised a 
theoretical synthesis that brought significant advances in this field. Storper argues that 
evolutionary and neo-Schumpeterian economists, despite not being principally interested in 
territoriality and regions, "permit us to identify [...] the intangible aspect of a territorial or 
regional economy that underUes iimovative, flexible, agglomerations, of both the high- and 
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low-tech variety" (ibid: 18) (emphasis of the author). It is precisely this 'intangible' aspect, 
referred to as the social, cultural and institutional foundations of economic activity, which 
became a key theoretical tuming point owing to it opened the field of the so-called 
'untraded interdependencies' or 'relational assets' (ibid). Storper's main proposition is that 
the main role of the region is as the locus of untraded interdependencies, "which take the 
form of conventions, informal mles, and habits that coordinate economic actors under 
conditions of uncertainty" (ibid: 5). 
Untraded interdependencies are identified here as 'a central form of scarcity in 
contemporary capitalism', which provides sources of differentiation in production and 
therefore competitive advantage (Storper, 1997:5). In Amin's words, untraded 
interdependencies are not easily substitutable, since "they draw on the social properties of 
networks in which economic agents are implicated" (1999:369). According to Storper, it is 
a key concept in which analysis was absent in the transaction cost and/or traded input-
ou^ut relations approach to agglomeration previously discussed, and which cannot be 
easily accommodated in it due to its methodological individualism (ibid). Thus, the several 
attempts to marry insights of evolutionary economics with studies of innovation, learning 
and the role of institutions at the level of regional development (i.e. Amin and Thrift 1994; 
Camagni, 1991; Cooke and Morgan, 1994; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998; Piore and Sabel, 
1984; Pyke et al, 1990) have found in Storper's insights one the most sophisticated 
argumentative 'synthesis'. Consequently, the regions are now said to occupy a central role 
in the 'supply architecture' of the leaming economy (Storper, 1997) and as such, "they are 
appropriated, indeed necessary objects of public policy" (Scott and Storper, 1995:509). A 
policy rationale that seeks to integrate the new insights should then turn towards policy 
bodies critically built upon the idea of 'geographical-relational proximity'. Furthermore, in 
contrast to the strands of the NIP literature discussed in Section 3.3, 'spatial considerations' 
should be at the heart of the analysis. 
Out of; and beyond these symptomatic readings, two key policy areas have emerged 
followed by the majority of the intemational experiences of local- and regional-based 
industrial development. The first relates to the formation of a regional system or 
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architecture of socio-economic governance and political mobilisation^", whilst the second 
relates to the development of a regional system or supply architecture of irmovation and 
learning-based competitiveness.^' In the following section I will address the first policy 
dimension, while in section 3.4.4, I will discuss some elements regarding the regional 
architecture of socio-economic and political governance. 
3.4.3.1. Regional architecture of innovation and learning 
In the previous section it was pointed out that the literature on 'geographical proximity' 
puts a premium on both traded and untraded relations between economic agents and that 
untraded or relational assets among local agents and institutions add high value to the 
organisation of productive activity under conditions of uncertainty. A question raised is 
which are those localised 'assets' that not only have a market value (as the untraded 
interdependences) but also can be materialised into better, cheaper, different and/or novel 
products or services? According to several scholars, the answer is 'knowledge assets' and 
specifically 'tacit' or 'embedded' knowledge. This is indeed the main claim of the 
advocaters of the 'spatial turn' in studies on the ' ILK triad'. 
The region is said to ftinction as a repository of knowledge assets. Specifically, it is said 
that these knowledge assets are mostly 'tacit', which, because it is sticky, "can be best 
accessed, learned and finally mastered on the basis of face-to-fece interactions and 
communications at the local or regional scale" (Lee, 2001). In dense industrial 
agglomerations 'tacit knowledge' is both relationally developed through networks of 
mutual interdependence (it is context-dependent) and needs long period of time for its 
exchange (this is also why proximity matters). In this way, tacit knowledge creates not only 
Amin and Thrift (eds), 1994; Bianchi, 1994; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Keating, 1998; Scott and Storper, 
1995; 2003; Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997. 
Camagni, 1991; Cooke et al 2000; Braczyk et al, 1998; Florida, 1995; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998; 
Morgan, 1997; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 1999; Storper, 1997. 
Di£Ferent conceptual perspectives converge in this debate, notably those asserting the role of 'regional 
innovation systems' (Brazyck et al, 1998; Cooke et al, 2000; Howells, 1999), ieaming regions' (Florida, 
1995;Morgan, 1997; Morgan and Nauwelears, 1999), and milieu irmovator (Camagni, 1991). Although these 
approaches present some clear differences, they are based on similar principles and, notably, the policy 
agenda and policy instruments forwarded often are the same. 
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firm-specific but also region-specific competencies (Maskell et al, 1998). These 
competencies are difficult, i f not impossible, for competitors and/outsiders to imitate and 
neither are they easily transmissible without direct contact with and participation in those 
local/regional networks. Therefore, they are responsible for the creation of sustainable 
competitive advantage (ibid). 
Untraded interdependencies are said to constitute a key part of the leaming environment of 
firms (Amin, 1999; Morgan, 1997). They provide 'access' to a set of relevant resources for 
firms (i.e. business information, technical know-how, ideas for solving problems, among 
others) which are activated though networks of interdependence among local firms and 
local institutions. These resources allow "territoriality embedded networks to develop 
unique, localized capabilities; combinations of institutional endowments, built structures, 
natural resources and the knowledge and skills in a region from which firms draw 
competitive advantages" (Boekema etal, 2000:11-12, based on Maskell etal, 1998). Hence 
proximity is only one part of the explanation of the impact of geography on leaming in 
embedded networks. Institutional fectors are also crucial and not only for providing 
transactional advantages of proximity but also the formation of localised and networked 
practices of leaming where mutual 'trust', 'understanding' and 'shared values' are essential 
(Maskell et al, 1998; Harrington, 1999). Leaming to cooperate by building up tmst among 
economic agents that may be competitors is another key element of the leaming 
environment provided by the local milieu. Other authors note that geographical proximity 
fosters the possibility of carrying out varied forms of (trial and error) experimentation. For 
instance, in searching for problem solving methodologies to fece similar difficulties, that is, 
encouraged by incentives and opportunities provided by a 'permanent possibility of 
monitoring, comparing and selecting strategies' followed by co-located firms (Breshi and 
Malerba -2001- in Amin and Cohendet, 2002:149). Co-located firms act as role models 
within agglomerations. 
In sum, (leaming) industrial agglomerations are, on the one hand, endowed with 
mechanisms (untraded interdependencies) that permit coordination of actors under 
conditions of uncertainty. On the other hand, they abound with valuable and accessible 
assets (notably, codified knowledge) that enhance and support innovation and leaming. 
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promoting and facilitating the process of adaptation to changing business environments. 
Hence, in Storper's and Scott's words, 
"the spatial proximity of large numbers of firms locked into dense networks of 
interaction provides the essential conditions for many-sided exchanges of information to 
occur, and out of which new understandings about process and product possibilities are 
constantiy generated. SpeciaUzed regional economies are the locus of intense knowledge 
spill-overs, thereby helping to raise the rate of innovation, and promote long-term 
growth" (2003:583). 
Two main 'policy metaphors' have sought to conceptually frame regional innovation 
strategies and policies (developed in the European context since the mid 1990s). One is the 
'regional innovation system' (RIS)^^ and the other the 'learning region' (LR) '^*. Although 
some differences exist between both metaphors, particularly those which refer to the 
different emphasis placed on 'outputs' (irmovation per se) or 'processes' (leaming) 
(Landabaso, 2000), at the level of policies these differences appear much less clear. In what 
follows I will use insights from both perspectives. 
Following Boekema et al (2000), a regional iimovation policy body should primarily be 
thought of alongside three different axes of analysis. The first level of analysis is that 
represented by the 'actors'. The second level is that of 'factors', and the third level is 
represented by the local/regional 'business environment'. Although a policy framework as 
the one here discussed should understand them as an integral whole. 
As regards actors, the firms, the local state and public agencies; local private institutions, 
research, educational and training institutions; and networks (which are here considered as 
collective actors) are the main ones mentioned by the literature. Under the 'leaming region' 
paradigm, these actors "possess, acquire, exchange and create knowledge through leaming" 
(Boekema et al, 2000:250), in this way they become a key unit of analysis for policy 
In a recent woric that seeks to systematise concepts and methodologies of the literature on RISs, Evangelista 
et aVs define it as "the localized network of actors and institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions generate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies" (2002:174). 
Based on different official European initiatives (RTF and RIS), Boekema et al's point out that the LR 
approach aims "to develop a regional innovation strategy through a joint effort of all the regional partners [in 
order to encourage] the exchange of knowledge between firms and between frnns and other players in the 
region. In other words, these strategies promote learning among regional actors -without, of course, ignoring 
the non-regional relations" (2000:11-12). RTF and RIS stand for Regional Technological Plan and Regional 
Innovation Strategy, respectively. 
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making, the local firms being the main one. Unlike the NSI policy framework, in this 
instance the small- and medium-size firms are the main focus of policy concern. The 
central role that SME innovation policy plays in the RSI and LR approaches represents 
another specificity of the 'spatial turn' in studies of innovation. Local innovation policies 
aimed at SMEs primarily operate on two levels. Firstly, at micro-economic level, 
encompassing all those areas, such as quality, organisation, management, marketing, 
training, and technology, on which innovation relies. Secondly, at the meso-economic level, 
it is by promoting the development of links and networking between firms and other local 
depositaries and/or intermediaries of knowledge, including firms along with public, private 
and intermediate institutions. There seems to be an agreement that firms leam best from 
other firms, their clients and suppliers leading to cluster policies often interacting, 
encompassing or forming part of local innovation policies. Furthermore, both centres of 
'real services', which operate on different aspects of the microeconomy of firms (i.e. 
relevant business information, marketing, quality control, etc.) and 'brokers', which act as 
mediators and facilitators between economic agents within and outside the locality or 
region, represent novel institutional policy devices which are directly linked to innovation 
activities of firms (see Chapter 1 section 1.4.3) (Landabaso, 2000; Todtling and Kaufinann, 
2001). Indeed, recent research confirms that co-operation is the key to innovation for SMEs 
at the regional level, the main firms' partners being firstly clients, then suppliers, 
competitors and, finally, support organisations (Landabaso, 2000). These potential partners 
represent the main institutional channels through which local SMEs can gain 'access' to 
and get in 'connection with' external sources of information and (mainly) knowledge. 
Likewise, policy strategies have pushed for large companies (whether nationals or 
multinationals) to operate 'as the heart of subcontracting networks', through horizontal 
and/or vertical linkages with SME suppliers (Begg et al, 1995). Finally, the main 
(traditional) local public and private institutions will be analysed in section 3.4.4. 
The following table lists the main 'strategic axes' for regional innovation policy. It 
summarises the main areas of policy concern observed through different official policy 
frameworks in developed countries.^' As can be seen in the table, this policy body has a 
" In particular, it is based on the Regional Technological Plans (RTFs) and the Regional hmovation 
Strategies (RISs) in the framework of the European Union. 
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strong SME content and mostly aims to promote technological rather than institutional or 
organisational innovation. 
Table 33. Major strategic axes defined in RTFs and similar operations 
Strategic Axes for Regional Innovation Policies 
Bridge the gap between HEIs and industry 
Identify and support clusters of enterprises 
Raise demand for innovation in SMEs 
Inia^ase demand for skilled people in SMEs 
Increase supply of adequate human resources for iimovation 
Build a permanent Advisory Board for policy 
Provide adequate finance for innovation 
Raise awareness of innovation 
Adapt training and further education to SMEs' needs 
Organise oo-operation between supply organisations 
Foster the attractiveness of the region for high-tech companies 
Support external orientation of SMEs 
strengthen the technology transfer oflFer 
Develop support tools for the observation of SMEs needs 
Develop non-technological support to innovation 
Source: based on Morgan and Nauwelaers (1999:232) 
As regards 'factors' (the second level of analysis), they include the availability and quality 
of the physical infrastructure of the territory (i.e. universities, training centres, research 
institutes, information, communication and energy); factors of geographical location; level 
of both education of the labour force and skill of the labour market. As regards the 
'business environment', it encompasses not only the formal institutions previously 
mentioned, but also those informal institutions such as values, conventions, labour 
relations, business culture, and modes of government interventions observed in the territory 
(Landabaso, 2000). As Maskell et al (1998) note, these patterns of behaviour are often 
stable over time and therefore are responsible for the fact that regional development is to a 
substantial degree path-dependent. I will expand upon these issues regarding local/regional 
governance (of innovation) in section 3.4.4. 
The following table addresses some of these issues from a learning and institutional 
innovation policy point of view. Indeed, Table 3.4 below presents policy programmes, 
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including policy instruments and actions, which are specifically aimed at encouraging what 
Bellusi (1999) calls 'collective leaming' amongst local economic agents. 
Table 3.4. Policies for collective leaming 
Level 1. MoMllgation of taiowledge and the creation of new luiowledge 
1. Focusing on various intaventions to maintain the 1. Promotion of specific training activity to diffuse 
elevated level of knowledge acquired in the past 'technological knowledge' accumulated in depository 
(sector-specific accumulated knowledge) organisations 
2. Reinforcement of empirical leaming (practical 2. Promotion of unintentional and unsystematic leaming 
knowledge acquired through direct expoience and opportunities (le. participation of firms in fairs, conferences, 
observation) debates on technology, and on other economic issues) 
3. Promotion of reverse engineering and benchmarking 
3. Development of imitative leaming through access practices 
to second-hand expoience 
4. Establishing institutional channels for imitation practices: 
4. Favouring new connection in the (local) productive using consultants, promoting meetings between technicians 
context: by pushing acquisition or joint-ventures of 
external firms of strategic interest, or by attracting to 
the area innovative enterprises, or highly specialised 
personnel 5. Shortening of leaming curves of firms (financing the 
e>q>aimentation of new technologies) 
5. Promoting specific research projects (R&D 
activity) for the implementation of innovative 6. Establishing of centres for providing services to advanced 
solutions functions of firms 
7. Predisposition of specific initiatives focused on themes 
relating to the competitiveness of firms to imp-ove working 
methods, standards, and environmental themes 
Level 2. Coordination and distribution of information 
1. Using specific structures and collective actors to 1. Increasing the numbCT of information offices 
intensify the distribution of information 
2. Wide publicity to the initiatives organised by (local) 
institutions 
3. Favotuing access to intonational data banks and to the global 
communication networks 
Level 3. Reinforcement of the (local) Identities and production of culture and codes and languages to interpret 
knowledge 
1. Construction of communication channels for 1. Systematic control of economic and social performance of 
inducing more cooperation among collective agents (local) system 
and among leading firms 
2. Activation of (local) development projects open to foreign 
partnerships 
3. Promotion of social dialogue with collective actors 
Level 4. Actions to store the accumulated specific knowledge 
1. Reinforcement of progressive coalitions 1. Promotion of social dialogue with collective actors 
2. Financing specific cultural "deposits" 
3. Promoting the setting-up of archives on local history 
4. Promoting research on local development. 
Source: Belussi, (1999:740-1) 
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This scholar identifies four main levels of what she calls 'conceptual interventions', and 
then specifies 'concepts and processes' and 'policy options', as follows: 1) the process of 
mobilisation of icnowledge and the creation of new knowledge; 2) the process of 
coordination and distribution of information; 3) the reinforcement of the local institutional 
setting; 4) the storage of the knowledge in the collective memory. 
3.4.3.2. Appraisal 
I have sought to identify the main theoretical foundations that have given rise to the strand 
of the NIP thinking concerned with local and regional development, hi particular, I have 
focused on those debates arguing the case for innovation and learning policies at a 
territorial level citing that the competitiveness of firms depends on 'localised capabilities' 
(Maskell et al, 1998). Focus on innovation and learning under this perspective has drawn 
attention to some central points of the process of regional development, particularly in the 
light of the new competitive settings. I have discussed a number of policy programmes for 
local economic development based on innovation. I have shown that these programmes 
assume principles fi^om the 'new regionalism'^^ or the 'new heterodox economic 
framework' for regional development. These approaches advocate IP bodies as: 'context-
sensitive', that is, concerned with the embeddedness of industrial practices in specific 
contexts; 'production-systems-oriented', rather than focused on individual firms; and 
promoting the 'ongoing adjustment of the capacities' of regional economies rather than the 
mere implementation of the so-called 'best practices' (Scott and Storper, 1995:513). I will 
expand upon this in the following section. 
The strands of the NIP literature discussed here also come with some limitations as regards 
the development of sustainable competitive advantage. An initial set of critiques refers to 
issues associated with methodological problems. Firstly, tacit forms of knowledge may be 
spatially 'sticky' but they are also methodologically 'slippery', as untraded 
interdependencies or relational assets are difficuh to identify and measure (Evangelista et 
Including authors such as Amin and Thrift 1994; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Keating, 1998; Scott and 
Stoiper, 1995; Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997. 
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al, 2002). Secondly, the theoretical approaches presented seem to display considerable 
elasticity with respect to the unit of analysis, whether localities, regions or a mix of both 
(Allen et al, 1998). As this research is concerned with IP approaches, which to a critical 
extent emerge 'from-below', the definition of the unit of analysis (including the 'extension' 
of the concept of region) will primarily be an expression of the economic and socio-
political interests active in a given territory. 
A second set of critiques refers to issues of content. Firstly, the validity of the main 
assumptions of NIP thinking has been questioned because they largely depend upon 
research findings based on secondary data sources (i.e. official censuses, large-scale 
surveys). Research relying on aggregated secondary information lacks the necessary depth 
and specification to grasp and assess methodologically 'slippery' units of analysis that are 
thought to underpin localised learning and knowledge creation processes (MacKirmon etal, 
2002; Martin and Sunley, 2001). Secondly, the emphasis placed on the endogenous 
capacities (as source of competitive advantage) and geographical-relational proximity (as a 
potent constituent of the firms' learning environment) have led to an underestimation of the 
importance that external sources of knowledge have on the generation and fostering of 
'sustainable' competitive advantage (Amin and Cohendet, 1999, 2002; Oinas, 1999, 2000; 
Lee, 2001). In effect, the competitive pressures created by the changing business 
environments under which firms operate (as regards markets and technologies), bring them 
to a permanent search for new sources of knowledge and opportunities for learning beyond 
the local/regional boundaries. This is generally the case for larger and more dynamic firms, 
which can no longer rely upon 'local tacit knowledge' and 'incremental learning' for 
sustaining their competitive performance (Amin and Cohendet, 1999; Oinas, 1999). 
Localised effects of globalisation often operate as strong market signals for change or for 
the need to change, but it consequently does not mean that economic agents act or have the 
ability to act (in terms of resources and capabilities). In many cases those pressures can 
result in defensive behaviours which may strengthen dangerous situations of closure or 
'lock-in' at the level of firms as well as at the level of the local institutional set up as a 
whole (Grabber, 1993; Hudson, 1999). 
Hence, a modem policy framework should operate as an animateur and facilitator of varied 
policy actions for opening up sustained and wider extra-territorial connectivity and 
networking. It may not mean a mere strengthening of traditional local SME policy 
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instrumenis associated with enhancing the export conduct of firms (such as tiirough visits to 
international trade fairs or leading firms and participation in 'rounds of business' along 
foreign entrepreneurs). It may also not mean a mere policy of attraction of inward 
investments (mostly large companies and/or subsidiaries of MNCs) within territories in 
order to promote spill-over effects and upgrading in the local productive system (Trigilia, 
1991). This policy framework means that IP should also attempt to promote external 
connectivity (i.e. based on a concept of development of economies of distance). 
Accordingly, economic agents can virtually or physically connect through multiple forms 
of proximities, that is, relational, cultural and cognitive proximities, besides the 
geographical-based one. Opportunities for connectivity have also increased owing to lower 
costs of transport and communication (notably, the Internet), allowing firms to exploit 
different sources and forms of knowledge. A policy in this sense may be carried out 
through varied forms of social interaction between experts and 'non-experts' at an intra 
firm level (as the Japanese companies have shown -Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995-), at an 
inter-firm level and through wider 'communities of practice' (Amin, 2001b; Amin and 
Cohendet, 2002; Lee, 2001). 
3.4.4. Architecture of socio-economic and political governance 
According to Morgan and Nauwelaers (1999), a key policy question is whether there are 
'entry points' for public policy in the circular reasoning of those theories that claim that 
'innovation occurs because there is favourable milieu, and the milieu develops where there 
is innovation'. They understand that the 'entry point' is the need to identify "potential 
network animateurs and use them as stimuli for building cooperative relationships between 
local actors" (ibid:237), which can operate as both catalysers of synergic potential and 
engines for the development of economies of association. 
Concepts such as 'policy network' (Rhodes, 1990; Cooke and Morgan, 1993, 1998), 
'forums and mechanisms of collective action' (Scott, 1998), 'institutional thickness' (Amin 
and Thrift, 1994), 'developmental coalitions' (Keating, 1998), to mention but a few, have 
been coined in order to attempt elucidate two crucial poUcy questions. Firstly, 'who' is the 
agent or subject of policy at a territorial scaje and, secondly, how are they constituted as 
such. As seen already, the national state, through all its ftinctional and spatial divisions, 
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faces growing pressure and challenges in the context of open and increasingly globalised 
market economies. Therefore, states, in particular those that largely are recipients and not 
agents of globalisation, have been forced to undertake varied processes of internal 
reorganisation and reconfiguration through which they have ceded, relinquished or 
delegated former powers (see Jessop 1994,1997).^' There has been a movement of the state 
towards more decentralised, co-participative, interactive and co-operative forms and 
mechanisms of policy making and, therefore, the shift in the traditional conception of 
governing. In effect, there has been a shift 'from government to governance'^ *, "the 
complex art of steering muhiple agencies, institutions and systems which are both 
operationally autonomous from one another and structurally coupled through various forms 
of reciprocal interdependence" (Jessop, 1997:4). Directly associated with this 'passage' 
from government to governance is the concept of 'policy network' (Rhodes, 1990; Cooke 
and Morgan, 1993, 1998), as an altemative policy making mechanism to those based on 
state hierarchic controls and individuals and 'decentralised' (but not necessarily horizontal) 
market relationships. An interesting definition is offered by Cooke and Morgan (1998), to 
whom a policy network is: 
"an informal or semi-formal organizational mechanism consisting of public and private 
individuals, groups, organizations, and associations whose key discriminating factors is 
that they interact around specific policies and programmes [...] The key is that networic 
participants are 'of consequence' to the policy field in question" (ibid:80) (emphasis in 
original). 
As seen in the definitions above, the new policy making approach refers to logic of 
collective action (or 'collective subject'), shaped by multiple agencies and institutions (i.e. 
public, private and intermediate sectors) and where the policy making is a product of 
cooperative and/or conflictual interactive practices in permanent processes of negotiation. 
It is indeed important to distinguish here between those functions that have traditionally been the exclusive 
domain of the state (i.e. administration of justice, provision of internal public security, and external defence) 
of those functions and activities linked to tiie governing of the economic and socio-political 'game' in which, 
in principle, these changes are mostly operating. 
For a full analysis of the different meanings of govemance see Rhodes (1997), "Understanding 
governance". Buckingham: Open University Press. 
105 
It is necessary to emphasise that the build up of local or regional logics of collective action 
represents a key problem in the literature on 'decentralised industrial policy' (Begg et al, 
1995; Begg and Mayes, 2000; Capellin, 1997). In theory, the local or regional state (if this 
is institutionalised) is the main 'receptor' institution and co-ordinator of decentralisation. 
However, it is also recognised that the less developed regions lack a critical mass of 
technical capabilities, expertise and skills to become agents of decentralisation. Hence the 
need for varied processes of institutional up-grading and learning (see in the following 
section) and the construction of a new logic of intermediation/decentralisation such as 
regional development agencies observed in some European experiences. In both cases, 
multi-agency architectures of socio-economic governance are, again, a key aspect of the 
process. 
Furthermore, although key aspects of decentralised IP are held by public national agencies, 
since they are in charge of the more 'generic' aspects of a regional development policy, the 
national states are increasingly called upon to 'complement' their main policy initiatives 
with those operating at regional levels (Cooke et al, 2000). Issues of sectoral composition 
of regional economies, deficits in varied physical infrastructures, specific community 
needs, or even 'ideas-projects', are some of the factors that help to define local/regional 
specificities which may be considered by the national policy body (ibid). There seems to be 
an agreement between recent studies that the national state has a duty to, primarily, create 
the 'necessary conditions' (Landbaso, 2000) for innovation, that is, by fostering basic 
conditions for the development of a regional learning environment. Necessary conditions in 
the first instance refer to physical infrastructure, within the (single or broader) region (i.e. 
educational and training, R&D, information and communication, energy, etc.) and, 
secondly, to the development of interfaces and synergies between national and regional 
authorities in charge of this infrastructure, in order to encourage national-regional research-
industry linkages (Cooke et al, 2000). A second and more intangible aspect, relates to the 
definition of an appropriate legal, administrative and fiscal framework for productive 
activity (Morgan and Nauwelaers, 1999). Furthermore, another responsibility of the 
national state is the duty to create and foster instances for inter-regional communication and 
networking between policy makers; consequently, avoiding inefficient overlaps and 
competition (i.e. for foreign investments and public resources) as well as to generating 
spaces to share ideas and experiences (i.e. on 'best practices') which may stimulate 
practical learning (ibid). Al l these studies coincide in pointing out that the national 
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government has the duty to allow regions a considerable level of 'empowerment', since it is 
the only means through vdiich the latter can 'legitimate' the promotion of actions which are 
fine tuned to the local situation. 
Finally, the growth of business networking also calls for the needs of logics of collective 
action and 'modem logistic intermediaries' (Cappellin, 1997). As discussed already, in 
complex business environments increasingly complex firms not only depend on their own 
capacities to cope with this complexity but also they critically draw upon the competitive 
assets of other firms and on institutional supports. Concepts such as networks of firms, 
supply chains, labour division among firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984) production systems 
(Scott and Storper, 1992), clusters (Porter, 1990, Schmitz, 1995) and systems of innovation 
and knowledge creation and leaming (Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall and Maskell, 2000) 
become key policy issues in the new competitiveness. As Cooke and Morgan (1998) argue, 
in order to boost competitive advantage, firms and regions need to build up co-ordinated 
associational capacities (or economies of association) at the level of the firm, at the level of 
inter-firm relationships and at the level of institutional support systems. However, all the 
systemic policy instruments cited above pose a number of co-ordination problems for the 
building up of associational capacity (i.e. asymmetries of power and information, moral 
hazard and opportunism) and, as a consequence, new forms of governance are required. In 
a context in which firms "become more dependant on each other, opportunistic behaviour 
becomes increasingly counter-productive" (Boekema et al, 2000:254). Boekema et al 
conclude that trust-based relationships are a central issue in a new approach to govemance, 
since it "is the glue that binds firms and organizations together in networks" (ibid). In tum, 
trust may be also connected to space, as it can be institutionalised in regionally-based 
networks (Maskell etal, 1998). 
In summary, neither the national state nor the local state on their own (and even less so 
decentralised market mechanisms) can cope with the complexity and detail associated with 
new govemance demands. Consequently, networking practices, interaction, and 
complementarity among multiple local/regional agencies is required for the design, delivery 
and control of the IP body as a whole. The IP body should help to generate the necessary 
conditions for the co-ordination and regulation of the business environment in which firms 
operate. Setting up conditions for local regulation (referring to informal norms and 
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conventions regulating the local business activities, sharing values and aspirations, and 
social capital mediating the relationships between economic agents) indeed becomes both a 
necessary condition for the govemance of inter-firm and firm-institution relations and a 
determinant factor to provide (micro) certainty for productive activity under conditions of 
(macro) uncertainty (Camagni, 1991; Scott, 1998; Storper, 1997). In other words, this 
collective policy agent not only plays a key role in the process of building up a policy body 
inspired in the NIP thinking, but also in the generation of the environmental conditions in 
which these bodies can operate. This fmally requires political mobilisation, the dynamic-
catalyser element in the process of accumulation of synergic potential and positive 
activation of the local/regional political agenda (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Cooke and 
Morgan, 1993; 1998; Scott, 1998). 
What then remains for the local state to do? It can, firstly, 'lead' and 'conduct' a local IP 
agenda. Either independently or in partnership with other public, private or intermediate 
agencies, the state in this case exerts the leadership and control over the decision making 
process regarding a given IP body and its policy instruments. 'Decentralised' programmes 
of SME policy, which are managed (though not necessarily delivered) by and through local 
public agencies, are a typical example in this sense. Hence in this case it may be more 
accurate to talk about 'govemance in the shadow of government' (Jessop, 1997). There is 
an increasing trend, however, towards sharing the implementation of public IP programmes 
with (or delegating it) to other local actors, in order to avoid the trap of govemment failure 
(Helmsing, 2001). 
The state, secondly, can become a 'partner' of a policy agenda which involves diverse local 
agencies such as universities, business associations, and other groups of local entrepreneurs 
and professionals. The policy initiative in these cases is a product of discussions which 
emerged from a 'bottom-up' process and then becomes a proposal aimed towards the local 
state. Through partnerships or networked relationships the local state can provide strategic 
guidance, technical support, financial resources and official political support and 
representation. Cluster policies and the formation of centres of services and innovation 
critically rely on the participation and support through design, management and control of 
the sectoral business associations and diverse groups of potential beneficiary firms. 
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Partnership is indeed a crucial issue i f these types of IP instruments and programmes are to 
be successfiil. 
Finally, the state can have a 'secondary' or more 'passive' role in the policy agenda. In this 
case the IP instruments are led and conduced by and through private or intermediate actors 
(such as business associations, professional associations, universities or R&D institutes) 
and the role of the state is, or should be, fecilitating (i.e. providing information, contacts 
and infrastructure) the setting up and performance of these initiatives. Examples of this 
third level of political action could be found in Ae formation of an export or R&D 
consortia, the developing of small chains of subcontracting, and the formation of selling or 
buying groups of firms. These types of actions can be characterised as being closer to forms 
of governance of private interest (Streek and Schmitter, 1985, quoted in Helmsing, 2001). 
3.4.4.1. The process of building up of a 'collective subjective' 
The concept of 'institutional thickness', introduced by Amin and Thrift (1994), becomes a 
usefiil analytical tool to 'isolate' some key socio-institutional determinants of collective 
action and political mobilisation. According to Amin and Thrift, there are three main 
factors that contribute towards the construction of institutional thickness. 
Firstly, a strong 'presence' of formal institutions (notably firms and the local institutional 
set up as a whole). Secondly, "high levels of interaction amongst the institutions" are 
also required and then, as a result of sustained interactive and cooperative processes 
based on shared values, conventions, and knowledge, "the development of [...] sharply 
defined structures of domination and/or patterns of coaUtion resulting in the collective 
representation". Finally, the development amongst participant actors of "a mutual 
awareness that they are involved in a common enterprise" (ibid: 14). In the authors' view, 
"[t]his will almost certainly mean that there is a commonly held industrial agenda which 
the collection of institutions both depends upon and develops" (ibid: 14-5). 
Old institutions have new roles. As regards local government, there appears to be a 
consensus that the role in promoting local or regional development has changed from that 
of traditional rule-maker to 'animateur' (Boekema et al, 2000; Landabaso, 2000; Morgan 
and Nauwelaers, 1999). Local governments manage two important assets: regulatory 
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economic power and political legitimacy and authority (in cases that they have been 
democratically elected). Through regulatory instruments and public procurement policies 
the government may make use of 'carrot and stick' policies of incentives. Most 
importantly, as Morgan and Nauwelaers argue, it may activate the regional actors "by 
animating communities of meaning, by building capacities for action and by crafting 
networks through which agents are able to collaborate for mutually beneficial ends" 
(1999:14). As the autiiors conclude, it is not only govemmentper se that is important, "but 
competent regional govemment which appreciates the significance of enabling and 
orchestration"(ibid) (emphasis in original). Therefore, both permanent interaction between 
local actors and search for shared solutions to common problems are at the heart of the 
animation capacity of a local or regional govemment and, at the same time, become a first 
stage in the developing of coalition patterns. Furthermore, a number of other pre-requisites 
are often mentioned as necessary for the regional state to be able to play a progressive role 
in regional development, including institutional innovation towards: more flexible, less 
bureaucratic and more efficient state fiinctional structures; quality and transparency of the 
local legislation (notably, efficient business legislation); disposition towards consensus-
building (which implies dialogue- and negotiation-oriented vocation of the public leaders 
and servants); inclusiveness in the political process and; political stability, at least in respect 
to the policy agenda for development (Amin, 1999; Boekema et al, 2000; Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998; Keating, 1998; Landabaso, 2000; Morgan and Nauwelaers, 1999). 
Another key role for the state to play is to facilitate the development of opportunities for 
collective representation and the involvement of economic agents in common enterprise. 
This could be achieved by primarily opening up 'bilateral' stmctures of power observed in 
'traditional' localities and regions that include only the local govemment and local business 
elites. Indeed, the experience of the Italian industrial districts has shown that this is possible 
through public 'pressures' from the local state to include and involve other economic 
agents of consequence in local industrial development such as smaller firms and informal 
manufacturing-related sector (Bagnasco, 1977; Becattini, 1978; Bmsco, 1982; Piore and 
Sabel, 1984). 
As regards the local/regional business elites, and the business associations (BAs) that they 
normally control, they play new roles in a local IP agenda. Firstly, whether or not the main 
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BAs represent the interests of the local firms, they are a power base within the territory 
since they have the ability to gather and build up political consensus among firms. BAs by 
action or by omission may affect positively or negatively the policy-building process or the 
IP itself Secondly, BAs may become focal players in articulating concerns and demands of 
local firms, pooling resources and proving 'club' goods to firms through, for instance, 
centres of services (Best, 1990; Keating, 1998; Helmsing, 2001; Maskell et al, 1998). In 
particular, BAs may help to foster conditions for 'collective leaming' by generating spaces 
of interaction between local firms, but also due to the fact that they can fiinction as 
channels through which local firms search for and acquire information and knowledge 
inside and outside of the territory whether nationally or internationally (Cooke and Morgan, 
1998; Maskell et a/, 1998; Helmsing, 2001). For all these reasons, BAs are both a key 
partner for the local state in a local IP agenda and a central constituent of any architecture 
of socio-economic govemance concemed with industrial development issues. 
However, the business elites and/or BAs in addition to the local or regional state, can also 
contribute to situations of 'lock-in' and therefore become a key source of economic failure 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Grabber, 1993). This is especially the 
case in less developed and institutionally thin regions. Evidence of institutional sclerosis is 
often observed with respect to embedded forms of policy making and other institutional 
routines and practices that generate resistance to change, "by acting as a block on 
innovation and the wider distribution of resources and opportunity" (Amin, 1999:373). This 
is especially the case vs^ere the dominant elites enjoy substantial benefits from the existing 
status quo (Keating, 1998; Helmsing, 2001). Consequently, following Amin (1999), though 
business elites and BAs can provide strategic leadership, they, like the different public 
agencies (but mostly the local govemment), would need to ask "whether their decision-
making processes constitute an obstacle to institutional renewal, away from a culture of 
hierarchy and mle-following, towards one that focuses on informational transparency, 
consultative and inclusive decision-making, and strategic-building on the basis of reflexive 
monitoring of goals" (1999:373). In my opinion, the widening of the institutional basis of 
participation, and the representation of the collective subject of the local policy and its 
opening up to external influences, may encourage such reflexivity. The openness of local 
actors (individuals and institutions) towards varied sources of extemal influences in terms 
of information, new knowledge, expertise, best practices, failures and so forth is without 
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doubt a central element in a consultative learning process. As Amin concludes, "the critical 
factor for economic success is not the presence of local relations of association and 
institutional advancement but the ability of places to anticipate and respond to changing 
external circumstances. Thus it is the management of the region's wider connectivity that is 
of prime importance, rather than its intrinsic supply-side qualities" (1999:375). 
Finally, it must be emphasised that institutional learning within both public and private 
sectors (that is, the time needed to fecilitate re-training and up-grading of institutional 
leaders and public servants) requires a minimal threshold of co-ordination. Such co-
ordination is crucial since 'cumulative causation', required for the good performance of a 
local or regional IP, must affect all actors involved in the architecture of socio-economic 
govemance that has generated such an IP. The eventual existence of 'progressive' leaders 
(which can act as the main animateurs of the local IP agenda) may help to ameliorate tiie 
negative effects derived from an asymmetric co-evolution of the institutional learning 
process (i.e. within or between private and public sector and other agencies). However, due 
to the feet that the strategic view (which is a key asset for a forward looking policy) is often 
both a scarce good and in general is asymmetrically distributed in less developed regions, 
there is a need for more inclusive practices of institutional learning and unlearning. Only in 
this way will it be possible to create the conditions to exploit ihe incremental improvements 
or innovations generated by the different 'scaffolding' of the value chain that shapes the 
local IP body (i.e. public, private and intermediate sectors). Thus, by developing regional 
'intelligence' (Morgan, 1995), it will also be possible to avoid or at least contain tensions 
and resistance to change that the new policy agenda raises. The dual concem of 
maximising opportunities for negotiation and consensus-building and rationalising the 
administration of dissent become key axioms for any local or regional industrial 
development agenda inspired by the NIP thinking. 
3.4.4.2. Appraisal 
In this section I have analysed some theoretical principles arguing for the need to build up 
logics of collective action, which, through political mobilisation of the local or regional 
economic agents, promote the development of local IP agendas. In particular, I have 
examined the new role that the state can play as a 'network builder' and animateur of the 
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regional economic development in the new competitive setting. In effect, the state, as well 
as the institutions of the private sector, can develop institutional 'intelligence' in the 
decision making process through their associations with each other and with the other 
regional economic actors. The development of associational powers at a territorial level can 
even be thought of as a form of re-building state power 'from-below'. This is evident 
particularly in localities and regions in vv^ich the national state has simply 'vanished'. This 
is indeed a key policy challenge for many localities and regions throughout the developing 
world, notably, in Argentina. Furthermore, I have argued that the systemic nature of the IP 
instruments forwarded by the strands of the NIP thinking discussed here, pose different 
levels of co-ordination problems, which, could be best managed by new forms of multi-
agency governance. 
However, as Jessop (1995) argues, govemance mechanisms are not always a solution to 
market or state feilures. It follows that the policy maker must carefiiUy evaluate the 
potential sources of govemance feilure associated with the risks of governing complexity of 
economic or political coordination. In Jessop's view, 'cooperation v/s competition', 
'openness v/s closure', 'govemability v/s flexibility', and 'accountability v/s efficiency' are 
some of the main strategic dilemmas that may contribute towards govemance failure (ibid). 
In this section I have discussed the problems linked with situations of 'political lock-in', 
which may result in an important source of economic failure (Grabber, 1993). I have 
addressed the need for openness towards varied sources of external influence, via extensive 
connectivity. This is required not only at the level of firms (either individually or 
collectively) but also at the level of the main institutions involved in a regional economic 
development agenda. Finally, following Hudson (1999) and MacLeod (2000), there are a 
number of contextual variables regarding industrial cultures embedded in particular 
schemes of social relations of production and consumption (i.e. in old industrial areas) 
which impose major cultural barriers to the 'entrepreneurial' socio-economic and political 
transformations discussed above. It follows the importance of, again, 'context-sensitive' ex-
ante evaluations as a strategic input for policy decision making, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, the conviction that the agenda for industrial development discussed here is far 
from being a proposal for any locality or region. 
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The scarce influence that a regional economic policy has on macro-economic variables (i.e. 
rates of interest, import duties, competition policy, etc.) without doubt represents a second 
source of constraints for a regional IP body. Two different types of problem arise regarding 
the macro-economic issue in relation to IP. Firstly, the level of certainty that an 
institutionally thick local milieu can provide to the local productive activity does not 
necessarily compensate for the negative regional effects of an instable macroeconomy. 
Certainly, competitive pressures in the current globalising political economy have 
intensified. Hence, nowadays, in the absence of a favourable macro-economic setting, "it 
seems irresponsible to ask the regions to embark upon a long-term and comprehensive 
overhaul in pursuit of an endogenous pathway to prosperity" (Amin, 1999:376). This issue 
becomes a key variable to the regional industrial development in countries like Argentina, 
which present 'endemic' macro-economic troubles. Secondly, the NIP thinking as a whole 
has not developed a coherent macro-economic framework altemative to that provided by 
mainstream economics, observed at the level of the EU by the 'coexistence' of neo-
Schumpeterian-led IP bodies operating under the framework of a neoliberal 
macroeconomy. Furthermore, wdiether the macro-economic policy should be part of an IP 
framework is matter of debate (see Chang, 1994). 
In the following chapters (Section n of this thesis) I evaluate the relevance of the main 
theoretical claims forwarded by the NIP thinking to Argentina. This assessment is carried 
out through a two-fold empirical study conducted in Argentina. It included the study of 
both a 'regional-based' economy (the Tigre region in the Province of Buenos Aires) and the 
main 'national' institutions concemed with IP issues. Specifically, Chapter 4 attempts to 
read the NIP thinking in light of the changes recently observed in the Argentine industrial 
economy, particularly in the context of the &ilure of the last neoliberal economic model 
(1991-2001). 
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SECTION II 
The New Industrial Policy versus Practice: 
An Argentinean case study 
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CHAPTER 4 
Argentina: Industrial Competitiveness and Policy 
4.1. Introduction 
Argentina entered into the new millennium in a very traumatic way. Politically, it ended 
with thousands of people demonstrating and/or looting on the main cities' streets; with a 
declared stage of siege that resulted in 12 murders; with the fall of the democratically 
elected government (which however did not result in a military coup); and with the 
subsequent designation of five nominal heads of state in only ten days! Socially, it ended 
with 53 per cent of the population (37 million) falling under the 'official' poverty line, 20 
per cent (7.5 million) no longer, in a food export country, affording food; with 
unemployment and under-employment figures affecting around 50 per cent of the 
workforce; and with the public services and institutions of the (former) 'welfare state' 
disintegrating. Economically, it ended with an economy 20 per cent smaller after four 
years' economic recession (1998-2002); with GDP felling by a historical record 16.3 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2002 and manufecturing output by almost 20 per cent; with a 
highly indebted state; with a collapsed bank system and a new wave of 'capital flight'; with 
the system of private contracts entirely paralysed; and finally, with the declaration of the 
largest defeult registered in modem world economic history (U$132 billion) (Rock, 2002). 
Though some economic indicators (but not the social ones) have suggested slight 
symptoms of'recovering' since mid-2003 (Clarin, 2003; INDEC, 2003) the situation is still 
critical. 
I want to start this chapter with the following reflection. In 1989 there was a political and 
economic alternative to 'hyperinflation'^^ to the wave of lootings and subsequent 
institutional crisis: the neoliberal model. Indeed, 1989's lootings were politically utilised in 
order to both 'bury' the remaining parts of the welfare state and impose once and for all the 
Washington Consensus's agenda in Argentina. The lootings of 2001 and the associated 
Inflation reached 3,000 per cent and 2^00 per cent in 1989 and 1990 respectively, so that this period was 
labelled 'hyperinflation' crisis. 
116 
institutional crisis helped instead to 'bury' the hegemony of the neoliberal speech. 
Although this time there is not a 'handy' alternative economic model, it seems that the 2001 
events outlined above have opened political and economic perspectives most linked with 
the world of work and production. This chapter analyses the evolution and recent changes 
in the Argentine industrial economy, particularly in the context of the spectacular feilure of 
the last neoliberal economic model. The chapter attempts to place into historical context the 
nature of Argentina's industrial competitiveness problems (in section 4.2 and section 4.3), 
by focusing on the changing nature of both the Argentine IP framework and its pattern of 
industrial specialisation. Finally, it attempts to critically evaluate (in section 4.4) these 
problems in light of the insights stemming from the NIP thinking discussed in Chapter 3. 
4.2. Industrial development and competitiveness. Import substitution and 
the first wave of liberal reforms 
Argentine modem history is populated with political and economic projects and counter 
projects and political-institutional crisis.''*' Nevertheless, two main periods stand out, the 
industrialisation model based on import substitution (1930s to mid-1970s) and the new 
(neo)liberal project (mid-1970s to the present date). The Argentine industrialisation process 
had its upturn during the import substitution period (LSI), which extended between the 1930 
crisis'" and the late 1970s. In contrast to the previous agro-industrial goods' export model, 
the ISI took place under a framework of a semi-closed economy. It was based on 
manufacturing production largely aimed at the growing domestic market. Highly fevoured 
by both new regulatory frameworks and the predominant conditions in the intemational 
political context, the substitutive industrialisation progressively evolved through two 
stages. From the manufacturing of basic consumer goods (i.e. textiles, clothes and others 
for domestic consumers) towards durable goods of higher valued added (i.e. metal and 
'"' Democratically elected, military and transitional governments alternated through a large part of the last 
century. Argentine institutional instability is best illustrated by the fact that there was only one 'normal' 
transition between two diffCTent democratically elected presidents in the last sixty years. The 21st century, 
unfortunately, started in the same way. 
The 1930 crisis refers to the collapse of the 'agro-export model' dominant in Argentina since the 1880s. It 
was the result of a series of factors, including the end of the expansion of the so-called Argentine 'agricultural 
frontier', the 1929 crisis (and its negative effects on the intemational trade) and the conflictive three-sided 
political relationship between Argentina, the US and the UK (Argentine's main commercial partners at tiiat 
time) (Kosacoff and Katz, 1989). 
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chemical products, machineries and automobiles). During the ISI second stage (1958 to 
mid-1970s), the manufacturing industry had turned into "the country's engine of economic 
growth and job creation, as well as its base for capital accumulation" (Kosacoff, 2000:36) 
(see GDP figures in Table 4.1 below). 
Table 4.1. Manufacturing industry's share of GDP (at factor cost) 
Decade Share (%) 
1900-09 15.35 
1910-19 16.54 
1920-29 18.65 
1930-39 21.06 
1940-49 24.22 
1950-59 24.80 
1960-69 28.18 
1970-79 27.23 
1980-90 23.60 
Source: Kosacofi'(2000), based on Argentine Central Bank databases 
The import substitution strategy of industrialisation brought about vast social, political and 
cultural transformations. They were largely promoted by or channelled through, the 
Peronist movement which ruled Argentina during most of the 1940s and part of the 1950s 
and 1970s. As a result, the urban proletariat, the trade unions and the small- and medium-
sized entrepreneurs (associated with the -at the time- rising middle class) became major 
political actors for first time in Argentine history.'*^ In turn, the state, or more precisely the 
new socio-political and economic alliance in power, became the main animateur of the 
transformations in process. Indeed, the state played a crucial role in the ISI model's 
performance (Katz and Kosacoff, 1989). As Kosacoff (2000) argues, an explicit policy goal 
of raising the level of national economic self-sufficiency was pursued. The ISI's IP 
framework included, firstly, the estabUshment of a regulatory framework of a closed-
economy (during the 1930s), tiien, the manufacturing of basic inputs by new large state-
owned companies (fi-om the 1940s ahead), the utilisation of the state purchasing power and, 
finally, its massive projects of public investments in infi-astructure and services (notably, 
public education and R&D). The IP fiumework also included the financing and promotion 
This in part explains the fact that the wage' share in the overall national wealth reached a historic record 
during the 1940s climbing by almost 50 per cent. At present it represents less than 20 per cent. 
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of manufacturing activity through speciaHsed institutional devices (notably, the Industrial 
Bank). 
Three main economic agents shaped the ISI manufecturing industry: state-owned 
companies, subsidiaries of transnational corporations (MNCs) and the 'national industry', 
often identified as small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The state-owned 
companies formed a small group of large-scale companies (at a domestic-market scale) 
which operated in monopolistic markets (i.e. public facilities and oil and military industry), 
under conditions of economic and financial stability and were endowed with enough 
resources, thanks to which they established formal R&D teams and laboratories. The 
subsidiaries of MNCs also formed a small group of leading companies in the domestic 
market (though marginal in the intemational market) which operated on the basis of large-
scale production and generally in oligopolist markets. They were technologically 
articulated with their respective mother companies by utilising 'mature' (and already 
depreciated) equipments and capital goods. Finally, the SMEs, though their size varied 
according to sectors and type of firms, were often family firms which operated in markets 
dominated by larger enterprises. As explained below, they had to develop continuous 
'adaptive' learning processes in order to utilise the often outdated import technology in tiie 
domestic market. 
In effect, although the ISI pattern of productive specialisation fiinctioned on the basis of 
technologies largely developed in tiie US and Europe, the local manu&cturing industry had 
to develop considerable and permanent 'engineering ad^tive efforts' to make them 
operable in shorter-scale production (Kosacoff and Katz, 1989; Bisang and Lugones, 2002). 
Consequently, the 'national industry', and in particular the bigger firms in this group, was 
crafting and shaping an idiosyncratic path of learning and knowledge creation, based on the 
development of local 'adaptive' capabilities (focused in product technology) and under 
conditions of a semi-closed market and institutional-instability. As Bisang and Lugones 
(2002) note, although far from being close to intemational best practice, this pattern of 
productive specialisation laid the foundations of a significant local techno-productive 
capacity. 
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However, the ISI model simultaneously generated numerous micro- and macro-economic 
constraints tiiat affected not only industrial competitiveness (in the short and long-term) but 
the model's viability itself In short, the transference of income toward the manufecturing 
industry, largely drawn upon from resources (foreign currency) generated by the primary 
sector exports, was permanently conditioned to macroeconomic restrictions. Indeed, the 
cycles of industrial growth generated a permanent need for importing both technology and 
crucially intermediate goods tiiat were not produced in the domestic market. This caused 
regular trade deficits as the manufacturing industry did not generate enough foreign 
currency via exports. This trade-off undermined the possibility to finance the necessary 
technological upgrading over any sustained period without causing a balance-of-payment 
crisis (Kosacoff, 2002) and the subsequent 'stop and go' cycles. Within the ISI model, two 
DP bodies were set up in order to cope with these structural deficiencies. The first one 
sought to promote the export of manufecturing goods. It had in fact a considerable level of 
success."*^  The second, and more important policy, was the 'industrial promotion' 
programme. It aimed to reduce the dependence on imported industrial inputs (i.e. steel, 
aluminium, cellulose and paper and petrochemical products) through the promotion of new 
large private undertakings. Industrial promotion was set up in the mid-1970s under a 
scheme of 'infant industry' poUcy. It had strong public support (see below) and was 
conceived as a first stage of a decentralising policy that sought to promote the location of 
companies in less favoured regions. The concept of 'region''** appeared thus for first time 
associated with IP issues within the ISI model. It in feet had its epicentre in a few large 
metropolitan cities (Buenos Aires, Rosario, Cordoba), being characterised by a high level 
of industrial (and therefore population) concentration, which generated enormous pressures 
on the large urban centres. Industrial promotion enabled the new group of large modem 
companies to set up and restructure when they otherwise would not have done. However, 
this promotion system has been criticised for its deficient level of selectivity in picking 
firms, the absence of a coherent industrialisation pattem to follow in guiding such choices, 
and the absence of monitoring and evaluation of firms' performance (Kosacofif and ICatz, 
1989). As regards the regional issue, these firms operated as 'enclaves' of production since 
In fact, while in 1960 exports of manufacturing goods were statistically insignificant, in 1975 they reached 
a quarter of the country's exports. They mostly (though not only) were aimed at neighbouring countries. 
It more precisely refers to 'provinces' in which the Argentine RepubEc Is politically and administratively 
divided. 
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they did not develop 'upstream' or 'downstream' links with other local (but also non local) 
manufacturing industries. As I show below, they nevertheless became key players during 
the 1980s and beyond. 
A mixture of factors determined the end of the ISI model and the dramatic transition 
towards a new pattern of accumulation. It included the structural deficiencies previously 
outlined, the changes in the ideological international climate, globalisation and, most 
importantly, the intemal social and political turmoil w^ich resulted in a new military 
coup.'*' Backed by the conservative military dictatorship (1976-1983), US-trained liberal 
policy makers established a programme of market liberalisation (notably, financial reform), 
which was followed by an aggressive policy of external openness."*^  Ironically, the 
technocrats leading the restructuring labelled the period 'sinceramiento' of the economy 
(which in English roughly means 'making the economy sincere'). According to Kosacoff, it 
"aimed to ehminate the entire set of regulations, subsidies and privileges established in the 
past in M l attempt to modernize and increase the efficiency of the economy" (2000). In 
short, the new stage was characterised by the massive and unregulated influx of both 
imported goods and short-term financial capital.*' This brought about a phenomenal 
accumulation of public and corporate foreign indebtedness, which 'blew up' in 1982 when 
the American Treasury raised interest rates determining the outbreak of the Latin America 
foreign-debt crisis. The effects of this crisis on the fragile Argentina economy were (and 
still are) overwhelming. In principle, it deepened tiie stmctural external disequilibrium of 
the Argentine economy, resulting in fiscal crisis in the public sector, inflation, macro-
economic uncertainty and so on. Hence, between 1982 and the early 1990s the control of 
the macroeconomic issue became the crucial factor of economic policy for the reinstalled 
democratic governments and 'stabilisation' its main goal (ibid). However, the failure of 
three consecutive programmes of macro-economic stabilisation, the resulting outbreak of 
the 'hyperinflation' phenomenon (1989-1990), looting, and institutional crisis (that ended 
The new military dictatorship (1976-1983) promoted, through the so-called 'Process of National 
Reorganisation', the entire re-foimdation of the social, political and economic basis of the Argentine 
Republic. Some of the devastating effects of the 'process of restructuring' were the destruction of the 
democratic institutions as a whole, the repression on the working movement and its more progressive 
institutions, and the resulting 30,000 missing or murdered people and other thousands of exiled. 
Import tariffs fell overnight from 90 per cent to 50 per cent. 
An overvalued local cmxency and high local interest rates favoured both processes. 
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in the presidential resignation), helped to amalgamate a considerable level of political 
consensus'** regarding the need to undertake once and for all deep structural reforms. 
Let me go back to the industrial economy field. As a result of the changes outlined above, 
through the 1980s the manufacturing industry lost its hegemonic role as the main engine of 
economic growth (see GDP figures in Table 4.1), job creation and upward social mobility 
(Kosacoff and Katz, 1989). Simultaneously, these changes seemed to bring about the 
emergence of a new path of productive specialisation. Industrial production based on the 
intensive use of natural resources or capital and service industries tended to supersede the 
manufacturing industry as main generator of economic dynamism (Bisang and Lugones, 
2002). Firstly, as fer the stagnation of manufecturing activity is concerned, the restructuring 
process led to a three-fold destruction of accumulated capital. It included the massive 
closure of firms, downsizing and a sharp &11 in investments (Kosacoff, 2000)."*^  Within this 
vast segment of firms, the local complex of metal products and machinery, electronic 
industries'" and industrial productions associated with construction and consumer goods 
(i.e. textiles and clothing, the wood and fiimiture industry) (most of which were SMEs) was 
the most affected activities by the restructuring programme. In particular, these activities 
were not only labour-intensive, but also intensive in the use of qualified staff and 
development of local engineering adaptive efforts or incremental innovations. According to 
Kosacoff, what he terms 'regressive restructuring' implied the failure of the new economic 
rules "to base the restructuring of the industry on the positive aspects that had been built up 
in four decades of import substitutions - during which knowledge, abilities, engineering 
and entrepreneurial skills, equipment, human resources, and so on, had all been 
accumulated" (2000:49). Directly linked with the point above, the hollowing out of the 
welfare state institutions (notably, education, health, housing and the physical and 
technological infrastructure) had (and still has) an extremely negative effect on the 
fimdamentals of the Argentine' structural or systemic competitiveness. 
This consensus was not however the result of a wide consultation processes. 
In the 1980-1990 period GDP went down by 9.4 per cmt, industrial outpiit by 24 per cent, consumption by 
15.8 per cent and investments by 58.9 per cent. In particular, investments fell below the level of capital 
depreciation, producing thus decapitalisation of the still operating manufacturing industries (Kosacoflf, 2000). 
Interestingly, the 'dismantling' of the electronic complex occuired in the middle of a process of transition 
in the international context from electromechanical to electronic-based industries (Kosacoff, 2000). 
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Secondly, the fast-growing industrial activities associated with the intensive use of natural 
resources and/or capital present some novel characteristics. They constituted a small but 
modem group of companies focused on activities such as natural gas extraction, production 
of food products (notably, vegetable-oils processing) and some industrial commodities (i.e. 
paper and cellulose, petrochemicals and steel). They grew as the result of an exceptional 
and rapid process of capital formation and concentration that gave rise to a new and 
different political and economic agent, namely, the national holding companies (HCs) 
(Azpiazu, Basualdo and BChavisse, 1986).'^ Some subsidiaries of MNCs also were fiivoured 
through the industrial promotion. Paradoxically, the state played a key role in such a 
process. Though the new political-ideological alliance in power promoted a subsidiary role 
for the state, while the market was seen as main resource-allocation mechanism, the state 
promoted, permitted and intermediated the massive income transference that went to 
subside the new players' emergence (Azpiazu et al, 1986).^ ^ According to Bisang 
(2000:147-8), the close 'business links' between the national HCs and the state, 
materialised through different support devices which included: market protection (even in a 
context of economic opermess); industrial promotion regimes (through which the state 
subsided the purchase of capital goods); tax exceptions; and permissible regulatory 
schemes (which facilitated the exploitation of natural resources and market concentration). 
Critically, through its nationalisation the state socialised 'private' foreign debts (but also 
those taken from state-owned banks) acquired by the national HCs and MNCs subsidiaries 
in order to finance the start up and/or restmcturing of their new companies. Hence, it can be 
said that the HCs' policy decision making in reality became state policies or, more 
precisely, the state's policy decision making in effect was privatised. 
Regardless of both the high social cost of the restmcturing process and its negative effects 
on almost every indicator of economic performance (hence the 1980-1990 period is better 
known as 'lost decade'), exports showed positive signs with 78 per cent growth within this 
period. Part of this is explained by the HCs' performance (Kosacofif, 2000). In fact, some of 
these companies technologically operated very close to intemational best practice (Bisang, 
'^ With the exception of a few companies of foreign capital, the national HCs emerged either during the 
development of the agro-export model or during the ISI. 
" Between 1976 and 1990 the industrial promotion policies subsided the generation of around 50 projects 
involving large cqiital-intensive companies estabUshed to produce intermediate goods (Kosacoff, 2000). 
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1998). However, despite the positive aspects associated with the new companies' 
competitiveness (notably, their export capacity), they did not advance in the development 
of dynamic competitive advantage. As Kosacoff notes, "forward linkages into the 
manufacture of differentiated, higher-value-added goods were not pursued" (2000:53). 
Furthermore, they did not develop a local innovative capacity, which is reflected in the fact 
that they exclusively depended (and still depend) upon import technologies (Bisang, 2000). 
Consequently, although the evidence shows many cases of successfiil microeconomic 
performance (notably, those related to the HCs and some MNCs subsidiaries) the total sum 
of cases, as Kosacoff claims, did not bring about enough "macroeconomic strength to 
establish a new path for economic growth in Argentina" (2000:50). Likewise, the 
microeconomic efficiency observed in some successfiil SMEs was not enough to 
compensate the macroeconomic constraints that affected firms' competitiveness (Yoguel, 
2000). 
Therefore, Argentine industrial competitiveness at the beginning of the 1990s was 
characterised by a range of constraints, including structural deficiencies, inflation and 
uncertainty at a macro-economic level and a hollowing out of the national innovation 
system that sustained its stmctural competitiveness during the ISI model. The situation was 
not much better fi-om a micro-economic standpoint, despite the group of firms belonging to 
the national HCs and MNCs subsidiaries accumulating considerable productivity gains 
through the period. In effect, the large majority of firms that survived the restructuring 
policies undertook 'defensive' business strategies to improve their competitive 
performance. As a whole, however, they show the following constraints: 
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Table 42. Micro-economy of manufecturing industry before 1990s structural reforms 
• Sub-optimal scales of production. It was the result of both the smaller-size market in which local firms opo-ated and 
the manufacturing profile exclusively (Hiented towards the domestic market 
• High levels of vertical integration. It was the result of, firstly, a weak local presence of specialised suppliers and 
subcontractors (despite the empty cells of the input-output matrix that the subsidiaries of MNCs were filling) and, 
secondly, the high transaction costs generated by the business environment in which firms operated. Integration was 
the way in which the firms tried to neutralise such costs 
• A highly diversified mix of production and low level of specialisation 
• Innovation efforts based on incremental improvements of a very informal or ad hoc kind. They were mostly focused 
on product technology. 
• In contrast to the largest &ms, only a marginal per cent of SMEs had access to credit to acquire imported capital 
goods. Hence they commonly operated on the basis of outdated technology 
• Low level of exports. SMEs' exports for instance accounted only by 6 per cent of their total output 
• The SMEs displayed in turn a centralised managerial style centred on the owno'-manager and/or other family 
member. As result, they relied on their 'self-diagnostic' ctpacity for strategic decision making, which was focused 
almost exclusively on 'manufacturing' issues. Hence the majority of SMEs were technologically and managerially 
out of date when trade openness was introduced 
Source: based on Gatto and Yoguel (1993; Kosaooff and Katz (198% Kosacofif (2000) 
Finally, both the negative effects of the 'lost-decade' (1980-1990) and tiie trauma generated 
by the hyperinflation chaos and successive institutional crises accelerated (socio-politically 
and economically speaking) the outbreak of the structural reforms that took place in the 
early 1990s. The manufacturing industry that once occupied a high status position as an 
engine of economic growth and job creation became the focus of 'blame' for all of 
Argentina's economic problems during the transition towards the new model of 
accumulation (Schvarzer, 2001). Similar social stigma affected the state-owned service 
enterprises (i.e. telephone, gas and power). This deeply weakened the social dignity and 
morale of entrepreneurs as 'historical subjects' as well as the political conviction and 
compromise of those public and private institutions that backed the Argentine 
industrialisation project. Both low-quality and high price products, despite the costly public 
subsidies received for decades, became key political slogans utilised to convince society 
that the so-called 'national industry' did not deserve support and that it should be 
'punished' for its failures (ibid). The new hegemonic speech was very well managed by the 
consolidated anti-industrialist crusade (or also labelled 'historical revenge') conducted by 
the traditional dominant elites, associated with land-ownership and the old agro-export 
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model, now in partnership with the new economic orthodoxy (ibid). Schvarzer (2000) quite 
rightly reminds us of Hirschman's assertion that the Argentine industry is not criticised for 
what it did but for having gone too far. 
4.3. Stabilisation, structural reforms and industrial competitiveness 
A programme of stabilisation and far-reaching structural reform was launched in 1991 by 
the government under the Convertibility Plan. Convertibility pegged the value of the peso 
to the dollar and established a currency board to both increase the credibihty of the peg and 
to constrain monetary (and therefore fiscal) policy'^ (Bird, 2002; Financial Times, 2001). 
As a result the state lost key tools of economic policy. Argentina's currency-convertibility 
system was not, strictly speaking, an element of the Washington Consensus. However, the 
Plan's foimdations were strongly aligned with the World Bank and IMF agenda for Latin 
America (Stiglitz, 2002). Thus, the structural reform programme included the extreme 
financial and commercial liberalisation, deregulating of markets, extensive privatisation of 
the old state-owned companies (oil, commimications, power and utilities), flexibilisation of 
the labour market and cutbacks on social-welfare provision. In addition, it included the 
increase of commercial integration into MERCOSUR initiated in 1985. It is hardly accurate 
to refer to TP during this period but i f something existed in this sense it was presided over 
by the guidelines above. It is critical to emphasise that structural reforms were also possible 
due to the feet that Menem's Peronist government (1989-1995/1995-1999), under which 
the former came into force, redrew the Argentine political map.'"* The review below 
As Kosacoff explains, the Convertibility Plan "was based on fixing the nominal rate of exchange by law 
and only allowing it to be modified by the same method, while the Central Bank was obligated to guarantee 
the monetary base with sufficient reserves [Simultaneously] the plan required the government to desist from 
using inflationary taxation. It did this by restricting monetary creation by the govemmrait to the positive sums 
available from the balance of payments" (2002:59). 
Menem instituted both strong presidential political leadership and bribed poUtical support within the 
country and obedient 'carnal relations' (as Menem's Foreign Minister called it) with the US, which extended 
to the WB and IMF. Both strategies became central to carry out the structural reforms internationally 
supported and/or prompted in the way that they were done. An illustrative example of Menem's political style 
is that his government "used the emergence law to institute privatization by deo-ee, and then exploited his 
powers of appointment to the Siq)reme Court [the so-called 'automatic majority'] to impede investigations of 
malfeasance" (Rock, 2002:69). Likewise, the union leaders (and unions themselves) who aidorsed 
privatisations received generous rewards by poHtical support. 
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focuses, firstly, on aspects linked with macro-economic performance and, then, on those 
relate to industrial economy under the new pattern of accumulation. 
As regards the macro-economy, both price stabilisation and accelerated reactivation of 
economic activity constituted the Convertibility's expression of success during its 'golden 
age' (1991-1994). Economic growth was underpinned by an important influx of extemal 
fmancial capital, direct foreign investments, and the 'repatriation' of Argentine capital 
deposited in foreign banks (Kosacoff, 2000; Albomoz, 2002). Both the refinancing of the 
country's foreign debt (i.e. via privatisations) and the lower intemational interest rates, 
brought about fixnds' flight towards tiie 'emerging markets', and were thus centtal elements 
in the above process.'^  The change in the expectations of economic agents was reflected in 
the positive performance of key economic indicators, notably inflation, which fell from 
1343,9 per cent in 1990 to almost' zero inflation' in 1996. In the same period GDP rose by 
40 per cent, consumption by 15 per cent and investment by 61 per cent (Chudnovsky et al, 
1996). The consensus generated by the peso-dollar convertibility became far bigger than 
the downside effects generated by the stmctural reforms (see below). Powerful vested 
interests (represented by national HCs, subsidiaries of MNCs and the financial sector) made 
huge and lucrative businesses starting from privatisations, an easy access to extemal 
fmancing, and permissive local 'regulatory' frameworks. Middle-class sectors kept their 
savings in local banks and/or acquired medium- and long-term debts in dollars (i.e. to buy 
real state and automobiles). As Rock addresses, "[e]ven the poor entered into small-scale 
hire-purchase deals" (2002:74) (i.e. to buy white goods and electronic products). As credit 
and indebtedness expanded, "no one wanted to end peso-dollar convertibility: it would 
mean slashing savings and increasing debts" (ibid). It is no surprise that this broad-based 
support endured even into the Convertibility collapse in 2001. Hence, the simultaneous 
problems of unemployment (and under-employment), a regression in wealth distribution 
and, as an expression of both, the rise of poverty and social exclusion, were still not enough 
to change the peso-dollar convertibility. All these indicators worsened from 1998 onwards 
until the popular uprisings of December 2001 and, still today (beginning 2004), they remain 
the biggest Argentine 'social debt'. 
Argentina became the world's fourth largest recipiait of foreign ftinds in the early 1990s (Rock, 2002). 
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The peso-dollar convertibility generated its own contradictions which brought it to its 
chaotic end. A first 'tremor' was caused by the 'Tequila effect' (1994-1995). A sharp rise 
in US interest rates resulted in the devaluation of the Mexican resulting in defeult and 
subsequent capital flight fi-om Latin America. Runs on banks, strong deposits lost and 
significant GDP fell were some of the Mexican crisis's effects on the Argentine economy. 
Although Convertibility was kept 'intact' it revealed the fragility of its 'external front'. The 
appreciation of the Brazilian currency (Real) came, however, "to the rescue of the 
Argentine economy" by creating a big pull for Argentine exports via MERCOSUR (Rock, 
2002:79). In January 1999 this trend changed. The Real came under a strong speculative 
attack and the Brazilian government was obligated to devalue. 
Figure 4.1. GDP by quarters 1998 to 2003 (base first quarter 2002 = 100) 
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By then, Argentina had already fallen into recession as a result of changes operating in the 
international context.'* The Brazilian devaluation turned into an economic 'earthquake'. 
The consecutive drop in economic activity (recession) assumed historical proportions. It 
lasted almost five years (fi-om the fourth trimester in 1998 to the second trimester in 2003) 
during vdiich the Argentine economy shrunk by 20 per cent (INDEC, 2003). Revenues 
fi-om privatisation were exhausted, foreign investments stagnated and soon after the access 
to external credit froze (whilst Argentina needed both to finance its increasing fiscal deficit 
and afford the heavy foreign-debt interests' payments). The main aim forwarded by the 
short-lived Alianza's government (1999-2001) was to attract more foreign capifel and 
investments in order to firmly service the foreign-debt requirement Under the 
circumstances above outlined, the government turned back to the IMF for emergency 
assistance (or financial relief) to be able to govern. With no consideration of the explosive 
social and political situation, the IMF demanded a 'zero fiscal deficit' policy. It brought 
about a new wave of adjustments (in public wages, pensions, social security and budgets of 
lagging regions and so on) along with a draconian new flexibilisation in the labour market 
(another demand from the IMF). To summarise, popular uprisings were only a matter of 
time. In the meanv^ i^ile, the fiscal deficit continued growing v^ile the economic activity 
continued falling. The defauh and the subsequent 'hard landing' of the Argentine economy 
became a matter of fact. 
43.1. Industrial structure and competitiveness 
A new Argentina was bom as a resuh of the long and deep proems of reforms that began in 
1976. Their effects were and are a determinant for the fiiture of Argentine industrial 
competitiveness. However, the changes of the micro-economic nature analysed below were 
not sufficient to give place to a new industrialisation model sustainable in the long term 
(Kosacoff, 2000). In effect, the relative importance of manufecturing activities continued 
declining and simultaneously it showed, once again, its heavy dependency on external 
financial cycles. Hence, it is necessary to critically evaluate the new Argentine industrial 
economy. According to the last Economic Census conducted in Argentina (1994), in 1993 
The dollar appreciation in 1996, the rise in US interest rates, the subsequent foreign-debt payment crisis in 
the 'emerging countries' and Southeast Asia's collapse in 1997, and Russian default in 1998, had in fact a 
deep impact on the fragile 'external front' of Convertibility. 
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there was a total of 90,756 manufecturing firms, including: 64,355 micro-enterprises (< 6 
employees), 24,911 SMEs (6 to 100 employees) and 1,490 large enterprises (> 100 
employees) (see Table 4.3). 
Table 43. The Argentine manufacturing industry in 1994 
Number Employmoit Ou^ut* 
Mkro-cnterprlses 64,355 139,657 4,617 
70.9% 13.9% 5,1% 
SMEs 24,911 448,930 
32,126 
27.4% 44.6% 35,9% 
Large enterprises 1,490 417,889 52,857 
1.7% 41.5% 59.0% 
Total 90,756 1,006,476 89,601 
100.0% 100.0% 100,0% 
Source: Gatto and Fetraro (1997) * Millions of pesos 
Table 4.4. Inter-census evolution of the manufecturing industry (Censuses 1974, 1985, 
1994) 
1974 1985 1993 
Number of firms'' 126,388 109,376 (-13.5%) 93,156 (-14,8%) 
Employment 1,525,221 1,381,805 (-9.4%) 1,061,528 (-23.2%) 
Source: INDEC, SUtistioal synopsis, 1998 
Despite the lack of up-to-date census information, industrial researchers agree that the 
number of manufacturing firms (and production lines) diminished after 1994 and that the 
industrial activity has, in net terms, shed employment, contributing to increased unequal 
wealth distribution. It is accepted that the process of deindustrialisation that began in the 
" The Census unit of analysis was 'establishment' in 1974 and 1985 and 'local units' in 1994. It often 
generates diflfo-ences in the total number of firms regarding the different statistical criterion utilised to analyse 
the 1994 census 
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late 1970s continued deepening at least until 2002. An inter-census comparison, which 
shows the evolution of this process, can be seen in Table 4.4. 
The evidence also reveals a marked process of concentration and 're-primarisation' (a 
return to production based on the intensive use of natural resources) of the economic 
activity, along with an increasing primacy of foreign ownership (extranjerizacion) in the 
main local industrial activities (including those activities dominated by the national HCs 
during the 1980s), while the state-owned firms have virtually disappeared. The process of 
capital concentration benefited both national HCs and MNCs, which together represent the 
'Argentine new economic power' (Azpiazu et al, 1986). As in the 1980s, during the 
1990s both investments and credit predominantly went into large firms dominated by these 
conglomerates. The rises in productivity accumulated through the 1990s are largely 
explained by the performance of these fums. However, productivity gains must be analysed 
in light of their monopolistic/oligopolistic basis of accumulation. Indeed, their size and 
cross-capital structure enable these firms to occupy dominant positions in almost all the 
markets in which they operate (i.e. energy, food, transport and communications and, to 
lesser extent, motor automobiles, iron and steel). National HCs are often concentrated in 
markets characterised by a limited exposure to foreign competirion or where there are 
'industrial promotion' policies, or which involve an intensive use of abundant local natural 
resources in which Argentina has comparative advantage (Bisang, 2000). Agro-industrial 
productions such as food production have been the most dynamic sector in export markets. 
In contrast, the manufecturing industry as a whole had a poor performance in export 
markets, with the exception of only a few industries (notably, the motor vehicle industry) 
focused on the Brazilian market (via MERCOSUR). 
Interestingly, apart from the industrial promotion policies that continued in force in some 
inland regions, the 'automobile regime', which regulated the motor vehicle industry, was 
the main and perhaps the unique industrial policy (in a strict sense) established in Argentina 
under the Convertibility. This regime was two fold. Firstly, it regulated domestic protection 
from import competition, reduced tariff duty to imported parts and components, and 
promoted exports, resuking in a spectacular increase in both production and intra-industry 
HCs' and subsidiaries of MNCs' sales together represented between 25 and 30 per cent of gross industrial 
product in the mid-1990s, although they account for only 18 per cent of industrial employment. 
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trade. Between 1991 and 1994 it became the most d5mamic manufecturing industry. In just 
a few years it tripled its output compared to the 1990 level. The 'automobile regime' along 
with the growth of domestic consumption observed in that period was the key to this 
performance. Secondly, the preferential agreements signed with MERCOSUR resulted in 
turn in the opening up of a market for a small and specialised number of vehicle parts. 
However, the growing domestic demand generated a notable trade deficit (due to the need 
to import intermediate goods), which, in a short time, was covered by growing exports to 
Brazil. Despite the problems caused by the high levels of import content that the local 
vehicle production utilises (that is, trade deficit and lower local added-value), which needed 
correction, there was here a relatively successfiil case of 'active' IP for policy makers to 
take into account. A synth^is of the main micro-economic characteristics of the most 
recent Argentine industrial economy is provided in Table 4.5, while the specific effects on 
SMEs are summarised in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4^ . Micro-economy of firms after 1990s' structural reforms 
• Lower levels of votical integration, although mainly due to the replacement of domestic value-added by both 
greatCT levels of import content and, secondly, by weak local subcontracting practices. It is mostly observed in the 
largest firms 
• Firms have significantly streamlined their product mix while they have also filled out their p-oduct mix with 
finished imports 
• Orowing trend towards the outsourcing of (auxiliary) services, which were previously carried out by the firms' own 
staff 
» Poor performance in export market MERCOSUR being the main (although instable) mark^ for manufacturing 
exports 
• Increased extonal trade openness, although more focused on the import side (until 2001) than on the export side. It 
meant that the value-added coefficient in production declined abruptly. Furthermore, an increased import 
component had a negative effect by disarticulating value chains of local suppliers (SMEs). There is an increased 
trend to the assembly of imported inputs and paits. 
• Manufacturing industries became more competitive intentionally starting fi-om the 2001 peso devaluation, while 
import fell abruptly. There is now a current-account surplus. Likewise, evidence shows the recovery of some 
manufacturing activities (i.e. basic and durable consumption goods for the domestic market) via import substitution 
(i.e. textiles, metal products and machinery) 
• However, due to both the mao-o-economic uncertainty generated by the events of 2001 and the uncertainty with 
respect to the future {or the transition firom the 2001 'chaotic' adjustment and the current 'instable' equilibriumX 
manufacturing exports still remain lower than expected The lack of credit in the domestic market is the third key 
factor affecting the export market 
• A new phenomenon emerged in the late 1990s, it refored to the incipient relocation of some local firms within 
MERCOSUR countries (mainly Brazil) 
• In««ased trend towards the incorporating of import technology (in some cases close to international best practice). 
It was favoured during the Convertibility by both the over app-eciation of the peso and some policy instruments that 
promoted capital goods imports. It had extremely negative effects on the generation of endogenous technologioal 
capacities 
• Widespread and increased use of less labour-intensive production fimctions within firms (via incorporated 
technology, out offs in firms' staff and flexibilisation of labour) 
• Inravased, though heto-ogeneous, gains in labour- and equipment-productivity. Soft innovations, which occurred in 
technology of processes, production organisation and management (apart fi-om the incorporated hard technology), 
explain this performance. Growing structural heterogeneity observed at inter- and intra-industry level is the result of 
the marked differential productivity growth between firms. It has led to the differentiation between firms that 
earned out an 'offensive' restnioturing (mostly large firms) and those that carried out a 'defensive' restructuring 
(mostly SMEs) during the Convertibility 
• During the 1990s output prices went down appreciably in relation to both the costs of inputs and services required 
in production and in relation to the wages. It resulted in a decline in the real gross profit margin of manufacturing 
activities and tho-efore in their competitiveness. The change in the relative prices since 2002 evened new business 
opportunities particularly in the tradable sectors (as shown above in relation to the new import substitution) 
• For this business opportunity to be taken, it depends upon three factors: the rising of investments (and, therefore), 
the greater access to credit (which nowadays is extremely reduced), and the positive expectations that economic 
agents have about the medium-term fiiture so that investments can be made. 
Source: based on Bisang and Lugones (2002); Bonvecchi and Porta (2003>, INDEC (2002, 2003); Kosacoff (2000; 2002) 
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Table 4.6. SMEs after 1990s' structural reforms 
• SME number diminished by around 25 per cent between the 1984 and 1994 censuses. A broad agreement exists 
among researchers that the SME closure numbers continued growing at least until 2002 (although statistics are not 
available) 
• Evidence shows those SMEs which manufacture both 'labour-intensive' and 'knowledge-intensive' types of goods 
wo-e the most affected throughout the 1990s. Apart from the negative effect on the labour market, the loss in 
accumulated innovative endogenous cqiacity resulting from this process will have an enormous negative effect on 
the SME capacity to generate higher value-added p-oducts in the future 
• Throiighout 1990s SMEs operated under several systemic deficiencies doived from the new regulatoy frameworks 
and market structure. As in the past, they opo-ate in markets dominated by large companies; SMEs have less control 
(than the largest firms have) on regulatory frameworks that affect their business activities and; they have become 
dependant on new 'intermediary' agents (distribution chains, oontractors, larger-sized firms) 
• MERCOSUR was largely seen as a threat by local SMEs. This is due to the competitive advantage that Brazilian 
competition (notably, SMEs) has on the local firms in terms of production scales, technology and state support 
• SMEs have been particularly 'discriminated' against by the bank system, which is expressed in both the difficulties 
that they find in obtaining finance from banks and in the conditions demanded by banks. Financial gaps existing 
between large- and small-sized firms in accessing credit continued deepening in a context of an ino'easingly 
concentred bank system 
• Evidence reveals that only an extremely small number of firms showed a good performance in terms of production 
and managerial capabilities during the 1990s. They have conduced a process of 'offensive' restructuring 
• About two-thirds of manufacturing SMEs have faced, and still face, a 're-foundational challenge' with respect to 
their business altogether. Thus, the majority of firms undertook 'defensive' strategies, including: first and foremost, 
cutting back on costs of administrative and production staff and, to lesser extent, by restructuring production 
organisation or other incremental improvements as well as acquisition of capital goods 
• A considerable numba- of these firms have indeed swapped from being manufacture^ to being importo^ and/or 
traders of import goods 
• A final group of firms (estimated in one-third of the SMEs before 2001) presented a 'little chance to survival' in the 
market place, at least until the devaluation. They observed extremely defensive behaviours, short-term management 
style and in many cases their only goal was 'to survive'. 
Source: Gatto (2000); Yoguel (2000); Yoguel and Moori-Koening (eds) (1999); Yoguel and Rabetino (2002) 
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43.2. Regional development and industrial policy^^ 
As in the past, the regional issue has been absent from the state policy agenda as a policy 
concern in its own right. No national IP was established in order to support local strategies 
of industrial regeneration. As already shown, 'industrial promotion' (still in force in a few 
inland Provinces) generated 'enclaves of production' which had no major impact on either 
the vAiole regional economy or the developing 'down-stream' linkages. In contrast, through 
the 1990s, Provinces and municipalities {municipios) were pushed into the adjustment and 
structural reform process by the national state, resulting in the outbreak of the so-labelled 
'crisis of regional economies'.^ Paradoxically, during the same period, through the system 
known as 'coparticipacion', the national state effected considerable financial transfers 
towards the Provinces. Two major issues need to be elucidated in order to understand this 
apparent 'paradox'. 
Firstly, regions, or more precisely 'regional economies', have historically been associated 
with economic activities based on natural resources and agro-industrial production (i.e. 
forests, mines, gas and oil, cereals, cattle and vegetable oil) rather than with manufecturing 
activities. Manufacturing activities become concentrated around capital cities of the richer 
Provinces such as Province of Buenos Aires (PBA), Cordoba, Santa Fe and Entre Rios (see 
Map 4.1). In 2000 Buenos Aires City (or Federal Capital) and Buenos Aires Province 
(PBA) together accounted for 60 per cent of the national Gross Gteographic Product (GGP) 
(and represented 47.19 per cent of population in 1995). PBA, along with Buenos Aires City 
and tiie Provinces of Cordoba, Santa Fe and Neuquen, accounted for 78 per cent of national 
GGP. 
" Argentina politically is divided into 23 Provinces and one Federal Capital (the Autonomous City of Buenos 
Aires). 'The region' as such does not account for a constitutional status within the administrative division of 
the Argentine state. The region has however been either used to identify primary or agro-industrial 
productions located in particular geographical areas or to make 'geographical' distinctions between Provinces 
situated in differait cardinal poles. Within Provinces, Municipios (Counties or Boroughs -depending upon the 
Province in question-), which sum 1,900 in total, are the only constitutional administrative sub-division of the 
national state. Furthermore, the bigger municipios often politically govern groups of municipios which are 
called Departamentos or Partidos. 
* Regional economies' crisis not only refers to falls in economic activity or employment figures as occurred 
at a national level. It also refers to flie disintegration of entire pubUc and/or private economic activities in 
some regions which constituted the main or only source of wealtii and/or employment (apart fiom the public 
.sector). 
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Table 4.7. National Gross Geographic Product by Province (percentages from 1970, 1993, 
2000) 
Province 1970 1993 2000 
1. Buenos Aires 33.61 33.59 32.85 
2. Ciudad de Buenos Aires 29.03 24.26 25.12 
3. Catamaroa 0.29 0.54 0.62 
4. Chaco 1.02 1.28 1.27 
5. Chubut 1.15 1.35 1.43 
6. Cdrdoba 6.70 8.07 8.03 
7. Corrientes 1.39 1.26 1.16 
8. Entre Rios 2.59 2.20 2.20 
9. Formosa 0.45 0.59 0.56 
10. Jujuy 0.77 0.88 0.86 
11. La Pampa 0.76 0.86 0.86 
12. La Rioja 0.23 0.54 0.54 
13. Mendoza 4.21 3.78 3.73 
14. Misiones 0.80 1.38 1.34 
IS. Neuquen 0.70 1.73 2.24 
16. Rio Negro 1.02 1.45 1.48 
17. SalU 1.28 1.48 1.51 
18. San Juan 0.86 1.11 1.03 
19. San Luis 0.56 1.04 0.99 
20. Santo Cruz 0.57 0.97 1.10 
21. Santo Fe 8.86 8.02 7.55 
22. Santiago del Estero 0.87 0.92 0.90 
23. Tierra del Fuego 0.08 0.67 0.70 
24. Tuoumto 2.19 2.03 1.93 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Gatto, F . (2003) 
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Map 4.1. Argentina and its Provinces 
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Furthermore, the dependency of regional economies on a few economic activities, often 
dominated by a few large companies (i.e. oil, gas, mines, forests) or influential traditional 
local elites (i.e. agro-industrial productions), resulted in Provincial governments not having 
their own regional strategy for economic development (Gatto, 2001, 2003). 
Coparticipacion fiinds transferred to Provinces were mostly allocated to the payment of 
wages, then social security and Municipalities, and only marginally to productive 
investments (Figueroa, 1998). Municipalities, whether from urban or rural areas, neither 
have resources nor technical capabilities to 'animate' actions aimed at local economic 
development, and neither have they found a partner in provincial government to act in tiiis 
sense. Traditional and 'paternalist' structures of relationships between the state and the 
private sector resulted in situations of institutional lock-in and sclerosis determining the 
lack of a progressive view on development issues (Gatto, 2001). Furthermore, influxes of 
private investments in lagging regions were rare and, in all cases, their reinvestment 
coefficients within the holder regions were low. They were also centred on few competitive 
products that in none of the cases laid the foundations for the regeneration of regional 
economies. 
Secondly, Argentina never had, strictly speaking, a regional policy for development. 
Neither did it account for preparatory or compensatory policies for less developed regions 
(LDRs) facing emergency situations, as those generated by the 1990s structural reforms 
(Figueroa, 1998). The country never undertook, as Brazil and Chile did, policies aimed 
toward decentralisation of the national state. In confirmation of this Argentina has not 
developed institutional, technical and bureaucratic mechanisms to generate and coordinate 
systemic policies between national government, provinces and municipalities (Gatto, 2001, 
2003). This situation is reflected in the fact that, historically, different national public 
agencies have nm diverse and atomised policy programmes through different public 
regional spheres. However, due to Iheir small scale, problems of setting up and a lack of 
coordination among them (resulting in overlap, institutional complexity and confusion 
among their potential beneficiaries), they have had a low synergy and a very poor 
performance in terms of their cost-effectiveness (ibid). In none of the cases did this plethora 
of policy programmes provide an efficient answer to the problems that undermined regional 
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economies. Neither did they generate 'genuine' employment.^ ^ I claim that the fact that 
these policies sought neither to develop 'regional innovation systems' nor to involve the 
whole regional industry helps us to understand this failure. The national state's reform 
process bought decentralisation of major public services in Provincial governments, such as 
health and education. Decentralisation attracted little criticism in the early 1990s, as 
Provinces had plentiful access to coparticipacion flinds. These fiinds, as Provinces claim, 
were not enough to imdertake strategies of productive regeneration. However, due to the 
'crisis of regional economies', the growing staff of Provincial pubHc servants (to face tiie 
growing unemployment ratios) and the lack of strategies for economic regeneration. 
Provinces in the short term funded themselves in struggling economic and financial 
situations. Provinces, then, neither had the local nor regional strategies to fece the 
challenging new setting nor the national state help to foster conditions for those strategies 
to develop. As Gatto (2001) claims, these strategies, beside large firms and/or dominant 
regional economic activities, should have involved all the economic agents that shape local 
economies (notably, the SMEs). Although the provincial distribution of SMEs varies, in 
1993 the manufacturing SMEs amounted to about 60 per cent and 41 per cent of 
manufacturing employment and output respectively (see Table 4.3). 
However, some 'punctual' provincial as well as local initiatives of SME industrial policy 
(IP) developed through the latter part of the 1990s. These IP initiatives neither formed part 
of a national strategy nor were linked with national agencies concerned with SMEs, such as 
the National SME Secretariat established in 1997.*^ Like the SME Secretariat, they 
emerged in light of some 'interstitial' changes observed in the general framework of the 
1990s Argentine political economy. This included a part of the public sector and key 
representative institutions of the manufacturing industry (notably, Argentine Industrial 
Union -UIA-). The cases of Buenos Aires Province (PBA), the Santa Fe Province and, 
within this, the locality of Rafaela, are the more renowned experiences of what I will term 
That is in contrast to those programmes aimed to generate 'covered' unemployment through, for instance, 
pubhc self-employment poUcies. 
SME Secretariat was set up by the national government in order to put together and articulate the different 
and uncoordinated SME programmes established by different public agencies. Both scarce political support 
from the main economic authorities and therefore low budget have affected the possibihties of good 
performance of this Sewetariat 
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here the new praxis of inicro IP actions'. Interestingly, they were inspired by the NIP 
thinking. 
In 1996, the Ministry of Production of Santa Fe Province established a local policy 
progranune called 'Productive Municipios' (MPs). Coordinated by the provincial 
Production Ministry, MPs aim to support decentalisation processes and the SMEs of the 
urban localities (forty-eight in total) in which they were set up. In short, MPs implied the 
creation of Secretariats of Production within local government in order to mediate between 
local SMEs and policy instruments provided through the provincial Production Ministry. 
By organising and mobilising both local SMEs and private institutions, MPs seek to 
transform local states to become facilitators and animateurs for the joint generation of local 
SME development strategies. Areas of policy concern addressed by MPs have been 
managerial training, subcontracting, business opportunities and international trade. A study 
conducted by ECLAC (1999b) in twelve municipios (Reconquista, Villa Ocampo, Ceres, 
Sunchales, Frontera, Esperanza, Galvez, Carcarana, San Lorenzo, Firmat, Totoras and 
Rufino), which are 'representative' of the patterns of productive specialisation observed in 
the Province, revealed interesting results. First and foremost, it demonstrated that, starting 
from the establishment of MPs, the local economic agents (including firms and business 
associations) began to see for first time a reference point and a potential partner 'within the 
local public sector' concerned with the production sphere. Local economic agents 
highlighted personal contacts, participation and 'inclusive' policy strategies as key issues 
for networking at a local level. MP' establishment was based on an insightful experience of 
industrial competitiveness and institutional building which had been successfully developed 
by the locality of Rafaela. 
Rafeela is a medium-sized city located in the Province of Santa Fe which, due to its 
industrial performance and institutional dynamism built up on the basis of local competitive 
advantage, is considered as a 'quasi-industrial district' (Gatto et al, 1993). Rafeela has 
experienced a very favourable development recently with a 20 per cent increase in 
employment between 1984 and 1994 while, during the same period, employment declined 
both in the Province of Santa Fe and in Argentina at large (Costamagna and Ferraro, 2000; 
Ascua, Kantis and Joharmison, 2000). 
140 
Table 4.8. A synopsis of Rafeela 
Characteristics Rafaela 
Origin of local industry Italian and Swiss immigrants in the 1880s 
Location (distance for metropolitan area) Central Argaitina (100 km.) 
Population 80,000 
Manufacturing-firms 418 (6,139 employees) 
Commercial establishments 1,697 (8,573 " ) 
Agricultural sector 84 (135 " ) 
Dominant manufacturing sectors Metal engineering and food industry 
Major institutions Local business associations 
Centre for Entrepreneurial Development 
Public agencies 
Local govanment 
Source: Secretaria de Programaoi6n Eoon6mica de Rafaela 
Three factors can be identified as contributing to our understanding of Ra&lela's 
outstanding competitive performance. Firstly, the existence of a dynamic and forward 
looking SME entrepreneurial sector linked with the manufacturing industry. Secondly, a 
proactive, specialised and relatively homogenous private institutional structure associated 
with local entrepreneurial activities. Finally, the existence of state leadership and a public 
'task force' strongly committed to the organisation and support of activities aimed at the 
local SMEs. Collectively, these fectors enabled the mobilisation of diverse local economic 
interests during the early 1990s (notably, SMEs and public and private sectors) w^ich gave 
rise to an effective public/private partnership, which itself became a platform for the 
design, coordination and management of a local IP framework. Through the establishment 
of both the public 'Secretariat for Economic Plaining', which is in charge of the animation 
and political organisation of the local economic agents, and the semi-private 'Centre for 
Entrepreneurial Development', which is in charge of the provision of real services to firms, 
Ra&ela laid the operative basis of its local strategy for development. The main IP areas 
targeted were Ae provision of specialised (sectoral) business information to firms, training 
(in areas such as management, product and process^  quality, ma^ commercialisation 
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and ICTs) and technological upgrading. Both institutions promoted and conducted a policy 
of networking towards different technological, political and economic institutions at a 
national as well as at an international level (i.e. Porto Alegre in Brazil, the Piemonte and 
Emilia Romagna regions in Italy and Baden-Wxirttemberg in Germany). Notably, Rafaela's 
'process of intemationalisation' embraced not only entrepreneurial activities but also 
political, techno-educational and R&D activities associated with different areas concerning 
local development (ECLAC, 1999). In summary, through the 1990s Rafaela became a 
paradigmatic case of local development in the Argentine and Latin American contexts. 
Although the levels of division of labour and subcontracting between local firms are 
considerably lower than those observed in the Italian industrial districts, Rafaela with its 
process of institutional building is seen as a role model and 'tangible' source of inspiration 
for many researchers, practitioners and policy makers both committed to local and regional 
industrial development issues and inspired by the NIP thinking. 
The 'Bonaerense Institute of Entrepreneurial Development' (IDEB) is the most important 
experiment in terms of the scale and resources involved. Established in 1996 in the 
Province of Buenos Aires (the richest Argentine Province representing a third of the GDP), 
IDEB's main aim is to promote the development of Provincial productive activities as a 
whole, particularly those concerned with the micro-, small- and medium-sized firms. IDEB 
headquarter is located in La Plata (PBA's capital) but its operative structure is decentralised 
through five regional IDEB-Centres and thirty-five local IDEB-Institutes. Through the 
latter IP instruments and programmes are delivered. Thirteen IDEB-Institutes were 
established within urban localities of Greater Buenos Aires. Although IDEB is under the 
political command of the Production Ministry of PBA, and depends upon this fmancially, 
the private sector is a constituent part of the IDEB's political structure. Public and private 
partnership and local multi-agency govemance were founding parts of IDEB's political 
guidelines. Based on a concept of real services to firms, the main policy areas tackled by 
IDEB are product and processes quality, managerial training, technological updating, 
international trade, inter-firm cooperation, subcontracting, retailer trade, assessment of 
business plans, and some sectoral programmes such as tourism management. As explained 
in Chapter 5, the empirical research proposed by this research evaluates, among other 
aspects, the performance of the first local IDEB experience established in the locality of 
Tigre. 
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Map 4.2. Province of Buenos Aires 
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4.4. Argentina and the NIP thinking 
To consider Argentine industrial competitiveness in light of the NIP thinking raises issues 
regarding macro-, meso- and micro-economic features that determine firm competitiveness. 
Firstly, the Argentine policy regime has exclusively focused in recent years on the macro-
economy. While it is true that this is a product of chronic problems affecting the whole 
Argentine economy, it is also the product of the belief that only a healthy macroeconomic 
performance in the framework of an open and unregulated market economy would release 
the necessary micro-economic adjustments leading to economic growth. In this framework 
IP was seen as a second best policy option to deal selectively with market failures, 
remaining strictly subordinate to macroeconomic fundamentals. As seen in Chapter 3, the 
NIP thinking not only has a strong emphasis on meso- and micro-economic levels 
generating learning processes, but it also to a certain extent presumes a stable and 'normal' 
macro-economy setting. The situation has changed since the events of 2001. The state 
recovered key tools of economic policy management (notably, monetary policy), the new 
government that came into power in mid-2003 is more sensitive to the problems of 'real 
economy', and society is again beginning to see 'national industry' as a factor of economic 
growth. However, once again, a prime need is perceived to be to stabilise the extremely 
fragile macroeconomic 'equilibrium' achieved throughout 2003, 'before debating' medium-
and long-term IP considerations. The current wait and see behaviour assumed by most 
economic agents, on which any project aimed at underpinning industrial competitiveness 
depends, will only change once the existing wide range of social, political and economic 
uncertainties are tumed into medium-term certainties (Bonvecchi and Porta, 2003). It is 
also important to take into account that the continuous process of deindustrialisation in 
Argentina, coupled with capital concentration, contradict the NIP assumption regarding 
industrial economies based on a plethora of firms and economic agents. 
Second, the Argentine institutional set up 'underpinning' firm competitiveness presents a 
series of systemic deficiencies often resulting in economic failure. Argentina, in contrast to 
Brazil and Chile, has foiled to build up institutions specialised in industrial development 
which had been able to 'transcend' political contingencies and become truly state policies. 
Therefore, the Argentine IP framework can be characterised as a 'collection' of instruments 
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and programmes that were scarcely co-ordinated; run by different public agencies (mostly 
by Ministries of Economy and Employment); and an expression of projects that different 
administrations established whilst they were in power. Institutional complexity and failure 
are not problems exclusive to Argentine nor a restriction to the success of IP (as observed 
during the ISI), but, institutional efficiency is a prerequisite within the NIP thinking in 
order to set the conditions for systemic competitiveness. Institutional failure also 
characterises the framework of relationships between public and private sectors. During the 
Convertibility these relationships were mostly restricted to the distribution of power and 
shares in businesses associated primarily with the privatisation of public assets, but not 
necessarily to criteria of accountability and efficiency in public and private institutional 
spheres.^ ^ This institutional culture contradicts assumptions of the NIP literature in which 
the framework of public/private agreement should constitute the main body promoting 
systemic efficiency. The recent political changes in Argentina suggest a transition to more 
transparent and participative schemes of policy making, but it remains to be seen whether 
this shift is sufficient to lay the foundations for public and private partnerships as conceived 
in the NIP literature. Furthermore, regions and localities have yet to appear as active agents 
in the development of local strategies supporting industrial competitiveness. There has been 
little help from the national state, which has not established the conditions necessary to 
mobilise local or regional actors. As seen, some interstitial changes have occurred in this 
respect through the 1990s. However, the Argentine case does not resemble the more 
proactive regions addressed by the NIP literature. 
Finally, the microeconomy of local firms does not resemble the dynamic, innovative, 
flexible, specialised and intemationally competitive firms addressed by the NIP literature. 
While SMEs are less proactive economic agents, systems of firms acting as networks of 
subcontracting and specialised divisions of labour are rare. Although the micro-economy of 
firms has considerably changed throughout the 1990s, it is a case of individual success 
stories rather than a qualitative change in Argentine industrial competitiveness. What is 
The case of the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), which historically 'represented' the manufacturing 
industry, turns out to be paradigmatic due to the controversial role it played during the Convertibility. Besides 
internal differaices, the economic sectors that directed UIA backed the structural reforms and market 
liba-alisation. These sectors indeed were favoured either by their participation in the privatisation process 
and/or by the regulatory fi-ameworks in force. When UIA wanted to react in the face of the deepening 
economic crises in the late 1990s (which also affected those vested interests), UIA no longer has the power 
that it use to have to undertakes different courses of action. The fmancial sector along with national and 
multinational conglomerates was already the main political variables in state policy decision making. 
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more, the most competitive local firms built up their basis of accumulation on monopolist 
or oligopolist market positions, mainly gained through a protective regulatory framework, 
and not necessarily on the basis of neo-Schumpeterian competition. 
Some questions arise regarding the relevance of the NIP thinking in the light of the setting 
above, which will be used as the basis for the empirical study introduced in the next 
chapter: 
Are learning and change processes forwarded by the NIP thinking possible and desirable 
for firms in contexts where short term and wait and see business strategies seem to be the 
most rational answer to cope with uncertainty? 
Are the assumptions of the NIP thinking concerning irmovation and leaming economies 
compatible with situations of institutional complexity and failure as well as an absence of 
'innovation' systems? 
Is it possible, as well as contextually relevant, to promote local and/or regional IP agendas 
in Argentina inspired by the NIP thinking in light of the predominant restrictive local 
conditioning? Does territorial competitiveness matter in the framework of the Argentine 
economic policy as a platform for policy design? 
Finally, can the NIP literature adapt to settings characterised by a marked and permanent 
macro-economic instability often dominant in developing countries like Argentina? 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Tigre Region 
5.1. Introduction 
The case study which follows focuses on the Tigre region. Tigre '^* is situated 32 km to the 
north of Buenos Aires centre and harbour (both can be reached in half and hour by car), in a 
straight line between the City of Buenos Aires (CBA) and the remaining biggest cities in 
Argentina, Cordoba, Rosario and Santa Fe (situated towards the northwest of the country). 
The north Panamericana, which crosses Tigre and has an important access point within the 
Partido, is the main motorway from/to the centre-north of Argentina and to Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay (MERCOSUR) (see map 5.1). 
I have chosen the Partido (County) de Tigre as the region for the case study based on a set 
of criteria that enable me to conduct an empirical study of the characteristics required for 
this research. In Tigre's region: 
• There is a critical mass of manufacturing firms which account for an important part of 
the local GDP. Most of these firms are micro-, small-, and medium-sized firms. 
• An important number of the firms belong to the timber and wood furniture industries. 
For their number, geographical proximity, and sectoral composition these firms constitute, 
in a broad sense, an industrial agglomeration or cluster. 
• Owing to the timber industry encompassing a series of fragmented processes of 
transformation of raw material into intermediate and then final goods, a theoretical 
possibility exists for production specialisation and division of labour among firms. 
• Likewise, the Partido de Tigre had a vibrant economic performance during an important 
part of the 1990s particularly in comparison to most of regions in Greater Buenos Aires. 
The Partido de Tigre has a total surface of 386 km^ from which 147 km^ correspond to the Tigre's 
continental surface, in which the" commercial and manufactunng~a~ctivities~m-e located. In turn, 221 km^ 
correspond to the wooded islands, located within the Parana River Delta (see map 5.1). 
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• Tigre's institutional set up is shaped by a considerable variety of public, intermediate 
and private institutions, which, in one way or another, are concerned with the competitive 
performance of firms. 
• Finally, the urban Tigre is situated within Grreater Buenos Aires. Hence Tigre is a 
locality within a larger urban metropolis. As already explained, the majority of firms in 
Argentina are located in big cities. Specifically, Tigre politically belongs to Buenos Aires 
Province where around 50 per cent of total number of firms are located (see map 5 .1). 
All the reasons above make the Partido de Tigre an interesting candidate for testing the 
relevance of the propositions of the NEP thinking previously discussed. The study focuses 
on SMEs in this region for the following reasons: 
• In Argentina, like elsewhere, micro-, small and medium-sized firms are the most 
numerous enterprises and represent a very important part of the economy in terms of 
employment and GDP. 
• According to SOCMA (1998, based on Census 1994), i f all economic activity is 
considered, in 1994 there were around 900,000 micro-, small- and medium-sized firms (1 to 
150 employees). It means that 99 per cent of firms fell within this segment of enterprises. 
The largest part of these firms being micro-sized firms (1 to 5 employees) and around 
80,000 SMEs. 
• They generated 2,5 million jobs (which represented at that time around 22 per cent of 
total employment and nearly 80 per cent of manufacturing employment) and 60 per cent of 
output (approximately U$ 94,000,000 millions). As a vs^ole they contributed 41 per cent of 
GDP. 
• Finally, the SMEs represented both the basis of Argentine industrialisation and a central 
vector of the development of the associated social economy. In contrast, the national and 
multinational conglomerates have neither laid the foundations for a sustainable model of 
accumulation nor have they become influential in job creation and wealth distribution. 
Although the conglomerates may become key players in boosting international 
competitiveness, the events of 2001 have shown that an economic model based on 
exclusion and pemianent job shedding is not sustainable in the medium- and long-term. I 
argue that the SMEs do matter as economic actors in their own right in light of the re-
launch challenge tiiat the Argentine economy faces. 
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Map 5.1. The Tigre Region 
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The case study attempts to evaluate in practice the relevance of three propositions asserted 
by those strands of the MP thinking concerned with learning and innovation in the 
framework of local and regional economies. These are firstly, the 'relevance of learning 
and innovation' as strategic behaviour underlying competitive performance of the firm; 
secondly, the 'power of economies of association'; and thirdly, the 'power of place', in 
boosting firm systemic competitiveness. 
The following research questions are designed to test these theoretical claims: do 
geographical and cultural proximities play a role in enhancing leaming, the development of 
innovative capabilities and interfirm division of labour in the regions and firms studied? 
Does the regional institutional set up operate as a facilitator or partner in firm leaming 
processes and the development of their business strategies? Do the regional public and 
private institutions share communal interests and political agendas concerning both firm 
performance and, in a more general sense, local industrial development? On which socio-
political and economic basis of governance do these communal interests materialise into 
local IP agendas? I f the theoretical propositions evaluated do not reflect the reality 
observed in Argentina, what are the main theoretical and IP implications that need to be 
anticipated in this context? Do the dominant views observed in provincial and national 
institutions with respect the case for IP strategies at the level of localities and regions 
support, debate and/or oppose such a policy concern? Do those views support 
decentralisation of national policy agendas towards regions and localities in Argentina? 
These propositions have been tackled through the study of four main variables. Firstly, I 
examine some social, cultural and historical factors in relation to economic evolution, 
factors of productive specialisation and performance. These are considered against certain 
strands of the NIP thinking that asserts their importance in shaping economic development 
(Brusco, 1982; Camagni, 1991; GarofoU, 1991; Piore and Sabel, 1984; Pyke et al, 1990). 
Secondly, I assess to what extent leaming and the development of 'innovative capabilities' 
of the local firms matter in shaping their competitive strategies. In particular, I assess 
whether the former are interactive processes, involving other economic agents, and the 
extent to which they are processes in which geographical proximity matters, as addressed 
within the NIP literature (Cooke and Morgan, 1994, 1998; Florida, 1995; Maskell and 
Malmberg, 1997, 1999). Thirdly, I analyse the nature of the relations between economic 
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agents of the region, especially those that afifect the competitive performance of firms. That 
is carried out by examining three types of relations, namely, inter-firm, firm-institution and 
inter-institution relations. In doing so, I attempt to identify and analyse elements of 
institution-building and territorial mobilisation concerning the generation of local policies 
aimed at supporting firms' competitive performance. Simultaneously, I evaluate the 
contextual constraints that obstruct the emergence of such elements. These issues are tested 
against different strands of the NIP literature asserting the importance of systemic relations 
and the institutional set up (Amin and Thrift 1994; Bianchi, 1994; Braczyk et al, 1998; 
Brusco, 1992; Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Keating, 1998; Storper, 1997). Finally, in order to 
place into context the debate proposed by the NIP thinking regarding localities and regions 
as platforms for policy making, I attempt to grasp the dominant imaginaries existing in 
provincial and national institutions concerning the tiiree propositions above as well as on 
more general issues of competitiveness and IP. 
More than a decade ago Becattini defined an industrial district as: "a socio-economic entity 
which is characterised by the active presence of both a community of people and a 
population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded area." (1990:39). Becattini 
finds the need to 'resurrect' the concept of industrial districts originally formulated by 
Alfred Marshall (c.l870) in order to emphasize "the dynamic linkages between the socio-
cultural features of a productivity community and the rate of growth of both its productivity 
and innovativeness" (2002:484). Similarly for Garofoli, " [ . . . ] territory plays an active role 
in the process of development as it includes all those historical, cultural, and social fectors 
that are the basis of specific models of productive organization, of the continuous 
interaction among economic and social actors and, therefore, of the actual processes of 
economic and social transformation. The emphasis on the territorially anchored 
organizational model of production hinges, therefore, upon at least two dimensions: 1. The 
system of production [...] 2. The social and institutional base that allows that specific 
organizational form." (2002:227). 
These propositions have been enriched with insights from economic sociology, notably on 
'embeddedness' (Granovetter, 1985), which asserts the importance of locally specific social 
and institutional features in shaping economic development. Subsequently, related concepts 
such as 'social capital' (Coletnan, 1988; Putaam, 1993), ref^^ to patterns of social 
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relationships that permit cooperation between actors that are, at the same time, competitors. 
Similarly, 'untraded interdependences', coined by economic geographers (Morgan, 1995; 
Storper, 1995), refers to the advantages that firms can gain through informal links and 
patterns of social interaction fevoured by proximity of economic actors (i.e. other firms, 
suppliers, supporting institutions) within localities and regions, giving insights that have 
enhanced NIP thought. 
Besides introducing the case study, my aim is to tease out fi-om the analysis of Tigre's 
economic development some fectors linked to territorial identity, pattems of conduct and 
organisation, and entrepreneurial culture that may be crucial to interpreting the economic 
geography of this region. This chapter is divided into two sections. Section 5.2 describes 
the current structure of the regional economy and analyses the profile of its manufacturing 
industry. In particular, this section looks at both the timber and wood fiimiture industrial 
cluster existing in the region and some of its historical antecedents. Finally, this section 
briefly examines some of the factors associated with Tigre's geographical location that 
have influenced its economic development. Section 5.3 examines the institutional structure 
of the Tigre region by focussing on key aspects of its history and evolution. In particular, it 
analyses the specific institutions that have emerged dedicated to supporting firms, rather 
than on local and regional institutions as a whole. The concluding subsection summarises 
the empirical findings in light of the theoretical propositions evaluated. 
5.2. Local economic system and manufacturing industry 
The Partido de Tigre experienced outstanding economic dynamism through the 1990s in the 
context of the City of Buenos Aires (CBA) and the urban distticts of the Province of 
Buenos Aires (PBA). Interestingly, 'public' official statistics were not available in Tigre's 
Municipality. Qualitative information collected during the course of the fieldwork enabled 
me to confirm that Tigre was one of the fastest growing localities within the CBA 
throughout the 1990s (personal interviews with key informants from ECLAC and 
FLACSO, 2001). Over this decade the Tigre region benefited from comparably high levels 
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of public (local) and private (non-local) investment.^' Therefore, the primary reason for 
choosing the Partido de Tigre as a case study is that it allows exploration of whether 
underling this dynamism there are effects in line with the NIP assumptions mentioned 
earlier. Secondly, and in a normative sense, it is interesting to consider wdiether this 
dynamism may be enhanced in the fiiture through policy agendas inspired by the new IP 
thinking. 
There is a critical mass of manufecturing firms (632 in total)^^ in the Partido, which have a 
substantial participation in the local GDP (see figures in Table 5.1). Secondly, these firms 
can be classified as micro-, small-, and medium-size firms (see below in this subsection). 
Thirdly, an important number of these firms belong to the timber industry and related 
products, notably the wood fiimiture industry (see in subsection 5.2.1). For their number, 
geographical proximity, and sectoral composition these firms constitute, in a wide sense, an 
industrial cluster (Porter, 1990; Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). Likewise, as the timber industry 
carries out a series of fragmented processes of transformation of raw material and 
manufacturing of intermediate goods before producing a final good, there exists a 
theoretical possibility to develop a division of labour between local and clustered firms, in 
the sense argued by the flexible specialisation school (initially by Piore and Sabel, 1984 
and then Pyke et al, 1990). 
Table 5.1. Economic Structure of the Partido de Tigre: divided into Commerce, Services & 
Manufecturing Industry 
Activity Number 
(Shop/firms) 
Employees Sales 
(Millions U$ dollars) 
GDP 
(Millions U$ dollars) 
Commerce 3,030* 6,067 8.0 131,557,518 5.0 89,734,253 5.5 
Services 1,059 51,197 67.0 116,256,557 4.0 57,380,423 3.5 
Industry 632 18,948 25.0 2575,127,000 91.0 745,748,710 91.0 
Total 4,721 76,242 100% 2822,941,075 100% 1638,612,096 100% 
*130 shops sell "furniture and associated equipments". Source: IDEB-Tigre, 2000 
" It is important to emphasise that the economic growth experienced by Tigre is not reflected in the figures of 
local employment and welfare. Unemployment and marginality have steadily grown since the second half of 
the 1990s. 
^ According to a study carried out by ECLAC- Buenos Aires, the lack of critical mass of firms in localities 
and even regions is one of biggest restrictions to setting up territorial programmes of IP in Argentina (Gatto, 
Cesetti andFritche, 1997). 
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As shown in Table 5.1, the manu&cturing sector is the dominant local sector with respect 
to commerce and services considering its contribution to sales and GDP. The 
manufacturing firms (632 in total, in year 2000) account for 91% of local sales and GDP, 
respectively. Local commerce and services as a whole amount for the remaining 9%. I f one 
looks at the employment figures by sector the picture is notably different. Over two thirds 
of jobs filled (67%) correspond to the service sector, and only 25% to the manufecturing 
sector (over a total number of 1,059 shops/firms)^'. The remarkable figure corresponding to 
the manufacturing sector within the local GDP made this region an exception with respect 
to the most part of localities and cities in Argentina, where either services or commerce 
often predominates. 
With respect to firm size, there is no specific available statistical information. Key 
informants interviewed pointed out that with the exception of only a small group of large 
companies, the majority of local firms are micro-, small- and medium-size firms (IDEB-
and UIA-Tigre). I f one looks at the employment figures in the manufacturing sector in 
Table 5.1 (18,948 in total), and divides this figure by the total number of firms (632), it can 
be estimated that they employ on average 30 people each. For the most part these firms 
would fall thus into the category of small firms (6 to 50 employees). 
However, qualitative information collected reveals that only a small group of large 
companies. Ford Motor Company (Ford) among them, account for a considerable part of 
the regional GDP (some of them MNCs). As stated by Industrial Union of Tigre (UIA-
Tigre) and the Development Institute of Bonaerense Entrepreneur (IDEB-Tigre), this group 
of large companies as a whole amount on average to more than 80% of the manufecturing 
sector GDP. This figure includes MNCs such as Ford, Coca Cola S.A., and S C. Johnson. 
Therefore, the 'SME factor' previously addressed must here be taken very cautiously. As 
Gatto and Yoguel (1992) argue, the simultaneous presence of a few dominant large 
companies in manufecturing sectors and localities populated by a large amount of SMEs is 
Employment statistics in localities placed within large cities have however considerable shortcomings. 
Many people who live in these types of localities may work in other parts of the city, and vice versa, and Ihis 
data is rarely registered by the census in Argentina. 
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one of the most typical characteristics observed in the Argentinean industrial geography. 
This fact neither represents a problem for the local SMEs themselves nor a restriction for 
this research. It may become an advantage as long as external economies and economies of 
association emerge as a result of the activity of these large companies (i.e. imitative 
technological and managerial spillovers, and subcontracting practices). 
Table 5.2. Manufacturing industry of the Partido de Tigre: divided into subsectors by 
number of firms and sales 
Activities Firms Sales (Millions U$ dollars) 
1. Food Products & Drinks 83 13.1 356, 800 13.8 
2. Textiles and Articles 24 3.8 60, 643 2.3 
3. Timber & Sawmills 109 17.4 62,498 2.S 
4. Papa, Editions & Printer's 24 3.8 75,082 2.9 
5. Chemical Products 62 9.8 225,558 8.7 
6. Non M^all ic Minerals 20 3.1 12,251 0.5 
7. Basic Metallic 103 16.3 197,437 7.7 
8. Machinery, Equipments & Vehicles 1S3 24.2 1558,223 60.5 
9. Other Industries 54 8.5 26,635 1.0 
Total 632 100% $2575,127 100% 
Source: IDEB-Tigre, 2000 
However, these MNCs and the group of Argentinean large companies (i.e. Terrabusy; 
Frigorifico Rioplatense SA; and Techint SA) operate as sort of 'enclaves' or 'islands' 
within the regional economy. Despite their contribution to regional figures of employment 
and tax payments, qualitative information collected reveals that these companies hardly 
develop 'down-stream' linkages with local SMEs and institutions. The subsector of 
Machinery, Equipments & Vehicles, which is shaped by only a large company (Ford) and 
many auto-part SME suppliers, represents the only exception in this sense. However, the 
SME suppliers have for the most part been merged or acquired by different large 
automotive companies operating in the country (Ford included) during the last decade. 
Hence most of these firms are no longer independent. I f ownership is considered, the 
subsector of Timber & Sawmills (wood furniture firms included) becomes the biggest 
group of local firms owned by local entrepreneurs (see Table 5.2). 
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I f the contribution of Ford and the remaining large companies to local GDP were 
eliminated, the panorama would be quite different. The remaining 20% of the regional 
GDP, shaped by subsectors of Basic Metallic; Paper, Editions & Printer's; and Timber & 
Sawmills (Activities 2 to 6 and 9 together in Table 5.2) highly populated by SMEs, would 
become more important for the local real economy. The concept of 'local' refers to the fact 
that these entrepreneurs and their firms organise, coordinate, and run their business 'from' 
the local/regional milieux, they build up external links 'from' the local, and they interact 
with and somehow shape the local business and institutional environments. This is 
particularly the case for localities with diffiise boundaries, like Tigre, which are situated 
within larger cities. In fact, for the firms situated in Tigre and the region, the City of 
Buenos Aires constitutes their local and national market at the same time. Tigre's 
geographical location and its network of connections are factors that help to explain the 
significant number of manufacturing firms located in the region, particularly on the North 
Panamericam motorway (see map 5.1). However, the availability of external links in this 
case does not guarantee that local clustered economies easily can avoid, for instance, 'lock-
in' of their technological trajectories (in the sense discussed by Bell and Albu, 1999). 
5.2.1 Timber and wood furniture cluster 
There is no commonly accepted definition of industrial clusters. However, some 
characteristics differentiate an industrial cluster from other concepts currently utilised in IP 
issues. Unlike networks, industrial clusters are critically associated to geographical 
proximity of firms and economic actors^ *, which is thought of as a source of competitive 
advantage. Humphrey and Schmitz (1996), in a work specifically concerned with local 
industrial policy, offer a very useful definition of industrial cluster: 
"A cluster is defined as a sectoral and geogr^hical concentration of enterprises. Whether 
specialization and cooperation develop is considered a matter for empirical research and 
not subsumed in the definition. Once such a concentration exists, however, external 
economies are likely to arise, notably from the emergence of suppliers who provide raw 
I recognise the existence of 'virtual clusters', based on digital-organisational networks or e-business 
communities, as new competitive and collaborative economic spaces (see for instance Romano et al, 2000). 
As far as available information informs, however, small firms in traditional sectors of production in 
developing countries (in some cases) have only recently begun to use computers and information technologies 
as business tools. 
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materials and components, new or second-hand machinery and spare parts; or the 
emergence of a pool of wage workers with sector-specific skills. A cluster may also 
attract agents who sell to distant markets and favour the emergence of specialized 
services in technical, financial and accounting matters" (1996:1863). 
Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, (1999:1694) note that what makes clusters attractive from 
the IP perspective are the opportunities for promoting collective efficiency. Collective 
efficiency is defined as the competitive advantages derived from both (often passive) local 
external economies and, above all, (active) joint actions (Schmitz, 1995). This last 
dimension of collective efficiency, related to interfirm relationships and division of labour 
in the timber cluster, is addressed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
Statistical information shows that the timber industry contributes the largest number of 
firms in the region. It accounts for an approximated total figure of 295 firms (109 and 186 
firms in each Partido)^' (see in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively). These firms range from 
forest production (at the Delta islands) to firms concerned with wood derivates, such as 
sawmills, shipboards, carpentries, wooden crates, and the wood fiamiture industry (see 
photographs in appendix 2). Furthermore, those local activities and services associated with 
the commercialisation and supply chain of the timber industry should also be added to the 
total number of (sectoral related) firms. In Tigre alone there are about 130 shops that sell 
fiimiture and associated equipments (IDEB-Tigre, 2000), an important part of which sell 
wooden furniture. 
This figure is approximated because there exists a possibility that some timber firms had been considered in 
both Tables 5 .2 (elabofatal by K)EB-Tigre uiider a regional critefidh) and Table 53 (elaborated by the San 
Femando's Municipality, under.a local criterion). _ _ 
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Table 53. Manufecturing industry of the Partido de San Fernando: divided into subsectors 
by number of firms and per cent of total 
Activity Number of Finns % 
1. Food Products & Drinks 122 19.S 
2. Leather 6 0.9 
3. Shipbuilding 22 3.5 
4. Timber 186 30 
3. Sand Extraction' Firms 5 0.8 
6. Chemistry & y Rubber 58 9.3 
7. Metallurgic, Metabnechanic & Auto parts 12S 20.1 
8. Plastic 20 3.2 
9. Electricity 6 0.9 
10. Graphics 52 8.4 
11. Ceramics 9 1.5 
12. Other industries 11 1.8 
Total 622 100% 
Source: Municipality de San Fernando, 2000 
In the case of San Fernando'*' (in Table 5.3) the total number of timber firms reaches 186 
firms (30% of the total) and, therefore, constitutes the main manufacturing subsector. From 
these 186 firms, 147 are SMEs devoted to industrial wood processing and, from these 147 
firms, 115 firms are wood fiimiture producing firms which use both wood pine and 
algarroba (Municipality de San Fernando, 2000). The remaining 32 firms are either 
sawmills or wooden crate producers, which use willow, poplar, and eucalyptus as raw 
material. These latter species of wood mostly come from the Delta islands (see photographs 
in appendix 2). The small size of firms concemed with fumiture production (not in 
fiimiture retailing) seems nevertheless to be a structural characteristic to fiamiture industry 
(Best, 1989) rather than a local specificity. For example, only nine percent of European 
fumiture firms by mid 1990s had more than twenty employees (Maskell, 1998). As this 
scholar notes: 
"[t]hroughout the world, fiimiture production has always taken place in small firms 
regardless of numerous attempts to 'Fordize' the industiy" (ibid: 101). The "very nature 
of fumiture consumption as a deeply personal statement of a consumer's taste and 
™ The timber cluster covers the Partido de Tigre and the neighbouring Partido de San Femando (see map 5.1). 
Hence in this case for Tigre region I concentrate on both Partidos together. 
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personality and the relatively lengthy possession of furniture by a consumer worked 
decisively against the introduction of mass production in the furniture industry" 
(Hounshell, 1984 quoted by Maskell, ibid). Hence the fiimiture industry seems to be an 
industry of niches. "Most [small fiimiture] firms compensate for any size-related 
disadvantages by focusing on specific products or niches in the value-added chain of the 
industry" (ibid: 102). 
Finally, the timber industry is labour intensive, a characteristic that seems to be common to 
developing as well as developed market economies (Maskell, 1998) and, at least in the 
Argentine case, it displays highly sensitive job absorption rates in terms of increases in 
demand. Though there is no available official statistics of local employment by 
manufacturing subsectors, some entrepreneurs and institutions interviewed pointed out that 
the timber industry accounts for an important portion of the regional industrial 
employment. Bearing in mind the high level of structural unemployment registered in 
Argentina (23% of the workfece in 2002, with a additional 22% under-employed), to study 
labour-intensive sectors of production, like the timer industry, represents an additional 
motive to choose the timber cluster as a case study. 
5.2.2. External economies, identity and entrepreneurial culture 
Following the distinction made between competitive advantages derived from 'incidental' 
or 'passive' collective efficiency that 'fall into the producer's lap (or extemal economies in 
the strict sense), and those that derived from 'planned' or 'active' joint efforts realised by 
clustered firms (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1999:1504-5) a first question arises: is there evidence 
of extemal economies ('passively') available to the local firms in the sense suggested by 
the theory at the wood fumiture cluster? 
The fieldwork reveals the presence of some extemal economies derived from the existence 
of a timber and ftimiture market in the region. As expressed by some entrepreneurs 
interviewed, some areas of Tigre and San Femando fiinction as i f they were a fumiture 
'shopping mail'. This market is shaped by a series of actors: fijmiture wholesalers and 
retailers, the general public (who come to the region from all over the country to buy 
fiimiture), timber and fumiture suppliers, who provide raw materials, intermediary goods, 
and new and second-hand machinery. Many of these suppliers regularly come to the region 
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to offer their products and, to a lesser degree, specialised services. Some suppliers have 
even opened sales outlets in the region. Likewise, the firms are provided with an easy 
access to workers with sector- and territory-specific skills related to the regional production 
of fiimiture. As described below, the fiimiture market has historically developed as a result 
of the dynamic between a critical number of related activities clustered in the same 
geographical location. These external economies mean a reduction in transaction costs for 
small entrepreneurs, manifest in reduced searching time and price bargaining. It is a 
decisive issue for entrepreneurship (even for the less exceptional and more common 
entrepreneurs) since "clustering makes it possible to advance by taking small and calculable 
-rather than large and wild- risks" (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999:1506). 
Consequently, the competitive advantages derived from the basic external economies due to 
the existence of this market of factors of production, low entry barriers to the industry (due 
to the low investment of minimal fixed capital required -Maskell, 1998-), and the relatively 
protected nature of the domestic market to international competition (at least until the early 
1990s), makes the Partido de Tigre and the region a fioiitfiil terrain for entrepreneurship. 
The 'active' and 'deliberate' learning processes have therefore been developed and 
activated by the presence of passive extemal economies. New firms go forth generating 
their own conditions of reproduction within the cluster, and this explains why the new 
entrepreneurs set up their firms and shops within the cluster, and often right next to the 
competition. Interestingly, a part of the market pull is directly shaped by the flux of tourists 
that visit Tigre every weekend. Many tourists come to Tigre for its traditional goods, such 
as fruits, vegetables, plants, jams, liqueurs, and a wide variety of crafts and fiimiture. 
According to the Tigre Sub-Secretariat for Tourism, on average 50 thousand people visit 
Tigre every weekend. In addition to the traditional produce, areas of tourist attraction lie in 
its geographical location (at the River Plate Delta islands' coastline) and its well-resourced 
infi^structure (i.e. riverfront, marinas, yachting and rowing clubs, and resorts and beaches 
in the islands). The tourism circuit is centred on Tigre's riverfront, the Delia's islands, and 
Tigre's harbour where many commercial and recreational activities are located 
(photographs in appendix 2).^ ^ 
Tigre's harbour has two main docks. The harbour's main^ock accommodates the wood smd sand trade (the 
most "active and' p~enrianent businesses in tiie harbour) and it is the unloading area for boats transporting 
willow and poplar logs brought from the islands.-The-harbour's second-dock is the location of the Fruit 
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Let us come the question raised in the inttoduction of this chapter concerning whether the 
socio-economic, cultural, and historical features matter in explaining the competitive 
performance of the local SMEs and the region itself The evidence collected reveals that 
these fectors, intertwined with the emergence and development of traditional sectors of 
production associated with the expansion of the Delta islands and Tigre harbour economy, 
were the original attraction to entrepreneurs to Tigre and developing a local entrepreneurial 
culture. A brief historical account becomes necessary here to explain this point. 
By 1790 nine sawmills and a shipyard were functioning in Tigre, linked with the intense 
commercial traffic of wood from the Delta islands towards Buenos Aires centre. Forestry 
production for wood trading, along with fruits and vegetable forming, were the primary 
sectors of productive specialisation in the emerging local economy. The production of the 
Delta islands diversified towards the end of the 19* century. This included the production 
of jam, preserves, sausages, and liqueurs, which led to the accumulation of manufacturing 
skills in sectors linked with primary production. In addition to sawmills there were several 
carpentry workshops already functioning in Tigre. 
The diversification of forming and manufacturing activities largely encouraged by official 
policies of the national administration aimed at promoting the settlement of European 
immigrants within the Delta islands. By the turn of the 19th century, and during the early 
days of the 20th century, thousands of immigrants, notably Italians and Spaniards, settled 
throughout the Delta islands^. The immigrants brought with them a varied set of crafts and 
manufacturing expertise (generically known as 'tacit knowledge') that had an enormous 
impact on the technological and managerial transformation, upgrading, and growth of the 
traditional local economy. Immigrants also brought with them institutional and associative 
experiences of community organisation (see details in the following section) that had a 
significant effect on the future organisation of the locality as a whole. In this sense the 
immigrants acted as technological 'gatekeepers' (Bells and Albu, 1999) in opening the 
Market. Local and non-local production of fruit, vegetables, plants, crafts, osier-based crafts, and a part of the 
furniture industry business operates within the Fruit Market's.infrastructure. 
During the islands' production heyday, the Tigre's islands population reached about 20 thousand people, 
five times higher than Recurrent figure (Municipality-of Tigre, 2000).^— -
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regional knowledge system. This fector is intimately linked to the origins of the 
Argentinean industrial take off (Kosacofif, 1998). 
How do these historical antecedents relate to the fumiture industry's evolution, and the 
emergence of an industrial atmosphere? The origin of the wood fumiture industry in the 
territory was a resuh of the positive combination (and then evolution) between tacit 
knowledge and manufacturing expertise developed by the traditional sectors of production 
within the region (such as sawmills, wooden crate, shipbuilding and other industries 
concemed with industrial processing of wood) and the 'carpentry' workshops that had been 
established by European entrepreneurs at tiie beginning of the 20* century. Extemal tacit 
knowledge, which in this case can be thought as a technological innovation for the region, 
was incorporated in the new productive undertakings. Regarding the latter, when 
interviewed some entrepreneurs singled out Fritche's carpentry (a German cabinet-maker 
family) as the first "master" firm established in the region. Some Spanish families were 
also singled out as those who "brought new techniques of production " into the region, 
which were, over time, copied by the other fumiture firms and transferred to the emerging 
wood timber-specialised local workforce. 
The historical sjmthesis of both traditions as origins of the local entrepreneurial culture and 
identity was recognised by a number of entrepreneurs and institutional leaders interviewed. 
For instance, Poma and Gastaldin (a wood supplier and a local fiimiture manufacturer 
respectively), in response to a question about why the fiimiture entrepreneurs believe there 
are so many wood fumiture firms in the area, pointed out: "it is hereditary! "It is passed 
from one generation to the other". Poma added that there exists "a fumiture family" in the 
region. In this sense, Gastaldin more precisely observed that "a work culture" has 
developed in the region linked to fumiture manufecturing. He argued that this "work 
culture" came from the Delta islands to the Tigre locality, from sawmills to carpentries, 
and from immigrant grand parents to new generations. Gastaldin emotively concluded, 
"this is my own history, this is the history of everybody here" [in the wood fumiture 
industrial cluster]. 
Furthermore, the field work reveals that cultural identity observed in the wood fiimiture 
cluster 'belongs' only to the cluster (which presents some characteristics of an industrial 
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district) and to the entrepreneurs and institutions that shape it, rather than to the territory 
(locality or region, its actors and institutions) in a wider sense. Interestingly, the local 
institutions interviewed were evenly divided on whether there are factors of cultural 
identity and social embeddedness associated with Tigre's industrial profile and sectoral 
specialisation. Half of those interviewed identified Tigre only with "the two or three large 
companies" located in the zone of the Panamericana motorway. In contrast, the other half 
did so with the shrinking traditional sectors of production in the region, such as the forest 
and timber industry, sawmills, shipyards, nautical industry, and craft and forming activities. 
The absence of a marked local identity regarding local industry to a degree contradicts the 
NIP literature. Industrial districts and local milieux approaches (often inspired on 
'illustrious clusters' -Cooke et al, 2002-) assign a critical importance to the existence of a 
local 'identity' (based on fectors of sectoral specialisation i.e. those observed in industrial 
districts specialising in textiles, knitwear, fiimiture, and shoe production) so as to mobilise 
the interests of local economic agents. 
5.3. Institutional structure and competitive performance^ '^  
The presence of local institutions make Tigre a good case to evaluate whether there is new 
thinking along the lines identified by NIP theory in producing collective efficiency 
(Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999), and in creating localised competitive advantages (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999). In particular, Tigre has been chosen as a 
case study due to the fact that since 1996 a group of local actors and institutions have been 
deepening the process of local institution building through the setting up of the 
Development Institute ofBonaerense Entrepreneur of Tigre (QDEB-Tigre), a 'decentralised' 
regional agency concemed with the provision of real services to firms. As pointed out in 
Chapter 4, IDEB (and IDEB-Tigre) represents a novelty in SME policy in Argentina. 
However, the institutional capacity observed in the region is not a product of the IDEB-
" References to pubhc, private, and intermediate institutions will be understood to be those from the Partido 
de Tigre only, unless otherwise stated, while information referring to firms relates to the region (Partido de 
Tigre and Partido de San Femando together). The difficulties in making a clear distinction between factors not 
delimited by poUtical or jurisdictional boundaries, such as an industrial cluster or an institutionaljietwork, 
T^fesent a methodological problem when one attemptslb'sfiidy localities or regions within lirge cities. 
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Tigre's establishment in 1996. As I show below, it rather is intimately linked to the socio-
economic, political, and institutional history of Tigre. This subsection briefly looks at the 
history and evolution of the Tigre's institutional set up and its interrelationship with the 
development of the local system of production''* This review focuses only on formal 
institutions related to the local system of firms and the local economy. 
53.1. Institutions of the local state 
The institutions of the local state consolidated during the last decades of the 19* century are 
in part as a result of the economic progress experienced by the locality. The local state as 
such rose seven years after the first train came to the District of Las Conchas (the current 
Partido de Tigre) in 1865. The railway represented a milestone in Tigre's economic history 
since it gave considerable encouragement to the local/regional producers who could now 
gain efficient access to their main market, the CBA. In 1882 Dr Daniel Maria Cazon was 
elected as the first mayor of Tigre, an event that marked the origin of the first local 
administration for public affairs. During his administration (the most remembered in 
Tigre's history) the region achieved remarkable progress in its public infrastructure and 
facilities: primary schools were built, electric services were expanded, streets and roads 
were improved, and a sewage system was built. By then, a naval yard, promoted and 
financed by the national government, was established in Tigre's harbour. This naval yard 
let to enormous progress in the locality since it favoured not only the Tigre's consolidation 
as an important shipping traffic point, but it also encouraged population settlement (notably 
immigrants) and some small manufacturing activities in its adjacent areas. Furthermore, the 
first bridge on Tigre's River was built in 1878. This new 'access' bridge, along with ttie 
railway network, constituted the first direct terrestrial link between Tigre and the CBA. As I 
show in Chapter 7, public infrastructure and facilities, in particular 'accesses' to/from urban 
Tigre, even today represent a 'master key' of the local governments' agenda for local 
development. 
During the 20* century the local state expanded through the creation of different agencies 
concerned with different aspects of the local affairs (health, justice, security, welfare. 
''^  The local institutions' perfonnance in shaping and encouraging competitive performance at the present time 
is analysed in detail in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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housing, education, treasury, among others). At present, the MunicipaUty of Tigre (the 
Partido' political authority) and the Secretariat of Economy and Exchequer (the financial 
and economic authority) are the most powerful state institutions of Tigre, which have been 
controlled by the ruling political party since the late 1980s (see Chapter 8). 
53.2. Private institutions and local financial system 
The industrial take off of Argentina and its subsequent process of urbanisation experienced 
in the large cities, notably CBA, during the ISI period (1930/40s to 1970s), represented the 
main source of change for the Partido de Tigre and the region throughout the first half of 
the 20* century. Tigre used to consist of only fields, islands, and a small town at the 
beginning of 1900s. hi contrast, currently the Partido de Tigre has an estimated population 
of 300,000 inhabitants (Municipalidad de Tigre, 1999). Li the course of Tigre's process of 
transformation into an urban locality, through which the locality simultaneously began to 
become part of, and be absorbed, by Buenos Aires's expansion, the local actors began to 
organise themselves through the establishment of different local organisations and 
institutions. These were established to meet the locality's new needs and encourage its 
socio-economic and political development. Likewise, the European immigrants that settled 
in the region, and their descendants, played a key role in Tigre's first stages of the 
institutionalisation of its emerging entrepreneurial business community. 
The first business associations were created to meet the demands of the (by then rising) 
traditional sectors of production of Tigre. The islanders created their first form association 
(called the Permanent Council of Islands' Producers) in 1935 in order to organise and 
regulate the commercial activity of the Delta islands farms. This former association played 
a decisive role in the creation of the Fruit Market at Tigre's harbour in 1938. As mentioned 
already, the fruits, vegetables, and derivate products from the Delta islands were sold 
through this market. Furthermore, this was the origin of the fiimiture market that 
subsequently developed in the region. Both the Chamber of Delta Tourism Entrepreneurs 
and Cooperatives of Delta Osier Craftsman were more recently created linked to the Delta 
islanders, the Fruit Market, and the harbour's activities. Almost simultaneously as the 
creation of the farmer association, the timber entrepreneurs established the Industrial 
Timber Centre (CIM) in 1938, at the neighbouring Partido de San Fernando. CIM was 
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created to promote and defend the timber industry as a whole. Hence, this institution has 
incorporated the whole of the regional timber industry: the primary forest production of the 
Delta islands; primary industrial wood processing; wood transformation into intermediate 
and final goods, such as timberwork for the shipbuilding industry; and the wood fiimiture 
industry. 
At that time some financial institutions existing in Tigre already provided the financial 
services that were necessary for the needs of the local forming, commercial, and 
manufacturing activities. In 1920 the Banco de la Nacion Argentina (National Bank of 
Argentina) opened a branch in Tigre. In 1959 Banco Provincia de Buenos Aires (Buenos 
Aires Province Bank) also opened a local branch in Tigre. As a result of the Delta islands' 
economic expansion, this bank innovated by setting up a mobile service branch to serve 
(and still serve) the Delta islands, catering for the islanders' banking operations and tax 
payments. Therefore, the national state, in the first case, and the provincial state (Province 
of Buenos Aires -PBA-), in the second, played a decisive role in the establishment of a 
financial and banking system in Tigre. However, this arose also as a result of both the local 
economy's dynamism and the organisational capacity of local actors and institutions. At 
present, some private and cooperative banks also operate in Tigre. The existence of local 
branches of banks does not imply, however, tiie existence of local bank policies (set up by 
local branches) suitable to meet the needs of local firms. In the Argentine economy of 
today, decision-making processes of banks are, without exception, extremely centralised at 
the banks' headquarters in CBA, and yet they operate entirely on the basis of national (or 
provincial) policies. Hence local branches of national/provincial banks have rarely been 
considered as a 'variable' in studies on local/regional industrial development carried out in 
Argentina (Gatto etal, 1993; Yoguel et al, 1998; Costamagna etal, 2000). 
Once the local process of urbanisation reached a significant level of maturity, the urban 
commercial activities were organised through the establishment of the Commercial and 
Industrial Chamber of Tigre (CACIT) in 1967. CACIT was created to provide basic 
business services to its members (i.e. information and consulting on legal, labour, and tax 
issues), but due to internal and extemal problems it was closed under the last military 
dictatorship (1976-1982). After a long period of reorganisation, it was reopened in 1996 
and currently claims to 'represent' the sgialj^pmmerci^^^^ of Tigre's urban centre. 
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More recently, after a period of expansion of manufacturing firms in the region, the 
Industrial Union of Tigre (UIA-Tigre) was created in 1987. UIA-Tigre was set up by a 
group of dynamic small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs established in the region during 
the last stages of the ISI period (1960s and early 1970s) and the first decade of transition 
towards the neoliberal economic model (1976 to 1985). As already mentioned, many large 
companies, in addition to SMEs, came to the region attracted by advantages of 
geographical location and existing infi-astructure. As I show in Chapter 7, the fieldwork 
reveals nevertheless that factors associated with the good administration of public affairs by 
the local government have also positively influenced the locating of firms. Two 
specificities made UIA-Tigre a different business association to those mentioned above. 
UIA-Tigre is the first local business association specifically concerned with manufacturing 
activity and it is the only one created after the dramatic collapse of the ISI model in 1976, 
under the last military dictatorship. UIA-Tigre claims to be the main business association 
operating in the region, which comes to represent the interests of the whole regional 
manufacturing industry. In particular, it claims to represent the interests of the regional 
SMEs. Though UIA-Tigre constitutes a 'decentralised' regional delegation of the 
Argentinean Industrial Union (UIA)' ' , its creation was promoted and engineered by local 
entrepreneurs. From an evolutionary perspective I would hypothesise that due to the fact 
that UIA-Tigre was bom in a very different economic context (characterised by market 
liberalisation, rising import competition, and change in the patterns of organisation of 
production and management of firms) it should represent a new case in relation to the 
business associations that were bom under a protected and regulated economy. Some 
aspects derived from this proposition are analysed in the following chapters of this thesis. 
Finally, IDEB-Tigre Institute (Institute of Bonaerense Entrepreneurial Development) was 
established in Tigre promoted by and under the umbrella of UIA-Tigre, along with the 
PBA's govemment and some other local institutions. As testament of this, IDEB-Tigre's 
offices are situated within UIA-Tigre's headquarters (more details in Chapter 7). 
UIA used to be the most important business association existing in Argentina. It used to represent what 
during the ISI model was known as 'the national industry'. Though UIA still maintains a portion of its former 
political power it no longer rq)resents the real economic powCTS thaRodky Me~the~Argaitii^^ economy, 
such as the financial sector and the largest national and multinational economic conglomerates. 
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53.3. Institutions of the technological and educational system 
The technological and educational institutions are the last group of institutions that I would 
like to mention in this review, since they are intimately linked to the needs of the local 
system of production. The state National School of Technical Education N°5 (ETN) was 
established in 1946 in order to meet the need for a skilled workforce from local industries 
such as shipbuilding, nautical, and furniture manufecturing industries. The ETN had a 
marked effect on the labour market for the timber industry: many local workers, as well as 
future entrepreneurs, were trained in this school and in qualifications suited to the needs of 
local firms, notably in the carpentry trade. 
The National Technological University of Tigre (UTN-Tigre) is in turn the only state 
university existing in the region specifically concerned with tfie education and training of 
diverse technical disciplines related to engineering. Though UTN-Tigre was created as a 
result of a different process than ETN (since it is a regional sub campus of the UTN Buenos 
Aires), it came to meet similar demands from sectors of production with an important 
presence in the region, such as metal processing, machinery, and tiie motor vehicle 
industry. Since 1983 (once Argentina returned to democratic rule) UTN not only undertook 
a strategy of active and close contact with the manufecturing firms in the region and 
beyond, but they also undertook an active strategy of institutional involvement and 
networking with other local institutions (notably UIA- and IDEB-Tigre) and general 
supporting activities relating to the firm system in the region (see details in Chapter 7). 
Two additional comments need to be made in relation to these two institutions. Firstly, their 
existence represents an external economy accessible to the local firms, which arises as a 
result of both the sectoral agglomeration of related firms and the organisational capacity of 
local actors. As argued by Maskell, "the agglomeration of firms in related industries creates 
a demand for an improved supply of transport systems, educational fecilities, and other 
infrastructure advantages" (1998:110) (emphasis in original). As already seen, the 
educational infi^structure in Tigre represents a competitive asset for some local timber 
firms in terms of advantages associated with the labour market (in the majority of the cases) 
and, to a lesser extent, local availability of training and consultancy (i.e. in quality control). 
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In this sense, IDEB-Tigre's establishment can be also thought of as a result of Tigre's 
institutional dynamism derived fi'om both the geographical concentration of manufecturing 
firms and the organisational capacity of the local entrepreneurs and institutions. 
Secondly, the existence of these institutions within the region represents an opportunity for 
the local firms from the perspective of those strands of NIP literature that assert the critical 
importance of the so-called local/regional systems of innovation (i.e. Braczyk et al, 1998). 
ETN, IDEB-Tigre, UTN-Tigre, along with other institutions not mentioned in this review, 
would constitute key components of the local/regional system of irmovation, related to the 
manufacturing firms. Whether these institutions constitute both a 'system' that also 
'innovates' will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. At this stage of analysis, it can be 
pointed out that in cases like Tigre, situated within a large city and delimited by many other 
local institutional set ups, it would be more accurate to talk about (extremely) open and 
borderless systems. I f it is indeed a 'system', perhaps a network is a better word to use in 
this case. 
5.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced the case study by focusing on a set of factors related to Tigre's 
socio-economic and institutional history, considered with reference to the NIP literature. 
Three provisional conclusions can be highlighted from these first findings. These concern 
firstly, the complex relation between economic and social factors that helps explain the 
industrial atmosphere existing in the region; secondly, the importance of clustering in the 
development of extemal economies; thirdly, the risks involved in the possible confusion 
between industrial identities and local identities. 
Firstly, the economic and institutional dynamism observed in Tigre can hardly be explained 
without having taken into account the historical dialectic between the socio-political, 
cultural and economic dimensions of its development. This allows us to hypothesise that in 
those localities or regions where a relation between these dimensions does not exist, the 
generation of competitive advantages derived from extemal economies and the result of the 
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economic process in general will be different than those observed in Tigre. The 
Argentinean industrial geography, and in particular regions where there are high 
concentrations of SMEs, abound in these types of negative experiences (ECLAC, 1999). 
This links into the important finding by Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer that "cluster support 
in Latin America often proceeds on unrealistic assumptions about development potentials 
of (groups of) firms and clusters, ignores the specific logic guiding entrepreneurial 
decision-making, and understates the inertia of local sociocultural milieu, thus failing to 
design adequate policies" (1999:1694) (brackets in original). 
The sfrands of the NIP literature evaluated in this chapter are correct in asserting that 
history, culture, and social embeddedness matter in explaining the economic dynamism of 
territories. However, this does not support an extreme historical determinism according to 
which IP is unable to break path-dependent trajectories. The conscious policy decisions of 
settling European immigrants is a good example, since it prompted a remarkable process of 
technological updating and innovation of the local system of production as a whole. In fact, 
they were brought into the country by the national government as carriers of 'civilisation' 
(or 'best practices' to use a more fashionable expression). At present, as I will show 
through the following chapters, there are a series of IP instruments that can play a similar 
role to that played by the immigrations a century ago. Likewise, the literature on clustering 
in Latin America (i.e. Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996; World Development, 1999) informs 
that a long common history and a shared culture were not the main ingredients of economic 
success in several successfixl experiences of indusfrial clusters. For example, this is 
highlighted in the case of Chilean small furniture manufacturers, which have undertaken, in 
less than a decade, a successful process of intemationalisation starting from export-oriented 
networking practices and subsequent 'injection' of institutionalised public and private 
support, (Messner, 1993). 
The importance of the geographical agglomeration of firms from related industries in 
developing external economies in the region is the second issue that requires highlighting. 
Although some extemal economies available for all firms have arisen in the region, such as 
public infrastructure and the entrepreneurial atmosphere, the most important ones are 
sector-specific. This is principally the case for the market existing in the region for some 
local products (notably forniture) and an important part of the institutional/educational 
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infiustructure (i.e. ETN and UTN-Tigre). Such externalities are a critical factor in 
stimulating entrepreneurship. This can be observed in the wooden fiimiture industry of the 
Partido de Tigre and the region, at least until the early 1990s (fiirther details on this point 
are given in Chapter 6). However, the evidence also reveals that the particular geographical 
location of the Partido de Tigre has had (and still has) an important effect on its industrial 
profile and arising extemal economies. Although geographical location is considered a 
static comparative advantage, and therefore it does not fit into the NIP framework, I argue 
that when effectively used fi-om a policy point of view this fector becomes a dynamic 
competitive advantage. 
Finally, the Chapter shows that the elements of 'cultural identity' associated with factors of 
industrial specialisation and socialisation observed within the wooden fiimiture cluster do 
not necessarily correspond with the elements of cultural identity observed in the locality 
taken as a wiiole. Though we have yet to consider local govemance and politics, this lack of 
correspondence has had important effects on the decision-making process related to the 
local policy framework (as I will show in Chapter 7). Consequently, IP approaches in 
Argentina should be carefiil in assuming that territory (whether locality or region as a 
whole) should 'coincide', in terms of cultural identity or political projects and sectoral 
interests, with the 'extension' and 'character' of cultures, ideas, and interests observed 
within an industrial cluster (in its entrepreneurs and linked institutions). The literature on IP 
and territory in Latin America has underestimated the analysis of local culture issues. This 
is perhaps due to the strong influence received in Latin America (notably, in Argentina) 
from approaches focused on the Italian industrial districts experience, which often do not 
make a clear distinction between local/regional 'identities' as a whole and the local/regional 
industrial set up. This factor perhaps does not represent a problem in the case of successftil 
industrial districts in Europe vAiere a harmonic relationship seems to exist between both 
spheres. However, in light of the Tigre case study this distinction may be of critical 
analytical importance. 
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In the following chapter I look at the processes of leaming, generating of knowledge, and 
development of innovative capacities in a sample of SMEs of the wooden furniture 
industrial cluster of Tigre and the region in order to evaluate the relevance of these 
theoretical propositions for firms' competitive performance. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Learning and Competotoveness 
6.1. Introduction 
Chapter 6 evaluates two propositions arising from the studies concemed vnih the ' ILK 
triad'. The first proposition stresses that innovation is an interactive process between 
different actors, rather than an act of Schumpeterian heroic individualism. The second 
proposition asserts that geographical proximity and industrial agglomeration enhances 
irmovation by favouring collective and interactive learning. 
Accordingly the chapter specifically looks at interfirm relationships, primarily between the 
wooden fiimiture firms of the case-study cluster. The primary reason for choosing the 
'interfirm relationships' level is that it is one of the most important levels of aggregation 
(apart from the 'intrafirm' and 'firm-institution' levels) through which learning and 
innovation are realised as collective processes (Morgan, 1997; Lundvall, 1992, 1994). 
Secondly, interfirm collaborations, as asserted by the flexible specialisation school and 
industrial districts approach (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Pyke et al, 1990), may result in 
division of labour and subsequent firm specialisation. Finally, networks of firms have been 
identified as a key dimension for design of local IPs's in developing countries aimed at 
SMEs (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996). 
The specific research questions tackled are the following: How do the fiimiture firms of 
Tigre's industrial cluster leam and develop their iimovative capacities? Do the firms engage 
in a collective dynamic of leaming and innovation as asserted by the theory? Do the 
geographical and cultural proximities observed in this cluster play a role in enhancing the 
collective and interactive leaming process, knowledge creation, and interfirm collaboration 
in production? 
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6.2. Development of innovative capacities and learning economy of firms 
6.2.1. General competitive environment 
The firms have had to survive under a turbulent and uncertain macroeconomic environment 
throughout the Argentinean economy's transition into a free market economy. Hence, 
without exception the SMEs analysed can first and foremost be characterised as surviving 
firms. As claimed by the entrepreneurs, to be "still alive " under such conditions indicates 
that, in principle, all these firms to a lesser or greater extent have developed a 'minimal 
threshold' of capabilities and competitive assets that have allowed them to remain, and in 
some cases, grow and succeed in the market place. It should be emphasised here that this 
research was carried out in the context of a 40% failure rate in the wood fiimiture industry'^ 
(FAIMA, 2000), during the more critical period of economic recession in 2001. As can be 
seen in Table 6.1, output in the wood furniture industry fell by 26% between 1996-1999''. 
Table 6.1. Wood Fumiture Total Output, 1996 to 1999 
Sales (biUions of US dollars) 
Percentage of variation 
(1996-1999) 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1,050 1,030 880 780 -26% 
Source FAIMA, 2000 
Losses for the period 2000-2001 were even more dramatic as the domestic market 
continued downsizing and as import competition intensified: the majority of entrepreneurs 
interviewed pointed out that sales dropped by an average of about 50% between July and 
October 2001, just before the economic collapse in November 2001. Therefore, the 
meaning of 'minimal threshold' of capabilities and competitive assets accumulated by the 
firms is a very important issue for this research. 
Wood fumiture industry represents 70% of the total fiimiture industry in Argentina. 
Official figures aggregated at a national level for firm failure are not available in Argentina since the last 
industrial census was carried out in 1993. However, some studies based on samples of firms conclude that 
more than 30% of SMEs would have disappeared between 1993 and 2002 (UIA-SME Observatory. 2001). 
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A second important contextual factor is the high level of heterogeneity regarding business 
strategies observed among the firms interviewed. In the past, heterogeneity in the ways in 
which firms used to process their business problems and, consequently, take decisions on 
courses of action and strategies, was rarely observed at an intra-sectoral level in Argentina 
(Fundes-UNGS, 1999; Kosacofif, 2000). Regardless of how the level of heterogeneity in the 
conduct of firms observed during the 1990s might be explained, the phenomenon imposes 
an important limit on generalisations made with respect to the firms. Consequently, while 
the first factor fiicilitates the search for regularities between the firms' competitive 
strategies, the second necessarily forces me to deal with the diversity among them. 
6.2.2. Incremental innovation and the passage towards a major innovative capacity^^ 
Much of the literature on innovation as a source of competitive renewal assumes that small 
firms innovate in a gradual form, through permanent incremental improvements and in a 
collective form through the firm's network of relations. Innovation and learning is said to 
be largely favoured by spatial proximity and local entrepreneurial cultures drawing on tacit 
and experiential knowledge rather than codified knowledge. 
The findings of the fieldwork reveal that the NIP assumptions only partially hold. The 
evidence shows that firms learn, innovate and compete in different ways, depending upon 
the type of SME, the market in which they operate, and the nature of the individual 
entrepreneur. Indeed, two groups of firms clearly differentiated in relation to the 
development of innovative capacities and sources of learning and knowledge have been 
identified. The first group of firms is characterised by its 'incremental capacity' for 
innovative improvements, and the second group by its 'higher innovate capacity'. 
I have preferred use the term 'innovative capacities' instead of 'innovation', to refer to incremental 
innovations that small firms gradually develop in the different areas that the microeconomy of firms 
comprise. It is important to emphasise that the evaluation is based on qualitative information. This indicator is 
taken fipm G. Yoguel's works (1996, 1998, 1995), wjio hai ieydpped a s^ ^ indicators to 
measure 'innovative capacities' in Argentina. The main variables considered in his studies are: the efforts in 
training carried out by ttie firms; quality in product and processes; customer tailored production; development 
of new products in their contribution in the total number of sales; percentage of engineers and other 
employees iiivolved ifi activitiesTof R&D; technological TOopCTation with othS '^conomic"agents; aM pos^  
sales services, among others. _ _ . - _„ 
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6.3. Firms with incremental innovative capacity 
This first group represents up to 80% of the firms interviewed (17 in total) and is made up 
of the smaller and younger firms on the panel. On average these firms employ less than 20 
employees, and were mostly established during the 1970s or 1980s when the local economy 
began its transition towards an open and intemationally exposed market economy. They are 
typically 'family' firms, in which the owner-manager oversees all aspects of the firm. In 
many cases these entrepreneurs lack formal education (only some of them have finished 
secondary school), which, as I show below, has effects on the development of the firm's 
innovative capacities. All the firms in this group are located in the cluster of the Partidos de 
Tigre and San Fernando. Although these firms do not display a proactive, sustained, and 
planned strategy in order to improve their innovative performance, they display a level of 
dynamism that has allowed them to remain and compete in a market place that has been 
extraordinarily unfavourable in recent years. This dynamism, which I have referred to as 
the 'minimal threshold' of capabilities and competitive assets, is based on two factors: the 
firm's strategy of product differentiation and the craft skills and expertise of the 
entrepreneurs. 
a. Product differentiation. The findings revealed that product differentiation has been the 
key strategy adopted by the small furniture firms in order to improve competitiveness over 
the last few years characterised by increasingly international exposure. Indeed, this strategy 
has mainly been triggered by the need to differentiate their portfolio of products from 
imports. Through permanent trial and error, the smaller entrepreneurs have sought new 
market niches in which import competition can be avoided or at least minimised. 
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the product differentiation strategy is directly 
sustained by a second strategy, namely, 'customised production of specially made 
furniture'. 
Through a product differentiation strategy these small firms have opened up new markets. 
In turn, product differentiation combined with tailored customer production necessarily 
entails a notion of demand-oriented competitiveness from the firms' side. As illustrated in 
Box 6.1, the core of this competitive strategy is the close coritact and interchange of ideas 
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concerning products between entrepreneurs and customers. This in some cases results in an 
emerging concept of 'specialisation' directed towards higher quality production. 
There exists a growing consensus between the entrepreneurs that both product 'quality' and 
'design' should become the core of their competitive strategies. They understand that it is 
practically impossible to compete with foreign firms via lower prices due to the scale and 
technical advantages of importers, mainly Brazilian firms. Product innovation in general is 
associated with the creation of new markets or with the quality improvements of existing 
products (Evangelista et al, 2002:178). Both factors are observed in this group of firms. 
Along with the product differentiation strategy the entrepreneurs mentioned 'cutting fixed 
and variable costs' as another key factor in their competitive performance. Within studies 
on innovation this factor is usually associated with process innovation, for instance, via 
introduction of new technologies to improve productive efficiency (ibid). In this case, 
however, cost cutting responds only to a 'belt-tightening' strategy of the firms rather than 
any improvement in production. 
Finally, the nature of the product differentiation strategy can also be characterised as 
'reactive' or 'defensive' as long as it has been triggered by the threat represented by import 
competition. These findings coincide with those found at European level by Todtling and 
Kaufinann (2001:206), to whom the SMEs, particularly in traditional industries, tend to 
develop 'reactive' innovation strategies, in w^ich specialisation on niches, the focus on 
quality advantage, redesign of traditional products, and cost cutting are predominant. 
b. Craft expertise. The fieldwork revealed that the leaming process and, therefore, the 
development of firms' innovative capacities, is largely based on practical-experiential 
knowledge and know-how, intuitiveness, manual abilities and accumulated expertise of the 
craftsman-entrepreneurs, particulariy in relation to products and process of production. The 
craft/artisan business approach is a highly valued competitive asset in the studies on 
industrial districts (see for instance Piore and Sabel, 1984). These approaches identify the 
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nature of innovation associated with this t j^e of intangible assets such as 'craft iimovation'. 
As the CITEMA-INTI™ manager pointed out in interview: 
"They are artisans, they are artisans. They are people who leamt by doing. Let's say, they 
trained themselves on a day-to-day practice, starting from a previous knowledge coining 
from the father or the grandfather. This is to say, there are firms that come from a second 
or third generation of artisans, and this fact is very interesting. Well, they have a high 
capacity in the timberwork and even in managerial and negotiation issues, but they are 
intuitive people, they are people who... well, peihaps this quality has a high value, hasn't 
it? Nobo(fy taught them to make all that they know how to make, they just leamt it". 
In addition, being an artisan is considered a strength by these entrepreneurs, through 
'business-artistic' management of their relationship with customers. As I show later in this 
section, 'customers' are key actors in the leaming process and knowledge creation of these 
firms. Mr Feldman, a small entrepreneur from Tigre, specialising in the manufacturing of 
kitchen fumiture, explains this competence in the following terms: 
"Given that we woric with specially made ftimiture I try to interpret what people want 
[... ] People ask you for a piece of fumiture model and you try to make them understand 
what they want. If you don't understand what people want is better that you don't get 
involved in this business. You have to be sure you understand what people want. If you 
understand, there is no problem. [...] Put it this way, I try to interpret the clients' 
dreams." 
The craft expertise of the entrepreneurs is directly linked with the capabilities on v^^iich the 
product differentiation strategy relies. The entrepreneurs firstly appeal to their 
'intuitiveness' to search for new fumiture models and fashions with the help of magazines 
and, in the minority of cases, visiting trade feirs and fumiture expositions. This basic 
marketing sfrategy, typically observed in small firms, has been termed 'intuitive marketing' 
(Brooksbank, Kirby and Wright, 1991). This in tum reveals the 'imitative' nature of 
product innovation in this group of firms. Once the search for new models has finished, the 
entrepreneurs utilise their craft skill 'to copy' and 'to adjust' these new ideas to the firm's 
technical capacities (mainly to its machinery and equipment), and then manufacture a new 
™ Centre of Technological Innovation To the Wood Industry (CITEMA) of the National Institute of Industrial 
Technology (INTI). This public institution of technological support to the timber industry is situated in the 
north part of the CBA, though not within the Partido de Tigre and the region. 
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product. It is important to point out that these entrepreneurs minimise the relative antiquity 
of their machinery (10 years old in average) by arguing that their own expertise and not the 
machinery is what matter in the manu&cturing process of a new product. Mr Ferreira (a 
local small furniture entrepreneur) claims: "/ am able to make any sort of thing with the 
machinery I've got". From an evolutionary perspective, these kinds of routines of learning 
can result in non-intentional knowledge creation. Maskell and Malmberg (1999) note that 
"learning from experience, by trial-and-error and by repetition represent incremental 
improvements vv^ich accumulate over time and gradually result in new and better ways of 
doing things". As seen in Chapter 5, the craft knowledge of these small entrepreneurs can 
be traced back to the work culture brought by the European immigrants (notably Germans, 
Italians, and Spaniards). The entrepreneurs have acquired this practical knowledge 
gradually living in the region and performing the activities of this industry (Maskell, 1998). 
Crucially, what remains to be answered is vdiether these strengths are sufficient for success 
in the context of today's competitive global economy. Product differentiation strategy 
(linked with product quality improvements) seems to go along with the key aspects pointed 
out by the theory of flexible specialisation. However, crafts skills and business strategies 
based on the intuitiveness of the entrepreneurs may be a weakness for the firms (as 
explained below) with respect to the imperatives of the learning economy and permanent 
adaptation. To retum to the CITEMA-INTI manager's insights, v^o, after having stressed 
the artisanship of the ftimiture entrepreneurs, remarked: 
"[ . . . ] However, when the fmn achieves a level of development from which it can think 
about ejq)ort, this [the condition of artisan] is not enough, this is not enough. Well, then a 
more professional training is already needed, isn't it? A different work organisation, 1 
don't know; tools and methodologies that until then the firm was not utilising. Right 
there, at that point, firms come here [in CITEMA-INTI offices] asking how can we help 
them." 
Therefore, what has been characterised as a strength can become a weakness, especially in 
the international market. The furniture firms trying to reach extemal markets soon find that 
they must satisfy a series of basic technical requirements and norms of quality certification, 
such as those required for the 'drying' and 'stabilisation' of wood, which cannot be met by 
the craft entrepreneurs themselves. They need professional support and technical training to 
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meet this type of more sophisticated requirement, and the business strategies based on 
intuition are often in contrast with both needs. Furthermore, because these entrepreneurs 
neither utiHse professional consulting (for instance, before they set up their business 
strategies) nor carry out their own market research to test their product and commercial 
strategies, the only way in which they can control their furniture designs and value added in 
product differentiation is through the ex-post test of a product in the market (see in Box 
6.1). These entrepreneurs cannot easily visualise the relation between training/technological 
updating programmes or consulting and ou^uts for the firm's performance, as these tools 
do not necessarily mean or imply sales in the short term. These findings coincide with those 
of Humphrey and Schmitz (1996) for whom 'cumulative' technological upgrading is 
critical in achieving continuous improvements in SME competitiveness in developing 
countries and, therefore, a key aspect in their agenda for a local IP. Many entrepreneurs 
within this group of firms recognise their weaknesses in understanding, managing, and 
controlling management; aspects such as cost control and financial tools, marketing, 
international trade, and information technologies, among others. Often craft entrepreneurs, 
in particular when they lack formal training or qualifications (as observed in this group of 
firms), are not outward looking and this may lead to a narrow strategic vision in relation to 
the necessity of updating and change (Smallbone et al, 2000). 
63.1. Collective learning and innovation? 
Contrary to the emphasis of the NIP literature on the collective nature of learning and 
innovation, the empirical evidence reveals that in Tigre learning is essentially 'firm-
centred', relying on the craft skills and expertise of the entrepreneurs themselves. Through 
informal and gradual processes of trial and error the entrepreneur learns and incorporates 
new knowledge into the firm by translating external inputs (i.e. information and new ideas) 
into new products (the entrepreneurs in this group rarely mentioned 'process' 
improvements as an aspect of their iimovative development). The development of new 
products is generally carried out through the utilisation of machinery and equipment 
already existing within the firm. Hence the iimovative capacity of these small firms refers 
to a process of permanent adaptation of the existing capabilities and the development of 
new competencies, which are idiosyncratic and firm-specific. Sometimes, the more 
qualified employees are seen as an important asset in the process of learning. Interestingly, 
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the intrafinn level of learning appears to be operating even at a level of (owner-intensive) 
small-size firms that, unlike larger firms, often do not have any internal fixnctional 
divisions. Some of these dimensions are illustrated in Box 6.1, a typical case example: 
Box 6.1. "Muebles Ferreira". 
Ferreira is a small furniture entrepreneur, whose firm is located within the cluster. 
Founded in 1988, this firm specialised in the manufacturing of lounge and 
bedroom furniture made from 'raw' pine. Currently the firm operates with five 
employees, along with Mr Ferreira and his wife, who also run their own furniture 
shop located in a nearby locality. 
Mr Ferreira's entrepreneurial background dates back to the early 1980s, whai he 
was employed in a large local firm specialising in pine fumiture manufacturing. 
In that firm Mr Ferreira learned how to produce pillows and cushions for wood 
fumiture. Indeed, when he decided to become independent, he started up his own 
business as a supplier of pillows and cushions for the local fumiture firms. As 
described by the entrepreneur, he found an opportunity to buy some second hand 
machinery for the manufacturing of fumiture on special offer. He bought the 
equipment despite his lack of fumiture manufacturing experience, relying on his 
knowledge of the pine fumiture business in general. Not long afterwards Mr 
Ferreira received an offer from an individual interested in working with him who 
was also skilled with the machinery. Mr Ferreira accepted this offer and thus they 
began to produce fumiture besides cushions. Mr Ferreira admits that at the 
beginning he lost a lot of money as a resuU of production mistakes and the low 
quality of the fumiture manufactured. However, they were gradually, without any 
external support or advice, improving the fumiture quality and acquiring manual 
skills and expertise. 
This firm's innovative changes occurred in 1999 as a result of the threat to the 
firm from the 'low-cost' import competition coming from Brazil (i.e. fumiture 
made from chipboard). Interestingly, Mr Ferreira, as well as many other fumiture 
entrepreneurs, shifted his strategy firstly towards the production of commodities, 
made as cheaply as possible, in order to compete with the imported fiimiture via 
price. This strategy failed, after a short period of time. This was the firm's tuming 
point, since they then took the decision to change once again and begin to 
differentiate their products from the imported competition, "by producing titings 
that nobody else was producing", as the entrepreneur points out. Furthermore, 
this change also entailed an improvement in the quality of the fumiture 
manufactured by the firm. 
The marketing strategy based on product, which the firm followed, is described 
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by Mr Ferreira as follows: "We first produce one piece of furniture, then we see 
how it goes [with the clients], and then we produce that piece of furniture 
depending upon how [sales] go". This strategy, characterised as a permanent trial 
and error of products, is also used for new models of furniture that Mr Ferreira 
along with his 'partner' find and copy from specialised journals and magazines. 
However, the firm's main source of new ideas and furniture models are from its 
commercial clients. In Mr Ferreira's words: 'Teople come here with ideas, 
drawings, you know? A furniture dealer once sent me a drawing of a piece of 
fumiture, he wanted a lounge bar like this (he shows me). Well, we made the 
lounge bar exactly how that person wanted it, and we left it here (in the workshop 
main entrance until that client returned). Well, the client took one week to come 
back for his lounge bar, and we sold it three times! [during that time] (laughing)". 
This lounge-bar, along with other similar models manufactured starting from the 
original model brought by that client, constitute the main products in the firm's 
current portfolio. 
As stated by Mr Ferreira, although the demand for tfiese high quality products is 
not as big as he would like, it is demand after all that keeps his business running, 
and he no longer competes directly with the firms from the cluster or with 
imported fumiture. 
• Trial & error 
strategy rather 
than use of 
modem marketing 
tools 
• Firm-centred 
innovative & 
leaning process 
As illustrated by Box 6.1 the innovation and learning processes are firm-centred. Other 
'rival' firms fi^om the cluster, professionals, and supporting institutions are not mentioned 
in relation to the firms' innovative strategies. Interestingly, as the evidence reveals, the 
'customers' of the firms were identified as the main source of innovative ideas and 
incentives to creativity. The customers, who can be commercial customers (i.e. fumiture 
dealers) or final consumers, are those that bring new models of fumiture or general ideas to 
the entrepreneurs, for instance drawn by hand or depicted in photos. In the words of Mr 
Feldman*", these drawings or general ideas reflect what the customers desire to have, and 
the entrepreneurs try to "interpret", through interactive practice with the cUent, that new 
idea or "dream " (as Mr Feldman metaphorically puts it). Hence the strategies of product 
differentiation and specially made fumiture principally rely on the direct contact and 
interaction between the entrepreneur and the customer. A key to understanding this face-to-
face and interactive practice is that the majority of the fumiture firms have their own shops 
where they sell directly to public. The nature of this learning process allows tiie 
' Mr Feldman is a small entrepreneur flx)m the Partido of Tigre, who manufactures fine kitchen tumiture. 
182 
entrepreneurs to adapt their capabilities (exploration), built on artisan know-how and 
expertises, to tiie client's desires and needs, and therefore to develop a demand-oriented 
business approach. Customer's demands and preferences, which Burton-Jones terms 
'customer capital', constitute (besides the firm workforce -human capital- and the systems, 
products, processes, and capabilities -structural capital-) a firm's knowledge capital 
(1999:6). 
In turn, customers, in accordance with neo-Shumpeterian and economic-geography 
approaches (Lundvall, 1992; Johnson and Limdvall, 1994; Maskell et al, 1998; Morgan, 
1997), are one important source of (interactive) learning for the firms. The feet that a 
commercial outlet chooses a given firm among the many located in the cluster, indicates at 
least a critical threshold of knowledge and 'trust' between firm and customer that make the 
linkage possible. Trust, a key concept in inter-firm relation studies since the first researches 
on Italian industrial districts, "enables a network of firms to adapt flexibly to unforeseen 
circumstances and to engage in continuous improvement and innovation, or what has 
become known fashionably as 'learning'" (Sako, 1998:23) (emphasis in original). Thus, 
apart fi"om the market relation involved in a firm-customer relationship, the 'personal 
network' of the entrepreneurs (along with the entrepreneur's skills and expertise) would 
seem to be the basis for the leaming process and the creation of knowledge. The personal 
network refers to the (social and business) primary network of entrepreneur's relations (i.e. 
friends, femily, colleagues, the first and/or closest customers and supphers) that become a 
key supporting structure or 'sponsors' for smaller and (relatively) newer firms (Johaimisson 
and Nilsson, 1989; Johannisson and Nowicki, 1992). 
However, the firm-customer relationships found in this group of firms are not necessarily 
those emphasised by the NIP theory. Firstly, it is a 'bilateral' relationship between an 
entrepreneur and a customer (or user-producer relationship) rather than a 'collective' 
relationship, where there is a multiplicity or network of actors participating. Though 
constructive relationships with a customer are an important strength for a firm with respect 
to its leaming process, they can also result in a situation of sectoral 'dependency' with 
respect to the need for variety and scope in a firm's innovation process (Todtling and 
BCaufinann, 2001). Finally, the fieldwork reveals that although there is an informal and tacit 
transfer and interchange of ideas between firm and customer, this interchange mainly 
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occurs through market relations. I did not find any evidence of formal networking practices 
between these firms and their customers. Market relations are in effect one of the fectors 
that determine the nature of innovation in small fu-ms, and "the more dependant a firm is on 
certain actors in the value chain -primarily customers- the more incremental is the 
character of its innovation activity" (Todtling and Kaufinann, 2001:206). However, the 
question for an IP framework should concern how firm-customer leaming (vv^ich comes 
close to mainstream leaming) can lead to more formal and ftirther-reaching pattems of 
leaming when the relationship-base is a market link. 
As regards interfirm links, there are three factors that characterise the nature of 
'relationships' on this level in the Tigre's furniture cluster: there seems to exist an emerging 
need to 'open up' the firms towards other firms, despite the feet that the entrepreneurs do 
not associate interfirm relations with their firms' leaming process; geographical proximity 
has had a marginal positive effect on building up business interfirm relationships; and 
building up linkages and the development of networking activities among firms is largely 
prevented by an 'individualist' business culture embedded in the Argentinean industrial 
philosophy. Stmctural conditions linked to the chronic macroeconomic instability helps 
explain this business culture as well as current restrictions on interfirm relationships in spite 
of the firm's emerging need to 'open up'. These factors are analysed through the following 
three subsections in order to grasp the exact meaning and relevance that interfirm links and 
relationships have for the competitive performance of firms, measured against the 
expectations of tfie NIP literature. 
63.2. Emerging need to 'open up' the firms 
The fact that many of these small entrepreneurs do not manifestly mention other firms in 
relation to their leaming process, or do not conceive of how other (rival) firms within and 
outside the cluster could favour this process, without doubt represents a substantial 
restriction for any IP programme seeking to encourage interfirm relations. However, the 
evidence also reveals signs of an increasing need for complementary assets between firms. 
In other words, there seems to exist an emerging need to 'open up' the firms toward other 
firms through supply chain linkages. Three different 'opening up' practices were observed 
within the cluster; complementing the portfolio of final related products (finished 
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fiimiture); acquisition of intermediate goods (pre-fmished fiimiture); and subcontracting of 
services to third persons. 
As regards complementing the portfolio of related products, this type of commercial link 
constitutes a new, and perhaps the more utilised business strategy used by this group of 
firms (20% of the firms) in relation to rival firms. According to the entrepreneurs, the main 
rationale behind this need for complementary 'finished products' is to be able to offer a 
more integrated supply of fiimishing products to the customers. 
As regards acquisition of intermediate goods (pre-fmished furniture parts) manufactured by 
third firms, this constitutes a new business strategy within the cluster (though it is used by 
only some firms -10% of the cases-). San Pedro (the biggest firm in the cluster) and 
Gastaldin (a small firm) stated that they have recently begun to incorporate pre-finished 
furniture in their process of production such as fumiture's base-structure (boards), on vy^ich 
the final good is made. Large timber supphers from the country's northern forest regions 
provide these intermediate goods through market transactions. There is no evidence of 
more formal subcontracting activity in these transactions. In this regard, San Pedro 
recognised that incorporating this kind of intermediate good into the production process has 
made a considerable impact on the firm's performance. It has allowed the firm to gain 
productive efficiency and a significant level of flexibility through the substitution of entire 
lines of production that were formerly part of the firm's production process. Additional 
details on the effect that these pre-finished structures have on the final goods' composition 
were not provided, however, the entrepreneurs note that this new business practice will 
most likely spread in the near fiiture to the other furniture firms of the cluster. 
In the past the SMEs were highly integrated vertically, thus this type of business relation 
with other firms (in this case large firms) was rare. Therefore, the opportunity cost that 
prompts entrepreneurs 'to buy' from a third firm constitutes an important change in the 
industrial philosophy of entrepreneurs. In keeping with new arguments on vertical 
disintegration this qualitative change leads to an initial process of learning and unlearning 
with respect to the routines and path dependences of the firms. In particular, it leads to a 
novel decision-making process for the firms in relation to what 'to buy' from a third firm 
and what 'to make' internally. Though it is an old question in the theory of the firm (Coase, 
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1937; Williamson, 1985) it seems to be a new one for this group of entrepreneurs. In 
addition, buying instead of making some components necessarily entails the gradual 
'passage' towards a minimal level of productive specialisation within the firms. 
However, the emerging trend towards lower levels of vertical integration and higher 
specialisation, has so far not lead to more systematic linkages with suppliers of the type of 
intermediate or final goods mentioned earlier. The range of intermediate possibilities 
between 'make' or 'buy', such as 'cooperation', is non-existent within the wood fumiture 
cluster. This is tme even in the case of some firms such as "La Portena", which have 
developed long-mn (strictly) 'commercial' relationships with other firms from the cluster. 
As regards subcontracting, the firm "Lopez Hs" represents a shghtly different experience to 
the business commercial practices in relation to those previously discussed. "Lopez Hs" is 
one of the bigger firms within this group (16 employees in total). It began to subcontract 
services in 1997 as a result of a decline in sales and the consequent decision to start selling 
directly to the public through a new commercial shop opened by the firm for that purpose. 
The subcontracted services are linked to the 'secondary' production needs of the firm, such 
as fumiture 'upholstery' {tapiceria) and 'lathe products' {tomeado), and are carried out by 
individuals. A specificity observed in this case is that these services often are carried out 
within the firm, using the firm's installations and machineries. Mr Lopez remarked that 
these services are sourced fi-om former employees, those who are both from the region and 
have been working with this entrepreneur (whether subcontracted or employed) for about 
nine years. Hence each subcontractor, who individually mns his/her own micro-firm, has 
already developed firm-specific skills. 
Though this entrepreneur indicates that subcontracting is a secondary activity within the 
firm's production process, what is occurring in this case is a search for productive 
efficiency through a minimal notion of vertical disintegration. Interestingly, though "Lopez 
Hs" has developed a long-run relationship with its subcontractors, the entrepreneur 
maintains the direct 'control' on his contracts with third parties since they are carried out 
within the firm. As evolutionary approaches inform us, this reveals that even in those cases 
where there is a rising need to 'open up' the firm towards third parts, to change the firm's 
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routines in production and the entrepreneur's mentality is a very complex process for the 
entrepreneurs. 
63.3. Does geographical proximity matter in learning? 
The wood ftimiture cluster or the local milieux are not mentioned by the entrepreneurs as 
encouraging or 'playing' a role in their innovation process. This is especially surprising 
since these firms are geographically and culturally close to other firms. In reality, the 
customers, the firms' key asset in innovation issues, are not generally fi"om the region. They 
are located in areas closer to Buenos Aires City centre or other more distant cities and 
provinces of the country. Geographical proximity does not seem then to be a fector in the 
firms' leaming process. However, the geography of learning of this group of firms needs to 
be understood in a double sense. Though the firms' main sources of new information and 
innovative ideas are not local, their leaming process basically operates 'locally', once 
customers come to the workshops personally. As the evidence shows, these entrepreneurs 
in general 'travel' neither virtually nor physically searching for new sources of innovative 
ideas. Lack of information, financial resources, time, and technical training are factors that 
help to explain why these small firms 'learn' and 'innovate' at shorter distances. As I will 
show in subsection 6.4, both ways of travelling are key tools in explaining the innovative 
performance of the second group of firms. Therefore, two IP options include, firstly, to 
bring a larger variety of extemal sources of leaming to the firms and, secondly, to help 
entrepreneurs to (virtually and physically) 'disengage' themselves fi-om 'workshop-
bindings', both having important implications on IP. 
There is, however, one positive, although minor, localised source of soft leaming. This is 
related to 'tracking rivals'. Three small entrepreneurs from San Fernando, whose firms are 
located in the area of major concentration of wood fixmiture firms, hint that they learn 'by 
looking' at and mainly 'by hearing' what the leading firms from the cluster do, what they 
do not do, or what the others give up doing. In other words, the leading firms, or those first 
movers in terms of their business strategies, act as role models for the smaller firms within 
the cluster, either in a positive sense, by showing what should be done, or in a negative 
sense, by showing what should not be done. Messrs Gastaldin, Ferreira, and Reynoso use 
the case of "San Pedro" as an example to argue against producing 'standardised' fiimiture 
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and 'acquiring new technology' as profitable competitive strategies. The problems that 
"San Pedro" (see in Box 6.2) was experiencing were presented as tangible proof of the risk 
in producing standardised goods and acquiring new technology in the current context. What 
is more, these entrepreneurs utilised similar 'verbal expressions' as those utilised by Mr 
San Pedro himself (the firm's owner/manager) to explain his firm troubles when he was 
interviewed. 
Box 6.2. "San Pedro": 
San Pedro is one of the two biggest wood furniture firms from San Fernando. The firm's current 
strategy is to produce standardised fiamiture of relatively low quality and price to meet the bulk of 
the demand in the (shrunk) domestic market. In order to augment the firm's scale of production, 
San Pedro incorporated high technology in its production process, such as modem 'centres of 
work' assisted by computer, during the late 1990s. As a result, the firm enormously improved its 
productive efficiency. 
However, the San Pedro's gains in productivity were not enough to compete with prices of 
imported fiimiture. Though the firm is not deeply in debt due to its investments in new technology, 
they currently (2000-2001) have serious economic and financial troubles since the furniture market 
diminished. As a result, they not only reduced their workforce by up to 60% but also sold off some 
of the high-tech machinery purchased just a few years previous. 
Knowing exactly what rivals are doing (i.e. in product strategy), and how they are doing it 
(i.e. what technologies they are utilising) is one of the key advantages of geographical 
proximity. Tracking the competition is not necessarily an inter-firm relation in the sense 
stressed by the NIP theory; it is concemed with both social relations between actors 
socialising in the cluster with local entrepreneurs, and the daily circulation of information 
(which may takes the form of 'gossip') derived from these social relations. This kind of 
activity can be called 'cluster noise'. This noise arises out of the effect of 'individual' 
performance on other entrepreneurs within a cluster. Schmitz (1999:1644) remarks that 
"[pjerformance within clusters varies and the excellence of one firm tends to have 
incidental positive effects on others [... ] Proximity ensures that such external effects do not 
"evaporate"" (emphasis in original). These findings agree with those found by Lorenzen 
and Foss (2002:10) for whom '[p]roximity promotes face-to-face interactions along with 
monitoring and gossip, Md hraice shared experiences and point of reference", and wiA 
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those found by Breschi and Malerba (2001:827), for whom "co-located firms... tend to 
experiment with a variety of approaches and solutions to similar problems, spurred in this 
activity by the incentives and the opportunities provided by the possibility of constantly 
monitoring, comparing, selecting, and imitating the solutions chosen 'next door'" (both 
quoted by Amin and Cohendet, 2002:148-149). Interestingly, the actors who generate these 
noises are not only actors belonging to the cluster (i.e. entrepreneurs and neighbours) but 
also those visiting the cluster (i.e. customers, suppliers, general public). The latter in fact 
guarantees a minimal level of flux of information external to the cluster. 
The tacit transfer of information (i.e. prices) and knowledge (i.e. production strategies) 
between firms draws on neighbourhood links between the entrepreneurs located in the 
cluster. An example will illustrate this point. Three small furniture producers interviewed 
(Ferreira, Gastaldin, and Reynoso), along with other local entrepreneurs and some suppliers 
(notably, suppliers of glue for wood, sandpaper, and metallic hinges, among others) meet 
for lunch once a week where they seize the opportunity to talk about the problems and 
worries of their businesses. It is in these informal spaces of socialisation where primary 
ideas and discussions with respect to possible associative actions between the entrepreneurs 
have arisen in the last years. Gastaldin and Ferreira indeed indicate that on occasion, they 
have used these meetings to propose to other entrepreneurs the establishment of what they 
call a 'commercial cooperative' (a fijmiture outlet) to sell directly to the public, whether in 
the Tigre's Fruit Market or in the Buenos Aires City centre. 
Observations of this nature did not appear from the entrepreneurs whose firms are more 
geographically isolated and therefore less exposed to these informal instances of learning. 
Such transferred information and knowledge is vital for these small entrepreneurs who in 
general, as previously seen, do not have access to professional advice and do not participate 
in trade fairs or visit leading firms overseas. Nor do Ihey participate in meetings of 
entrepreneurs organised by local and non-local business associations or other 
institutionalised forms of meetings in which problems and problem-solving strategies 
related to the furniture industry are discussed. Furthermore, this occurs without any cost to 
the firms, but depends on extemalities of proximity, making it easier for small firms to 
appropriate new information by giving 'tangible' examples (local firms that act as 
'localised' role models) on how new technologies and systems may (or may not) be used 
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under specific circumstances. The level of'tangible-ness' of, for instance, a best practice in 
fumiture production becomes a key issue for craft-entrepreneurs for most of whom 
feasibility is based on 'seeing is believing' regarding such a best practice. 
Finally, although all these practices do not represent a formal process of leaming in a strict 
sense, it does generate spill-over business information and practical knowledge that helps 
frnns to reduce their level of 'uncertainty' about what to do concerning their technological, 
product, and commercial strategies. As previously seen, reducing 'uncertainties' is a core 
element in explaining increasing collective advantages of agglomeration (favoured by 
geographical proximity) to the approaches of local milieux (Camagni, 1991) and untraded 
interdependencies (Storper, 1995; 1997). 
However, these minimal advantages of 'being there' must be evaluated against what being 
there means in ideal types of cluster relationships 'canonised' in particular by the Italian 
industrial districts literature. One example clearly illustrates the distance from the latter. 
Although in the cluster "all the pine fumiture entrepreneurs know each other in one way or 
another, they say hello to each other and they ask each other how they are, at the end of the 
day nobody cares too much about the fate of the others. That's the tmth" (Ferreira). More 
precisely, in answer to a question about w^iat entrepreneurs do in the case where they need 
to solve a technical problem in their firms, Ferreira recognises that effectively there exists 
an interchange of technical know-how between the local entrepreneurs when they ask other 
entrepreneurs for advice 'who are friends at the same time'. He ironically complains, 
nevertheless, that "to any other entrepreneur that you ask i f you have got a problem they 
will probably give you the advice you are asking for, but to cock things up!" Though this 
comment may be a sharp exaggeration, it probably reveals part of the tmth about the nature 
of personal relationships among entrepreneurs within this cluster. In this sense Maskell 
rightiy informs us "one can find extensive differences in the relations between firms within 
an existing local or regional milieu, ranging from rapprochement to detachment and 
indifference or uncompromising rivalry" (1998:110). Therefore, geographical proximity 
and agglomeration guarantee neither interaction nor collaboration between firms. 
'Being there' does not extend even to the interchange of information and technical know-
how. As the entrepreneurs note, there exists a sort of industrial 'jealousy' and above all 
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'distmst' among local entrepreneurs. This would seem to concur v«th Maskell (1998) that, 
"small firms often envisage the producer down the street as their main competitor" 
(ibid: 110). Paradoxically, the problem seems to be fiielled by the feet that the entrepreneurs 
know each other personally within the cluster. One of the reasons that explains the 
industrial 'jealousy' and 'distrust' between local entrepreneurs is that a part of the 
'circulation of information', and noise-generating, within the cluster (i.e. relating to prices, 
discounts, and payment conditions) is informally carried out through fiimiture dealers who 
visit the different workshops seeking to purchase products, bargaining for better discounts 
and payment conditions. These dealers often cite prices in other firms to put pressure on an 
entrepreneur. Obtaining major discounts from the entrepreneurs under circumstances in 
which every body knows each other often generates fiiction, resentment, and distmst 
between them. Consequently, the business environment and the fector of local identity 
observed within this fiimiture cluster does not necessarily lend itself to the development of 
'untraded interdependencies' and 'tmstfiil relations' among the local firms needed for 
localised leaming to take place. 
This helps to explain why none of the firms studied have participated in more collective 
variants of interfirm collaboration, such as buying or selling groups, vAiich appear to have 
become more popular in recent years in Argentina. Such collaborative or cooperative 
practices would allow them to negotiate collectively both down-stream in the firms' value 
chain, with the main suppliers of raw materials (i.e. timber dealers) and up-stream, with the 
main clients (notably, the hypermarkets and home centres)*^ and therefore to developing 
traded interdependencies among local firms. Therefore, a second level of difficulties exists 
within the cluster working against collective interfirm agreements. Though entrepreneurs 
are aware that the cost and the risk involved in setting up a collective agreement are lower 
i f the investment is realised collectively, they also admit that it is extremely difficult to get 
the entrepreneurs together and, then, to get them to commit to a joint business venture 
(Ferreira and Gastaldin). 
'^ It is important to remember that the monopsonist business practices from big suppliers along with the 
'dramatic' concentration of the demand in stTpermarkets arid chains of disfribution have been ideiitified as two 
of the most important exogenous restrictions on the SME's competitiveness by EundesrUNGS report (1999). 
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6.3.4. Local business culture and interflrm relationships 
The prime obstacle, then, to networking practices among firms is an 'individualist' business 
culture, which is pervasive in the Argentinean industrial philosophy. Characterised as 
'individualist' and/or 'selfish' by the entrepreneurs, this idiosyncratic factor of the 
Argentinean business culture (as a whole) can be singled out as one of the main restrictions 
to building up interfirm relationships. In different ways local entrepreneurs often made 
reference to this problem. A small entrepreneur from Tigre, referring to the local fiimiture 
entrepreneurs, claimed: "The fumiture industry, the timber guild, is very problematic, 
because everyone looks after his/her self-interest. It is not even possible to set up a joint 
outlet together here in Tigre" (Aldo). In a more general sense, CIM-San Femando's 
manager, also a timber entrepreneur, notes: "we, Argentineans, do not have a culture or an 
education for cooperation". In addition, Mr Poma (a wood supplier from San Femando) 
reflects metaphorically on this point very well, by pointing out: "the football teams are the 
only thing that work as a team in Argentina". The practical consequences of this 
individualist business culture are very clear for the entrepreneurs: "The industrialists are 
very selfish, and one has to get by on one's own. That is the reality" (Feldman). 
The individualist business culture draws on three different strands. The first stems from the 
classic problem of homo economicus; the second from the subtler problem of the 
entrepreneurial background of local entrepreneurs (which in Argentina can be generalised 
to all the SMEs); the third from the stmctural constiaints of the Argentinean economy. 
These three factors work together and in different senses they challenge the NIP literature 
concemed with collective leaming and interfirm collaboration. In order to develop these 
points I will use information from the entrepreneurs from the second group of firms 
(characterised as that of 'higher innovative capacity'). 
The first problem is illustrated in the following example. Mr Biagetti (a entrepreneur from 
the second group of firms), who permanently subcontracts to third frnns, succinctly 
summarises the homo economicus problem as follows: 
"the majority of the entrepreneurs have the idea that to subcontract is, frankly speaking, 
like feeding the other". The consequence is an ethos of "why am I going to send the 
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work outside [to other firm] if perhaps I can make it [internally] by putting one more 
person to work! So, I do not give the work to any other firm, I make it myself^  and so I 
earn the money myself. 
As seen already, this business rationale has dominated the Argentinean industrial 
philosophy for many years, leading to entrepreneurs making instead of buying or 
subcontracting almost without consideration for any business strategy based on the search 
for collective efficiency. The highly protected domestic market and the lack of suppliers of 
some intermediate goods have favoured these types of practices (Katz and Kosacofif, 1989; 
Kosacoff, 2000). 
The second problem refers to the entrepreneurial background of the entrepreneurs. The 
individualistic business culture is also associated with the high value that entrepreneurs 
assign to decision-making power issues over all the aspects related to their firms. IDEB-
Tigre's manager for example notes that for the entrepreneurs: 
"... the passage from being absolutely independent, or from managing themselves with a 
certain level of independence, to having to search for consensus over certain issues 
related to your own firm, with people with whom they never had any sort of previous 
relationship is not easy at all for an entrepreneur. Which is so even when a associative 
activity among firms is being set up only in order to carry out common buying". 
Indeed, the sample of entrepreneurs largely consists of former employees of larger firms 
that in the course of their career decided to undertake their own entrepreneurial process by 
setting up a new firm. As stressed by entrepreneurship studies (i.e. Johannisson and 
Nowicki, 1992; Larson and Starr, 1993), one trigger for new entrepreneurs to set up a firm 
is the desire for personal 'independence' and 'self-determination'. It follows that both 
needs (independence and self-determination) are realised and materialised in the new 
entrepreneurial venture, hence the high value assigned to them by the new entrepreneurs. 
Therefore, I argue that the personal 'independence' and 'self-determination' power 
achieved by these ex-employees (once they become entrepreneurs) becomes threatened 
when feced with more formal practices of interfirm collaboration (i.e. a subcontracting 
policy between two firms). In practical terms it means that an entrepreneur necessarily must 
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share and negotiate hoih 'the power of decision-making' and 'the decisions' themselves on 
issues that were always decided, managed and controlled by the individual. 
Individualist business culture, along with the entrepreneurial background and the lack of 
other role models (there is little accumulated experience of interfirm relationships among 
manufacturing firms) leads to an important practical restriction. Entrepreneurs, regardless 
of their experience in this type of business practice, imagine large problems of 
'coordination', mostly referring to the management, control, and legal and regulatory 
aspects involved. For example, Mr Lopez, in response to a question about the possibility of 
interchanging and/or sharing machinery and equipment with other furniture firms*^ 
declares: 
"[T]hat idea is foolish, because people here [in Argentina] are not prepared to do it, that 
is the truth. Imagine that today one employee breaks a machine, ...poor guy! The firm's 
owner who borrowed that machine must pay to the machine's owner for the mistake that 
one of his/her employees has done. Then... it does not work for me, it is too risky". He 
concludes: "on my side, it does not interest me, neither do I think people are trained for 
that, nor do I think it gives good results in this business. Why? Because we need 
employees to operate the machines, so if I assume that the machines are going to be used 
for three or more firms, say, firms that bought the machines, how can you regulate the 
use of the machines and the amount of time they are used; how can you organise your 
work in that way; how can you control which wood is from one firm and which from the 
other one. In one word, that would be a big mess!" 
For entrepreneurs like Mr. Lopez, who in reality recognise the advantages of specialisation 
and interfirm collaboration and who admire the success of the Italian furniture industry, the 
best solution would be to have a machine that is readily available. Having to share a 
machine with other firms may be the less expensive option, but this compromises 
independence of control and access. 
The third problem refers to structural constraints associated with the chronic 
macroeconomic and institutional instability, which have posed an important restriction to 
building interfirm relationships. The case posed by a pilot experience of association 
^ This question responds to the fact that although some firms in the cluster have acquired modem machinery 
and equipment over the last decade they currently o_nly use ttiat technology a few.days.a.month. 
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between SMEs from the Partido of Tigre illustrates this point very well. Promoted by 
IDEB-Tigre, four 'peer' local firms created a joint venture during 2001 aimed at combining 
efforts for exporting cosmetics. Two of these firms manufacture containers made from 
plastic and the other two cosmetic products. The IDEB-Tigre's manager, who has been 
involved since the initial stages of this experience, explains the problem linked to stmctural 
constraints in the following terms: 
"This group of entrepreneurs was very well stmctured, they knew where they wanted to 
go [with the associative project] and they knew how to access that. But, because of both 
internal problems that the entrepreneurs were having internally in their firms [as a result 
of the economic crisis] and the limited results that we (IDEB) were in the short term able 
to show them with this project, was discouraging the entrepreneurs' participation". 
Intemally "these firms began to have many troubles, such as the temporary suspension of 
employees and falling into bank debts, etc. So, specific and serious problems arose with 
these firms that we did not consider when we estaWished the joint venture of these 
characteristics, which thus affected the group itself [...] Why? Because, to form an 
associative group I have to personally unite, and then I am responsible for what we 
establish in the group. What does 'personally united' and 'responsible for' mean for what 
the group estabUshes? If I am with you, i f I join you in order to, say, set up a buying 
group to subcontract a specific product, what happens with the association if tomorrow 
you fiilfil your part of the agreements and I cannot fiilfil my part because intemally I 
have fmancial troubles; labour problems; and a lot of other problems; under 
circumstances that 1 must be united and responsible [with the group]. As a consequence, 
these entrepreneurs [under the current context] do not want to assume certain agreements 
[e.g. mutual reciprocity and accountabihty] that even they themselves do not know if 
they are possible to be fiilfilled." 
Macroeconomic and institutional instability are acting as an important obstacle to building 
and developing business linkages and collaboration among firms, even in those firms that 
have been proven to have a clear intention of searching for collective efficiency through 
'opening up' towards other firms. Interfirm collaboration requires a minimal planning 
horizon and hence stability in the economic activity becomes a key issue. In a context of 
volatile markets and institutional instability (relating to the system of contracts as a wiiole) 
planning horizons are shortened, which affects the firms' decision-making process 
concerning any strategic decision, at short-term (i.e. fiilfiUing subcontracting contracts in 
due course and form) or at a long-term (i.e. establishing joint ventures with other firms and 
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attached investments), as in the case described above. I will return to these issues in the 
concluding chapter of the thesis. 
63.5. Conclusions 
In light of the findings, does the furniture cluster of the Partido de Tigre and the region look 
like those clusters often highlighted by the NIP literature? In many respects it differs from 
those stylised NIP models that have influenced the academic and policy discussion in 
developed countries (Pyke et al, 1992; Storper, 1993). Although evidence of incidental 
Marshallian external economies, factors of cultural identity and institutional presence have 
been found (see in Chapter 5), at present these factors only partially underpin the learning 
process and innovative performance of the firms within the cluster. As seen, learning and 
innovation is incremental, imitative and is mainly based on intuitiveness, craft skills and 
expertise (which is reflected in the firms' strategy of product differentiation). Above all it is 
firm-centred, though the primary network of relationships of the entrepreneurs (notably, 
some key customers) are key pieces of an interactive learning through which the 
entrepreneurs 'innovate' in product. This learning is nevertheless bilateral rather than 
collective and is mostly based on market transactions. 
All these fectors explain a certain level of dynamism of this group of firms. However, I 
have not found any evidence of business interfirm relationships and division of labour 
between local firms that allow positive conclusions related to the interactive and collective 
character of localised learning processes. Local institutions were not mentioned as 
interfeces or facilitators in the firms' learning process. Furthermore, untraded 
interdependencies between local firms are only restricted to selective friendship- or 
neighbourhood-based relationships between entrepreneurs, but they do not constitute a 
cluster-wide observable asset. Consequently, geographical proximity is not seen to 
encourage competitiveness. The unclear vision of its advantages, the lack of trust (existing 
between local firms) and the marked individualist spirit of the entrepreneurs were singled 
out as the main constraints to interfirm networking and collaboration. These findings are 
analogous to those found by inter-cluster comparative studies carried out in Latin America 
(LA). Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999), conclude for example that industrial clusters in 
LA, apart from being 'very heterogerieous' and 'quite different' from those complex and 
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innovative clusters described by studies on Italian industrial districts, have three main 
deficiencies in common: heterogeneity of development levels and lack of competitive 
SMEs, lack of innovative capabilities and low degree of specialisation and interfirm 
cooperation (ibid: 1708). 
This characterisation is true for Tigre as well despite the emerging process of specialisation 
and 'opening up' of the firms within the cluster towards other firms (in and outside of the 
cluster's boundaries). This characterisation is also the case despite the informal 
mechanisms of learning (i.e. by looking and by hearing) based on the noise generated in the 
cluster by the permanent casual contacts between entrepreneurs -and between them and 
different stakeholders - (notably customers and suppliers), which have been identified. As 
shown, the 'cluster noise' allows the entrepreneurs to track the competition's strategies 
'close up', in issues such as products, prices, technologies, marketing and organisation of 
production, and as a result they are able to 'costlessly' reduce the high level of uncertainty 
under which their firms operate. This free circulation of information derived from the 
extemalities of geographical and relational proximity may become a competitive asset for 
the firms as long as it is transformed into new knowledge. 
6.4. Firms of higher innovative capacity 
This small group of firms represents under 20% of the total sample of firms interviewed, 
and less than 10% of the total number of firms considered in this study. On average tiiese 
were the biggest, oldest, and more successfial firms on the panel. They employ more than 
20 employees each and were established under the ISI model. Two firms are external to the 
cluster. The remaining firm is situated within the cluster but not in the most densely 
populated area of fiimiture firms. Despite being a small group of firms (3 in total), they 
show a level of dynamism that offers interesting comparison to the NIP literature for three 
reasons. Firstly, the learning process and higher innovative capacity of these firms relies on 
interfirm relationships. Secondly, the organisation of their production process displays 
critical levels of flexibility, specialisation and, in one case, strategies of vertical 
disintegration. Thirdly, although these characteristics are the exception in the SMEs in low-
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tech sectors of production in Argentina, they constitute tiie 'best practices' within such 
sectors and therefore they could signal important implications for a more relevant IP 
framework. 
The fieldwork revealed that this group of firms learn and innovate through more interactive 
practices in relation to the search, exploration and generation of new knowledge. Though 
the entrepreneur remains important for these firms, the process of learning firstly centres on 
relationships with external sources of new information, knowledge, and know-how, notably 
'foreign firms' (in contrast to the NIP literature that stresses local learning). 
Biagetti, Occhipinti, and Solano, the entrepreneurs leading these three firms, all stressed the 
importance of linkages with foreign firms for their learning processes and development of 
innovative capacities. This has taken two forms. The first is based on visits that the 
entrepreneurs make to leading furniture firms from leading countries in the fiimiture 
industry (i.e. Germany, Italy, Spain, and the US) and/or to intemational trade fairs of 
fiimiture and related machinery and equipment. As indicated by the entrepreneurs, through 
visits to foreign leading firms they see, ask, learn, and absorb practical knowledge from 
firms that often work with state of the art technologies and methods of production 
organisation. Foreign firms act as 'role models' transferring best practices in practice for 
the local firms. Expressions like "/ have seen it myself in Italy!" (Mr Biagetti in reference 
to a case of division of labour and subcontracting strategy that he saw personally in a large 
Italian fiimiture firm) typifies the impact of this type of experiential learning. In addition, 
this modality of learning, w^ich requires 'physical' proximity, provides 'empirical proof 
of the validity and effectiveness of novel innovation strategies (i.e. vertical disintegration of 
production through outsourcing and subcontracting), that otherwise would remain only at 
an abstract level for the entrepreneurs. As shown in Box 6.3, this experiential process of 
learning has positive effects on the firm's conduct by encouraging the explorative and 
iimovative vocation of the entrepreneurs. 
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Box 6.3. "Biagetti Hns" 
Biagetti is a dynamic SME, located in the west part of Buenos Aires City, 
dedicated to the manufacturing of 'complete installations' of fumiture for 
offices. It competes in a market of high product quality, by producing specially 
made fumiture through a system of contracting 'by projects'. 
A highly flexible system of production based on both a disintegrated 
productive structure and an active policy of subcontracting is the firm's core 
competence. Through this system they achieve coverage of a wide variety of 
markets within fumiture and furnishing industries, operating as if it were a 
proper building firm. They keep the core competencies of the business 'in-
house' such as the design and coordination of the projects; quality controls 
and; as the entrepreneur stresses, the general 'score' (the style, the form and 
timings) of the works carried out Technical professionals (i.e. architects) work 
in the areas of project design. The firm subcontracts entire lines of production, 
depending upon the projects being executed, through two main groups of 
subcontractors: working teams specialised in installations and a team of 
professionals. The former (five teams made up of three or four people) work at 
the location where the projects are being carried out and the latter (basically 
three architects) work within the firm on the design of products and projects 
(i.e. integral recycling of offices). 
The firm formally employs only fifteen people (the smallest in this group), 
though often they operate with over twice that number (with the subcontracted 
personnel) depending upon the projects in progress. 
Biagetti's system of production represents a typical case of a 'network-firm', 
in which traditional categories utilised to characterise firms (i.e. boundaries, 
level of specialisation, etc.), are often inappropriate. It produces a wide number 
of different fumiture products, which are incorporated into each integrated 
project that the firm sells, but they work on the basis of a disintegrated 
productive structure. Furthermore, the firm has achieved an important level of 
specialisation in the conception and control of its projects but not in their 
execution, which is generally subcontracted. The subcontracted working teams 
that carry out the projects however, are specialised in what tiiey do. 
Mr Biagetti's oldest son (the firm's current manager) stresses that through tfiis 
system of production they have developed a capacity of rapid response with 
high quality products to segmented demands and at short notice. All factors 
that become the firm's key competitive advantages with respect to the 
competition of larger local and foreign firms. 
Relevant factors: 
• Tailored 
customer 
production 
• High quality 
products 
• Flexible 
system of 
production 
• Specialisation 
in core 
competences 
Subcontracting 
Network-firm 
• Second 
generation of 
entrepreneurs 
• Innovation in 
processes 
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The second type of learning operates through the development of either commercial 
agreements or joint ventures with foreign partners. This type of learning constitutes a more 
formal learning process and was observed in two of the three cases that comprise this group 
of firms. It includes the transfer of codified knowledge and technical know-how in product 
and techniques of production. The main rationale behind the commercial agreements is the 
need to widen the portfolio of related products, supplied by the local firm, with imported 
furniture or intermediate goods. In turn, the rationale behind tiie joint ventures is the need 
to import modem parts and pieces for furniture manufecturing which are not produced in 
the domestic market. In both cases the link is based on market transactions. Furthermore, 
these linkages have in two cases ended in the signature of franchising agreements through 
which local firms obtain a right to exclusive commercial representation of foreign brand 
names in the domestic market. Ms Redona (CAFYDMA's expert in intemational fiimiture 
trade)*^ argues that the trend towards developing joint ventures with leading foreign firms 
is one of the most important business strategies recently undertaken by the top and more 
dynamic local fiimiture firms. This is the case of "Occhipinti Hns". 
^^CAEYDMA stands for (national) Chamber of Eroduceis of Furniture, Upholstery, and Related Products. 
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Box 6.4: "Occhipinti Hns" 
Occhipinti is a medium-size fimi (45 employees) dedicated to the 
manufacturing of modem lines of wardrobes and closets, which successfully 
competes in a niche market of high quality products. Indeed, Occhipinti has 
become one of the leading local firms in this niche market during the last 
decade. 
One of the firm's main competitive assets is its highly flexible system of 
production, through which it can produce furniture parts and pieces that can be 
interchanged among the different models that shape its portfolio of products. 
Hence the firm is able to manufacture customised or specially made goods 
complementing economies of scope and scale. The operability of Occhipinti's 
system of production largely relies upon an integrated informatics system by 
means of which the firm can connect, on-line, the needs and requirements of 
customers to the areas of management and production. It follows that tiie 
information system developed by and for the firm (computer assisted design -
CAD-), constitutes one of its most important innovations. Through this system 
the customers, technically assisted by qualified employees, can design the 
piece of furniture that they are looking for, choose the quality of materials, 
colours, sizes, etc., and know the final costs in an automatic form. Thus, once a 
client decides to buy, the buying order (with the technical specifications 
required by the client) is automatically sent on-line to Occhipinti's workshop 
for manufacturing. 
As highlighted by Mr Occhipinti, the system of joint ventures with foreign 
firms has represented the key achievement and asset for the firm. Through joint 
ventures, the firm has been able to incorporate different high-tech furniture 
parts that are not available in the local market, such as soft metallic structures 
for organising clothes; super light systems of sliding doors and windows; and 
aluminium frames of different colours for mirrors, among others. As a result, 
Occhipinti is now able not only to compete with modem and sophisticated lines 
of furniture in the domestic market, but also, starting fi'om their extemal 
linkages, to develop their own systems and product lines. The firm calls these 
product lines 'Occhipinti's Systems'. 
This case is a good example of how a firm that operates in a traditional 
manufacturing sector, such as the furniture industry, has been able to update by 
producing goods that 'spread' technological progress within the domestic 
market by developing innovative capacities starting from own strengths and 
joint ventures with foreign firms. 
Relevant factors: 
• High product 
specialisation 
• Flexible 
system of 
production 
• Tailored 
customer 
production 
• Use of high 
technology in 
product and 
processes 
• Integrated 
informational 
system 
• Innovation in 
products and 
processes starting 
from joint 
ventures with 
foreign partners 
• Positive and 
active transference 
of technology 
• Learning and 
innovating from 
other firms 
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Under the surfece of formal linkages with foreign partners there exists a variety of learning 
processes that are determining fectors in the innovative and competitive performance of 
these firms. In order to incorporate high-tech parts and products in the production process, 
the local firm needs to modify and update its production routines and technologies to match 
them with the technological frontier 'imposed' by the (often state of the art) technology 
utilised by the foreign partner. In other words, to adapt to new inputs and processes the 
local firms need 'to move' their own technological frontier. In doing so the firm, unlike the 
fums in the first group, changes and evolves to become a new firm. The foreign firms, in 
turn, acts as the technological 'gatekeeper' (Bells and Albu, 1999). This is well illustrated 
in Box 6.4. In order to able to incorporate the imported technology, "Occhipinti Hns" has 
had to improve and update its production system as a whole along with some manufactured 
products, making them compatible, in terms of design, quality, and other technical 
requirements, with the imported technology. As a resuh of these cumulative improvements 
and technological updating, the firm developed both a modem system of production 
organisation (innovation in process) and a new and innovative line of products (innovation 
in product). According to Ms Redona, this displacement has pushed local firms not only 
towards a higher quality product but also towards higher levels of specialisation in their 
productive supply. Consequently, these entrepreneurs have been able to win niche markets 
in segments of medium and high quality products, competing directly with large foreign 
firms from leading countries. As the entrepreneurs argue, even though the latter utilise state 
of the art technology and large economies of scale, they cannot combine three key 
competitive advantages achieved by these local firms: customised goods, that are of a high 
quality product using high incorporated technology, and produced and delivered in a short 
period of time. 
Linkages with foreign firms, a key aspect in understanding the geography of learning and 
the competitive success of this group of firms, have not been the focus of the NIP 
framework. This second group of firms show us how the building up of links in the 
international setting are possible by, for instance, visiting leading firms or trade feirs. 
Virtual and/or physical intemationalisation of the learning platform of firms could become 
part of an IP framework aimed to enrich the firms' sources of learning and local institutions 
may become key players in promoting a policy in this sense. 
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6.4.1. Collective learning and innovation? 
Although there is evidence that interfirm collaboration between firms located in clusters in 
developing countries tends to be more 'selective' (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999), in this group 
of firms it is restricted to 'bilateral', 'partner to partner' and based on non-localised 
relationships. In this sense it is worth asking wiiether the examples come close to the 
mainstream reading of learning derived from, for instance, joint ventures and strategic 
alliances based on market transactions only. Learning at a distance has, particularly in its 
more formal forms (i.e. through joint ventures), a high component of intentional, plarmed, 
structured, and building of relationships costly (i.e. Redona and Solano remark that it 
includes several previous travels oversees). However, I have also shown that, starting fi-om 
joint ventures, these firms have developed learning processes and iimovative capacities that 
were not ex-ante stipulated in the contracts established with a foreign partner, and were 
very probably not ex-ante planned or even wanted by the local firm. Mainstream reading of 
learning and learning as forwarded by the NIP literature seem therefore positively 
converged in 'distanced' learning based on interfirm collaboration. 
The emphasis placed by these entrepreneurs on the foreign firms as a source of learning and 
encouragement for the development of innovative capacities, contrasts with that expressed 
in relation to both the local and non-local (national) firms and institutions. As regards links 
with local firms, Occhipinti Hns, Solano SA and Biagetti Hns all report that they do not 
have links of this nature with any local counterparts. That is, they have neither 'horizontal' 
collaboration, with rival firms, nor vertical collaboration, with key suppliers. It may be said 
that these are firms that have broken with the main 'subjective' constraints (notably, the 
'individualist' business culture) to interfirm collaboration, but only at an international level. 
The case of Biagetti Hns (the smaller and less internationally linked firm in this group) 
sheds light on a factor so far not considered in my analysis, i.e. the 'subjective' constraints 
of the entrepreneurs as regards business 'relationships' with local firms taken in a broad 
sense. Like the other two firms in this group, Biagetti does not recognise the local firms as 
a source of learning. Biagetti's competitive performance is, however, based on both an 
active subcontracting policy using different (smaller) local firms and, interestingly, it has 
also successfiiUy engaged in a process of leaming and innovation starting from a 'joint 
venture' with an ex-local partner. One of the subcontracted parts of Biagetti's system of 
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production used to be a 'system of office dividers' made from aluminium, provided through 
what the entrepreneur calls "something like an informal joint venture " with a local firm. 
Through this 'joint venture' both firms used to subcontract each other depending upon 
which firm sold the contracts. When Biagetti's partner sold a contract, they subcontracted 
to Biagetti the production of wooden fiamiture parts and, vice versa, Biagetti subcontracted 
to the partner firm the aluminium's systems. Finally, after a period of incorporating know-
how from the partner firm, Biagetti went on to internally develop its own system of 
modular divisions for oflfices made from aluminium. Although Biagetti broke the joint 
venture after teaming tiie partner's production knowledge, (a classic opportunistic conduct 
that generates mistmst towards interfirm collaboration), this example reveals that there is 
'objective' room for interfirm teaming among local firms. This is particularly salient for 
smaller firms that lack the resources and capacities to operate in an intemational context. 
As regards links with local institutions (in a broad sense), they seem to play a marginal role 
in the development of the firms' innovative capacities. However, 'access to business 
information' and the 'organisation of travel' to participate in intemational fair trades and, 
eventually, to visit foreign firms, are activities recognised by these entrepreneurs, although 
they are not highly valued by the entrepreneurs in relation to their leaming process. 
Interestingly, two of these three entrepreneurs (Occhipnti and Solano) are themselves lead 
actors within business associations. I will retum to the analysis of the roles of institutions in 
firm's competitive performance in Chapter 7. 
Geographical proximity is not seen as a source of competitive advantages for leaming and 
innovative development in this group of firms. As shown already, the emphasis falls on the 
network of 'de-territorialised' and 'distanced' relationships that the firms develop with 
foreign firms in the intemational arena. 
In tum, the network of business relationships of these firms and their entrepreneurial 
system as a whole are scattered through different places, beyond the local circuit. 
6.4.2. Learning and innovation as dynamic processes 
The comparison of findings conceming the two groups of firms reveals some key dynamic 
factors exist that explain the different inno^yatiye performance of firms. Indeed, the 
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evidence shows that the nature of the strategic transformation of the second group of firms 
and their disposition to change largely rely on the evolutionary character of the learning and 
unlearning process of the entrepreneurs and the firms themselves. Although tiie 
entrepreneur remains an important actor within the second group of firms, she/he no longer 
represents the classical 'artisan'; she/he has become an entrepreneur, while the firm has 
become a more professional and complex organisation. Those small- and/or medium-size 
entrepreneurs who run successful firms understand that there is a clear 'turning point' in the 
evolutionary path of the firm when they change from being 'craft-based' to being 
'industrially-organised'. For these firms, to become an industrial entrepreneur involved 
them adopting a radically different approach to their business, including: 
• A recourse to permanent and cumulative training in areas such as management, 
marketing and international trade, among otiiers, as well as changing use of consulting 
services in these areas as well as in technological support in quality and plant lay out 
planning. 
• Gradual technological upgrading (during the last decade), through investments in soft 
(i.e. varied forms of training aforementioned) and hard technologies: modem machinery 
and equipment such as semi-automatic machines and modem 'work centres' operated by 
numeric control. 
• A gradual process of internal restructuring making areas such as management and 
production more professional, and gradual incorporation of technical professionals such as 
engineers (i.e. in areas of product quality) and architects and designers (i.e. in the design of 
new fumiture models and fumishing projects). 
What this experience shows is that IPs concemed with learning and irmovation should not 
be based on a 'hit-and-mn' IP approach (as often happens in Argentina) but rather on a 
'sequential' and 'cumulative' strategy of firm support. In previous sections I have shown 
the difficulties that firms and entrepreneurs have in changing established routines and path 
dependencies. In this section I argue that dynamic learning and unlearning in traditional 
small firms involves 'long periods of time' and that it is therefore necessary to be aware of 
both the life cycle of firms and the stage of the entrepreneurs' career before arriving at IP 
conclusions conceming, for instance, interfirm leaming at a territorial level. A dialogue 
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between the NIP literature and the insights coming from entrepreneurship studies is needed 
to meet this theoretical gap. For instance, CAFYDMA's expert in fijmiture international 
trade (Ms Redona), argues that the 'experience accumulated' by the entrepreneurs, (through 
several business contacts with other entrepreneurs, trips to leading coimtries in this industry 
and, above all, long-term experiments of trial and error in her/his business strategies), is 
one of the most important assets in helping firms to create a qualitative jump in their 
evolving path. The younger firms in this industry find it difficult to attain success, for 
instance, in international market access, without having adequate accumulated experience. 
She notes that in the fiimiture industry, realising these requirements can take two or more 
decades. Hence the need for 'exposing' the entrepreneurs to different types of experience or 
for accelerating their process of accumulating experience is a clear implication in terms of 
IP. 
Unlike the leaming of codified knowledge and know-how described above, the nature of 
learning and knowledge creation in this case is essentially tacit and is largely embodied in 
the person of the entrepreneur. As a result, it is often untransferable and irreplaceable. It 
follows that there is also a need for encouraging knowledge transfer within (small) firms 
themselves. This implies not only a minimal codification of routines but also the 
transference from the older owner/manager to the new generations and key employees. In 
addition, the break of old routines and searching for new ones often involves a 
'generational change'. The development of new technological routines in the older and 
more successfiil (family) firms in the sample occurred through the new generations, when 
the 'youngest' and often 'more quaUfied' members of the family succeed the older in the 
control of the firm. Related to this, the CITEMA-INTI Director points out that although 
qualitative changes of entrepreneurial 'attitudes' or 'mentality' have been observed in the 
last few years in small firms, they are harder to achieve when compared, for instance, to the 
change in technologies: "One can develop a product in two years i f one has the necessary 
resources, but peihaps two years to change the mentality of a firm is nothing, it requires 
much more time. That is to say, they are processes that require more time". Generational 
change thus appears to be linked to attitudinal changes in the firms' conduct. Apart from 
the accumulated experience and generational breaks of those firms that reach a 'transition 
point' it is also the case that they are in general the bigger ones (15 to 20 employees) 
among the smaller firms. However, the size of firms matters in dynamic leaming only in so 
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far as it is associated with 'the workshop's' strategic transformation into an 'industrially-
organised' firm. San Pedro is the biggest firm within the cluster but at the same time shows 
a similar scheme of production organisation and management to those observed in the 
smaller firms. 
Consequently, to generate conditions of 'access' and 'assimilation' of leaming experience 
for the younger firms and entrepreneurs along with making accumulated experience 
transferable among firms (in particular between larger and more successfiil firms and the 
smaller firms) and within firms (from generation to generation and key employees) 
represents important challenges for an IP framework concerned with dynamic leaming and 
small firms. The findings show that geographical proximity in industrial agglomeration 
may facilitate informal and formal interchange of experiences among firms, as long as they 
are promoted by an IP programme (i.e. through an intermediary agent). However, the lack 
of accumulated experience among the firms of the cluster studied, for instance, in 
intemational trade, subcontracting, and interfirm collaboration issues obligates us to think 
of alternative sources of leaming beyond the cluster boundaries. 
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Table 62, Leaming and irmovation in the wooden fumiture SMEs 
a. Firms of incremental innovative 
capacity (Group 1) 
b. Firms of higher innovative 
capacity (Group 2) 
Nature of the 
innovative 
process: 
Leaming as an 
interactive and 
collective 
process: 
Interfirm 
leaming: 
Localised 
leaming: 
Finn-centred 
Mainly based on intuitiveness and craft skills 
of the entrq>reneurs ((S'aft-based firm) 
Incremental improvements in p-oduct 
Imitative and reactive 
Rudimentary soft and hard technologies 
Customers as the main source of leaming 
(little scope of sources of leaming) 
'Bilateral' leaming (based on firm-customo-
relations) 
Based on unplanned market links 
Institutions are not visualised as sources of 
learning 
High levels of vertical integration despite the 
emerging need to 'open up' the firms towards 
other firms 
Uncertain view of advantages of interfirm 
collaboration 
Individualist business culture (lack of 
experience and lack of role models) 
Geographical proximity matters only 
marginally in firm competitiveness 
Learning 'at shorter distances' 
Informal and unplanned sources of leaming 
derived fi-om locaUsed social relationships 
(tracking the rivals) 
Inta-firm relationship-centred 
Strong internal and extanal 
fH'ofessional support (industrially-
organised firm) 
Dynamic and cumulative leaming 
Innovation in product and process 
Imitative/creative and proactive 
High technology incorporated 
Foreign firms as the main source of 
leaming (gatekeepers of new 
knowledge) 
'Paitna- to partner' learning 
Based on planned market 
transactions 
Limited role of institutions in 
encouraging firm leaming 
Flexibility and increasing vertical 
disintegration (but not division of 
labour) 
Clear view of advantages of 
interfirm collaboration, but only at 
an intonational level 
Distrust of interfirm collaboration 
at a local level (individualism and 
fear of o|q>ortunistic behaviours) 
Geographical proximity does not 
matter in firm competitiveness 
What matters is distanced learning, 
through virtual OT physical travels 
and building up relational 
p-oximity 
6.5. Conclusions 
The nature of leaming and innovation in the majority of firms studied is incremental, 
unsystematic and sometimes unintended (as outlined in column 'a' in Table 6.2). Likewise, 
the potential advantages of clustering, notably collective leaming and efficiency, have not 
been developed within the cluster studied. Tigre's fiimiture cluster can be characterised as a 
'survival cluster' of micro- and small-sized firms (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999). 
However, the evidence also reveals that a small group of fumiture firms, located within and 
outside of the cluster boundaries, display a higher iniiovative capacity, which is based on 
dynamic and evolutionary leaming (as described in column 'b' in Table 6.2). As a result, 
these firms increased their competitive performance. Therefore, while the first group of 
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firms, and the cluster itself, are showing some of the main contextual restrictions of the NIP 
framework (when it is read in the fi^amework of small firms working in traditional sectors 
in developing countries), the second group sheds light on where the NIP could be aiming in 
order to boost competitiveness. Three policy implications arise as a result of these research 
findings, wdthout consideration for the macroeconomic conditions (inflation, rates of 
interest and exchange, etc.) and availability of financial resources. 
First, there is a prime need for a package of policies aimed at strengthening the productive 
efficiency of individual fums since in 'survival clusters', as Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 
(1999) conclude, there exist pronounced problems of inefficiency at the firm level, which 
impede the operability of any policy aimed, for instance, at technological upgrading. 
Provision of real services in areas such as management techniques (i.e. marketing, cost 
control, personnel, and post-sell services) and technological external support and training 
(i.e. in issues such as quality control, lay out of plant, control of stocks) can help the firms 
to overcome inefficiencies allowing them to build the basis on which more proactive, 
systematic and cumulative leaming processes may take place (or business intelligence 
develop). Improvements in product observed in the first group of firms could also trigger a 
qualitative jump towards an improved product 'quality' and more sophisticated 'designs'. 
Injection of new machinery and professional 'translators' (able to bring and to transform 
fluxes of new knowledge into outputs) or 'intelligent cells' (Landabaso, 2000) wdthin the 
firm may become 'vehicles' for the transformation of a 'craft-based' firm into an 
'industrially-organised' firm. SME policies such as these, aimed at individual firms, could 
be collectively delivered through groups of entrepreneurs and therefore could also be a 
cluster policy (third level of policy). 
Second, policies are needed aimed at deepening and widening the 'relational' sources of 
firms' leaming. The former refers to the firm's existing stakeholder network (notably its 
customers and suppliers) and aims at the systematisation and exploitation of the encounters 
between entrepreneurs and stakeholders in order to trigger the conditions to obtain usefixl 
and accurate business information (leaming by asking and listening). As regards 
stakeholder networks, Gibb (2000) in a challenging study referring 'the growth of 
ignorance' in academic research on SME policy, concludes: 
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"[A]n alternative approach to small business advice might be to expend public money on 
improving the potential for companies to learn better from their transactional 
relationships with customers, suppliers, bankers, accoxmtants, regulatory authorities, 
internal staff and so on. There seems little doubt in this respect that this is the field where 
most small businesses do most of their learning and that they probably leam better from 
the experience of Iheir peers" (2000:29). 
In industrial clusters located within a larger city, such as the Tigre's fumiture cluster, the 
fums frequently develop business links beyond the cluster boundaries. Therefore, a policy 
aimed at strengthening the asking and listening ability of entrepreneurs is only partially a 
cluster policy. 
As regards new sources of leaming, this entails the building up of links and relationships 
(beyond the existing links of a firm) in order to 'expose' the entrepreneurs to new sources 
of information and (practical) knowledge (often carried out through direct experience and 
observation). Visits to frade feirs, visits to more advanced firms and/or centres of expertise 
at a national or intemational level are three key mechanisms of 'exposure' to best practices. 
As seen, the search for 'extemal' sources of leaming, whether in a more informal (i.e. 
through visits to leading firms in leading countries) or, more importantly, in a more formal 
way (i.e. establishing joint ventures with foreign firms), is commonly a resuh of long-term 
individual endeavours (including time, energy, and money). Through IP institutional 
instmments as those mentioned above, these practices can be promoted at their initial stages 
(contacting and linking). Successful experiences of joint ventures achieved at an 
intemational level involving local firms (i.e. the case of Occhipinti) can be used as role 
models for group of firms without previous accumulated experience (for instance within the 
cluster). 
Third, there are implications for how clusters are imagined. In the 'survival cluster' 
economies of association are scarcely developed, Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) 
contend that pohcy makers and practitioners should seek first to raise the 'awareness' of the 
potential advantages of clustering among entrepreneurs. According to these scholars, 
experience of cluster policy in Latin America shows that "an important starting point would 
be to encourage the establishing of a local stakeholder dialogue to identify economically 
viable projects of collective actions in fields where economies of scale are relevant" 
(ibid: 1698) (i;e. purchasing of raw materials, selling groups, and hiring consultants). At the 
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same time, trust-building between local entrepreneurs, and between firms and local 
institutions, should be a critical IP concern in a context of the absent development of 
imfraded interdependencies and strong cultural barriers (notably, individualist business 
culture) to collaborative actions. Factors such as dialogue, inclusiveness and a disposition 
towards consensus-building (Landabaso, 2000) in the mechanisms of the governance of a 
cluster/local policy, along with the existence of "effective sanctions " (Schmitz and Nadvi, 
1999) to opportunistic behaviour, seem to be key aspects of tmst-building and networking. 
On the basis of a clear view of advantages of collective leaming and an increased trust it is 
possible to imagine changes in the routines of firms and an associated increase in interest in 
subcontracting and the most sophisticated practices of 'horizontal collaboration' involving 
division of labour. Once the catalysing effect is attained at firm level, which, in LA occurs 
in general through network brokers (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999), the following 
stage concerns linking network firms up with the local and non-local supporting 
institutions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Role of Local Institutional Support 
7.1. Introduction 
The NIP thinking asserts, in the words of Amin, that "economic life is both an instituted 
process and a socially embedded activity and therefore context-specific and path-dependent 
in its evolution" (1999:366) (Amin and Thrift 1994; Bianchi, 1994; Brusco, 1992; Cooke 
and Morgan, 1998; Morgan, 1997; Pyke et al 1992; Storper, 1997). This chapter claims 
that both social and institutional foundations underlie economic development and 
institutions play critical roles in boosting competitiveness*''. The research on European 
industrial clusters, notably, those concerned with Italian industrial districts (Best, 1990; 
Brusco, 1992; Brusco and Righi, 1989; Pyke etal, 1990), has given a particular attention to 
the roles played by local and regional governments in providing, in the words of Schmitz 
and Humphrey, "a fi-amework in which clusters of SMEs can flourish" (1996:1861). In 
turn, studies based on evolutionary theory assert that the determining variable in explaining 
learning and innovation is that they must be understood as collective, interactive and 
systemic processes (Braczyk et al, 1998; Cooke and Morgan 1998; Lundvall, 1992; 
Morgan, 1997). In Lundvall's views, the strategic capabilities of a firm "reside not only in 
its machinery and in its individual employees, but also, and primarily, in its organising 
capability to transform inputs into output. And this capability, in turn, depends on its 
institutional relationships with suppliers, customers, public agencies, research institutes and 
^ 'Institution' is by nature a fuzzy concqpt, in particular when it is used in empirical studies. Theoretical 
definitions clearly distinguidi between 'informal', 'soft' or 'tacit' institutions (such as sets of habits, routines, 
conventions, values and social norms) and 'formal', 'hard' or 'codified' institutions (i.e. laws, rules, and 
organisations) (Amin, 1999; Cooke and Morgan, 1998), or betweai institutions ("the rules of the game") and 
organisations ("the players") (North, 1993:26; Johnson, 1997). Empirical research often requires the 
triangulation of both dimensions in order to give an exact account of the phenomenon studied. In order to be 
able to_study-'informal' institutions (siich as 'tmst'and_!co^op^^pn_c^ among economic actore) it is, 
methodologically speaking, necessary to analyse (and then to infer from) the conducts observed in 'formal' 
institutions (notably, firms, local governments, business associations and the like). Stoiper in this regard 
contends: "Institutions cannot be reduced to specific organizations, although the latter may be important in the 
geitiCTation of "expectations, pi^fa^iices, "mTd'Mes'' (r997:268)rTHis~dia^^ relationship of miitual 
determination is-what will be utilised to analyse local, institutions in this chapter. 
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on the domestic institutional set up as a whole" (1992:311). In particular, Lorenzen points 
out, 
"competitiveness based on product quality, flexibility, and customisation through 
automation or specialisation subcontracting is a trajectory that many fiimiture producers 
in several OCDE coimtries have followed for a number of years. This type of 
competitiveness, based on localised leaming, is strongly dependent on a particular 
institutional environment for fiimiture production, promoting co-operation and 
information exchange between firms and providing SMEs with "real" services" 
(1998:26) (emphasis in original). 
These conceptual claims are evaluated through the analysis of the nature of the relations 
between wood furniture firms from the cluster studied and the local institutions 
'supporting' activities for firms from the Tigre region. I have taken local institutions to 
include public, private and intermediate institutions, which include those bodies grouped 
under the name of 'techno-educational' institutions (details in Table 7.1). Specifically, I am 
interested in evaluating the impact that the local/regional institutional set up has had on 
firm competitive strategies and performance, that is, to evaluate the role of institutions 
acting as both facilitators as regards provision of relevant business information and access 
to means and incentives to learn and to innovate, or as partners as regards planning, 
designing, and setting up firms' commercial, managerial and production strategies. 
7.2. The nature of the relations between Arms and local institutions 
As described in Chapter 5, there are many public, private, and intermediate institutions in 
the Partido de Tigre (see in Table 7.1). All these institutions profess to be committed to the 
socio-economic development of the region, with some specifically concemed with 
industrial development. Does this institutional 'presence' play a role in fum 
competitiveness consistent with the NIP literature? I will argue that this is not the case. The 
nature of the firm-institutional relations in the region can be summarised as follows: 1) 
limited attention aimed at the SMEs within the region; 2) topniown instruments and 
programmes targeted at the firms; 3) inadequate development of a local 'institutional 
thickness', reflected in an insufficient communication and lack of accurate knowledge 
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among firms and institutions and in scarce mutual awareness. This gives rise to a need for 
institutional representation that has been expressed in a number of different ways by the 
entrepreneurs. These results are discussed in turn below. 
Table 7.1. Local institutional set up and firm supporting activities 
1. Sector 2. Institution 3. Activity 
a. Public sector: 1 • Municipality of Tigre 
b. Intermediate 
Institutions: 
c. Private sector: 
(Business 
associations) 
d. Institutions of 
the Techno-
Educational 
sector (public 
budget): 
2. Municipal Sub-secretariat of Tourism & 
Sub-secretariat of Culture 
3. Municipal Office of Industrial Affairs 
4. Radical Civic Union bloc in the Local 
Assembly (Honorable Consejo 
Deliberante -HCD-) 
1. Institute of Bonaerense Entrepreneurial 
Development (IDEB), Tigre (IDEB-Tigre) 
1. Industrial Union of Tigre (UIA-Tigre) 
2. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Tip-e (CACIT) 
3. Industrial Timber Cenire (CIM), Partido 
of San Fernando 
1. Technical School N'S of Tigre (ETN5) 
2. National Technological University 
(UTN-TigiB) 
3. National Institute of Agrarian 
Technology (INTA-Tigre), Tigre Office 
4. Centre for Technological Innovation in 
the Wood Industry (CFFEMA-INTI) of the 
National Institute of Industrial Technology 
(INTI), Partido of Huriingham 
• Political direction and administration of Tigre's 
local govemmoit 
• Promotion of the local tourism industry & local 
cultural development 
• Promotion of the local SMEs 
• Political opposition's bloc within the Local 
Assembly 
• Intermediation of the regional SMEs' access to 
teal services and direct p'ovision to services and 
business infcnmation 
• Political representation and promotion of the 
manufacturing SMEs of the region 
• Political representation and provision of basic 
SCTvices to local, small commercial activity. 
• Political representation and intermediation of 
the regional timber industry's access to services 
• 'Secondary' professional (raining to secondary 
level in technical careers ('trades') 
• 'University' professional training in 
engineering and management disciplines and 
provision of services to the SMEs 
• Intermediation of services to the farming 
activity of the Delta islands 
• Provision of advanced technical savices to the 
timber industry at a national level 
7.2.1. Limited institutional attention 
The majority of entrepreneurs interviewed were categorical in highlighting the 'non-
existence' of institutions and services aimed at encouraging local firm competitiveness. In 
particular, they have rarely seen institutional support for business strategies and learning 
processes. Hence the entrepreneurs claim a 'lack of interest' in SMEs on the part of the 
formal institutions, particularly local govefnmeni Box 7.1 illustrates the typical case of a 
small entrepreneur, relatively new to the fiimiture business and not linked with any local 
public agency, business association, or wood furniture firm despite being located in a dense 
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zone of furniture shops within the cluster (the Tigre's commercial area around the Fruit 
Market). 
Box 7.1. "Muebles Pino Av. ItaUa" 
With respect to the Municipality of Tigre, have you had any kind of 
support in issues such as...? 
No! we have not. (the entrepreneur interupts) 
I was saying, some kind of support for commercialisation, training or...? 
No. In our case we have never had any kind of support. That is the truth. 
I do not know about the others [entrepreneurs]. 
And with respect to the timber sector in general, do you...? 
No, nothing, (the entrepreneur interupts again) 
// 
Finally, I would like to ask you about local institutions such as the 
Industrial Union (UIA-Tigre) and the Chamber of Commerce of Tigre 
(CACIT). Do you have any kind of links with or have you received any 
kind of support firom these business associations? 
No, no, nobody comes up to us. I do not know if all is dead here in 
Tigre. Everything vanished here, you see? In Tigre there is no interest, 
there is nothing to say: '...look, I can produce chairs because the 
chamber of...', any chamber, comes here and say: 'well, here there is a 
credit of 5 grand available, so we are going to advise you to buy a 
machine in order to make a specific work, we are going to verify that 
you effectively have bought that machine, etc, etc.' 
Well, nothing of this happens in Tigre. 
Relevant factors: 
• Absence of 
Institutional support 
• Isolation of the firm 
Institutional vacuum 
• View of business 
associations as a 
potential source of 
support 
The second illustrative example comes from "Lopez Hs" (Box 7.2), a medium-size firm 
that is well known and respected within the region. Lopez, has links with local and non-
local business associations and also an in depth knowledge of the local furniture industry. It 
is therefore well placed to provide a wider picture of the character of the institutional 
services aimed at supporting SMEs. 
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Box 7.2. "Lopez Hs'^  
Mr L6pez, have you ever received any kind of support from the local 
institutions, for instance, from the Municipality of Tigre? 
No, on the contrary. No, from the Municipality? We do not, nothing. 
On the contrary, some times they have fined us because of a law 
concerned with environmental issues, because we did not submit the 
documentation in due time to the Municipality. In other words, 
collaboration from the Municipality, nothing. On the contrary, they try 
'to drown' us, as if we were nobody. 
// 
... I understand, I see. But, would you say that at the outset there exists a 
concrete interest in the local SMEs in general from the Municipality? 
No, no!, there is not an interest. At least this is my opinion, because if 
they had an interest they would look for the ways not to pressure us, the 
entrepreneurs. Let's say, to give you an idea of what that I am saying. If 
you did not submit in time some documentation required they fme you $ 
300 pesos! (Equivalent to 300 US dollars, a basic salary at that time). 
This is to say, if we are talking about collaboration from the 
MunicipaUty? Nothing. They do not even stock up with local suppliers 
of manufacture for public works that the Municipality has done or to the 
works that they might do in &ture. At least they could look for a way 
for the SMEs located in Tigre to give an estimate. For instance, on 
furniture's prices, couldn't they? 
// 
So, what about the private sector, have you received support from, for 
example, the Industrial Union (UIA-Tigre) or the Chamber of 
Commerce (CACTT)? 
No. I didn't have too many links with the Industrial Union. They have 
invited me, but I did not resort to them, because I have the... Wood 
Chamber (he refers to CAFYDMA though, interestingly, without 
remembering the name) 
Although I do not use it either. I disagree also with the wood chamber 
because they come with proposals that for me are useless. It is useless 
for me set up a system of marketing or a training program aimed at the 
employees when what I really need is a market to sell my products. 
Only after that may I think about the other things. 
Relevant factors: 
• Absence of the 
public support 
• Negative factors of 
the public policy in 
relation to the firms 
• Lack of interest in 
the local SME 
• Minimal contact 
from the UIA-Tigre 
• Critical view on the 
activities of the business 
associations 
• Questioning 
instruments of micro 
competitiveness 
In order to begin to understand the lack of institutional interest in local firms, as claimed by 
the entrepreneurs, it is necessary to note that the local institutions, with the one exception of 
IDEB-Tigre, also admit that they have no contacts vwth local fiimiture SMEs, nor specific 
programmes for the sector. Indeed, the general institutional view is that the fiimiture firms 
belong to the craft sector existing in Ihe region rather than to an industrial activity worthy 
of formal policies. 
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On the margins, however, some signs of institutional supply activity are discernible. As can 
be observed in the cases of "Lopez Hs" (Box 7.2) and "Gastaldin" (Box 7.3), there exists, 
entrepreneurs note, the presence of some level of institutional activities aimed at local 
firms. These activities fell into two categories: First, general business information, mostly 
from UIA-Tigre and DDEB-Tigre. This information refers to standard matters such as 
sources of credit, tax changes or labour regulations, and business meetings. The private 
institutions also identify the offer of a package of basic 'professional services' aimed to 
support the entrepreneurs in issues such as taxes, labour regulations, and accountancy. 
Although these 'traditional' services are in general recognised as necessary by the 
entrepreneurs, they were not mentioned in relation to the institutions studied. In fact, for 
reasons of timing and convenience all the entrepreneurs prefer to contract out these types of 
services. The second information base relates to advertising and organising participation in 
national and international trade feirs and visits to foreign firms. This activity is organised 
by national furniture business associations such as CAFYDMA*' and FAIMA*^, in vAiich 
some entrepreneurs 'participate'. However, in neither case did entrepreneurs identify 
activities geared towards helping leaming or boosting competitive performance. This is 
explained partly by the fact that business associations see their main role as the "defence of 
the sectoral interests of the firms". This means lobbying at local, provincial and/or national 
levels, which often are plarmed and managed from the national level. But here too, as I will 
show below (in section 7.2.3), entrepreneurs are very critical of the role that local and 
national institutions play in 'representing' and/or 'defending' the interests of the sector. 
7.2.2. Top-down institutional support 
With respect to institutional support for the firms, the entrepreneurs claim that the services 
supplied often do not suit the existing needs of the local firms. One example will suffice to 
illustrate this second fector of the firm-institution relations in the territory: 
Mr Gastaldin, (Box 7.3), is a small entrepreneur who has not only developed a certain level 
of institutional contact with local business associations but has also participated in some 
Chamber of Makers of Furniture, Upholstering and Related Products. 
Argentine Federation of The Timber Industry. 
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activities organised by IDEB-Tigre. This firm is located in the pine fumiture firm cluster of 
the neighbouring Partido de San Fernando and, therefore, the entrepreneur's opinions will 
serve as a control case with respect to Partido de Tigre. 
Box 7.3. "Gastaldin" 
With respect to the Partido of San Fernando, for example, in relation to 
the Municipality. Have you received any kind of support from the 
Municipality, in aspects such as programmes of technical assistance, 
training...? 
No, no (the interviewees interrupt). They come along only when they 
need a vote. 
And with respect to the IDEB-Tigre, for example? 
... well, they dropped off some information some time ago. I have 
attended a couple of meetings [at the IDEB's offices], but frankly 
speaking they did not convince me because the credits were too 
expensive. Because it was credit that they were offering us, and 
expensive! Instead, it is work that we need. 
Relevant factors: 
• Negative view of 
the public sector 
• Sporadic delivery of 
information fi-om the 
private institutions 
• Unsuitable 
institutional supply for 
the firm needs 
• Market as the firm's 
main need 
In Gastaldin's case the mismatch between the IP instruments offered by the institutions and 
the instruments needed by the firms refers to a financial instrument that was generically 
promoted and offered to all of the local SMEs by IDEB-Tigre. Hence, this service was 
conceived without consultation with the entrepreneurs. "La Portena" comes to a similar 
conclusion to "Gastaldin" on local institutions: "The Industrial Union [UIA-Tigre] has 
sometimes sent me some information, but it was not suitable for my business, for my 
problems". This firm has never heard fi-om any other local institutions, including the 
Municipality of Tigre. 
The evidence also reveals that local services in general are conceived, designed, and even 
managed by the national institutions to which the local institutions are linked. For instance, 
the few services offered by CIM-San Fernando (i.e. information on new machinery and 
equipment, support to firms' application-process to national IP instruments and 
professional advice on international trade) are entirely determined by FAIMA at the 
national level. Thus the services offered by CIM-San Fernando are not designed to match 
local needs. Furthermore, though CIM-San Femando offers these services.locally they are 
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delivered in FADVLA's headquarters in the centre of Buenos Aires. Therefore, even in the 
small number of cases where local institutions appear to offer IP support, the top-down 
approach through which the activities and instruments are conceived to be harming the 
credibility of and then the interest in such support. 
7.2.3. Inadequate development of local 'institutional thickness' 
Two aspects best show the nature of 'institutional thickness' in Tigre. First, 'insufficient 
communication' between firms and institutions and, second, the desire for institutional 
representation expressed by the entrepreneurs. 
7.2.3.1. Insufficient communication between firms and institutions 
It was striking during fieldwork that only three local institutions (UIA-Tigre, IDEB-Tigre, 
and the Municipal Sub-secretariat of Tourism) have recently conducted research (i.e. 
surveys or market research) and analysis on their institution's target group (local 
manufacturing firms and tourism services providers in this case). For instance, information 
systematised in a database developed by IDEB-Tigre, although limited, constitutes the only 
database on manufacturing firms that exists in the entire region. This type of database, 
which includes only the entrepreneurs' name, address, telephone, and production subsector, 
is rarely available at the local level in Argentina. In addition, the Municipal Office of 
Industrial Affairs only compiles basic information from official registrations (i.e. legal 
authorisations and terminations). Further information compiled by the Municipal 
Secretariat of the Treasury only includes the dates of firm registration and its main business 
activity. 
"San Pedro's" case, (Box 7.4), one of the two biggest wood fiimiture firms in the region, 
demonstrates a second level of problems associated with communication links between 
firms and institutions. San Pedro has developed a considerable degree of institutional 
participation at the local and national fiimiture business associations (CIM-San Fernando 
and FAIMA respectively). Furthermore, due to his position as a leader in the local fiamiture 
industry, he has close links with the public authorities of the Partido of San Fernando. But, 
as Box 7.4 shows, he is negative about the role of institutional support. 
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Box 7.4. "San Pedro" 
And talking about San Fernando, at the level of the Municipality, have 
you had access to some kind of support from ... ? 
No, no! (The entrepreneur interrupts) 
... or, for instance, some institutional support to search for solutions to 
your current problems? 
No, no. 
So nothing, nothing. 
... Well, yes, Ihey [the Municipality of San Fernando] contacted us to 
export once. Apparently they were trying to promote exporting at the 
level of the local industry, but we do not have furniture appropriate for 
export. The fumiture made by pine for example warps entirely when it 
passes from the cold to the warmth (he explains). 
// 
Are you participating in some business association? 
Yes, in the Timber Industrial Centre (CIM). Yes, but they can do 
nothing. 
Here [in Argentina], here there should be a policy aimed at reinforcing 
the domestic market rather than one aimed towards outside. 
Relevant factors: 
• Asymmetry in 
access to information 
with respect to the 
smaller firms 
• The public sector's 
lack of knowledge about 
local firms 
o Questioning the 
capacity of the business 
associations 
• View of solutions 
only at macroeconomic 
and national level 
As can be seen from Box 7.4 the lack of accurate knowledge is reflected in the public sector 
not holding information about the specificities and technical characteristics of the goods 
manufactured by the fumiture firms of the region, most of which use 'pinewood' as their 
main raw material. Accurate knowledge about the type of fumiture that the firms produce 
would enable the institutions to design appropriate instmments. 
The insufficient communication between firms and institutions is also reflected in the 
passive strategies through which the institutions 'communicate' and 'transfer' information 
to the firms. In the case of the private sector, the majority of the business associations (i.e. 
CIM, CACIT, UIA-Tigre) use a non-periodic institutional magazine as the main method of 
communication with entrepreneurs. At times, in urgent cases, the entrepreneurs are also 
contacted by telephone. With the exception of UIA-Tigre and IDEB-Tigre, the business 
associations do not make use of the Internet. Interestingly, IDEB-Tigre, which, as 
previously mentioned, operates along with the UIA-Tigre, is the only institution that makes 
'personal visits' to entrepreneurs in the workshops in order to discuss or to promote 
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initiatives and programmes related to the local SMEs. One example illustrates well the 
implications of insufficient commimication between institutions and firms observed in the 
region. As an important instrument of their strategy for local wood furniture firms. 
Industrial Timber Centre (CIM) authorities have been promoting "Furniture CORFO" 
(Corporation of Encouragement of the Furniture Industry). The Furniture CORFO's main 
aim is to bring together all the wood furniture firms in the Partidos de Tigre and San 
Femando, as well as some wood suppliers, in order to encourage a division of labour 
between local firms. CIM authorities even claim to have obtained official support from the 
National Secretariat of Industry (a part of the Ministry of Economy) and FAIMA (the main 
national timber business association) to carry out tiiis initiative. Surprisingly, none of the 
local wood fiimiture firms interviewed mentioned this project during fieldwork! 
The public sector, through the Municipal Office of Industrial Affairs, communicates with 
fums only through generic means such as local radio or newspj^ers. This Office does not 
use any means of communication specifically designed to contact firms, despite the fact 
that it was established as a channel of communication between the local government and 
the manufacturing SMEs. Thus as one official puts it: "The Office of Industrial Affairs has 
some programmes aimed at the SMEs, but I do not know, I do not know what results it has 
had, I do not know whether or not these programmes are being carried out. I think not." 
Both local entrepreneurs and institutions in feet characterised the activities developed by 
this public agency as extremely minor, or as non-existent, and hence this Office's role is 
discredited within the territory. 
In light of these findings, the accuracy of what both the public and private institutions claim 
to know about the firms should be put into question. Rather, it would be more accurate to 
say that they have limited updated information or knowledge about local firms. 
Interestingly, the approach of the Municipal Sub-Secretariat of Tourism, another local 
public agency, contrasts widely with that of the Municipal Office of Industrial Affairs. The 
Tourism Sub-secretariat has an active policy of communication with firms in the tourism 
sector. The Secretariat is closely linked with tourism firms either directly or indirectly 
through the Chamber of Entrepreneurs From the Delta (which embraces approximately 20 
firms). Accordingly, the Sub-secretariat, the Delta Chamber, and local entrepreneurs have 
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begun to jointly develop training and updating projects aimed to support the competitive 
performance of the local tourism industry. 
7.2.3.2. The desire for institutional representation 
Without exception, every entrepreneur expressed the need 'to be recognised' and 'to 
belong' or 'to be represented' when they were asked about the roles that the public and 
private institutions should play in relation to the firms. The need refers to the region, 
constituting a demand on public and private local institutions, but also to national business 
associations and the national state and the political system as a whole. Box 7.5 illustrates 
the need for recognition at local level. 
Box 7 J , "La Portena" and "Ferreira" 
a. "La Portena": 
What happens here is that to feel part of something [a local institutional 
setting] you have to be involved, in the sense that, ... you see, nobody 
from the Municipality ever came here to say to us: 'Well, let's see, what 
are your firm's problems exactly?' 
When you see that [interest], ... how can I explain this to you. If they 
come and listen to you, then you have to give something to them as 
well. One gives when one receives, otherwise it is not going to 
happen... 
b. 'Terreira": 
I think that they [the Municipality de San Femando] have never taken 
us into account because we have never made ourselves be taken into 
account I always said, we were around 70 carpentries here [in San 
Femando], so reckon that up, if you take the 70 firms and bring all 
those people to the San Femando square, it is probable that they [the 
local government] will realise and say: 'there is a market here'! 
Don't you think so? Well, nobody ever took into account that there is a 
market in this part of the Partido. 
// 
Now, you (to me) are visiting around. I don't know, perhaps you don't 
bring solutions, but you can bring a perspective instead to say: 'well 
look at this guys, perhaps this product might come out better than that 
one; ...or to make 20 different products is not profitable, it is better to 
make just 10 and study them care&lly, and you will see that it is more 
convenient, or, why don't you try to cut off your final cost, etc'. 
But, apart from this nobody ever cares about us. 
Relevant factors: 
• Institutional absence 
in the territory 
• Lack of mutual 
awareness and 
acknowledgement 
among firms and 
institutions 
• Need for reciprocity 
and mutual compromise 
• Lack of interest 
bom the public sector 
• Need for 
institutional 
acknowledgement 
• View of collective 
action at local level as a 
possible vehicle for 
recognition 
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The situation in Tigre does not seem to differ from elsewhere in Buenos Aires. Biagetti 
(Box 7.6), located in the economically depressed Partido de Jose C. Paz in the northwest 
area of the Greater Buenos Aires, confirms this. 
Box 7.6. "Biagetti Hns." 
We cannot say that programmes and resources reach us from the 
national level, but they do not do so at the Municipal level either. I think 
that we do not know what the Municipality [of Partido de Jose C. Paz] 
does because they do not publicize what ttiey have done, although I do 
not know whether they do something. 
Likewise, I would say to you that I tiiink the Municipality does not 
know what we do, because even though they regularly re-register and 
licence [the local firms], those registers vani^ as if by magic! Not long 
ago they came here to say us that we were not re-registered, and we did 
it five hundred times! 
I tell you what, we have been contracted to make some woiks for the 
Municipality of the City of Buenos Aires, that is, a Municipality away 
from us [Partido de Jose C. Paz]. However the Municipality of Jose C. 
Paz never came along to ask us for an estimate to do some work. 
So instead of promoting an idea of regional development as others 
Municipalities do, which is to applaud, here we are deprived of that 
benefit. 
Again, I do not know what are the policies for the firms that the 
Municipality [of Jose C. Paz] is carrying out, nobody came to see me, 
and neither have I gone to see anyone. 
That is to say, I am not saying that institutions do not exist in their 
respective areas of work or they do not have the support that they 
should have. But the thing is that personally I do not feel myself 
represented by any of them. 
That is to say, if you look at the newspapers to see what they [the 
institutions] are discussing with respect to the industry, and when you 
read what they are putting forward [in order to support the industry] 
perhaps it is not what you need. 
I understand that it may respond to a generality, but I do not feel 
represented because what is being discussed [by the institutions at a 
national level] is perhaps neither going to reach me in a direct form nor 
I will be able to access it in the short term. 
Relevant factors: 
• Absolute lack of 
mutual awareness and 
acknowledgement 
• Lack of interest 
from the public sector 
o Problem of lack of 
and need for 
representation 
• View of a proactive 
institutional role in 
development issues 
• Gap between the 
institutional supply and 
the firms' needs 
• View of IP as 
unreachable for the 
SME 
Interestingly, the need for recognition varies by firm size. The smaller firms claim that they 
are entirely ignored, as reflected in expressions such as "we do not exist for anyone ", "they 
never come here" or "nobody worries about us". As noted already, this segment 
constitutes the most isolated group of firms in terms of relations with local firms and 
institutions. Instead, the biggest firms (i.e. Occhipinti and Solano) complain of 'lack of 
representation' by the public and private institutions of SME interests, rather than 'lack of 
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recognition'*'. "Nobody comes out in defence of us " is an expression that best illustrates 
this complaint. In particular, these entrepreneurs claim that the institutions should exert 
more influence on both the national state and the bigger economic interests (MNCs, the 
larger Argentine companies and the financial sector), which are identified as the most 
influential spheres of decision-making on economic poHcy issues in Argentina. 
From an IP point of view, both needs (recognition and representation) imply a different 
approach. However, the needs of entrepreneurs at the local level are not clear. In some 
cases it refers to recognition by local govemment or, in a more general sense, to lobbying 
access to provincial or national policy decision-making spheres. In other cases it refers to 
the generation of business opportunities for the firms, or access to the provincial and 
national IP instmments and programmes for SMEs. In all the cases, despite the critical 
judgement of the role played by the local institutions in supporting firms (as seen through 
subsection 7.2.2) the firms still assign a role to the public and private institutions. This 
represents an institutional opportunity waiting to be taken, in particular from the IP point of 
view at local and regional levels. 
7.3. Institutional set up and firm competitiveness 
The base-line aspect of firm-institution relations described in the previous section is that the 
'institutional presence' (a necessary condition for the establishment of 'institutional 
thickness') in the Partido de Tigre and the region does not mean, per se, that the local 
institutions play a role in firm competitiveness. What is more, local SMEs do not even 
associate wdth the local institutions any of the factors of competitiveness upheld by the 
different schools of thinking analysed in Chapters 6. This leads to a primary reflection. To 
limit the research methodology to examining institutional 'roles' in relation to firms 
assumes that to a certain extent the entrepreneurs 'know' about these potential roles and 
that, therefore, they are also able to 'identify' and 'evaluate' whether the institutions are 
fulfilling them. The point is to identify exactly what terms such as 'institutional support'. 
^ It is important to remember that the larger entrepreneurs in the sample are all members of some business 
association, often of a sectoral character such as CIM-San Femando at a local level, and CAFYDMA, CEMA 
or F A M A at a h"atibnal one. 
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'institutionalised support', or 'institution' itself mean for the entrepreneurs witii respect to 
their competitive performance, in a context characterised by scarce mutual knowledge and 
extreme fragile links between firms and institutions**. Indeed, the majority of entrepreneurs 
refer to the local public and private institutions with descriptions such as: "The 
Municipality charges taxes, fines, and builds squares"; "politicians don't know [anything 
about business]" or "they come over only when there are elections"; "business associations 
are useless" or "they carmot do anything"; and "the institutions sometimes drop off 
information", but in general "they do not exist!" 
A second reflection is that, even in those cases in which entrepreneurs identify institutional 
support, the top-down approach on vAiich the institutional supply is based, has direct and 
indirect negative effects on the perceptions and attitudes of the entrepreneurs, in particular 
the smaller ones, towards all of the IP instruments and programmes. The top-down 
approach seems to be affecting not only the entrepreneurs' view on the 'traditional' 
institutional supply available in the region (i.e. basic support in tax and labour regulation 
issues), but also on those most modem IP instruments such as managerial training and 
technological upgrading programmes, various consulting services, and ICTs (Information 
& Communication Technologies). ICTs constitute key tools for firm competitiveness in 
today's economy. I have shown already that these IP instruments do not constitute a 
priority from the SMEs point of view. The evidence reveals that firms, in particular smaller 
ones, justify their lack of interest on the grounds of a general distrust of utility and 
relevance. A vicious circle emerges because although almost every local institution 
identifies the scarce development of technical capacities and the limited access to training 
programmes of local small firms, the evidence reveals that except for certain institutions 
(i.e. UIA- and IDEB-Tigre, and some techno-educative institutions) this recognition does 
not necessarily translate into institutional support in dealing with these weaknesses. The 
majority of the local institutions studied were extremely critical of instruments to boost 
competitiveness (such as training programmes, product quality, continued improvement 
programmes, and post sales services) claiming that they are useless in a context of 
^ In fact, it turned out to be extremely difficult in this research even to ask about institutional issues and their 
potential link and releymice to the firm's cpmpeUtiye performance^ 
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economic crisis.*' Consequently, the entrepreneurs, as well as local institutions, often 
perceive the national sphere, rather than the local or regional spheres, as the only legitimate 
source of solutions for their needs. 
A third reflection is that the very nature of firm-institution relations observed in the region 
constitutes one of the main reasons why the entrepreneurs have an extremely 'passive' 
attitude concerning the development of contacts with, and the participation in, local 
institutions. CACIT for instance remarked that although professional services are supplied 
for free by CACIT (in issues such as taxes, labour regulations, and accountancy) "the 
entrepreneurs do not demand them!" In addition, a CACIT official remarked that when they 
call a meeting, "the attendance is minimal, often it is the Chamber's body and twenty more 
people". That is why, he concludes, "when we want to organise an assembly, we often alert 
people two months prior, and sometimes it is even necessary to bring the associates (via 
car, taxi, etc). At least this is the way in v/hich things work in Tigre. Perhaps other 
chambers function better, but the general situation must be more or less this." 
ECLAC report (2000) confirms that territorial identification, institutional participation and 
recognition of public and private bodies (as legitimate interiocutor to place problems) are 
factors mainly observed in furos from small- and intermediate-size cities in Buenos Aires 
Province rather than in larger urban localities located within Buenos Aires City. Although 
firms from large urban localities often have better access to business services (i.e. training 
and consulting) they prefer linking with sectoral and generally non-local business 
associations. From CACIT's statement I can infer that the levels of receptiveness to the 
participation of the firms in institutional life is only thought of as a weakness by the 
institutions themselves (particularly by the business associations). Certainly I know that 
participation in institutional life by the firms is not the same as the use of the IP instruments 
and services. Like other business associations, CACIT faces a problem of lack of 
entrepreneurial interest and commitment. The entrepreneurs do not utilise CACIT services 
leaving it with the problem of credibility and legitimacy. CACIT, however, blames the 
^ An additional factor appears to be hampering film-institution relations regarding provision of services and 
firm-institution links. The two main demands of the entrepreneurs on the local and non-local institutions 
(according to the institutions) are 'search for business opportunities' and 'access to bank financing', under the 
circumstaHces that the institutions neither sijpply financial^uppon^ operate as trading companies able to 
directly generate market opportunities. ^ _ _ 
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current economic crisis for the failure of its institutional strategies. The economic crisis has 
without doubt had effects on the activity of 'support' institutions, but by no means explains 
the marked absence of an institutionalised business culture in the region and tiie 
institutional sclerosis observed. 
The three factors that characterise the nature of firm- institution relations in the region 
(limited institutional attention, the top-down approach, insufficient communication and the 
lack of mutual recognition) were not identified as problems by most of the local public and 
private institutions studied. Hence it could be hypothesised that updated information and 
accurate knowledge about the local firms is not needed for the institutions, as tiie decision-
making process with respect to the institutional supply is top-down, directed by institutions 
at the national level without any consideration for the local firms' specific needs and the 
capabilities of the local institutions. Consequently, the lack of interactivity and 
receptiveness to the participation in institutional life by the firms, and the little credibility 
and subsequent lack of institutional legitimacy are hindering the critical process of 
institutionalisation concerning local firms and institutions that can help to establish 
institutional density in the region. How this process operates at an inter-institutional level is 
discussed below in section 7.3.1. 
In light of these findings my hypothesis is that in localities or regions with an insufficient 
level of development of economies of associations between economic actors, a set of initial 
conditions is required. This set of initial conditions specifically refers to the building up of 
relational density in the region that makes mutual knowledge and acknowledgment, 
interaction and development of synergistic potential between economic actors possible. In 
other words, a context-dependent IP framework concemed with institutional support first 
and foremost should identify and act on those minimal elements of transformation from 
institutional 'presence' to institutional 'thickness' (Amin and Thrift, 1994). 
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Box 7.7. "Ferreira" 
Have you had access to some type of support from the Municipality? 
No, never. 
Did tiiey ever come here to ask what their main concerns and problems 
are? 
No. Once we soHcited the Municipality to pave this street. 
They never paved it. 
// 
Certainly, furniture firms are labour-intensive. 
... , if you reckon that we could have 10 more people working here, 
and you consider I am an only small firm. You do the sum (he says to 
me), we are five small carpentries here so, 50 more people would be 
employed just in ftis street! You understand? 
They [tiie Municipality] would have to look for the way to reactivate 
this zone, by advising the entrepreneurs. They should come and say: 'ok 
guys, let us go hold a meeting' or something Uke that, but nothing has 
been done. 
So, I am not against the Mayor, neither do I care, right? But I think they 
should worry a bit more and say: 'look, there are some firms around 
there, at the Partido's bottom, why do we not go there to see what we 
can do, for instance, so that they [the firms] take five more employees. 
There are a lot of tilings that could be done: 'Why don't you employ 
two more persons, we [the Municipality] are going to pay them a 
minimal salary, and let us see how we can build the houses that the 
Municipality is building over there. We are going to furnish these 
houses with two of your products'. Do you understand wliat I am 
saying? 
Let us go set up a cooperative of furniture producers or whatever you 
want to call it, and let us look for solutions. But no, none of this has 
been done. 
Relevant factors: 
• Absence of public 
support and lack of 
interest 
• View of the public 
sector as a potential 
maker and facilitator at 
the local level 
• View of the 
industrial policy at local 
level 
• View of associative 
poUcies among firms 
promoted by institutions 
As claimed by some entrepreneurs (see "La Porteiia" case in Box 7.5), only once the 
relational fector has been activated will it be possible to think about relations of mutuality 
between firms and institutions (through vs^ich local institutions may become 'a peer' for 
the firms), and subsequently policies of collective leaming and varied economies of 
association. The case for a more active policy of linking-up, acknowledging, and searching 
for shared solutions, is illustrated above in Box 7.7. 
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7.3.1. Emerging features of institutional thickness in the region 
There are, however, certain signs of change in the IP culture. These signs are important 
points of possible IP solutions. The techno-educative institutions (notably, CITEMA-INTI, 
ETN5, and UTN) '^* along with UIA-Tigre and IDEB-Tigre^' are slightly more progressive 
than other local institutions. They display distinctive characteristics that permit me to 
hypothesise new 'bottom-led' IP schemes. 
73.1.1. The techno-educational institutions 
Three aspects of the strategies followed by the techno-educational stand out. Firstly, all 
these institutions have recently developed a proactive strategy of building up links with 
local and non-local firms, mainly in the form of 'personal visits to the enfrepreneurs'. 
According to these institutions, through such personal visits to 'the workshop' they have 
been able to contact, discuss issues face-to-face, and reach arrangements with 
entrepreneurs. In response to a question about CITEMA-INTI strategies to develop links 
with the firms, the Director explains: 
"Our link with the firms can occiu" in different ways. Let's say, there are firms that come 
here directly to present their problems and, accordingly, we then define how we can help 
that entrepreneur. Many times it also occurs through information spread by word of 
mouth among the entrepreneurs, or through some business association. Well, it is about 
the entrepreneurs knowing that there is a Centre [CITEMA-INTI] that can help the firms 
in certain specific technical aspects. The other way to [generate contacts] is by 
developing direct contacts with the firms, according to determined projects or issues that 
we want to promote, right? I would say that it has not been a good channel trying to link 
firms through business associations, although some of them are founding members of 
this Centre... [...] So, we came to a conclusion that the business associations are not 
good channels, and that we have advanced a lot since when we began to have direct 
contact with the firms. What is more, the most interesting projects for this Centre have 
arisen starting fi-om the direct contacts with the firms". 
^ Centre for Technological Innovation in the Wood Industry (CITEMA-INTI); Technical School No5 of 
Tigre (ETN5); National Technological University (UTN-Tigre). 
" Industtial Union of Tigre (UIA-Tigre); Institute of Bonaerense Entrepreneurid Development (IDEB-Tigre). 
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Secondly, with respect to the product suppHed, the institutions underline two key aspects. 
First, they seek to offer specialised and customised technical services. CITEMA-INTI, 
which is specialised in the timber and wood furniture industry, for instance offers technical 
services such as materials resistance and product quality control. ETN5, in turn, offers a 
recruitment service to small firms, and it has also developed training programmes in 
advanced subjects such as use of pneumatic technology and CAD (computer assisted 
design). Second, UTN, supplies a wide range of courses and training programmes in all 
branches of engineering, and high-tech consulting, alongside other programmes in soft 
technologies (i.e. marketing, stock control, and management). As mentioned in Chapter 6, 
these institutions have noticed that in the last few years the SMEs have more frequently 
approached them to ask for help to solve technical problems or for speciahsed services in 
order to achieve greater productive efficiency. The institutions also emphasise that an 
effective way of building links with firms has been to offer new ideas and services directly 
to the entrepreneurs in advance of an established demand. UTN notes that this is in contrast 
to the common perception held by the entrepreneurs that universities and technical schools 
usually ask firms for their services, rather than marketing themselves as a service. UTN 
notes: 
"The mechanism, first and foremost, the main mechanism was a policy of supplying and 
never asking for. I will tell you why, because nobody believes in...[universities]. You 
come along to the firms and who believes you? (He asks me) So, we have created some 
mechanisms, the 'job centre' for instance, where we help the firms to select their 
personnel for free. That was a long-term project. Then, from the 1990s forward, we have 
begun to participate in any sort of event. I do not know, but every time we saw some 
event where we could participate to promote the University's name we did". The other 
key strategy for us was to promote ourselves through our graduates. Each one of our 
graduates is working for some company and they keep an active participation within the 
University. So, each one of them is our seller, they do our marketing. That is the way by 
which we were getting into the firms". 
Thirdly, these techno-educational institutions make reference to the importance of response 
times to the requirements of the firms, along with the ability to convince entrepreneurs that 
solutions can take longer than expected, as key factors for an approach that aims to develop 
joint projects with the firms. For example, by offering the festest possible answers to 
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entrepreneurs, UTN has been able to convince firms about the need for specialised 
technical advice and services. 
Therefore, starting fi-om strategies based on a shift in attitudes and a policy of institutional 
opening-up (rather than large mobilisation of financial resources), some techno-educational 
institutions have been able to change their development path towards more interactive 
schemes of institutional learning and management. Valuable practical evidence on how the 
relational factor and the development of the so-called un-traded interdependencies could 
give rise to a process of institutional building and networking between institutions and 
firms at a territorial level is provided by these institutions. Furthermore, this has been 
achieved by making proactive use of the institutional vacuum existing in the region, 
showing that even in a context of economic crisis and financial restriction the nature of the 
relation between firms and institutions can be changed through a process of institutional 
reflection. In cases such as CITEMA-INTI and UTN, this has involved a process of 
institutional upgrading and innovation that has allowed them to create an opportunity to 
avoid economic crisis. Indeed, financial restriction itself has become an activator of 
institutional change. UTN, CITEMA-INTI, and ETN5, for instance, depend upon a public 
budget, vA\ich was systematically cut throughout the 1990s. As a result, the need for change 
became imperative, since the only means of obtaining extra revenue was to offer services to 
third parties such as the firms. 
In line with the expectations of the NIP literature on local and regional irmovation systems 
(Braczyk et al, 1998; Cooke and Morgan, 1998), some institutions of the techno-
educational sector have not only achieved links with local firms (the minimal relational 
threshold), but they are also fiilfiUing roles in boosting the firm's competitiveness and their 
learning processes. However, owing to the scarce impact of these practices on local firms as 
a whole and the lack of articulation and complementarity between the techno-educational 
institutions, we can scarcely define this institutional set up as a 'local/regional innovation 
system'. Indeed, the techno-educational institutions (along with IDEB-Tigre) appear not to 
have had an impact on the particular sample of firms studied in terms of their competitive 
^ Interestingly, in all cases the type of SME with which contacts are estabhshed are mostly small family run 
firms. As seen aheady, small firms have minimal resources in terms of capital, capabilities and time. They are 
not active in contactmg aiid^mCT^ting linlcs with the institutions: 
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performance. Instead, what I have found is a heterogeneous and in general isolated group of 
institutions, which show an individual rather than systemic potential to influence firm 
leaming processes. Following the literature on local/regional iimovation systems it must be 
recognised that to make the local techno-educational institutions more effective will 
require, besides larger financial resources, different capabilities, expertise and infrastructure 
that each one of these institutions catmot achieve individually. In this sense EDEB-Tigre 
and UIA-Tigre's cases, as shown below, are valuable since through a partnership they have 
been able to develop complementarity assets, giving rise to a novel process of institutional 
building. 
73.1.2. Institute of Bonaerense Entrepreneurial Development (IDEB-Tigre) and 
Industrial Union of Tigre (UIA-Tigre) 
Established under a more modem conception of the role of business associations in SME 
competitiveness, UIA-Tigre displays considerable dynamism in its process of institutional 
leaming and change. UIA-Tigre has undertaken an active and successful range of modern 
IP instmments aimed at local firms. It has organised various seminars and training 
programmes in areas such as new technologies and managerial tools; offered professional 
advice on international trade issues; promoted the participation of entrepreneurs in 
intemational trade feirs; and delivered general business information within the territory. As 
a result, it claims to have succeeded in gaining support from the whole of the 
manufacturing industry of the region. According to several local institutions since its 
creation at the beginning of the 1980s, UIA-Tigre has become the reference institution for 
the industrial sector. UIA-Tigre has also been successful with respect to its political 
capacity beyond the region.'^ 
Acting as a partner of UIA-Tigre (details in Chapter 8 section 8.4), IDEB-Tigre (created in 
1996), has in turn succeeded in organising, promoting, and subsidising a wide range of IP 
instmments and programmes. These range from: managerial training (i.e. in marketing, 
trading tools and post sales services, etc.); business evaluation (i.e. identification of 
weaknesses and strengths); product quality consulting; intemational and internal trade; 
access to sophisticated technological assistance; promoting interfirm collaboration; 
UIA-Tigre's fouiider and first president became President of UIA at national level, and then Minister of 
Economy of Buenos Aires Province. 
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subcontracting; and training in ICTs (i.e. e-commerce). According to the IDEB-Tigre 
manager, the institution has succeeded in its initial step of formation by gaining visibility 
among the regions's firms. A proactive and personalised communication strategy and a 
supply of modem instruments of entrepreneurial development explains this success. 
Unfortunately studies on the impact of IDEB-Tigre's policies on the Tigre's manufacturing 
firms as a whole are not available to confirm this success. However, within the fieldwork 
only a small group of firms fi-om my sample 'mentioned', though on a critical basis, 
activities conducted by IDEB-Tigre for the local SMEs. This paradox in part is explained 
by the fact that the local furniture firms have so far not been a target group for IDEB-Tigre 
strategy. As shown below, the main issue is again the top-down approach of IDEB. Due to 
the fact that IDEB is a pilot case, the analysis of its problems and restrictions will shed light 
on difficulties that any institution working on the provision of services to SMEs in the 
Argentine context might anticipate. 
Two structural conditions constrain the DDEB's strategy. Firstly, the absence of an 
associative culture, reflected in the way in which entrepreneurs relate to institutions and, 
secondly, the top-down approach of the IP services and programmes supplied by the 
institution. With respect to the absence of an associative culture, as claimed by IDEB-Tigre 
and UIA-Tigre authorities (and other private institutions), the "desire for short term 
solutions" by the entrepreneurs substantially restricts the possibility for building up long-
term relationships between institutions and firms (i.e. in such areas as technological 
upgrading, inter-firm collaboration and continuing quality). According to the institutions, 
this problem has become more obvious since the economy began to decline in the late 
1990s. IDEB-Tigre stresses that its programmes of interfirm collaboration were affected by 
the economic crisis, because "those entrepreneurs who discovered that the results in the 
short term were not what they were expecting became quickly discouraged and went back 
to the old ways of doing things". In response to a question about use of services and 
institutional participation of the local entrepreneurs, UIA-Tigre's President put the problem 
in the following terms: 
"There is a bit of everything. There are entrepreneurs who are absorbed in their problems 
and that do not come to us, no matter how much you invite them [to a meeting] and 
explain it to them, etc; they do not come anywhere near here. And the reason why is that 
233 
his/her problem has already overcome him/her, and then they do not have the mental or 
physical capacity or time to be able to attempt to search for a new altemative, a new 
solution. And the ones who eventually do come are equally complicated but come along, 
come close, some how in his/her subconscious imagines that we have a magic wand. 
Either they do not participate, and thus meet colleagues to work in a team to face 
common problems, or they come along but pretend that our action is miraculous. The 
option in both cases is unrealistic and negative from my point of view" (Mr Occhipinti). 
The implications for IP of the lack of a long-term associative culture are enormous. As 
addressed by the evolutionary approaches, IP instruments and programmes require a 
minimal threshold of time for 'maturing' before and after contacting the target group. This 
is true even in the case of generic policies, as entrepreneurs still need to be convinced of the 
utility of an IP instrument or programme before they get involved. Paradoxically, as I shall 
address below, the (political) opportunity cost of an IP that does not show positive results 
in the short term is extremely high in Argentina, in particular in a context of budgetary 
restriction and ideological adversity towards the IP idea itself 
With respect to the top-down approach of IP instruments and programmes supplied by 
IDEB, this has negative affects on all the service policies of the institution. As explicitly 
stated by some key informants, IP instruments and programmes suppUed by IDEB are 
directly "downloaded" from the IDEB headquarters (located in the City of La Plata, capital 
of the Buenos Aires Province) and then they are made available to the localities where 
IDEB's Institutes have been established (i.e. Tigre). In other words, they are supply-side 
oriented and therefore designed without any consideration for either the local firms' needs 
or the institutional culture and idiosyncrasy existing in these localities. IDEB-Tigre's 
manager recognises that the local IDEBs' main services are standard products (i.e. generic 
tools of technological assistance and training) aimed at SMEs in general without 
consideration of size, sector of production and specific demands. Like other public and 
private institutions, IDEB's strategy has mainly been criticised for the generic character of 
its IP instruments and programmes. A study on IDEB's performance carried out at a 
provincial level by the Buenos Aires Office of ECLAC in 2000 concludes that all the IDEB 
systems so far were supply-side driven and that the IDEB Institutes operate as "selling 
points" rather than "reception-antennas" of local demands (a key source of knowledge for 
decentralised IPs). Hence, although IDEB attained institutional visibility throughout the 
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Province of Buenos Aires (PBA) in a relatively short period of time^" (through standardised 
and 'catch-air services), it has not achieved the build up of a more stable and cumulative 
relationship with the firms that guarantee their permanency within the IDEB's system of 
services. Firms tend to use IDEB services on an intermittent basis in relation to their 
immediate needs. Critically, permanency of firms within the system through a more 
constant utilisation of services would relate more to the institutional development of IDEB 
itself (by creating institutional density) rather than to its menu of IP instruments and 
services (ibid). Therefore, as the literature on supply of 'real services' in the Third Italy 
shows, the standard IP instruments and services have critical disadvantages with respect to 
their 'customised' counterparts. As shown above, although they appear to be lower cost 
solutions (due to both the economies of scale involved in their design and delivery and their 
larger potential market) in reality they may end up being ineffective for the long-term 
institutional strategy as a whole. 
However, the inefficiencies of standardised IP instruments and services in Argentina should 
be discussed in light of the local political setting. ECLAC's report in this sense points out 
that IDEB strategy favoured the entry of firms within the IDEB system through the 
provision of generic IP instruments and services, and hence it also 'impUcitly' excluded the 
larger sized firms with particular and/or sophisticated technical demands, mainly due to two 
'short term' political imperatives. Firstly, IDEB was aware that it is the same SMEs that 
normally access IP instruments and programmes in Argentina, constituting a very small and 
closed user-supplier circle, which has both a marginal macroeconomic impact and a very 
low 'role model-effect' on the whole of the productive structure (ibid:29). Secondly, the 
strategy followed would allow IDEB to politically legitimate its performance as a public 
institution (ibid). In feet, any IP instruments or programme conceived in the 'neoliberal 
Argentina' of the 1990s must show 'short term results' (and therefore it needs to achieve 
'visibility' as quickly as possible) and prove to be cost-effective (in the sense that it should 
quickly change from being a subsidised IP to a self-fianded one). Aware of the trade off 
implied, IDEB strategy sought massiveness through standard instruments and services since 
failing to achieve any of the political imperatives mentioned above would be motive 
enough for the state to cut off funds and terminate such an instrument, programme or even 
the institution itself How to change the dominant status quo related to the IP framework in 
From 1997 to 1999 around fifty thousand micro-, small-, and medium-size firms of the PBA have 
participated in activities and/or used services supplied by the IDEB Institutes. 
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Argentina under such stmctural conditionings is a critical issue for the NIP framework in 
this type of context. I will return to this point in the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
7.4. ImpUcations for the NIP framework and concluding remarks 
The underdeveloped institutional set up and the absence of a shared institutional business 
culture observed in the Tigre region does not match the propositions of the NIP literature 
concerning provision of real services and leaming and knowledge economics despite the 
visible presence of local/regional institutions of consequence to the supporting activities for 
firms. The latter do not identify a proper local offer of services, beyond some partial actions 
carried out by IDEB- and UIA-Tigre, which in general are not relevant for firms' needs. 
Furthermore, the firms do not recognise the local institutions as strategic fecilitators, even 
less as partners, in their process of leaming and development of innovative capacities. An 
awareness of the lack of institutional density, reflected in the insufficient level of firm-
institution communication and the absent role played by the institutions as mechanisms of 
representation and coordination, helps in understanding the specificity of the institutional 
set up observed. Finally, despite the existence of IDEB-Tigre, a program of institutional 
policy expressly aimed at the provision of real services to firms and the encouragement of 
networking activities within the territory, both aims have not been developed in the region 
at the expected levels. 
Two questions arise as to whether the NIP thinking can accommodate the evidence found. 
The first question relates to what I will term the cognitive and relational gap existing 
between firms and institutions. This gap is characterised by firms neither knowing what 
institutions do, in relation to firm supporting activities, nor do they develop formal or 
informal contact with them. The question second relates to the hypothesis that locality, as 
localisation, is synonymous with industrial development emerging 'from below'. 
Regarding the first question, the existing cognitive and relational gap between firms and 
institutions blocks the applicability of institutionalist strands of the NIP literature in 
contexts where the nexus between firms and formal institutions is practically non-existent. 
What I have found in Tigre is a 'physical' density of institutions but not an institutional 
236 
density based on interaction, collaboration and association with the regional manufecturing 
industry. The underdeveloped institutional set up is, however, not neutral as regards IP. As 
the fieldwork reveals, this negatively affects entrepreneurial perceptions and attitudes 
towards the few IP instruments and programmes that attempt to encourage local firm 
competitiveness. Hence a vicious circle emerges as a result of which institutional 
immobility and (in some cases) sclerosis, on the one hand, and conservative entrepreneurial 
attitudes, on the other, reinforce each other, which could even neutralise attempts to change 
this path of blocked-relations. But, it is also the case that public, private, and intermediate 
institutions have, in the interstices hardly visible to the firms, begun to change their 
traditional patiis of institutional functioning. A slow process of institutional reform and 
irmovation has began since the early 1990s, involving opening-up towards more collective 
and interactive mechanisms of learning and deeper and wider levels of relational density 
with other actors. However, it is also true tiiat the lack of an institutionalised business 
culture in the region places a restriction on further institutional reform in the direction of a 
multi-institutional NIP framework. This, however, raises the issue of whether we should 
think of NIP as best practice or as a loose frame of principles for local adaptation. Any 
policy framework needs to be sensitive to context and spatial-temporal circumstances. I 
will return to this vital point in the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
The second question for the NIP literature raised by the evidence relates to 'bottom-up-led' 
industrial development at local or regional levels. What should we conclude from the 
reality that local SMEs feel neither recognised nor represented by local public and private 
institutions. Mutual recognition and representation are two key factors at the initial stages 
of a process of institution building, since the possibihty of reaching agreement between 
firms and institutions at a local or regional level in order to set up supporting activities 
relies on the existence and legitimacy of these two factors. The national state is elevated as 
the only agency able to recognise and to represent the entrepreneurs. In light of the little 
positive evidence found of institutional building at the level of relationships between firms, 
vis-a-vis public and private institutions, the NIP framework should move forward in the 
following two senses. Firstly, it should pay considerable attention to those attitudinal 
factors that make it possible for a process of firm-institution institutional building to take 
place, such as those revealed by IDEB-Tigre, UIA-Tigre and, notably, the techno-
educational institutions in their institutional strategy and supply of services aimed at the 
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firms (ETN5, UTN, and CITEMA-INTI). The 'personal visits to the entrepreneurs' carried 
out by the institutions 'at the workshops' in order to offer 'customised products and 
problem-solution strategies' have been the most effective media of communication for 
building linkages and developing joint projects with the firms. As shown in section 7.3. l b, 
however, there are substantial contextual restrictions to the successful promotion of these 
kinds of policies in Argentina. I will elaborate these points in the concluding chapter. 
Secondly, the NIP thinking should pay particular attention to those fectors that allow the 
institutional action to gain in operational scale and therefore build a larger presence within 
the locality/region, since so far it is limited to specific cases or success stories but not to the 
whole productive weave of the region. 
Finally, the under-developed institutional set up in the region regarding both firm 
supporting activities and, critically, the development of firm-institution economies of 
association, question the essence of the concept of decentralised industiial policy forwarded 
by most of the NIP literature (i.e. Bianchi, 1994; Begg and Mayes, 2000; Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998). I will address this issue in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The Role of Inter-institution Relations and Territorial 
Mobilisation 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses the nature of inter-institutional relations in the Partido de Tigre and 
the region, primarily between the main public and private institutions. In particular, it 
examines whether local institutions share conmiunal interests concerned with local 
industrial development and whether processes of institution building exist that can result in 
territorial mobilisation in order to promote such interests. By institution building process 
and territorial mobilisation I mean those actions through which social, political and 
economical actors of a locality or region define communal interests and subsequentiy, 
through 'partnerships' or, in a broader sense, 'territorial pacts', promote and set up policy 
agendas aimed to support such interests. 
This analysis is carried out against those stiands of the NIP thinking that assert that local 
institutions and the architectures of politic-economic governance that they establish can 
become catalysers of the collective will and triggers of its synergistic potential for political 
mobilisation. To retum to the concept of "institutional thickness" discussed in Chapter 7, 
Amin and Thrift stress that, besides the number and diversity of institutions, "high levels of 
interactions amongst the institutions in a local area", "the development [...] of sharply 
defined structures of domination and/or pattems of coalition" and "the development 
amongst participants in the set of institutions of a mutual awareness that they are involved 
in a common enterprise" (1994:14), are a critical condition for the establishment of 
institutional thickness. Establishing of a 'policy network', or a 'supplementary forum' and 
'mechanisms of collective action' in Scott's (1998) words, is the result of political agendas 
aimed to promote participation, interactivity (a key condition for trust-building), involving 
commitment of the different actors concerned with and 'of consequence to' local industrial 
development. As Bianchi observes, industrial micro policies are: 
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"essentially networking actions, or policies aimed at reconstmcting a network of 
relationships, that consolidate mechanisms of integration among individuals" [...], which 
"have a strong territorial and sectoral foundation because it is easier to induce these 
processes of aggregation where a common cultural and technical base already exists" 
(1994:34). 
However, the NIP literature also warns about the risks associated with situations of 
institutional 'sclerosis' and 'lock in' that can result in risk-adverse conducts, conservatism, 
and resistance to change (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Grabber, 1993). In this regard Boisier 
claims that in Latin American countries with a stiong (and recently renewed) authoritarian 
culture (notably, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) "there are technocrats (especially in regions) 
with a real terror of irmovation. which reflects cultural pattems that look negatively at the 
innovator and may even go so fer as to socially punish innovation (through mockery, 
marginalization, loss of employment, etc.)" (2002:21) (emphasis in original). Hence, in 
order to generate conditions for learning and overcome resistances to change in order to 
obtain results in line with those outlined above, the institutions need to undertake processes 
of adaptation, upgrading, and change, thus becoming more innovation-based themselves 
(Amin and Thrift, 1994; Cooke and Morgan, 1998). 
What this chapter asks is whether local institutions interact by developing joint activities 
and projects concemed with firm competitiveness. It also asks i f local institutions share 
communal interests and political agendas concerning local industiial development and, i f 
they do, whether they are changing and innovating in line with the assumptions forwarded 
by NIP literature. 
8.2. Relational gap and fragmented inter-institutional relations 
The fieldwork revealed that the majority of the local institutions studied did not develop 
joint activities or projects (which I will call 'formal relations') with other local institutions 
regarding local SMEs competitiveness. What is more, in some cases they did not even 
interact with other institutions, for instance through informal contacts and/or meeting (to 
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which I will call 'informal relations'), in order to discuss problems or ideas in this respect. 
On this evidence, I firstly identify a 'relational gap' with respect to the nature of inter-
institutional relations in the Partido de Tigre and the region. 
Table 8.1. Matrix of inter-institutional relations: expressed in existing (+) and formal (F) or 
informal (I) relations 
1. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
Institution/ 
Sector 
Mun 
Tig 
Tou 
Su 
O 
IndAf 
IDEB UIA CACi 
T 
CIM ETN5 UTN CITEM 
Formal (F) & 
inforHI rd. F I F I F I F I F I F I F I r \ F I F I 
a. Public: 
1. Mun. Tigre 
+ + + - + - + - + - - - -
2. Tourism - i - + + 
Sub-sec. 
3. Office 
Ind. Affair -1- -1-
b. Intermed: 
4. IDEB-Tig - + + + - + + + - + - + - + + + - -
c. Private: 
5. UIA-Tigre + - - - - + + - - - - - - + + - -
6. CACIT - + 
- + 7. C I M - S J . 
A Tech^:duc: 
8. ETN5 + - - - - - + 
9. UTN-Tig. - - - - - + + + + + 
10. CriEMA-
INTI* 
* CITEMA-INTI is considered in Table 4, despite not bang a 'local' institution, due to its potential relevance for the timber 
industry 
As Table 8.1 shows, the Municipality de Tigre and the Municipal Office of Industrial 
affairs (the pubUc institutions 'of consequence' to issues linked with manufacturing SMEs') 
develop no supporting activity jointly with other public, private or techno-educational 
institution, apart from tiieir 'decorative' participation at the IDEB-Tigre political board. In 
turn, private institutions display a similar pattem of non-collaborative institutional policy, 
witii the only exception of UIA-Tigre (see column 5, Table 8.1). Interestingly, the complete 
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absence of relationships between the institutions of the private sector (CACIT; CIM; and 
UIA-Tigre) clearly shows how fragmented the private sector is in the region. Specifically, 
there is no relationship between institutions 'representing' manufacturing and timber 
industries (UIA-Tigre and CIM respectively), on the one hand, and between them as a 
group and activities linked with local commerce ('represented' by CACIT), on the other 
hand. There is nothing like a single homogenous 'private sector' in the region. Finally, the 
techno-educational institutions (ETN5; UTN-Tigre; and CITEMA-INTI) which, as shown 
in Chapter 7, develop activities aimed at local SMEs (with the only exception of UTN-
Tigre -see column 9) do not collaborate with other institutions in the activities that they 
carry out. Like the private sector, these institutions have no joint activities. Therefore, the 
'relational gap' identified affects the relations between public, private and intermediate 
sectors (inter-sector relations) as well as those inside each sector discussed (intra-sector 
relations). The depth of the existing relational gap clearly shows the absence of 'common 
interests' in the region concerning SME activities. 
What explains this generalised relational gap? The scarce level of 'communication' 
between the local institutions is the most visible factor. The 'lack of time' for linking 
activities was in turn identified as the main problem feeing institutions in building up inter-
institution relations. However, what the evidence reveals most is an absence of discernible 
'reasons' or 'motives' to interact and cooperate as identified by both private institutions 
such as CACrr and CIM and public institutions such as Tigre's Municipality and the 
Municipal Office of Industrial Affairs itself (see in Table 8.1). The former indeed do not 
even recognise the case for inter-institutional relations. Often, local institutions see other 
institutions as operating in different areas of concern to their own. They do not identify a 
'potential link' between, for instance, techno-educational institutions and business 
associations or between the former and public agencies. Rather, some institutions see only 
'buildings' or 'legal identities' with different missions within the region but not potential 
partners. As shown below, however, the role played by the local government as an 
intermediary within local industrial development, is one of the main causes underlying the 
relational gap existing in the region. 
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8.3. The role of the local state as intermediary 
As well as "lack of interesf by local govemment in SMEs claimed by local firms (as 
discussed in Chapter 7), there is the absence of commitment to what I will call an agenda 
for local industrial development. As reflected in the quotation below, this absence of 
commitment represents an enormous obstacle for building up inter-institutional relations 'of 
consequence to' industrial development at local and regional levels. Institutions that are 
aware of this agenda such as IDEB-Tigre, UIA-Tigre and UTN-Tigre confirm this problem. 
Mr Pitaluga (National Technological University) explains the negative effects of UTN 
relations with the local govemment on its institutional predisposition to interact: 
"With respect to the MunicipaUty [of Tigre], we do not click very well with them. The 
Municipality has a... a centralised system of decision-making through which the 
Mtmicipality makes public works, and more public works, but there is not room [in the 
municipal agenda] for any issue that has to do with the local [industrial] development. In 
fact, they [the MunicipaUty] have participated in IDEB-Tigre but ... do not tell it to the 
Mayor (Mr Pitaluga asks me), they sent [to participate in IDEB] a Director of Industrial 
Affairs who has no influence [on the local government]. So... ?" (Mr Pitaluga finishes his 
comment doubting about the real interest that the local government has in IDEB-Tigre as 
an intermediary for local development). 
Is there some rationale behind this lack of interest from the local govemment? In the 
absence of one industiial strategy or, in a broader sense, a coherent economic development 
policy, the local govemment has what can be identified as an infrastructure-led 
regeneration programme. Large public investments in infiastructure have been, and still are, 
the main priority of the municipal authorities. The public works undertaken by Tigre 
Municipality since 1992, under the Ubieto administration, include the construction of 
bridges and access roads in the early 1990s, followed by plans to build squares, street 
paving, school construction, local health clinics and, more recentiy, the new railway station, 
the fluvial station, and the renewed riverfront. These investments are directly linked with 
the promotion of a large (non-local) private sector interests in real estate. Indeed, there 
exists a wide consensus that promoting private investments to construct gated communities 
(called 'private estates' in Argentina) represents "the strategy" (Tourism Sub-Secretariat), 
the "most important change " (HCD), and the "big issue " (CACIT) occurring in Partido de 
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Tigre, from the second half of the 90s forward^'. At the time of the fieldwork, around forty 
exclusive gated communities were being built in Tigre, on previously empty and low cost 
public terrains (grasslands), located close to Rio de Plata's Delta cost. As the IDEB-Tigre 
manager argues, the main rationale behind what he calls "Tigre's master plan" is that the 
gated communities will bring huge increases in council tax revenue for Tigre Municipality. 
Council taxes are estimated to triple by 2005-2010. It is estimated that on the basis of both, 
the Partido's total population will double the current figure and the percent of population 
expected to pay council taxes will grow fi-om 30% (the figure at 2001) to 80% or 90% in 
future. Hence, the magnitude of the public works realised (notably, bridges and access 
roads to/from Tigre to/from Buenos Aires centre) have been linked to the need for rapid 
circulation for the inhabitants of these gated communities. This municipal focus on private 
estates is matched by an emphasis to promote the 'tranquillity' and 'natural life quality' of 
the Partido, associated with its extensive green areas, forests, rivers and wildlife, as an 
attraction for potential habitants of the new estates. 
A contradiction exists between the key components that make up the local govemment's 
economic strategy and the needs of the local SMEs. On the one hand, as the local 
manufacturing industry has been in decline through the nineties tiie amount of council taxes 
that it pays has also declined. Thus, in addition to widespread tax evasion, the tax debt of 
the local firms to the local treasury is also growing. When questioned, the IDEB-Tigre 
manager ironically asked himself "why should I [if I was Mayor of Tigre Municipality] 
then support the local SMEs i f they are both fewer and fewer and more and more 
bankrupt!" On the other hand, the manufacturing industry is often associated with negative 
aspects of urban life such as pollution, smoke, noise, and ugUness in general. These &ctors, 
as observed by the Tourism Sub-Secretary, contradict an environment-friendly strategy 
aimed at promoting 'tranquillity', 'beauty' and 'natural life quality' as competitive 
advantages of the Partido. Two examples illustrate the effects of this contradiction. First, 
despite private institutions' attempting to convince the local government to support the 
promotion of an integrated local supply of manufacturing goods (i.e. fiimiture industry) and 
" Gated communities are a new modality of building neighbourhoods in Argentina. They are primarily 
characterised by their high internal security, which is guaranteed by the restricted access only to their 
permanent residents, and exclusivity. Due to their characteristics and high prices, they are mostly targeted at 
urban upper and high middle classes, whom are increasingly looking for safer places to live, as crimes against 
private propriety and street violence rose in large cities through the 1990s. 
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industrial services in order to generate market opportunities linked to the gated community 
building industry, nothing has been done by Tigre's Municipality. Surprisingly, the 
organisation of 'gardening courses' to meet fiiture demands from the new estates is so far 
the only action of local promotion organised from the local government in relation to these 
private investments! Second, the unpredictable future of IDEB-Tigre clearly shows how a 
strategy for local economic development and local IP can clash. At the time of the 
fieldwork, IDEB-Tigre was suffering serious budgetary problems because of the financial 
struggles of Buenos Aires Province (upon which it depends). Due to a budgetary cut in 
2001 IDEB-Tigre began to lose both presence within the territory (they could not continue 
promoting and funding some IP instruments) and operative capacity (they had to reduce the 
permanent personnel). IDEB-Tigre's future was and still is uncertain. Consequently, Mr 
Ruidiaz concludes that IDEB-Tigre failed, politically speaking, despite its success as a 
technical tool for firm support. He claims that the lack of institutional concordance (based 
on the non-existence of common interests) between the conception of local economic 
development sustained by the local government and those sustained by the institutions that 
made up the IDEB-Tigre's political structure (UIA-Tigre, UTN-Tigre, and Central IDEB) 
is the main reason for this failure. Mr Ruidaz explains this problem in the following terms: 
"IDEB-Tigre is established with a provincial budget, to work within a business 
association, with a municipality [Tigre], and with a university [UTN-Tigre]. IDEB-Tigre 
should have been sold, politically speaking, to [Tigre's] Municipality by the business 
associations and the universities, so that in time it demonstrates that an Institute of this 
category, of these characteristics, and interacting with [local] business associations, 
university, and Municipality, can be run with a very small municipal budget. [...] If we 
had been able to sell [IDEB-Tigre's idea] to the Miuiicipality in these five years [...] we 
would have ensured that the money that Buenos Aires Province has cut at the present 
time would be covered by the Municipality!" 
There exists an additional political constraint that hinders inter-institutional networking and 
specifically private/public partnership, namely, the style of leadership and government 
exerted by the local autfiority. Mr Ubieto (as explained fiirther on in Section 8.5) holds 
extraordinary political power and influence within the region, even over those local 
institutions opposed to his personalised style of leadership. As a result, "the priorities of the 
local agenda are always imposed by the Municipality" (Mr Weis, a local MP, argues). What 
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is more, this MP claims: "in Tigre all is already pre-established. The bridge is there, the 
road, the Casino, whether you like or not. These works are going to be done, no matter how 
much they affect the community, the nature." Therefore, there is a widespread perception 
and in some cases a certainty, that nothing works in Tigre i f the local government (and Mr 
Ubieto himself) is not involved in it. Hence, for this research the Tigre's local government 
is not only an important part of the problem for inter-institutional collaboration and local IP 
in the Partido but also a crucial part of the solution. I will return to this point in Section 8.5. 
As shown above, the role of the local government and the Municipal Office of Industrial 
Affairs in building up relations with private and intermediate institutions is absent. There 
are however some small examples of institution building and institutional irmovation of 
consequence to industrial development in the region that are worthy of discussion in 
imagining a potential new IP. 
8.4. Emerging process of institution building 
Against the pattem above, there is a group of local institutions, including private, public 
and intermediate institutions, which have been developing a proactive strategy of 
institutional linking-up in the region. This minority group of institutions, made up by 
IDEB-Tigre, the Municipal Sub-Secretariat of Tourism, UIA-Tigre and UTN-Tigre, display 
an associative strategy in order to promote common interests related to competitive 
performance of firms. This interest is mainly focused on tourism, through the Municipal 
Tourism Sub-Secretariat, and on manufacturing SMEs, through IDEB-, UIA- and UTN-
Tigre. 
8.4.1. Inter-institution collaboration and the local tourism industry 
The Municipal Tourism Sub-Secretariat works closely with the "Chamber of Entrepreneurs 
of Delta" (Delta's Chamber), its main local partner, and is closely linked to IDEB-Tigre. 
Through an informal network established with the Delta's Chamber (which represents all 
local suppliers of tourism services), the Municipal Tourism Sub-Secretariat has succeeded 
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in organising activities aimed at firms (notably training programs and seminars) in areas 
such as place marketing, foreign languages, international cuisine, and other related services. 
Along with IDEB-Tigre, and at times with provincial government, the Tourism Sub-
Secretariat has organised and participated in training programmes for the promotion of the 
tourism industry of Tigre at national and international levels (i.e. through trade fairs). As a 
result the local tourism industry has been able to improve the quantity and quality of its 
supply of services. Critically, it is now able to cope with demands of the growing flux of 
national and (to a lesser degree) intemational tourists that come to Tigre as a consequence 
of the promotion campaigns. Furthermore, the Tourism Sub-Secretariat is actively involved 
in an inter-Partido initiative called the North Metropolitan Region (RMN). Through RMN, 
established in 2001 (a few months before fieldwork was carried out) several public and 
private agencies from four Partidos fi-om the northeast of Buenos Aires City are seeking to 
promote communal interests to the whole region in areas w^ere economies of scale can be 
obtained such as (initially) the tourism industry and environmental policy. So far the only 
concrete action developed is the signing of a joint venture between the four Partidos 
through which a rubbish recycling plant was established. 
How far are these actions helping competitiveness? After years of decline, the process of 
modernisation (through improvements in the quality of product supplied and the setting up 
of new tourism services) along with the public works carried out by the Tigre Municipality 
have given enormous encouragement to the potential of this sector. The Municipal Sub-
Secretary notes that though the local tourism industry represents a small percentage in local 
GDP, it is both growing and begiiming to attract tourists with higher expenditure capacity. 
This Sub-Secretariat, along with the Delta's Chamber, is working on a collective proposal 
in order to overcome inefficiencies that affect the competitiveness of this sector (for 
instance, it is mainly weekends or Sunday tourism and, paradoxically, at the same time 
there is a notorious lack of hotels and B&Bs in Tigre centre v^ diere tourists can remain 
overnight). 
Inter-institutional collaboration seems to be playing a part in strengthening 
competitiveness. The supporting activities mentioned and the high level of firm 
participation in the activities organised are the result of the joint work between the 
Municipal Tourism Sub-Secretariat (public sector), the Delta's Chamber (private sector), 
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the firms themselves, and the Tigre Municipality (the main 'public' sponsor). Secondly, the 
public investments in infrastructure 'linked' with local tourism are the resuh of joint action 
by 'actors of consequence' to this industry (through presentation of concrete and 
consensual projects to be developed) on the local government. One example, the Tourism 
Sub-Secretary claims, is that the tourism industry is not a priority in the Municipality' 
agenda for local economic development. In fact, there is nothing like a local tourism policy 
strictly speaking in Tigre. Again, the level of proactivity of this inter-institution 
collaboration in mobilising the local tourism interest is limited as long as local tourism 
competitiveness seems to require a more active Municipal policy agenda aimed at 
supporting this industry. 
8.4.2. Inter-institution collaboration and the local manufacturing industry 
The 'policy network' that includes IDEB-, UIA- and UTN-Tigre (intermediate, private and 
public institutions respectively) constitutes one of the most interesting examples of 
institution-building in the region from the standpoint of this research. Operating either as a 
formal institutional network (as shown below in IDEB-Tigre's case) or through joint 
actions, these three institutions have succeeded in identifying and materialising common 
interests into a new platform of action supporting local SMEs. 
IDEB-Tigre's establishment without doubt is the most important achievement of this 
experience. It was the result of a strategic alliance between UIPBA (Industrial Union of 
Buenos Aires Province), UIA-Tigre, the Ministry of Production of Buenos Aires Province 
(upon whom the central IDEB depends) and UTN-Tigre. Interestingly, it was the first IDEB 
Institute established in the whole Buenos Aires Province after the IDEB program was set 
up. A battery of real services (including training programs and seminars, technological 
consulting and professional support) has been made available to local firms since IDEB-
Tigre's establishment in areas such as marketing, product quality, international trade and 
business evaluation. Secondly, IDEB-Tigre's institution building process became a key 
issue for understanding improvements in the institutional performance of UIA-, UTN- and 
the IDEB-Tigre Institute itself Through the combination of capabilities with IDEB-Tigre, 
UIA-Tigre gained a presence as a technical support institution to the firms, a profile that 
UIA-Tigre did not previously have. UIA-Tigre can now offer real services to local firms, 
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which in reality are provided by IDEB-Tigre. Through its partnership with UIA-Tigre, 
IDEB-Tigre in tum gained institutional experience, contacts throughout the region, and 
critical political support from the most important business association existing in the 
region. All this permitted IDEB-Tigre to concentrate, as soon as it was established, on the 
provision of services to firms without the need to invest time on seeking political support 
from the local manufecturing industry and its leaders. Political support, which can range 
from a simple acceptance to commitment and direct involvement in the new institution, is 
necessary firstly to gain 'access to' and to 'gather' entrepreneurs and then to be able to 
operate within the region. The lack of political support from local business associations is 
identified as a critical fector of institutional feilure for some local IDEB Institutes across 
the Buenos Aires Province (ECLAC, 2000). 
Finally, UTN has gained a market opportunity for the technical services and training 
programs that the university offers to firms. This has been possible through technical 
consulting services carried out by the university's lecturers and researchers, channelled 
towards the firms through IDEB-UIA-Tigre, and through the use of the university's 
facilities such as scientific and technical laboratories, computer rooms, conference rooms, 
and workshops. Interestingly, UTN has internally iimovated in order to be legally able to 
work with the private sector and intermediate institutions, by establishing a non-profit 
organisation and a Technological Centre as strategic tools to carry out its policy of 
extension towards the regional business community. 
It is important to emphasise that IDEB-Tigre's example of inter-institution collaboration 
neither means that they are absolutely convinced of their partners' capabilities nor that they 
share the same interests and projects. Mr Pitaluga explains UTN-Tigre relations with UIA-
Tigre in the following terms: 
"Well, we were working along with business associations. [But] the business associations 
do not... it is difficult for them, because business associations do not even know what 
they want to do. Actually, the business associations want to provide services to the 
entrepreneurs... but, they do not, do not... they have no authority to pull together 
[firms], nobody believes them, no entrepreneur trusts them." 
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However, they understand that their particular interests are more attainable through 
collaboration. Thus, both institutions (UlA- and UTN-Tigre), mainly through IDEB-Tigre, 
have successfiiUy organised sectoral programs of technological support to firms (for 
instance, the program of quality control for local suppliers of the car industry). They have 
also sought, though without much success, to convince the local govemment about the need 
to generate a more active Municipal action aimed at the local SMEs (for instance, in order 
to both generate market opportunities for the local industry related to the estate building 
industry and to build direct access roads firom the new estates to Tigre's and neighbouring 
localities' commercial areas and city centres). 
How effective has such institution building been in helping competitiveness? It is difficult 
to answer to this question as long as there are no available impact evaluations. My findings, 
concerned with the timber industry, show that these institutions have succeeded only 
partially. As shown in Chapter 7, these three institutions are becoming a more visible 
source of business information for local firms and, as long as their links with firms 
improve, they will be able to begin to respond to the growing need for institutional support 
and acknowledgment (expressed by local firms). The sectoral program jointly organised by 
UIA- and UTN-Tigre aimed at quality improvements of suppliers for the car industry has 
enjoyed a massive participation from local firms, but nothing can be said in term of its 
effectiveness across the car industry's suppliers as a whole. Rather, what these institutions 
confirm are individual stories of success of single firms that have begun processes of 
updating starting fi-om these supporting institutional actions. Furthermore, qualitative 
information provided by these three institutions suggests that their main success at regional 
level is to have stimulated a debate, previously non-existent in the region, regarding the 
SME issue. The IDEB-Tigre Institute indeed arose in the region as a result of the existence 
of minimal political conditions for territorial mobilisation linked with industrial 
development. 
More recently, two collective projects have been established as a result of the proactivity 
and cooperative will of these institutions. First, UIA-Tigre, after a decade of 'distant' 
relations with the Tigre Municipality, achieved the development of a primary link between 
both institutions in order to cooperate for the generation of market opportunities for local 
firms. Through this link (initiated at the end of 2002) the newUIA-Tigre's web site, which 
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incorporates business information referring to local firms (such as products and services 
supplied, prices, address, telephone and e-mail) remains linked to the Tigre Municipality 
web site. Through its technicians the Tigre Municipality, whose official web site receives a 
high number of visitors, will be in charge of creating and updating the firms' web pages. 
Though the impact of these institutional links will perhaps be very small, it constitutes the 
first shared action relating to manufacturing SME interests developed between the two 
main private and public institutions of the Partido. Second, UTN-Tigre, in 2001 initiated an 
agreement of cooperation with three universities (from surrounding localities to Tigre) 
called UNI-Desarrollo (Universities For Development). It aims to put together the technical 
capabilities of the four universities (notably, professionals, knowledge, expertise and 
infiBstructure), as well as of UIA-Tigre, IDEB-Tigre, Provincial Government, in order to 
generate supporting activities to promote what they call a regional "productive cluster". 
The first stage of UNI-Desarrollo aimed to carry out sectoral evaluations and feasibility 
studies of the regional industries of tourism, timber/furniture and the Delta's craft 
production. Although some studies have already been conducted (i.e. suppliers for the 
automobile industry), UTN-Tigre claims that Uni-Desarrollo's main problem is the lack of 
resources to fund supporting actions derived from these studies. They understand that tiie 
lack of support from the Tigre Municipality, on account of raising funding for UNI-
Desarrollo is hindering the project as a whole. Linked to Uni-Desarrollo, IDEB-Tigre 
promoted throughout 2002 the signature of an agreement with CIM-San Fernando in order 
to generate supporting activities aimed at the local timber and furniture firms including 
training programs in design, quality product, and marketing. The first meetings with local 
entrepreneurs to discuss ideas and proposals were held during 2003 and the first IP 
instruments (i.e. training program in quality product) are currently being prepared. 
As shown above, the need to obtain critical mass through joint ventures with partners from 
other localities is becoming an important mode of policy making. To this end, inter-
institutional collaboration seems to be moving towards an idea of region or region building 
(as conceptualised in Chapter 4). In Tigre, it is taking place between institutions of 
neighbouring localities located within Buenos Aires City. In particular, the need to 
overcome obstacles i f not restrictions found in undertaking agreements of inter-institutional 
collaboration with the Tigre local government seenis to be a key reason that explains this 
trend towards^cpllaboration^ 
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Contrary to the centralised style of governing observed at a local level, the Municipality of 
Tigre is also involved in initiatives of regional character.In all cases these process of 
institution building are challenging the rigid political boundaries of localities. 
8.4.3. Local state and institutional change 
In section 8.3,1 argued that the local government does not have a coherent strategy for local 
industrial development. What is more, its 'lack of interest' in local manufecturing SMEs, 
along with its style of goveming, are blocking the emerging processes of institution 
building and territory mobilisation recently observed in the region. However, i f the question 
is whether this is an example of governance failure, this section tries to show that the Tigre 
Municipality has been a key player in looking for good governance. This can be seen as a 
first stage in a process of institutional reform that can help to overcome the endemic 
institutional failures observed in Argentina. In Argentina one of the primary problems of 
economic policy has been 'institutional failure', rather than market failure, evident across 
the state, from the local to the national level, and in the private sector. It is a failure 
associated with factors such as operative inefficiency, bureaucracy, clienteUsm, corruption, 
political instability, short-term policy approaches and lack of long-term projects. Contrary 
to this, what the majority of the local firms and institutions identify in Partido de Tigre and 
the region is a case of institutional efficiency and good governance. Indeed, under Ubieto 
the local government has efficiently conducted the public affairs since he and the ruling 
political party {Frente Vecinalde Tigre) came into power in 1990. Legal and administrative 
reforms throughout the public apparatus became key aspects oriented towards bureaucratic 
efficiency and facilitating investment decisions for large private investors and local SMEs. 
The local govemment has tried to foster a business friendly environment in the Partido. A 
CACIT official, after claiming that the Municipality does not have a specific supporting 
policy to local firms, notes: 
^ The Tigre Municipality along with three other Municipalities (from the northeast cost of Buenos Aires 
City) established in 2001 an agreemoit of cooperation called North Metropolitan Region (RMN). Although 
RMN is not directly linked with manufacturing industry development, it is the first inter-locality agreement 
signed in Argentina (between localities located within a large city) aimed at undertaking non-traditional 
projects such as a recycling plant (estabhshed in 2001), the international promotion of their tourism industry 
(as previously shown) and the policy of local security, which, in the framework of a large city, requires 
coordinated actions between neighbouring localities. 
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"[ . . . ] but the Municipality does facilitate [things] for you. Tigre is very special in this 
sense [...] they [the Municipality] facilitate things because they do not put obstacles in 
your way. Of course they make you abide by the rules in force, but they do not raise any 
objection (when a firm or an institution has a project to develop). They clear a way for 
you, the legal and technical preparations for building up a private estate [is a good 
example]. If you abide by the mles you get your authorisation in logical time, they do not 
try to find faults [on your documents and papers]. They do not want any sort of bribe. 
There is nothing of this [in Tigre] at all. Fortunately, everything here is very clear and 
transparent". 
In tum, Mr Gustavo (a small fiimiture entrepreneur), after criticising the local institutions 
for the lack of support, comes to a similar conclusion: "But Tigre has after all a guy [Mr 
Ubieto, the Major] that... you see, they do not annoy you. As long as you submit your 
documents in due time to the Municipality, everything is going to be fine with them". 
The political stability and continuity of Ubieto's administration is itself recognised as a key 
asset in attracting private investments to the Partido^'. Apart from the investments in gated 
communities already mentioned, private investors have also undertaken large projects such 
as a new casino {Casino de Tigre), a modem fiinfair {Parque de la Costa) and a tourism 
train {Tren de la Costa). All together, the public and private investments, along with 
Tigre's natural beauty, have made Partido de Tigre one of the nicest places in the Buenos 
Aires City. 
How has the govemance of public affeirs by Tigre Municipality strengthened 
competitiveness? First, firms understand that it made a difference when compared to 
Tigre's previous administrations as well as neighbouring Municipalities. Bureaucracy, 
inefficiency and cormption in public affairs' administration constitute large diseconomies 
for firms in terms of the time, energy and money necessary to operate contracts, 
authorisations and legalisations. These diseconomies (also called transaction costs) have, 
without doubt, direct negative effects on firms' competitiveness. With regard to 
investments in infrastmcture, firms recognise that they have been fevoured in two senses. 
First, they now have quick and direct highways from/to their main market, Buenos Aires 
^ Frente Vecinal de Tigre and its leader, Mr Ubieto, have won three consecutive elections with around 70% 
to 80% ofthe total votes in.each municipal election.^—_ _ _ _ 
253 
City. Second, the official initiatives of marketing place (managed by the Municipal 
Tourism Sub-Secretariat), apart from bringing tourists to the region (who are potential 
customers for some local industries) strengthens the sense of place and quality life of Tigre. 
I wil l return to this last point in the following section. 
8.5. Links with the NIP theory 
The NIP literature, in particular institutionalist approaches, asserts that bottom-up 
intermediation becomes positive and fertile when the state (either as a key coordinator or as 
a strategic fecilitator) is involved in the process of institution building supporting local 
industrial development. It also asserts that the different actors that made up the private 
sector of a locality or region (notably, firms, business associations and tiieir leaders) both 
share common interests and display critical levels of political consensus and mobilisation. 
Both public and private sector will thus be able to lay the foundations for a 'bottom-up-led' 
policy of industrial development. 
Contrary to the expectations of the NIP literature, as shown in Section 8.3, the role played 
by the Tigre Municipality as an intermediary is weak, blocking the emerging processes of 
institution building observed in the region concerned with local industrial development (in 
particular those IP actions linked to IDEB-, UIA- and UTN-Tigre). In turn, the private 
sector is a fragmented, i f not fi^ctured, collage of interests and organisations which do not 
seem to share common interests and, as shown already, do not carry out formal or informal 
collective actions. Consequently, the lack of institutional thickness observed in the region 
with respect to the relations between the main local public and private institutions (and 
between them and firms) is unlikely to fecilitate the development of a political network 
capable of promoting territorial mobilisation to establish local industrial development 
policies. 
The question is whether the NIP framework accommodates the specificities of the 
institutional set up in Tigre. I will argue below that the emerging processes of institution 
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building are bringing about learning processes and institutional changes linked to collective 
learning and economies of association in line with the NIP thinking. 
Tigre's local govemment is fer from being a passive actor with respect to local firm 
competitive performance in Tigre, as we have seen. It has successfully sought to create a 
friendly business environment in the Partido. From the IP point of view this means that the 
claim by SMEs of a 'lack of interest' from the Tigre Municipality (reflected in the absence 
of explicit policies targeted at the firms) is disproved by actions and policies that in an 
'indirect' or 'non-explicit' way do have effects on firms' competitive performance. 
The approach of the Tigre Municipality, based on attempting good govemance and 
promotion of public and private investments in infrastructure and services, seems, however, 
closer to the neoliberal approach to economic policy for local development rather than to 
active models of local govemment stressed by the NIP literature (i.e. Emilia-Romagna in 
Italy and Baden-Wurttemberg in Germany). By neoliberal approach I here mean one that 
seeks (apart from an efficient control of public spending) a 'non-interventionist' approach 
of economic policy limited to setting up 'the rules of the game' leaving private enterprise to 
proceed freely. As the Tourism Sub-Secretary in response to the question about what was 
the key issue that made Tigre different than other localities in Buenos Aires City, 
concludes: 
"There is a variable, there is a very simple variable, and let's go straight to the point. 
When the authority respects both the private enterprise and the private sector as engines 
of economy, things change! The Tigre MunicipaUty has things very clear in this sense. 
This is to say, they (the Municipality) obstmct neither new ideas for development nor 
economic growth itself when these (ideas and proposals) are framed within the rules that 
govem this community. And to have [political] continuity and to be sure that what is 
agreed is respected [for the authorities] means a lot for an investor!" 
The question that is important is whether public/private collaboration and territorial 
mobilisation for local industrial development can arise under this neoliberal scheme. The 
research evidence shows that this is unlikely to happen. In fact, it shows that the main 
public sector strategy for economic development does not even consider the local 
manufacturing SMEs. There are 630 manufacturing firms in Tigre; local unemployment 
rates have steadily been growing in the last few years; private investments have not created 
255 
the expected number of new jobs and; finally, an important part of the Partido's inhabited 
area is far way from the Delta coast, where the private and public investments in 
infrastructure and services are concentrated. 
There is much scope for a related policy. A step towards a new IP requires a twofold 
change in the neoliberal conception for local development put forwarded by the Tigre 
Municipality. First, it requires a more active role of the local govemment in setting up 
and/or supporting activities aimed at local firms, by transforming good governance into 
good guidance. The latter consisting of identification of policy targets (i.e. industries of 
tourism, timber and fixmiture, and suppliers for the car industry), analysis and carrying out 
of feasibility studies and, subsequently, design of IP actions. Second, it also requires a more 
active strategy of networking and institution building along with firms and local/regional 
institutions of consequence to industrial development. Through networking the local 
govemment may not only legitimate its more active role in economic policy, but also it 
could be critical for the definition of common interests, partnership and political 
mobilisation around consensual local IP agendas. Networking in Tigre may be fevoured 
since local institutions such as IDEB-, UIA- and UTN-Tigre are already carrying out some 
IP actions, and promoting others, in and beyond the region, on the one hand, and, on the 
other hand, they claim that the Tigre Municipality should be somehow involved in these 
actions. 
Tigre's local govemment has succeeded in developing a local decision-making power 
'from below', gained as a result of its economic success and political consensus and 
legitimacy and, therefore, it is a good example of positive decentralisation with respect to 
the Buenos Aires Province govemment. The presence of local actors with decision-making 
capacity, political power and influence within the territory is a necessary condition for 
policy making in the NIP framework. This is tme despite the fact that in Chapter 71 argued 
that the local institutional set up observed in Tigre (due to the lack of critical mass of 
relations with firms) could hardly fiilfil positive roles as local scaffoldings of a 'top-down-
led' policy of decentralisation concerned with IP issues. Paradoxically, the Tigre's local 
govemment has played an ambivalent role since it does not actually correspond to the kind 
of decentralised state that the NIP framework requires. Rather, the Tigre's local 
govemment has conducted a hierarchical and highly centralised scheme of decision-making 
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and govemment within the Partido. As previously shown, this scheme of govemment is 
blocking any attempts to building up inclusive and more horizontal architectures of 
govemance for the promotion of interests concerned with local industrial development. In 
other words, the under-developed institutional set up observed in the region, as it so far is, 
could hardly give rise to a 'bottom-up-lead' policy that mobilises the region in order to 
promote local industrial development. But again, the power of circumstances obligates us to 
rethink this NIP requirement (in relation to the claim by decentralised states) in light of 
chronic institutional failure observed in Argentina. Could the Tigre's local govemment 
become less hierarchic, less centralised and more politically inclusive in the context of lack 
of cooperation, absence of institutional coordination, sectoral fragmentation and (on top of 
all this) absence of a national state able to fialfil the institutional roles mentioned above? As 
I will argue in the concluding chapter of the thesis, the presence of strong central players 
(like the Tigre Municipality in the Partido of Tigre) can be accommodated in the NIP 
framework i f it is able to understand roles and characteristics that institutional set up, in 
particular local governments, should play and have in a context of weak and/or inefficient 
(national) states. 
There are factors present in the case study associated with 'soft institutionalism' which 
form part of the institutional fabric that underpin competitiveness and which can be part of 
a first step in a new IP approach: i.e. the sense of place and the local entrepreneurial culture 
existing in the region. The sense of place seems to be reflected in the &ct that the local 
actors, particularly those who live in Tigre, stress that they are very proud 'to be from' or 
'to belong to' Tigre, which is identified as 'one of the nicest places' in the whole of Buenos 
Aires City due to both its natural beauty and the public works carried out. In this respect, an 
interesting observation arises from an entrepreneur vAio was asked whether he feels he 
belongs to Tigre: 
"We belong to ... I feel myself being from Tigre. Even more, although I do not live in 
Tigre itself I vote in Tigre because, just as I am criticising the Municipality, I have to say 
that in Tigre many things have been done. And these things have helped me, it has given 
me work, because pubhc works have been done; it has been paved; they [the municipal 
authorities] have given Tigre a very nice look. So I do support Tigre in that sense, in as 
much as I'm giving my vote here, to the Municipality, to Tigre itself. But, I do criticise 
the other part of the story also, since there is not too much consideration in the case of 
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fines [to firms for tax debts] and so on. Which is exactly what should not be done to 
support the industry, right?" (Heman Lopez). 
Consequently, the question for this research is how this sense of place or local identity, 
which has been kept alive despite the fact that Tigre became part of Buenos Aires City (a 
city of thirteen million inhabitants), can become a first step in a new local IP. The prime 
factor is that local actors 'feel' both that they share something in common (though they do 
not know what exactly it is), and that this happens because they are from Tigre only. This 
feeling of 'sharing things in common' can be utilised as an incentive in order to obtain 
commitment for action from local actors, in this case linked to the promotion of supporting 
activities for local industrial development. Critically, it can be achieved by "reinforcing 
local identities and production culture" and through "actions to store the accumulated 
[local] specific knowledge" (Belussi, 1999:741) related to industrial history. For instance, 
financing specific cultural 'deposits' such as museums regarding the craft, timber, and 
tourism industry, in relation to the history of immigrants (apart from the naval and local 
history museums already existing); and promoting the creation and renewal of a 'collective 
memory' (ibid) through seminars, expositions and civic demonstrations linked to the local 
industry. All of which, as Belussi concludes, can contribute to the "creation of specific 
identities, where common mles, loyalties and behaviours can emerge" (ibid:741). 
Interestingly, some of these ideas are beginning to gain consensus in Tigre. IDEB-, UIA-
and UTN-Tigre, along with the participation of the Municipality, successfiilly organised the 
First Entrepreneurial Exposition of Industries and Services of Tigre, v^diich took place at 
UTN-Tigre's facilities during August 2003. The exposition's main aim was to develop 
greater awareness and offer a meeting opportunity between the local and regional (and 
beyond) supply and demand of goods and services. 
The entrepreneurial culture and the industrial atmosphere existing in the region, which 
indeed made up the sense of place discussed above, are also factors that can be part of a 
fnst step in a new IP approach. I argued in Chapters 5 and 6 that some cultural and 
idiosyncratic local traits associated with the political and economic history of Tigre such as, 
notably, the entrepreneurial culture and organisational culture brought by European 
immigrants and formal and informal processes of socialisation (carried out within femilies, 
schools, and neighbouring-based relations) that allov^ed its disserhiriation and reproduction, 
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made Tigre a special case in terms of its social capital. Reinforcing these factors of local 
identity in the local actors (firms and institutions) may, as discussed above, result in a 
strengthened identity and sense of place. As seen through Chapters 6, 7 and 8, however, 
these fectors have not constituted sufficient conditions for establishing a local institutional 
thickness based on communication, interaction, association and political mobilisation 
around shared projects at the level of local firms and institutions. Does this mean that such 
factors do not at all determine the character of relations at local level? It is a difficult matter 
to address. Indeed, one could hypothesise that due to the existence of intangible 'common 
things' shared between actors, the lack of formal relations between them (in terms of 
concrete actions) or the lack of a 'formal' cooperative culture perhaps do not constitute a 
problem. These 'common things' shared between local actors are likely to quickly 
encourage economies of association when common interests emerge, as shown in the cases 
of IDEB-, UIA- and UTN-Tigre. However, they may also hinder networking processes, for 
instance by reinforcing conservative conducts in relation to new ideas and proposals that 
may be seen as different than those already established in Tigre. Certainly, these issues 
cannot by themselves guarantee the establishment of economies of association, but can only 
been taken as a potential asset active in the region which should, therefore, be considered in 
the design and setting up of'tangible' IP actions. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusions: re-conceptualising the New Industrial Policy 
thinking 
9.1. Introduction 
Far from offering an answer to the 're-launching' challenge that the Argentine economy 
faces, the findings of this research can contribute to debates that are beginning to take place 
in Argentina in relation to its fiiture industrial competitiveness. This chapter is divided into 
two sections. Section 9.2 summarises the main research findings while Section 9.3 
discusses, in light of the evidence, the main industrial policy implications and then reflects 
upon the NIP thinking in developing countries. 
9.2. Main research findings 
The findings show that 'basic' or 'passive' external economies are less important for firm 
competitiveness currently than they were in tiie past. At present, basic external economies 
do not even guarantee situations of entrepreneurial 'survival' within industrial 
agglomerations. Learning and innovation are seen as activities of minor relative importance 
for firm competitiveness, particularly in contexts of economic decline. The nature of 
learning and innovation is firm-centred, incremental, unsystematic and generally 
unintended. Innovation activities are reduced to ad-hoc strategies of product differentiation 
through which firms search to compete in market niches in vdiich import competition can 
be avoided. Product differentiation in some cases implies a move towards higher quality 
products. These business strategies are 'reactive' to the changing business environments. 
Competitive capabilities of firms largely depend upon craft skills, intuitiveness, and 
expertise of entrepreneurs. As a whole these characteristics represent not only a weakness 
in the context of open economies, but they also represent a restriction to be able to cope 
with the imperatives of the learning economy. Firms in general do not associate interfirm 
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collaboration with their learning processes. The institutional set up is not seen as an 
interfece for or a &cilitator of learning and innovation activities. Firms operate on the basis 
of high levels of vertical integration despite the emerging need observed to 'open up' the 
firms towards other economic agents in order to obtain complementary assets. An 
extremely individualist business culture and the unstable business setting help to explain 
the low levels of interfirm collaboration observed. Small firms in general travel neither 
physically nor virtually searching for new sources of information and knowledge. They 
learn at 'shorter distances' in comparison with larger firms. Tracking rivals is a positive 
source of learning observed within the cluster. Small firms learn 'by hearing' what the local 
leading firms do, what they do not do and what they give up doing. I have used the term 
'cluster noise' for all informal circulation of information that occurs through informal 
proximity-based social relations which helps firms to reduce their level of uncertainty. 
In contrast, the evidence reveals that some firms learn and innovate through more 
interactive practices in relation to the searching, exploration and generation of new 
knowledge. Learning in this case is planned and cumulative and technological upgrading 
becomes an important element in firm business strategy. These firms innovate in product as 
well as in processes. Learning is based on relationships with 'foreign firms' which operate 
as technological 'gatekeepers' for local firms. This is a 'partner to partner' learning practice 
which is based either on market relations (through joint ventures) or planned training 
activities at national or international levels. Although these firms have developed a clear 
view of the advantages of interfirm collaboration, this practice is positively seen only i f it 
involves links internationally; firms distrust interfirm collaboration in Argentina. 
Individualism and fear of opportunistic conducts are identified as the main constraints to 
associativeness. These firms operate on the basis of more flexible production systems, but 
often without becoming involved in practices of the division of labour among firms. 
Geographical proximity does not matter for firm competitiveness. They rely upon 
'distanced' or 'de-territorialised' forms of learning. 
The evidence reveals that firm-institution relationships are fi^gile and fragmented. Limited 
institutional attention aimed at local SMEs, 'top-down' policy instruments and inadequate 
development of local 'institutional thickness' characterise the nature of firm-institution 
relationships within the region studied. Fjrms dp npt recognisejhe local institutional set up 
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as a strategic fecilitator in promoting their competitive strategies. The nature of firm-
institution relationships observed is nevertheless not neutral regarding IP implications. This 
negatively affects entrepreneurial attitudes towards the few IP instruments operating in the 
region. The national state is elevated as the only agency able to recognise and represent the 
firms. However, the findings show that the institutions have began to change their patterns 
of institutional fiinctioning by opening-up towards interactive learning processes and more 
collective policy decision-making practices. Face-to-face contacts with the firms on the 
basis of an offer of specialised and/or customised technical services and interactivity in 
policy design were identified as key issues in encouraging institutional innovation and 
activating networking. 
My evidence suggests that the lack of institutional density observed regarding the 
relationships between the public and private sector (and between these sectors and the 
firms) is unlikely to facilitate the development of a political network capable of mobilising 
the region to promote local IP initiatives. The private sector constitutes a fragmented, i f not 
fractured, collage of interests and institutions which carry out neither formal nor informal 
collective actions. The role played by the local govenmient as an intermediary has had 
negative affects by blocking some emerging processes of institutional building concerned 
with local firm competitiveness. In contrast, the local government is far from being a 
passive actor with respect to the competitive performance of local firms. Grood governance 
has contributed to the creation of a business friendly environment helping firms to reduce 
transaction costs and uncertainty. However, public/private collaboration is unlikely to 
happen under the neoliberal approach forwarded by the local government Evidence of this 
is that the local government has not taken part in the emerging processes of institutional 
building observed. This is true in spite of the region succeeding in establishing a local 
power for policy decision-making. 
9.3. IP implications and re-conceptualisation of the NIP theory 
What can we conclude from the evidence above is that the NIP theory presents serious 
deficiencies as a valid analytical tool in the context of developing countries. The learning 
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and innovation economy is far from being considered a critical and/or realistic competitive 
strategy by firms, particularly in the context of macroeconomic uncertainty and volatility of 
markets. The power of economies of association, though recognised by some firms, is only 
marginally exploited. Finally, the power of place barely forms part of the concept of 
competitiveness portrayed by firms. However, my research reveals that some elements 
observed in individual cases of successful firms and in institutions undertaking innovative 
processes of change seem to be moving in the direction forwarded by the NIP theory. 
The findings suggest that the improvement of efficiency at the level of the firm, the 
broadening of the relational sources of learning, and the setting up of cluster- and 
geographical proximity-based policies are the three main IP areas that could be tackled to 
boost firm competitiveness in developing countries fi-om a micro-economic standpoint. 
Firstly, there is a prime need for IP instruments that seek to transform 'craft;-based' firms 
into 'industrially-organised' firms. This need is mostly evident in SMEs operating in low-
tech industries. A 'context-sensitive' strategy of provision of real services in areas of 
management (i.e. marketing, cost control, personnel, and post-sell services), technological 
upgrading and training (i.e. in issues such as quality control, plant lay out and stock 
control) could enable the firms to overcome internal inefficiencies and generate the 
business intelligence necessary for activating dynamic leaming. I argue that the firm 
transformation as mentioned above becomes the 'entry point' for policy agendas forwarded 
by the NIP thinking. Therefore, an IP framework inspired by the NIP theory should place 
special emphasis on the conceptualisation of the transformation of the firm. A theoretical 
'adjustment' in this sense implies that an IP framework should assume a higher level of 
sensitivity to the context and circumstances under which leaming takes place. I argue that 
contextual sensitivity in this case also implies the understanding that without access to 
financial supporting by the SMEs the NIP agenda lacks a key ingredient for its realisation. 
This leads us to re-considering the NIP agenda (in which 'real services' play a key role) in 
light of the importance of key IP instmments forwarded by the old IP agenda, namely, 
public financial support to firms. As learnt fi-om the Asian experiences, selectivity in 
resource allocation and strategic guidance by the state could be two key aspects for the 
necessary complementarity of the old and the new IP agendas in the context of developing 
countries. 
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Secondly, there exists a need to 'expose' the firms to new sources of information and 
various types of knowledge (including tacit and codified) in order to accelerate their 
process of accumulating experience. The generation of conditions for 'access' to new 
sources of learning (for instance through direct observation and interchange of practical 
knowledge among peers) becomes the second IP implication. Specifically, the exploration 
and exploitation of 'external' sources of learning (whether through visits to trade feirs and 
leading firms or through the establishing joint ventures internationally) should be a priority 
within a new IP framework. The emphasis on 'distanced' and 'de-territorialised' forms of 
learning should however be understood within the context of a fiindamental need that 
SMEs have for locally-based (and often institutionalised) relationships in order to be able to 
access distanced sources of learning. 
Finally, there exists a need for cluster or (geographical) proximity-based policies aimed at 
the development of ('triggering') economies of association between firms and other 
economic agents. In developing countries networking often develops as a result of planned 
IP actions and rarely as a spontaneous conduct of firms. Projects of collective action 
especially in policy areas in v/hich economies of scale are relevant (such as the provision of 
real services, specialised information, training programmes and travel to international trade 
fairs) could become the starting point for collective learning. The evidence suggests that 
dialogue-oriented strategies, inclusiveness and effective participation helps to build up trust 
between economic agents so that the strong cultural barriers existing towards association 
and collective action can be overcome in developing countries. 
However, a new IP framework should also pay special attention to evaluating what is the 
minimal threshold of critical mass 'necessary' (in terms of number of firms, institutions, 
resources and capabilities) before arriving at a conclusion on IP in localities or regions. 
Without a critical mass of firms it is likely that IP will not achieve the scale economies 
necessary for their operability and cost-eflfectiveness. A critical mass could be gained 
through the development of firm networks (i.e. through supply chains) beyond localities 
regionally, nationally or internationally. In which case 'relational' proximity, rather than 
geographical proximity (with its history and features of cultural identity), is what really 
matters for policy design. Furthermore, a new IP framework should carefully ex-ante 
evaluate socio-political, cultural and histojical features to be fully informed of 
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local/regional path dependencies. Although these features, as seen, do not determine path 
dependencies that are impossible to 'alter' by an IP framework. 
Therefore, a more realistic IP framework for developing countries could move in line with 
the factors discussed below. Let me start my final reflections by addressing two key issues 
concerning the microeconomic aspects of an IP. Then I will address the meso- and macro-
economic factors that need to be reconsidered. Firstly, the priority of'distanced' rather than 
'localised' forms of learning and innovation is one of the recent claims in economic 
geography in contrast to the emphasis placed on the powers of geographical proximity as a 
key source of learning (see Amin and Cohendet, 1999, 2002; Blanc and Sierra, 1999; 
Oinas, 2000). This is slowly changing, Amin and Cohendet argue, "as evidence comes to be 
offered of innovation and learning based in distant networks and communities linked 
through cultural ties, travel, and sophisticated commimications, in the travel of ideas and 
knowledge, in the links of localized clusters with sites many thousands of miles away" 
(2002:143). Though the emphasis of this claim is placed on 'corporate learning' rather than 
learning in small firms in developing countries, the IP implications toward the promotion of 
learning practices based on a distant network of relationships is critical for smaller firms to 
be able to adapt to and to anticipate future business settings. As Oinas argues "the creation 
and maintenance of non-local connections ... play a significant role in sustaining 
competitiveness. Such relationships allow centrally for the incorporation of new ideas into 
place-specific processes of technological learning" (2000:57-58). For geographically 
isolated small firms, distanced business relationships are even more critical since they 
perhaps are the only type of business relation to which these firms can access. The claim 
regarding the need for distanced learning strategies is particularly critical in developing 
economies (like Argentina) exposed to increasing international competition. In these 
countries economic decline has devalued the importance of the learning and knowledge 
economy, while simultaneously these countries are being severely affected by international 
competition where the learning and knowledge economy has helped to change the sources 
of firms' competitiveness. Avoiding enlarging the gap in relation to the more developed 
economies should be a prime IP concem in developing countries particularly with respect 
to those sectors considered as key for economic development. 
265 
The challenge to a new IP fi-amework in this sense is immense. Small firms lack financial 
resources and time to carry out 'physical' travel (i.e. to trade fairs or to visit firms and 
centres of expertise internationally). The Internet for instance is identified as a key tool for 
developing distanced links and 'virtual' business travel. However, small firms seldom use 
the Intemet as a source of business information or as a tool for e-commerce. In accordance 
with Malmberg (2002), establishing relationships at a distance requires tangible and non-
tangible resources that small firms generally do not have (i.e. money and specialised 
external support; and time, energy, and training, respectively). IP at a regional level could 
become a crucial instrument by acting upon these constraints, for instance through the 
promotion of training programmes and collective use of ICTs. More generally, an IP 
framework could contribute to the transformation of a cluster, particularly where they are 
'dormant', by organising trade feirs where local firms can participate (Schmitz and 
Humphrey, 1996). Trade feirs "can have a catalytic effect [since they provide] a clear 
indication of what customers want and how rival enterprises are meeting the customers' 
needs. Once some producers respond to these needs and receive new orders, those who do 
not will try harder" (ibid: 1867). The region or locality could thus transform themselves in 
platforms for distanced leaming. 
Secondly, as regards the development of economies of association through proximity-based 
policies, I agree with those scholars that emphasise the need to assume a dynamic approach 
in cluster studies in developing countries by moving 'from models', based, in effect, on 
stylised ideal types of European industrial clusters, 'to trajectories' (Humphrey, 1995; 
Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999). This means understanding the processes that lead to success or 
failure of a cluster, in a specific context and under determined circumstances, rather than 
assuming 'the Italian way' of doing things as 'the model' to be followed and therefore the 
horizon for SME policy. The strategies to overcome the deficiencies of clusters in Latin 
America have to differ depending upon the type of cluster. It is at this point that 
understanding 'trajectories' matters since, by distinguishing between 'incipient and more 
advanced stages of industrialization' of clusters will determine v^iiich kind of IP is more 
suitable for which kind of cluster (Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999:1507). Three 'ideal types' of 
clusters have been identified in Latin America: first, survival clusters of micro and small-
scale enterprises; second, more advanced clusters of differentiated mass producers; and 
third, clusteni of transnational corporations and cg-located suppliers (Altenburg and Meyer: 
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Stamer, 1999). Tigre's furniture cluster portrays diverse characteristics in common with the 
'survival clusters' singled out by this typology^*. Although, differences have also been 
found with respect to the 'survival clusters' and cases of single firms that come closer to 
more developed types of clusters. Without doubt fiiture research requires comparative 
analysis between clusters with different evolving trajectories. 
As regards meso-economic factors, a prime question arises relating to wiiether 
decentralisation or, more specifically, 'decentralised IP' is possible in developing countries. 
The research shows that minimal conditions in terms of institutional capabilities are not yet 
given for such a policy in cases like Tigre. The question should then be whether the NIP 
theory is capable of dealing adequately with cases where there are weak relationships 
between firms and local institutions and (as a result of the latter) between firms and the 
national state. I have already highlighted the importance that emerging fectors of 
institutional irmovation observed in Tigre have for policy design and decision-making. 
What I am going to argue now is the importance that 'good governance' and 'strong local 
actors', capable to act as mechanisms of co-ordination, have for a new IP framework within 
contexts in which institutional failure (caused by bureaucratic inefficiency, corruption 
and/or institutional sclerosis) is a common fector throughout the state apparatus. While 
good governance with more proactive IP approaches (as observed in the Italian Industrial 
Districts or in Rafeela in Argentina) is a 'gold standard' in boosting competitiveness, this 
research reveals that actions of good govemance in more general public affairs also matter. 
A simple, efficient, transparent and stable public legislation; a business friendly 
environment; and political stability are key aspects for achieving good govemance and 
institutional continuity. Whether this 'first stage' in a process of institutional innovation d 
la Tigre can result in the setting up of active IP and collaborative strategies of economic 
^ Survival clusters of micro and small-scale enterprises have the following characteristics: Production of low-
quality consumer goods for local markets in activities with low barriers to entry, such as the production of 
garments, furniture, and shoes. Firms in these clusters often display characteristics of the informal sector, such 
as low levels of productivity and wages. Though they are often labour-intensive, providing a significant 
contribution to employment and income generation. Handicraft skills are a key asset of firms in this type of 
cluster. Most of these firms do not master modem management techniques and new technologies. The degree 
of interfirm specialisation and collaboration is maricedly low. Furthermore, they entail some positive 
extemaUties, such as information spillovers, ayailability of semi-skilled labour force, easy access to raw 
materials and machinery, and low search costs for customers. Positive externalities reduce the barriers to entry 
for new firms, thus favouring entrepreneurship. However, trade liberalisation in L A is today jeopardising the 
survival of many firms and perhaps entire clusters of this type, which is especially true for tradable goods that 
are highly price-serisitive t6"impoft competition (Altaibiifg^d M^ef-Stmief, 1999:1695-1697). 
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governance is a different question to which I have answered 'not necessarily'. However, it 
constitutes a sine qua non condition to gaining the legitimacy and political consensus 
necessary for promoting processes of institutional building concerning local or regional IP 
initiatives. 
A new IP framework inspired by the NIP theory should also be able cope with structural 
restrictions to programmes of decentralised IP arising from 'the national sphere' associated 
with IP decision-making issues (notably, business associations and public agencies). The 
predominant view portrayed by the institutions interviewed regarding both territory (as a 
factor in economic policy) and the case for decentralised IP schemes is rather sceptical. The 
national institutions claimed that solving 'the macroeconomic problem' should be the main 
goal for Argentine industrial competitiveness. Specifically, policy makers from national 
public agencies (notably, the Ministry of Economy) argued that policies targeted at firms 
whetiier by size (SME policy) or location (regional policy) would not be necessary under 
the context of a 'normal' or 'healthy' macroeconomy. Private institutions (linked with 
SMEs and with the furniture industry) instead claimed that 'to recreate the domestic 
market' should be the main goal. Although the majority of national institutions recognised 
the increasing importance of regional policies at an international level and notably in 
neighbouring countries like Brazil and Chile, they stressed the following problems. Firstly, 
they pointed out that this is a 'relatively new' debate in Argentina and nothing has been 
done in relation to this. Secondly, they anticipated problems of implementation and 
coordination associated with potential regional IPs (i.e. inter-regional conflicts arising as a 
resuh of the re-location of firms following better incentives to invest). Thirdly, they 
mentioned the lack of a critical mass of firms in most of the Argentine LFRs; and, finally, 
the fact that regional IPs are likely to fail i f a strong support from the national state is not 
guaranteed. 
The factors outlined above reflect a lack of interest, i f not a discredit to regional policies 
which makes it difficult to pave minimal conditions for decentralisation from 'the national 
perspective'. The case of Rafaela in the Province of Santa Fe has however shown that good 
local performance is likely to influence policy decision-making spheres at a regional level. 
Hence, I argue that 'successfiil' local or regional strategies of economic development can 
play a role in reformulating embedded IP conceptions portrayed by national public and 
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private institutions, which, at the present moment, lack defined strategies for industrial 
development. 
As regards the macro-economic issue, the main question which arose refers to the relevance 
of the IP agenda forwarded by the NIP thinking in developing countries, which are often 
affected by chronic macro-economic instability. The original works of the flexible 
specialisation school (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Sabel and Zeitlin, 1985) forwarded 'flexible 
specialisation' and 'vertical disintegration' (for manufacturing industries with divisible 
processes of production) as the best way to face macroeconomic instability and variability 
of aggregate demand (in reference to the 1970s' crises). In particular, it was argued that in 
developing countries (notably, Latin America) the presence of modalities of production 
organisation similar to those existing in industrialised countries before the mass production 
generalisation, may become a good starting platform to gain niche markets in an 
international trade characterised by the growing demand for non standardised products 
(Sabel, 1986). Certainly, these predictions were not (and are still not) observed in Latin 
America. What is more prevalent today in countries like Argentina is the production of 
commodities (based on the intensive use of natural resources) produced by capital-intensive 
industries through continuous processes of production, which, by definition, are less 
'dense' in number of contracts (Donato, 1996). By contrast, goods produced by industries 
that operate through divisible production processes, based on a 'high contractual density', 
show a poorer competitive performance. According to Donato (ibid), the long periods of 
institutional and macroeconomic instability observed in Argentina made uncertainty and, 
therefore, the transactional costs of these industries, increase. This resulted in the reduced 
competitiveness of the manufecturing industry and increases in the levels of vertical 
integration of firms (obstructing potential economies of association and increasing 
collective efficiency). These finding are supported by recent comparative research on 
clusters in Latin America which conclude that: "Macroeconomic instability contributed to 
stimulating vertical integration through high uncertainty and transaction costs, and it in turn 
created a low-trust environment" (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer, 1999:1700). 
The interest of the NIP thinking on macroeconomic issues (following the 1970s crisis) 
seems to have declined after the works mentioned above. The paradigm of globalisation 
eclipsed the discussions on Post-Fordism and most of the NIP literature in developed 
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countries began 'to take for granted' macroeconomic stability and, consequently, to focus 
more on micro- and meso-economic issues. This 'turn' towards micro- and meso-economic 
issues has provided insightfiil and stimulating conceptual developments (which are 
discussed in this thesis). However, this happened at the moment when the NIP ideas were 
beginning to permeate developing countries, but under circumstances where in these 
countries (notably, in Argentina) the macroeconomic issue continued, and still continues, to 
be at the centre of the debate on economic policy. 
"Always, every two or three years something happens to the Argentine economy that stops 
you!" was a common expression received in fieldwork, which illustrates well the 'short-
term' business horizons affecting economic activity in general, and firm strategies in 
particular. Instability generates an additional problem for IP instruments concerned with the 
improvement of efficiency 'within' the firm since the main restrictions affecting 
competitiveness identified by the firms and business associations are 'exogenous' to the 
firms (notably, of a macroeconomic nature).'^ This is not to suggest that the macroeconomy 
issue is all that an IP framework should be about in developing countries. The East Asian 
experiences of industrial development have shown us that the strategic complementarity 
between the macroeconomy and IP (in stiict sense) became a key factor of success. 
Specifically, the successful individual performances identified by my research (which 
developed under the context of the instability described) allow me to question the argument 
of whether the macroeconomy is the only IP framework required (or possible) to boost 
competitiveness. What we can conclude is that a new IP framework adapted to developing 
economies needs to generate theoretical alternatives to fece situations of macroeconomic 
instability and, simultaneously, to conceive more flexible and rapidly adaptable IP 
instruments, which may be designed for specific purposes. 
^ Fundes-UNGS Rq)ort (1999) corroborates these finding by concluding that 'external restrictions' 
including: access to &iancing (-77%); cost of the privatised, utilities (54%); juridical insecurity (48%); and 
lack^ ofjregulation to control importations (48%), were the main problems hindering coiiipetitiveness 
identified by a sample of 600~SMEs at"a national level. " — 
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Appendix 1 
Methodology 
Three units of analysis are studied in this research. This includes: 1) A sample of small- and 
medium-sized manufacturing firms. As explained in Chapter 5, most of the sampled firms 
are located within an industrial cluster; 2) the institutional set up of the region to be studied; 
3) a sample of provincial and national institutions concerned with industrial development 
issues. Points 1 and 2 relate directly to the case study (Tigre's region), while point 3 refers 
to more general issues relating the Argentine industrial economy, sectoral issues and 
industrial policy. Both SMEs and the different sampled institutions are here considered as 
'economic agents' however the firm, whether individually or collectively, is the focal 
economic agent for the research. The selection of multiple units of analysis relates to the 
systemic research approach proposed. 
1. The sample of firms: 
Two main criteria were followed for selecting the firms, the size of the firms, measured by 
number of employees (5 to 100 employees), and their location. Namely, that the workshops 
were situated in the urban/central parts of the Partidos of Tigre and San Femando or within 
the urban 'limits' of the wooden cluster studied (see map 5.1 in Chapter 5). Two 
assumptions supported the criterion of location. The first one is that 'geographical' 
proximity facilitates (or may facilitate) the interaction and development of associative 
capacities between co-located firms. The second one is that the institutional action in 
relation to the local manufacturing firms is (or should be) more 'visible' within those areas 
where the firms are mostly located. No additional data to classify firms was available (i.e. 
output). 
Unfortunately, I was not able to conduct a randomised process of sampling due to the lack 
of official information relating the total number and the characteristics of the furniture 
firms located in the region. Hence, the rationale for selecting the final sample followed 
different procedures, wiiich are explained below. My aim was to gain access to at least 
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twenty firms, that is, approximately 10 percent of the total number of wood fiimiture firms 
located in the region according to rough estimations by DDEB-Tigre and CIM-San 
Fernando. 
• I firstly contacted telephonically all the wood fiimiture firms recorded in the database 
compiled by IDEB-Tigre (20 in total), which were located within the focus area. As 
explained in Chapter 5, this database was the only aggregated information on 
manufacturing firms available in Tigre and was compiled starting from the registration 
of the entrepreneurs in one seminar delivered by E)EB-Tigre in 2000. Six interviews 
were attained using this database (30 percent of the firms registered in the database). 
Apart from the fact that some telephone numbers were outdated, the critical economic 
and financial situation which the firms were going through at the time of the fieldwork 
was the main cause for refiising to be interviewed (in fact, some firms were in the 
process of closing down). 
• Secondly, through one of the entrepreneurs interviewed (whose firm is located in one of 
the most densely populated areas of fiimiture firms of the cluster) I was able to gain 
access to three additional furniture firms that were subsequently surveyed. The same 
entrepreneur introduced me to some suppliers of wood and other raw materials and 
invited me, along with IDEB-Tigre manager, to attend an informal lunch together with 
a group of local furniture entrepreneurs. 
• Thirdly, six entrepreneurs were contacted and surveyed follovmg the interviews 
conducted with the authorities of both the Industrial Timber Centre (CIM) of San 
Fernando (5 firms) and IDEB-Tigre (1 firm). 
• Fourthly, three firms were contacted through personal approaches following some 
informal visits that I carried out to different points of the locality. 
• Finally, the two firms from the control group (see below) were approached through 
institutional contacts via the University of General Sarmiento and the ministerial 
Nacional Secretariat of Industry respectively. 
A total of twenty-one firms made up the panel of SMEs interviewed. The panel can be 
divided into three groups: a) thirteen local firms, in which entrepreneurs have no political 
involvement in business associations; b) six local firms, in which entrepreneurs actively 
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participate in business associations (i.e. CIM and UIA-Tigre); and c) a control group of two 
'successfiil' firms which are located in Greater Buenos Aires but outside the focus area. 
Further sectoral information was drawn from a group of twenty wood fumiture 
manufacturers fi^om the northwest part of Greater Buenos Aires. They were informally 
interviewed at a workshop organised by the National University of General Sarmiento in 
June 2001 in which I participated, on the basis of ten questions relating problems of 
competitiveness that the firms feced. 
2. The local institutional set up: 
The selection process for local institutions was as follows. Firstly, I mapped all the 
institutions operating in Tigre that were cormected with the local SMEs or that were in 
somehow 'relevant' to their competitive performance, either directly (i.e. through policy 
initiatives) or indirectly (i.e. having a role to play in the establishment of the local business 
atmosphere). A sectoral criterion relating the wood fiimiture industry was utilised as 
rationale for selecting the Industrial Timber Centre (CM) of San Femando and the Centre 
for Technological Innovation to the Wood Industry (CITEMA-INTI). The latter is located 
outside, although close to the focus area studied. 
Conversations with key informants, Internet searches and analysis of local newspapers were 
the main sources of information utilised to map the local institutions. Drawing upon 
previous research conducted by the author, the institutional map was divided into a) 'public 
governmental'; b) 'intermediate'; c) 'private'; and d) 'techno-educational' institutions. 
Once identified and selected, the sampled institutions were contacted either through the 
IDEB-Tigre's network or personally, via phone calls and/or emails and letters on behalf of 
the Economic Commission For Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), United 
Nations. The instihitional backing given by IDEB-/UIA-Tigre and ECLAC-UN became a 
critical factor of'access' to conduct fieldwork. 
Ten of the twelve institutions selected accepted being surveyed, they comprised the 
following: a) four pubUc govemmental; b) one intermediate; c) three private; and d) four 
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techno-educational. Overall, they represent the total number of institutions concerned with 
the local manufacturing SMEs. 
Table 1. The local institutional set up 
Sector Institutions 
a. Public governmental 1. Municipality of Tigre* 
institutions: 2. Municipal Sub-secretariat of Tourism & Sub-secrrtariat of Culture 
3. Municipal Office of Industrial Affairs* 
4. Radical Civic Union bloc in the Local Assembly (opposition bloc) 
b. IntaTnediate Institutions: 5. Bonaerense Institute of Entrepreneurial Development of Tigre (IDEB-Tigre) 
(public, private and self-funding 
budget) 
c. Private institutions: 6. Industrial Union of Tigre (XJIA-Tigre) 
(Business associations) 7. Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Tigre (CACIT) 
8. Industrial Timber Centre (CIM), Partido de San Fernando 
d. Techno-Educational 9. Technical School N°5 of Tigre (ETN5) 
institutions: 10. National Technological University of Tigre (UTN-Tigre) 
(local and national public 11. National Institute of Agrarian Technology, Tigre OfSce (INTA-Tigre) 
budget) 12. Centre for Technological Innovation to the Wood Industry (CITEMA-INTI) of 
the National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI), Partido de Huriingham 
* Institutions that rejected being interviewed 
It is important to emphasise that a small group of institutions considered as critical for 
business activity such as banks were not selected. Indeed, I deemed it inappropriate to 
include banks in this study on tiie basis that they have no 'local' loan policies specifically 
targeted at the local SMEs. In Argentina most of the local branches of national (and 
provincial) banks only operate as channels of transmission of top-down policy instruments 
and decision making, centralised at the headquarters located in the 'the city', in Buenos 
Aires cenfre. It widely differs firom those cases of local banks highlighted by the NIP 
literature which are proactive in supporting the business strategies of local firms through 
customised policy instruments. Likewise, regional banks practically vanished alongside the 
concentration process of the financial and bank system that occurred in Argentina 
throughout the 1990s. 
Finally, as can be noticed in Table 1 above, the Municipality of Tigre (the local 
government) and the Municipal Office of Industrial Affairs (the public agency in charge of 
locail industrial policy issues) refused to become part of this study despite several attempts 
298 
to make contact. The reasons why they refused to be interviewed and the possible 
implications of this for the research findings and conclusions are discussed below. As for 
the local government, from the very beginning some key informants informed me that 
Tigre's Mayor and his irmer circle were not easily contactable, especially in relation to 
'minor' issues which 'they were not interested in'. The local SMEs and the (potential) local 
IP agenda fit in with this category (see in Chapter 8). In feet, I never received any response 
to the several letters I sent to Tigre's Municipality requiring an audience. On occasion, an 
administrative secretary notified me that the Mayor and his entire inner circle were 
extremely busy campaigning for the coming local elections (due two months after the 
fieldwork). 
The case of the Municipal Office of Industrial Affairs turned out to be particularly 
revealing with respect to the 'absent' role played by the local state on issues of local IP. In 
theory, the purpose of this Office is, precisely, to support the local economic and industrial 
activity in particular those associated with the SMEs. As discussed in chapters 7 and 8, both 
local firms and institutions agreed in pointing out that the Oflfice of Industrial Affairs plays 
a rather 'decorative' role on issues of local IP. A key informant suggested that the Office's 
own inactivity was the reason for refusing to be interviewed. The feet that I approached this 
Office on behalf of IDEB-Tigre could have generated a negative effect on the municipal 
Secretary's willingness to accept the interview as he has openly been criticised by IDEB-
Tigre (between other local stakeholders) for the Office's ineffectiveness. 
The local state is considered as the key actor on issues of local IP. Admittedly, the fact that 
both Tigre's Municipality and the Office of Industrial Affairs refused to be interviewed had 
important implications for the research findings and conclusions. Certainly, to an extent it 
could have biased the reading I made on the evidence found in Tigre, i.e. in relation to the 
role that the local state plays in relation to the 'local IP agenda' vis a vis that played by the 
private and intermediate sectors. Most importantly, I consider that this issue exposed a key 
research fmding in its own right as it helped me to realise why the rich and well-endowed 
institutional set up existing in the region does not work as the one in Rafaela for instance 
does. Indeed, an effective public and private partnership supporting local SMEs and 
industrial development issues has not been developed in Tigre because a key partner, the 
local state, is not interested in doing so. Primary information drawn upon from other public 
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agencies that did accept being interviewed (namely, the Municipal Sub-secretariat of 
Tourism & Sub-secretariat of Culture) helped me to confirm this hypothesis from the very 
perspective of the ruling political party (see chapter 8). Finally, I consider that the primary 
evidence collected from the wide range of individuals and officials in local institutions 
interviewed gave me a fairly complete picture of Tigre's local development agenda 
promoted by the local authorities. 
3. The national and provincial institutions: 
Thirteen institutions were selected whilst ten of them were effectively surveyed (mounting 
to 15 interviews in total). They were divided into two groups depending upon both the 
sphere, and within this the sector, to which each institution belongs to, as follows: a) 
national institutions, divided into public, private and sectoral-private institutions; and b) 
provincial institutions, divided into public and private institutions. It is important to 
remember that the national private institutions represent agents mostly concerned with the 
SMEs. Likewise, IDEB, at a provincial level, is an institution founded by the Provincial 
government and therefore it is a public institution. 
Table 2. National and provincial institutions 
Sphere Sector Institution 
Public: 
1. National Secretariat of Industry and trade (cuirent National Director and Ex 
National Sub-Director of Industry) 
2. National Secretariat of the Smail and Medium enterprises (ex-Secretary) 
3. Guarantee Fund of Buenos Aires (FOG ABA)* 
a. National: Private: 
4. Argentinean Industrial Union (UIA) (SME Obsa-vatory) 
5. Economic General Confederation (CGE) 
6. General Confederation of Industry (CGI) 
7. Association of Small and Medium Entrepreneurs (APYME) 
Sectoral-
private: 
8. Argentinean Federation of the Timba- Industry (FAIMA) 
9. Chamber of Furniture, Ts^jestry and related pijducts makers (CAFYDMA) 
10. Chamber of Timber entrepreneurs and related products (CEMA) 
b. Provincial: 
Public: 11. Ministry of Production of the Buenos Aires Province (PBA)* 
12. Bonaerense Institute of Entrep-eneurial Development (IDEB-Central)* 
Private: 13. Centre of Bonaerense Studies (CEB) 
* Institutions not interviewed 
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Both provincial and national institutions were contacted on behalf of the Buenos Aires 
Office of ECLAC-UN. This key institutional support was provided by ECLAC-UN, 
without vs^ich it would have been very difficult to approach these institutions, relies on the 
fact that I have worked (as an external consultant) for ECLAC in different projects and due 
to which I maintain close personal contacts with senior members of the staff. 
Finally, six key informants were interviewed in-depth, including experts in industry and 
local development from ECLAC-UN (2 interviewees); UNGS (2); UIA (1); and one ex-
DDEB (1) manager, who informed me of IDEB's internal issues and performance. IDEB-
Tigre's manager played a two-fold role, primarily as a key informant and then as part of the 
sample of institutions. 
Table 3. Summary of interviews by groups of interviewees 
Economic Agents Number Interviews 
1. Firms 21 21 
2. Local institutions 10 10 
3. Provincial institutions 1 1 
4. National institutions 9 11 
3. Experts and key informants 6 6 
Total 47 49 
4. Research approach and data collecting: 
A qualitative research approach has been chosen due to the evolutionary character and 
qualitative nature of the variables that this study attempt to grasp, understand and evaluate. 
Two different but comparable semi-structured questionnaires were utilised to conduct the 
interviews on firms and local institutions respectively. In-depth interviews were guided by 
a set of general themes and utilised to interview provincial and national institutions, key 
informants and experts. All interviews (49 in total) were conducted personally on the basis 
of face-to-face conversations. Likewise, in order to facilitate the interpretation and analysis 
of individual narratives and subjectivities, the interviews were recorded (equivalent, to 
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1,600 minutes recording). For reasons of confidentiality, however, six interviewees did not 
allow this. 
In order to design context- and individually-sensitive questionnaires, I discussed the themes 
to be tackled in the interviews as a sort of pilot test with both experts in the fiarniture 
industry and key informant cormoisseurs of the local institutional and political dynamic. In 
this process, varied sets of secondary sources of information were utilised, including: 
participation in workshops and seminars and reading of specialised publications, 
institutional bulletins and web pages, and newspapers. All of which was crucial to avoid 
'offending' individual and institutional sensibilities within the critical socio-political and 
economic context of the country at that moment (as explained below). 
5. Fieldwork and interviewing: 
The fieldwork was carried out between April and October 2001. In particular, the 
interviews with local firms mostly were conducted between August and October 2001. It is 
important to emphasise here that this was just a few montiis before the collapse of the 
Convertibility and a move into one of the worst moment of the four-year economic 
recession (1998-2002). Indeed, the 'timing' of the interviewing process affected the 
availability of entrepreneurs to participate in interviews. Some firms contacted were closing 
down or thinking of doing so at the time of fieldwork. But mostly, the 'timing' clearly 
biased the responses of entrepreneurs and institutions to questions posed in relation to 
medium- and long-term settings. Firms in fact were extremely pessimistic as regards issues 
such as training, development of irmovative capacities, technological upgrading and 
cooperation. It was reflected in several comments received which remarked on the survey's 
timing, as follows: 'If you would had have come in another moment I would had have told 
you something different But one has to be realistic. I don't even know what is going to 
happen in the country tomorrow. So... you cannot take risks at this moment'. 
302 
Appendix 2 
Photographs 
1. Tigre's Railway Station and Ferry Port 
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2. Tigre's Delta Islands and Timber Production 
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3. Tigre's Tourist Attractions 
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